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
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The PASSAGE of HANNIBAL over the ALPS.
Published Dec. 23^d 1740. by J. P. Knapton.

T H E
ROMAN HISTORY

FROM THE
FOUNDATION of ROME
TO THE
BATTLE of ACTIUM:

THAT IS,
To the END of the COMMONWEALTH.

By Mr. R O L L I N,

*Late Principal of the University of Paris, Professor of Eloquence in the
Royal College, and Fellow of the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and
Belles-Lettres.*

Translated from the FRENCH.

V O L. III.

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A. R. 457.
Ant. C.
295.

Q. FABIVS, V.
P. DECIVS, IV.

Liv. l. 10. C. 21, 22. **A**PPIUS, who had remained in Hetruria, wrote letters after letters to advise Rome of the danger, with which it was menaced. He said, that four armies had united their forces: the Hetrurians, the Samnites, the Umbrians, and the Gauls: that they had divided their forces into two camps, because one could not contain so great a number of troops. This news caused the Consul Volumnius to be recalled to Rome, to preside at the election of new magistrates. Before he took the suffrages of the Centuries, he assembled the People, and expatiated much upon the importance of the war in question. He represented, “ that from the time he had been in Hetruria with his colleague, one general and one army did not suffice for sustaining the war. That it was said the Umbrians, and great succours from the Gauls, had joined the former enemy. That they should remember, in giving their suffrages, that they were choosing Consuls, to oppose four powerful People. That if he did not assure himself, that the Roman people would choose the person Consul, who was indisputably the greatest

greatest of all their generals, he should declare him Dictator directly." A. R. 457.
Ant. C.
295.

It was perfectly understood, that he meant Q. Fabius. In consequence the suffrages all declared for him, and the People intended to give him L. Voluminius for a colleague. I desire the reader to observe the perpetual attention of the Roman people, and of their chiefs, to confer the command of their armies upon persons of merit universally known, especially in times of difficulty and danger. This is one of the causes, which contributed most to aggrandize the Roman empire. Fabius excused himself, as he had done the two preceding years, but as ineffectually. He therefore confined himself to demanding Decius again for a colleague, and represented, "that it would be a great support and relief to his advanced age. That he had found by experience, during their being Censors, and their two Consulships together, how much the union between colleagues conduces to the service of the public. That an old man habituates himself with difficulty to a new companion in authority; whereas he is much more easy and open with one, to whose manners and humour he is accustomed." The Consul, far from taking offence at this kind of exclusion by Fabius, came in with joy to so just a demand, giving Decius the praises he deserved, and insisting strongly upon the great advantages in military government, that resulted from the good understanding of the Consuls, and the infinite evils, that attended their dissension, of which he was very near making a sad experience in the disputes that had passed between him and his colleague; and he exhorted Decius and Fabius to live in perfect union with each other. He added, "that there * were men born for war, and capable of the greatest actions, but not

* *Esse præterea viros natos militiæ, factis magnos, ad verborum linguæque certamina rudes: ea ingenia Consularia esse. Callidos solertesque juris atque eloquentiæ consultos, qualis Ap. Claudius esset, urbi ac foro præsides habendos, prætores que ad reddenda jura creandos esse.* Liv.

A. R. 457.
Ant. C.
295.

happy at wordy controversies and disputes : that those were the characters formed by nature for the Consulship. That there were others penetrating, hard to deceive, versed in the laws, and eloquent, as Appius Claudius was, and that they were the proper persons to preside in the city, on the Tribunals in the assemblies of the Forum, and be elected Prætors for the administration of justice." The day passed in these preliminaries and preparations. The next morning came on the election both of Consuls and Prætors, and was made conformably to the advice of Volumnius. Q. Fabius and P. Decius were elected Consuls, and Ap. Claudius Prætor; all absent, the two first from the field of Mars, and the latter from the city. The Senate and People continued Volumnius in command for a year longer.

Liv. l. 10.
c. 23.

Many prodigies happened this year. To avert their effects, solemn processions were decreed and made. In that to the temple of Patrician Chastity, there happened a dispute between the Roman ladies, which made abundance of noise. They denied Virginia's entrance into it, because being of a Patrician family, she had married Volumnius, who was a Plebeian. She complained highly of that affront, which she did not deserve, because she had a right as well as the rest to enter that chapel, being a Patrician, of exemplary chastity, and having never been married but once, and that to a person, whose dignities and great actions reflected the highest honour and glory upon her. She did not confine herself to barren complaints. She fitted up a chapel in her own habitation, separate from all the rest of the building, and placed an altar in it. Then having assembled the Plebeian ladies. * "I consecrate this altar," said she, "to Plebeian Chastity; and my view is, that no less emulation, than prevails amongst the men of this

* Hanc ego aram, inquit, pudicitie plebeie dedico; vosque hortor, ut, quod certamen virtutis viros in hac civitate tenet, hoc pudicitie inter matronas sit; detis operam, ut hæc ara, quam illa, si quid potest, sanctius & castioribus coli dicatur. Liv.

“ city in respect to valour and honour, may prevail A. R. 457.
 “ amongst the women in respect to chastity. Be it Ant. C. 295.
 “ your care therefore that people say this altar is
 “ *adored* with more devotion, if possible, and by
 “ women of stricter chastity, than the other.” This
 was a very wise and religious revenge of an affront,
 to which the ladies are extremely sensible. This new
 chapel became as famous as the old one, and the same
 ceremonies were observed in it, that is to say, none
 but women of distinguished chastity, and who had
 been married but once, were admitted into it.

It is remarkable, that amongst the Pagans, second
 marriages, of men as well as women, were deemed a
 disgrace. According to * Tertullian, the great Pon-
 tiff at Rome could not marry a second wife. We see
 in Propertius, a Roman lady, who takes honour to
 herself, for having had only one husband, and is for
 having that circumstance mentioned on her tomb.

*Jungor, Paule, tuo, sic discessura, cubili :
 In lapide hoc, uni nupta fuisse, legar.*

Propert. l. 4. v. 11—35.

The same praise is extant in many ancient inscrip-
 tions.

MATRI CARISSIMÆ
 OMNIUM. FÆMINÆ
 SANCTIORI. UNIVIRÆ
 MÆCIANÆ CONJ. INCOMPARABILI
 UNIVIRÆ ET. CASTISSIMÆ.

Dido in Virgil understands it as a crime contrary to
 the faith she has sworn to her first husband, to marry
 another, and seems resolved to die rather than disho-
 nour herself by so shameful an action.

*Sed mihi vel tellus optem prius ima debiscat —
 Ante pudor quam te viclem, aut tua jura resolvam.*

* Duo ipsi Pontifici maximo matrimonia iterare non licet. TERT.
 Exhort. ad castit. c. 13.

Pontifex maximus nubet semel. Id. de Monog. c. 17.

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*Ille meos, primus qui me sibi junxit, amores
Abstulit : ille habeat secum, servetque sepulcro.*

Æneid. l. 4. v. 24, &c.

* Plutarch, in speaking of the Romans, says, that first marriages were highly in honour, and second in no less disgrace amongst them : and † Valerius Maximus says, that the crown of chastity was granted only to the women, who had been contented with one marriage.

Levit. xxi. Amongst the Jews, the law of Moses prohibited
13, 14. the high-priest to marry a widow. St. Paul is very far from condemning second marriages : but amongst the qualities of a bishop he puts that of having been only once married : “ the husband of one wife.” The twice-married were not admitted into holy orders. But to return to our history.

The same year, the Curule Ædiles cited some Usurers to a trial, who were condemned in sufficiently considerable fines. Those sums were applied in different ornaments for the temples, and in other publick works.

Liv. l. 10. The two Consuls Fabius and Decius, who entered
c. 23—29. at this time upon office, were now colleagues for the third time in the Consulship, as they had been in the office of Censors. They were famous not only for the glory of their actions, which was great, but the perfect union which had always prevailed between them. That union was a little interrupted at present by a dispute that arose, less between them, than between the different orders of which they were. The Patricians were for having Fabius assume the province of Hetruria by privilege : the Plebeians, interesting themselves for Decius, demanded, that the provinces should be drawn by lot according to the usual custom. The Senate having given the affair in favour of Fabius, it was brought before the People. As the dis-

* Ζηλοῦντες γὰρ ὁ πρῶτος γαμὶς ὁδὲ δεύτερος ἀπεκλιναῖς. Detestandæ.

† Quæ uno contentæ matrimonio fuerant, corona pudicitiaë honorabantur. VAL. MAX. l. 1,

pute was between military persons, more accustomed to act than to harangue, the pleadings were not long. Fabius said, "It was not reasonable that another should gather the fruits he alone had planted. That every body knew, he was the first, who had penetrated through the Ciminian forest, and opened a way for the Roman armies into a country till then inaccessible. Why at so advanced an age as his, had he been almost forced out of a state of repose, if the war were to be made by another general? He even modestly reproached his colleague for having proved an adversary, rather than the aid and associate in command he expected to have found him. He added, that Decius seemed to repent the union which had subsisted hitherto between them. That as to him, he confined himself to demanding to be sent into Hetruria, if he were thought worthy of it. That for the rest, as he had referred himself on that head to the judgment of the Senate, so he submitted to that of the People."

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Decius began by complaining of the injustice of the Senate. "The Senators," said he, "long used their utmost endeavours to exclude the Plebeians entirely from all great offices. Since virtue has forced the barriers they laid in its way, and independently of race and birth, has caused the honours to be rendered it, that are its due, they seek a means for rendering void and ineffectual not only the suffrages of the People, but even the favours of fortune, in reducing them to the power of a small number of persons. All the Consuls before me, have drawn lots, for their provinces: but now by a special privilege, contrary to all custom, the Senate is for granting Hetruria to Fabius. If it be to reward his merit, Fabius has done me personally, and the commonwealth in general, such great services, that I shall always make it a duty as well as a pleasure to promote his glory, so long as it shall not turn to my own dishonour. But can any body doubt, when there is one difficult and danger-

A. R. 457. "ous war on foot, and the care of it is confided
 Ant. C. " without drawing lots to one of the Consuls, that
 295. " the other is considered as incapable and of no use.
 " Fabius takes the honour to himself, and not with-
 " out foundation, for the great actions he has done
 " in Hetruria, and as for me I aspire at the same
 " glory. Who knows, but this fire which Fabius
 " has left covered under the ashes, and which sud-
 " denly and so often breaks out afresh, I may not be
 " so successful to extinguish totally and for ever. If
 " only honours and rewards were in question, I could
 " freely resign them to my colleague out of respect for
 " his age and merit : but when dangers and battles are
 " to be sustained for the safety of the commonwealth,
 " I think I cannot in honour give place to him. And
 " after all it is of good example, and for the glory
 " of the Roman people, to have those in office, to
 " whom they can indifferently confide the care of so
 " important a war as that of Hetruria."

Fabius, without any farther reply, contented himself with desiring, that the letter which was come from the Prætor Ap. Claudius in Hetruria, might be read, before the Tribes were called upon to give their suffrages : after which he quitted the assembly. The People declared themselves with no less ardour and passion for Fabius, than the Senate had done ; and Hetruria was decreed to him for his province without drawing lots.

The youth ran in crouds to list, so much did they desire to serve under Fabius. He contented himself with four thousand foot, and six hundred horse, and set out with this little numerous army, but full of confidence, because they saw that their general did not believe he wanted more troops for gaining the victory. He arrived at the city of Aharna, not far from the enemy, and advanced towards the camp of the Prætor Appius. A detachment discovering the Licitors, and being informed, that Fabius was arrived, ran to meet him. The officers and soldiers, in the highest joy, returned thanks to the Gods for having sent them
 such

such a general. Fabius having asked them, where they were going, and been answered to fetch in wood: "Is not your camp intrenched then," said he? "It has two good intrenchments and a very deep ditch," replied they; "and yet the whole army is in very great terror." The Consul ordered them to pull up the palisades, and they did so immediately; which much augmented the dread of the soldiers in the camp, and especially of Appius. As this operation surprized every body extremely, the workmen, upon being questioned, said only, that they were obeying the Consul Fabius's orders. He decamped the next day, and sent the Prætor Appius to Rome. After he was gone, the Romans had no longer any fixed and durable camp. He said, that it was not for the advantage of an army to continue always or long in the same place: that marching and change rendered it fitter for action, and contributed to the health of the soldiers. The marches were not long, and continued only as the winter-season, which was not quite over, would admit.

In the beginning of the spring, having left the second legion at Clusium, a city of the Camertes, a people of Umbria, and given the command of the camp to the Pro-prætor L. Scipio, he returned to Rome, whether of his own accord, in order to concert measures with the Senate for the conduct of a war, of the importance of which he had had a nearer experience, or, which is more probable, that he had been sent for by the Senate, perhaps upon the remonstrances of Appius. For Appius was one of those generals, who, for want of courage and experience, can see nothing but difficulties, multiply dangers, suffer themselves to be easily terrified, and communicate their fears to others. He was incessantly representing in the Senate, "That a single army and one general were not sufficient to make head against four States. That if they united all their forces, they could not fail of crushing him by their numbers; and, if they acted separately, he would not be able alone to oppose so many enemies every where. That when he set out from

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A. R. 457. from the army, he had left only two Roman legions
 Ant. C. there; and that the troops Fabius had brought with
 295. him, did not amount to five thousand men, horse and
 foot. That he was of opinion, that the Consul P.
 Decius should set out as soon as possible to join his col-
 league in Hetruria, and that the command of the troops
 in Samnium should be given to Volumnius. That, if
 the Consul chose rather to remain in his province,
 it was necessary to send Volumnius into Hetruria
 with a sufficient number of troops, and a Consular
 army."

As great part of the Senate seemed to give in to the
 Prætor's sentiments, Decius represented, that in an
 affair of that importance, nothing could well be decid-
 ed without first consulting Fabius: that therefore it was
 proper to stay either till he came in person, or till he
 sent one of his lieutenants, to inform the Senate of
 what concerned the war in Hetruria, and enable it to
 decree with some knowledge of the affair all that was
 necessary to the success of the Roman arms on that
 side. It was probably in effect of this advice that Fa-
 bius was sent for.

When he arrived at Rome, he gave the Senate and
 People an account of the state of affairs in Hetruria.
 He did it in a simple and natural manner, without
 either disguising, augmenting, or diminishing any
 thing. He related things just as they were; and, if
 he consented to receive a second general into the joint
 command, it was rather out of condescension to the
 terror and consternation of the public, than the per-
 suasion, that either the Commonwealth, or himself,
 had occasion for such a coadjutor. He was left en-
 tirely at liberty to choose whom he thought fit. He
 was not long in fixing upon Decius, who on his side
 was as soon determined, and believed himself much
 honoured by such a choice. The joy of Rome was
 universal, to see so perfect an union between those two
 great men, and from that moment every body assured
 themselves of victory.

Livy observes, that authors differ in their accounts of several circumstances related hitherto, but that they agree better concerning those that follow.

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For the rest, Fabius's absence cost the army dear. The legion he had left at Clusium was surprized by the Gauls, and entirely cut to pieces.

The two consuls set out from Rome with four legions, and a numerous body of Roman cavalry, without including that of the Campanians, which consisted of a thousand chosen horse. The troops of the allies were still more numerous. Besides this, there were two other armies ready to act against Hetruria, both near Rome, the one in the country of Falerii; and the other in the plain of the Vatican close to Rome: they were commanded by the Proprætors Cn. Fulvius, and L. Postumius Megellus.

The Consuls, having passed the Apennines, arrived in the country of Sentinum, and incamped four miles from the enemy. It was here they were informed by their own eyes of the sad defeat of the Roman legion, the cavalry of the Gauls carrying the heads of the Romans upon the points of their spears, and hanging before the breast-plates of their horses.

The enemy in a council of war, agreed, that it was neither proper to shut themselves up all together in one camp, nor to give battle in one body. The Gauls joined the Samnites, and the Umbrians the Hetrurians. A day was fixed for the battle: and the Samnites and Gauls were to fight it. The Hetrurians and Umbrians had orders to attack the Roman camp in the heat and confusion of the action. But these measures were disconcerted, the Consuls having got intelligence of them. Three deserters of Clusium brought them that important advice. They were well rewarded, and sent back with orders to inform themselves of every thing as exactly as possible, and bring back a good account of them. In the mean time the Consuls sent orders to Fulvius and Postumius to march their armies towards Clusium, and to ravage all the enemy's country: this they executed without loss

A. R. 457. loss of time. Upon the news of those incursions, the
 Ant. C. 295. Hettrurians quitted the country of Sentinum, in order
 to defend their own lands.

This was a reason for the Consuls to hasten a battle. The two first days passed in slight skirmishes on both sides, in order to try one another. The third both armies moved in earnest. Whilst they were drawing up in battle, an hind, pursued by a wolf, crossed ~~them~~. The two beasts divided, and each took ~~different~~ ways, the hind towards the Gauls, and ~~the~~ wolf towards the Romans. The latter ~~opened~~ a way for the wolf thro' their ranks; the Gauls killed the hind. Upon that a Roman soldier in the front cried out: "Flight and
 " defeat are the lot of those, who have just killed the
 " animal sacred to Diana. The wolf, protected by
 " Mars, victorious and without a wound, puts us in
 " mind of our Founder, and that we are a martial
 " race." Every body knows, that in those ancient times facts are frequently embellished with the Marvellous.

The Gauls were on the right, and the Samnites on the left wings. Fabius at the head of the first and third legions against the Samnites; and Decius on the left with the fifth and sixth against the Gauls. The charge in the beginning was sustained with so much equality on both sides, that if the Hettrurians and Umbrians had shared in the battle, or had attacked the camp during the action, as had been at first concluded, the Romans would infallibly have suffered some considerable loss.

Though neither side had yet the advantage, and it could not be judged which would be victorious, the two wings of the Romans fought in a quite different manner. On Fabius's side they were more employed in sustaining the attack of the enemy, than in charging them with vigour: which occasioned the battle's being spun out till night. The * Consul's reason was,
 because

* Ita persuasum erat Duci, & Samnites & Gallos primo impetu feroces esse, quos sustineri satis sit. Longiore certamine sensim residere
 Sam-

because the Samnites and Gauls were only formidable in their first charge, which it sufficed to sustain well : that the force and courage of the Samnites perpetually decreased, in proportion to the length of the battle : that the bodies themselves of the Gauls, incapable of supporting heat and fatigue, insensibly grew weak, and lost all their vigour ; and as in the beginning of the battle they were more than men, in the end of it they were less than women. Fabius therefore reserved the force and vivacity of his troops for the time, when those of the enemy should begin to flag. (I do not know whether the Gauls of ancient times were such as Livy describes them in this place. It is certain that their successors the French scarce resemble them now : witness the last campaigns in Italy and Germany.)

It was not the same on the side where Decius commanded. As his years and complexion made him more active, he employed all his force from the beginning of the action. As the infantry seemed to act too slowly, and not to second his ardour with sufficient vivacity, he made the cavalry advance, and putting himself at the head of the bravest squadron, he desired the noble youth of which it was composed, to charge the enemy with him, representing to them, “ That they would acquire double glory if the victory began both by the left wing and by the horse.” They put the cavalry of the Gauls twice into disorder. But pushing them too far, whilst they were engaged in the midst of the enemy’s squadrons, a new kind of fight amazed them. Horsemen in chariots of different kinds, from which they fought, attacked them unexpectedly. The neighing of the horses, and the noise of the wheels, to which the Roman horse were not accustomed, frightened and made them unruly. The cavalry, victorious but a moment before, were seized with a kind of panic, which made them disperse and fly on all sides, and occasioned the loss both of men

Effedis,
carrisq.

Samnitium animos : Gallorum quidem etiam corpora intolerantissima laboris atque æstus fluere, primaque eorum prælia plusquam virorum, postrema minus quam fœminarum esse. Liv.

and

A. R. 457. and horses. The disorder reached also the infantry :
 Ant. C. many in the front were crushed to death by the horses
 295. and chariots. The main body of the Gauls seeing the enemy in disorder, did not give them time to breathe, but pushed them with great vigour.

Decius at this moment, not being able to stop the flight of his troops, addressed himself to his father, and invoking him by his name : “ Wherefore, cried he, should I refuse myself any longer to my destiny ? “ It is the fate of our family to sacrifice themselves “ voluntarily to expiate the wrath of the Gods, and to “ avert the misfortunes of the public. I go this instant to devote myself and the legions of the enemy “ as victims to the Goddesses of the earth and the Di “ Manes.” After having spoke thus, he ordered the Pontiff M. Livius, whom he had caused to follow him in the battle, to repeat the words before him, by which he was to devote himself with the legions of the enemy in favour of the Roman People. Accordingly he devoted himself without losing a moment’s time, in the same terms, and habit, as his father had used in the war against the Latines at the battle of Veferis. He added, after having repeated the form prescribed, “ That he caused terror, flight, murder, slaughter, and the wrath of the Gods of heaven and hell to march before him : That he was going to charge with fatal imprecations the ensigns, darts, and arms of the enemy ; and that the same place should be witness of his death, and of the destruction of the Gauls and Samnites.” Having uttered these execrations against himself and the enemy, he spurred his horse into the thickest of the Gauls, and in the midst of a shower of darts was soon mortally wounded, and fell dead.

After this, says Livy, the battle was continued in a manner that had nothing human in it. The Romans, after having lost their general, an accident which generally puts an army into a consternation, stopt short in their flight, and breathed nothing but battle. The Gauls, on the contrary, who surrounded the Consul’s body, seemed stupified and out of their senses, and discharged

charged their darts ineffectually and without vigour. Some remained even without motion, and without thoughts either of fighting or flying. On the other side the Pontiff Livius, to whom Decius had given his Lictors, and whom he had appointed Pro-prætor, cried out, "That the Romans had conquered: that the death of the Consul had appeased the wrath of heaven. That the Gauls and Samnites appertained now to the Goddesses of the earth and the Dii Manes. That Decius drew after him, and summoned, the army he had devoted in devoting himself: and that the Furies and Terror drove before them, and confounded, all their troops."

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It is no wonder, that the imagination, heated by the sight of a Consul who devotes himself to death, by the solemn and hideous ceremonies used on that occasion, by the terrible execrations that a priest dressed in pontifical habits utters with a loud voice against the enemy in the presence of the army, and by the respect natural to all men for Religion and the Divinity, should make extraordinary impressions upon the minds of soldiers, and change them on a sudden into other men.

Whilst they were re-inflating the battle with inconceivable ardour, they were joined by L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Marcius, whom the Consul Fabius had sent from the rear with the body of reserve to the aid of his colleague. On their arrival they were informed of the death of Decius: which was a potent incentive to them not to spare themselves. The Gauls keeping very close order, and continuing covered with their bucklers, it was not easy to combat man to man, nor to come to blows with them: The Romans therefore, by order of the lieutenants, gathered the javelins that lay upon the ground between the two armies, discharged them vigorously against the Gauls, penetrated through their shields to their bodies, broke that kind of tortoise, and threw down that breast-work with which the enemy opposed their attack, so that most of them in a kind of amazement, without so much as
, having

A. R. 457. having received a wound, fell to the ground. Such
 Ant. C. was the fate of the left wing.
 295.

We have already said that Fabius, on the right wing, had at first spun out the battle, in order to exhaust the enemy's courage, and spend their fire in those first efforts. When he perceived that neither their cries, the darts they discharged, nor their general attack, had the same force as at first, he ordered the officers of the cavalry to make their squadrons file off along the two wings of the Samnites, and to hold themselves in readiness to attack them in the flanks with their utmost vigour the moment he gave the signal. He then made his troops insensibly advance against the main body of the enemy, in order to put them into disorder. When he saw that they made but a faint resistance, and that they were exhausted with fatigue, drawing together all the reserved troops whom he had spared for this occasion, he made his legions move, and gave his cavalry the signal for attacking the enemy. The Samnites could not sustain so rude a charge, and leaving the Gauls in the midst of the danger, fled precipitately to their camp.

The Gauls, however, having made a tortoise by joining their bucklers, kept close to each other. Fabius, who at that time was informed of his colleague's death, detached a body of about five hundred Campanian horse, with orders to attack the Gauls in the rear. He made the Principes of the third legion follow them, and ordered them as soon as the horse had put the enemy into disorder, to charge them vigorously, and to give them no quarter. After having vowed a temple to Jupiter the Victor, and the spoils he should take, he advanced to the camp of the Samnites, the whole multitude of whom was retiring thither in disorder. There in the intrenchments themselves, those whom the too great croud prevented from entering the camp, of which the gates were too narrow to receive them all at a time, endeavoured to fight. Gellius Egnatius, the general of the Samnites, was killed there. The Samnites were afterwards driven into the works.

The

The camp was taken without difficulty, and the Gauls surrounded on all sides. Twenty-five thousand men were killed, and eight thousand taken that day. The victory also cost the Romans a great deal of blood. For of Decius's army seven thousand fell, and of Fabius's twelve hundred. Whilst search was making by the latter's order for his colleague's body, he burnt the spoils of the enemy, which he caused to be piled up in heaps, in honour of Jupiter the Victor. The Consul's body could not be found that day, because covered with those of the Gauls: but it was found the next, and brought with great mourning of the whole army to the camp. At length, all other cares being at an end, Fabius celebrated his funeral with all possible magnificence, and rendered the just homage of praise to his extraordinary merit, and great qualities.

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At the same time, the arms of Cn. Fulvius the Pro-prætor, were also successful in Hetruria. Besides the considerable ravages by which he had ruined the whole country of the enemy, he gained a victory, in which above three thousand inhabitants of Perugia and Clusium were killed, and twenty ensigns taken. The Samnites flying through the country of the Peligni, were surrounded by an army of those people, and of five thousand which they were in number, one thousand were killed.

Fabius leaving Decius's army in Hetruria, returned to Rome with his Légions, and triumphed over the Gauls, Hetrurians, and Samnites. His soldiers who followed him in his triumph celebrated in their military, that is to say, simple and artless songs, not only Fabius's victory, but at least as much the glorious death of Decius; recalling that of his father, which rendered both equally illustrious, and truly worthy of each other. Out of the spoils taken from the enemy four-score and two Asses were distributed to each soldier (*Æris octogeni bini*. Add, *nummi librales*, five Asses, which are something more than the value of an ounce of silver.)

A. R. 457. Ant. C. 295. Notwithstanding all the defeats I have related, and in which some authors make the loss of the enemies of the Romans amount still higher, no peace ensued either with the Samnites or the Hetrurians. Those two people were again defeated; the first especially, who lost above sixteen thousand men in one battle in the country of the Stellatini. It is not easy to conceive, how the Samnites could supply numbers for such great and frequent armies, and how their courage was capable of holding out. They sustained the war with the Romans forty-seven years, almost without any respite. Not to mention so many other defeats, and only to reckon those of the present year, how many considerable losses did they sustain, in the country of the Sentini, Peligni, Tifernum, and in an action against Volumnius in the territory of the Stellatini. They have been defeated by four armies and as many Roman generals. They lost the greatest of their captains, who was killed in a battle. They saw the Hetrurians, Umbrians and Gauls, their allies, undergo the same fate as themselves. They could support themselves no longer either by their own forces, or those of strangers. However, they could not prevail upon themselves seriously and in earnest to renounce the war, though every thing seems to invite and almost to reduce them to it. Such an obstinate perseverance shews, that people were sensible they were not made for slavery, and that the love of liberty was natural to them, as there * is nothing they are not ready to undertake to preserve or reinstate it, as the worst success is not capable of making them lay down their arms, and they choose rather to be conquered than not to attempt victory.

For the † rest, these almost anniversary wars, which did not tire the Samnites, extremely disgust both the author who writes the history of them, and the reader,

* Bello non abstinebant, adeo ne infelicitè quidem defensæ libertatis tadebat, & vinci quam non tentare victoriam, malebant.

† Quinam sit ille, quem non pigeat longinquitatis bellorum scribendo legendoque, quæ gerentes non fatigaverunt? Liv. l. 10. c. 31.

to whose eyes the same objects are continually presented, levying of troops, ravaging of countries, sieges, battles, defeats, and treaties of peace, followed with breach of engagements, and open ruptures. I have done all in my power to abridge the account of them, when the facts were neither necessary nor important.

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In the year of which we are speaking, Q. Fabius Gurges, the Consul's son, cited some Roman ladies accused of adultery before the People. They were fined, and the money employed in erecting a temple to Venus.

L. POSTUMIUS MEGELLUS.

M. ATILIUS REGULUS.

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These two Consuls had orders to march into Samnium. Sickness kept Postumius some time at Rome : the other set out immediately, and soon arrived in view of the enemy. The latter taking the advantage of a thick fog, ventured to attack his camp, and took part of it, but were soon beat out again. They however kept it close shut up, and were only reduced to retire entirely by the arrival of the other Consul. Having joined their troops, the Roman generals took several towns, most of which had been before abandoned by the inhabitants.

Liv. l. 10.
C. 32—37.

Atilius marched to the aid of Luceria, attacked by the Samnites. The latter advanced to meet him, and a battle ensued. The event was doubtful, but most heavy upon the Romans, who retired entirely discouraged ; so that if the enemy had pursued them to their camp, they had made themselves masters of it without difficulty. It was expected, that they would have attacked it the next morning, and the trembling soldiers passed the night in cruel anxiety. Happily the Samnites were in no greater certainty than themselves, and set out the next day in order to retire. But their route lay near the camp of the Romans, who believed they were coming to attack them. The alarm was excessive. The Consul endeavoured to en-

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courage his foldiers, employing the moſt affecting motives, honour, ſhame, fear, hope, and declaring that he had rather die in the miſt of the enemy, than ſuffer himſelf to be beſieged in his camp. He had abundance of difficulty to make them march out of it. The Samnites trembled on their ſide, when they ſaw them quit their camp, and believed they were coming to diſpute the paſſage with them, which they had exceedingly apprehended. When the two armies faced each other, they continued ſome time gazing in ſuſpence, without making any movement, becauſe neither had courage to begin the battle ; at length they engaged languidly enough at firſt on both ſides. The Samnites however pushed the Romans with vigour ſoon after, and put them to flight. The Conſul advanced full ſpeed in deſpair to the gate of the camp, where he poſted a ſmall body of horſe, with orders to treat all that approached the intrenchments, Romans or Samnites, as enemies ; which they did. It was neceſſary in conſequence to face about. At the ſame time the Conſul, holding up his hands to Heaven, vowed a temple to Jupiter Stator, if he ſtopt the flight of his troops. Religion had great weight with the Romans. Their force revived with their courage. The fight was renewed, and continued very obſtinate and bloody. The Samnites had four thouſand eight hundred men killed, and ſeven thouſand three hundred taken, who were all made to paſs under the yoke. The victory coſt the Romans dear. They loſt ſeven thouſand three hundred men in both days.

Whiſt this paſſed in Apulia, another body of Samnites had attacked Interamna, a Roman colony on the Latine Way. Not being able to take the place, they carried off a great booty. The Conſul, on their return, met them, and took from them all their ſpoils, after having entirely defeated them. He was recalled to Rome, to preſide at the election of magiſtrates for the year following.

The other Conſul had entered Hetruria with his army, and had very good ſucceſs there. He ravaged
the

the country of the Volsinians, and made himself master of Rufella, where he killed almost two thousand of the citizens round the walls, and made two thousand prisoners. But what was still more glorious for him, and more advantageous to the Commonwealth, three of the most powerful cities of Hetruria, Volfinii, Perugia, and Arretium, demanded to treat of peace. Having agreed with the Consul to furnish the army with habits and corn, they had permission to send deputies to Rome, and obtained a truce of forty years. Each of these cities were condemned for the present to pay the Roman people five hundred thousand Asses, that is to say, about twelve hundred and fifty pounds sterling. The Senate refused the Consul a triumph, as they had his colleague before. By the favour of the People, he triumphed, notwithstanding the Senate's opposition.

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L. PAPIRIUS CURSOR.

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SP. CARVILIUS.

This year presents us an illustrious Consul, Papirius Curfor, who by his own glory sustained that he had inherited from his father. We shall see a considerable war with the Samnites in it, and the greatest victory hitherto gained over them, except that of Papirius, the Consul's father. Every thing resembled each other in these two wars: the extraordinary efforts and preparations employed in them; the splendor of arms; the terrible ceremonies used for rendering the Gods propitious, and initiating in some measure the soldiers by an oath of ancient form; and lastly, the levies made universally throughout the whole extent of Samnium under that form, which devoted to Jupiter, and loaded with curses, all such amongst the youth, as should not present themselves for the service on the general's order, or should retire from it without his permission.

Liv. x. 38.
46.

The rendezvous of the army was fixed at Aquilonia. All the troops repaired thither at the time, and amounted to forty thousand men. They were the flower

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of the forces of Samnium. There in the midst of the camp an enclosure, two hundred feet square, of hurdles and planks, covered with linen, was made. Within this enclosure a sacrifice was offered according to ceremonies prescribed in an ancient linen book. The person who offered it was a priest, named Ovius Paccius, of great age, who affirmed, that he had extracted the rites of this sacrifice from the most ancient monuments of the religion of the Samnites, of which their ancestors had made use, when they formed the secret resolution of taking Capua from the Hetrurians. The sacrifice being over, the general sent an officer for the most considerable of the nation. They were introduced separately one by one. Besides the other circumstances that attended this ceremony, which was wonderfully proper to fill the mind with religious awe, there were in the midst of this inclosure covered on all sides, altars surrounded with victims, which had been killed there, and centurions with their drawn swords in their hands. The soldier was made to approach the altar more like a victim himself, than one who was to assist at the sacred fire, and to take an oath, that he would declare nothing of what he should see or hear in that place. He was afterwards made to repeat by way of oath a form of execration against his own head and person, his family and all his race, if he either fled from battle himself, or did not immediately kill whomsoever he should see fly. As some at first refused to take this oath, they were butchered that moment around the altar. They were afterwards laid in the midst of the bloody victims, and served as a terrible lesson to others not to make the same refusal. When the principal Samnites had passed through this ceremony, and pronounced these execrations, the general nominated ten, each of whom he ordered to choose out of the troops one of the bravest men they knew: those were ordered to do the same, and so on till the number of sixteen thousand were compleated. This body of troops was called The Linen Legion, from the linen with which the place where they had sworn

sworn was covered. Shining armour and helmets adorned with plumes were given them, in order to distinguish them from all the others. The rest of the army consisted of somewhat more than twenty thousand men, who differed little from these either in largeness of stature, exterior equipage, or reputation for bravery. Such was the army encamped at Aquilonia.

The Consuls on their side had entered Samnium, and had already taken some * cities there, whilst the enemy were employed in these gloomy and horrid ceremonies. After having ravaged the country, they stopt Carvilius at Cominium, and Papirius at Aquilonia, where lay the weight of the war. After having rested some days, and taken all his measures, Papirius sent a courier to his colleague, who was twenty miles from thence, to let him know, that he was resolved to give battle the next day, if the auspices were favourable; that it was therefore necessary for him to press the siege of Cominium more closely than ever, that the Samnites might have no room to send aid to Aquilonia. As soon as the courier set out, the Consul called the assembly, to prepare the soldiers in respect to the arms and ornaments of the Samnites. He told them, " That it was not the plumage floating on the helmet which made wounds: that the Roman javelins could pierce through gilt and painted bucklers: that the whiteness of the tunick, when they came to blows, would soon be sullied and spoilt by the blood flowing from wounds. That formerly a like army of the Samnites, all glittering with gold and silver, had been cut in pieces by his father. That their gold and silver had done more honour to the victorious enemy, whose prey they became, than to the Samnites, in whose hands they proved ineffectual arms. That it seemed the privilege of his name and family to furnish generals against the extraordinary efforts of that people, and to take from them spoils fit to adorn the public places of Rome: That the immortal Gods

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* Amiternum, Duxonia.

A. R. 459. would now avenge the treaties so often demanded, and
 Ant. C. 293. so often violated, by the Samnites. † That if it were allowable to enter into the secrets of the Gods he, dared presume to say, that they never were more offended at any army than now with that of the Samnites, which, polluted with the blood of men and beasts shed promiscuously in an impious sacrifice, doubly, and in whatsoever manner they should act, devoted to the just anger of heaven, and having the Gods, who were witnesses of the treaties concluded with the Romans, to fear on one side, and on the other the imprecations, with which the oath taken in prejudice of those treaties had been attended, had sworn against their will, detested the oath which had been forced out of their mouths, and were at once in dread of the Gods, their citizens, and their enemies.”

Papirius had been informed of all these circumstances by deserters. After having repeated them to the soldiers, who were already of themselves full of anger against the Samnites, encouraged by all the motives divine and human to hope, they raised an universal cry to demand a battle, and suffered it to be deferred till the next day with reluctance. The night seemed to them too long, and the return of night too slow : in their impatience every moment's delay gave them pain.

At the third watch of the night, that is to say, at midnight, the courier being returned with Carvilius's answer, the Consul Papirius rose without noise, and sent to the officers, called Pullarii, who kept the chickens, to take the auspices. No kind of persons in the camp were indifferent concerning the battle ; great, small, all desired it impatiently. This ardour had reached even these subaltern ministers of the auspices. As the chickens would not eat, the officer

* Si qua conjectura mentis divinæ sit, nulli unquam exercitui, quam qui nefando sacro mistâ hominum pecudumque cæde reiperfus, ancipiti deûm iræ devotus, hinc fœderum cum Romanis ictorum testes deos, hinc jurisjurandi adversus fœdera suscepti execrationis horrent, invitus juraverit, oderit sacramentum, uno tempore deos, cives, hostes metuat. LIV.

took upon him to assure the Consul that they had ate A. R. 459.
Ant. C.
293. very greedily. Papirius, in the highest joy, declared publickly, that the auspices were happy, and that the Gods would be propitious; and at the same time gave the signal.

As he was quitting his camp in order to give battle, a deserter came and told him, that twenty cohorts of the Samnites, each consisting of four hundred men, were set out for Cominium. Papirius, immediately, sent that news to his colleague, to prevent his being surprized. At the same time he made his troops advance, and drew them up in battle. He had already disposed the reserved troops, and appointed the officers who were to command them. He gave the command of the right wing to Volumnius, and of the left to L. Scipio. Cædicius and Trebonius had the command of the cavalry. He ordered Sp. Nautius to take the mules, after having removed their pack-saddles, with a certain number of cohorts of the allies, and to carry them immediately, by taking a compass, to the top of a mountain much exposed to view; and afterwards in the heat of the battle, to make them appear, raising at the same time as much dust as possible.

Whilst the general was giving these orders, a dispute arose, in the hearing of some of the Roman horse, between the officers who kept the sacred chickens, concerning the auspices of that day. They did not think this a circumstance to be neglected, and acquainted Sp. Papirius, the Consul's nephew, with it: * The young Roman, born in an age when the dangerous philosophy which teaches to contemn the Gods was unknown, informed himself exactly in the fact, and reported it to his uncle. The Consul, after having heard him, said: " I commend your scrupulous
" zeal. But if he who took the auspices, has given
" me any false account, it is himself alone who is to
" answer for it. As for me, I adhere to what he told

* *Juvenis ante doctrinam deos spernentem natus.*

A.R. 459. “ me, which is the most favourable omen for the
 Ant. C. “ Roman people and army.” He afterwards ordered
 293. the Centurions to post those keepers of the chickens
 in the front of the army. The Samnites made their
 ensigns also advance, followed by their troops armed
 and adorned in a manner that made a magnificent
 shew, even to their enemies, to whom it must natu-
 rally have been terrible. Before the usual cries were
 raised, and the armies came to blows, the keeper of
 the chickens received a wound from a javelin, thrown
 by chance according to Livy, or more probably by
 the Consul’s order, that laid him dead upon the earth.
 When that news was told the Consul: “ It is well,
 cried he; “ the Gods manifest themselves; the cri-
 “ minal is punished.” Whilst he was speaking, a raven
 croaked over-against him. The Consul, transported
 with joy upon that omen, and affirming that the Gods
 had never interfered more evidently in human affairs,
 caused the signal to be given, and the usual cries to
 be raised. Who does not perceive that part of this
 account is mere invention, and fitter for the stage than
 the gravity of history?

The battle ensued, and was extremely obstinate: but
 the disposition of the two armies was very different.
 Hope, courage, rage, and the desire of revenge,
 urged on the Romans to battle, thirsting for the
 blood of the enemy. The Samnites, most of them,
 were forced by necessity, and a mistaken motive of
 religion, rather to defend themselves against their
 will, than to attack. Accustomed as they had so long
 been to defeats, they probably would not have sustain-
 ed the first cries and charge of the Romans, if a stronger
 fear with which they were possessed, had not prevented
 them from flying. They had before their eyes the
 dreadful solemnity of that secret sacrifice, priests armed
 with daggers, the dead bodies of men and beasts pro-
 miscuously mingled and confounded together, altars
 covered with impure blood, and those infernal forms,
 which they had been made to pronounce against them-
 selves, their nearest kindred and whole families. These
 were

were the ties that kept them from flying. They were more afraid of their own citizens than the enemy. The Romans pressed them on all sides at once, the right, the left wing, and main body, and finding them in a kind of amazement and stupefaction, occasioned by a dread that did not leave them in their natural situation of mind, they made a great slaughter of them without finding much resistance.

The first line was almost entirely defeated, when suddenly a great dust was perceived on one side of them, which seemed to be raised by the march of a numerous army. This was the execution of the orders Papirius had given Sp. Nautius. The servants of the army mounted upon the mules, dragged great branches of trees along the ground. As they were seen only at a great distance through a gloomy and confused light, many imagined that they saw arms and ensigns: and the dust continuing to rise, and increasing perpetually, they persuaded themselves that it was occasioned by cavalry drawing up in battle. Not only the Samnites believed that new troops were arrived against them, the Romans were also deceived in that respect; and the Consul confirmed them in their error, crying out at the head of their troops so as to be heard by the enemy, That Cominium was taken; that his colleague was coming to join him; and that they should use their utmost endeavours to defeat the enemy, before another army deprived them of the honour of the victory. He was on horseback when he spoke these words; and immediately after ordered the Centurions and Tribunes to open passages for the horse. He had before directed Trebonius and Cædicius to charge the enemy as vigorously as possible with the cavalry, as soon as they saw him lift up his spear, and move it to and fro with the point upwards. Every thing was executed at the moment, and in the manner prescribed. Passages were opened through the ranks of the infantry; the horse rode through them upon the spur, charged the main body with their lances, and broke them wherever they turned. Vol-

lumnus

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A.R. 459. Iulianus and Scipio seconded and sustained them with
 Ant. C. their infantry, and put them into disorder universally.
 293. The flight then became general. The engagements they had taken, sacrifices, oaths, and imprecations, were forgotten. The Gods were considered no longer; and nothing feared but the enemy.

What remained of their infantry after the battle was driven to their camp near Aquilonia. The mobility and cavalry retired to Bovianum. The camp was presently taken by Volumnius. Scipio found more difficulty at the city Aquilonia: not that the enemy had more courage there, but because walls were a better defence than the intrenchments of a camp. He at last took it by scaling them: but as the night came on, he kept his troops quiet. The enemy abandoned the place in the night. In this battle more than thirty thousand men were killed, and near four thousand taken, with ninety-seven ensigns.

The siege of Cominium was no less successful. The Consul Carvilius was attacking the place with vigour, when he received the news from his colleague of the twenty cohorts marching to the relief of it. He immediately detached a considerable body of troops, with orders to march against those succours, and to prevent them, at any price whatsoever, from approaching Cominium. In the mean time he made extraordinary efforts in assaulting the place. The walls were scaled, the gates broke down. The besieged, in despair, retired in a body to the Forum, and after a short and weak defence laid down their arms, and surrendered at discretion to the Consul, to the number of fifteen thousand: above four thousand had been killed during the siege.

Thus ended on one side the battle of Aquilonia, and on the other the siege of Cominium. In the country between those two places, where it was expected there would have been an action between the Roman detachment and the succours, they did not meet each other. When the latter were within seven miles of Cominium, they were countermanded, and returned directly.

directly. It was almost dark night when they arrived near the camp and Aquilonia. The cries which they heard from both the one and the other, made them halt at first : and the flames which they saw soon after in the camp, which the Romans had set on fire, assured them of its fate. They went no farther, and passed the rest of the night upon the ground in their arms, in sad expectation of the day. As soon as it began to appear, as the Romans had got sight of them, they immediately fled, so that a detachment of infantry sent in pursuit of them could not come up with them. Only about three hundred in the rear were killed by the cavalry. The rest without any farther loss arrived at Bovianum. Besides abundance of arms thrown away in their terror, they lost eighteen of their ensigns.

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The joy of each of the two armies for their own victory was much augmented by the equally good success of the other. The Consuls in concert abandoned the two cities they had taken to the soldiers, and after they had turned the people out of the houses, they caused them to be set on fire. Thus Aquilonia and Cominium were entirely destroyed in one and the same day. They afterwards united their camps, and in the sight of both armies praised and rewarded the officers, soldiers, and even whole bodies of troops, who had distinguished themselves in a particular manner. They afterwards held a council, to know whether they should march off both, or only one of the armies from Samnium. They made a third choice, which was to leave both there, in order to terminate the war absolutely on that side, and deliver Samnium to the Consuls their successors entirely conquered and subjected. As the enemy had now no army to keep the field and fight battles, they conceived, that the best method to carry on the war, was to attack towns; a certain means both to enrich the soldiers by the spoils they should find in them, and to compleat the destruction of the Samnites, who would be obliged to fight for their altars and household-gods. Accord-
ingly

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ingly the Consuls, after having given the Senate and People of Rome an account of all they had done hitherto, and of the choice they had made, divided and led their legions, Papirius to Sepinum, and Carvilius to Volana.

The Consuls letters, which were read in the Senate and the assembly of the People, occasioned universal joy, and public prayers and solemn thanksgivings were decreed for four days. This news was the more grateful, as advice came at the same time that the Heturians had revolted. The war with Samnium, in which they saw Rome entirely engrossed, and whither she had sent both the Consuls with all her forces, had given them opportunity to resume their arms. In consequence, people represented to themselves the danger, to which the war with Hetruria would have exposed Rome, if that of Samnium had been unsuccessful, and they had sustained any losses there. The deputies of the allies, sent by the Prætor M. Atilius, complained that their country was burnt and destroyed by the Heturians in their neighbourhood, because they would not quit the party of the Romans, and demanded in the strongest terms that they might be secured against the insults and enterprizes of those common enemies. The deputies were answered, “ That the Senate would make provision, that the allies should not suffer for their faithful attachment to the Roman people. That the Heturians as soon as possible should have the same fate as the Samnites.”

No haste however had been made to send them succours, if advice had not come, that the Falisci, antient friends of the Roman people, had joined the Heturians. The proximity of that people gave the Senate some disquiet, and induced them to send heralds to the Falisci with their complaints. Upon their refusal to make satisfaction, war was declared against them in form, and the Consuls had orders to draw lots, which of them should march from Samnium into Hetruria with his army.

Carvilius had already taken in a very few days Volana, Palumbinum, and Herculanum, from the Samnites, and about ten thousand men had been killed and made prisoners in attacking those three places. Chance gave him the commission to march into Hetruria. His troops were very glad of it, because they began already to suffer exceedingly from the cold in Samnium. Papirius found more resistance at Sepinum, but at length he carried the place. In this siege, and the actions with which it was attended, more than seven thousand men were killed, and almost three thousand taken prisoners. All the spoils were granted to the soldiers, which were very considerable; because the Samnites had laid up their best effects in a small number of places, which they believed most capable of resisting the enemy's attacks.

The whole country was already covered with snow, and the army could keep the field no longer: the Consul therefore withdrew his troops from Samnium. He entered Rome in triumph, followed by the soldiers with all the military gifts, crowns, and marks of honour, with which he had rewarded their bravery. Every body was particularly attentive to the spoils of the Samnites, and compared them for splendor and beauty with those the victor's father had formerly taken from the same people; which were very well known, because most of the public places of Rome were adorned with them. Some considerable prisoners were led in this triumph, well known for their own exploits, and those of their fathers. The copper money, which was exposed in the procession to the view of the public, according to Livy, amounted to such immense sums, as gives reason to believe that there is an error in the text. This money is said to have arose from the sale of prisoners. The silver, which had been taken in the cities, amounted to one thousand three hundred and thirty pounds weight. The whole was carried into the treasury; and no part of it given the soldiers: which highly offended the People, because the usual tax for the payment of the army

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A. R. 459. army was levied upon them : whereas, if the Consul
 Ant. C. had not had the vanity to display the sums intended
 293. for the treasury in his triumph, the soldiers might have been rewarded with part of them, and the rest been applied in discharging the arrears due to them. The Consul Papirius dedicated the temple of Quirinus, which his father, during his Dictatorship, had vowed to that God ; and he adorned it with the spoils of the enemy, which were so abundant, that besides what were placed in that temple and the Forum, part of them were given to the neighbouring colonies and allies, to adorn their temples and public places. When the triumph was over, Papirius put his army into winter-quarters in the territory of Vescia, because that country was exposed to the incursions of the Samnites.

During the interval of which I am now speaking, Carvilius took Troilium, and some other strong places in Hetruria. The Falisci demanded peace ; but had only a truce for a year granted them, for which they were made to give an hundred thousand Asses, and the pay of the troops for that campaign. At his return to Rome, he received the honour of a triumph. The sum which he caused to be carried into the public treasury amounted to three hundred and ninety thousand Asses. For the rest, he caused a temple to be built to Fortune ; and distributed to each soldier out of the spoils an hundred and two Asses, and twice as much to the Centurions and cavalry : a liberality which gave them the more pleasure, as his colleague had been very close in that respect to his soldiers.

Fortis
 Fortunæ.

Liv. l. 10.
 c. 47.

This year the Census was compleated by the Censors P. Cornelius Arvina, and C. Marcius Rutilus. The number of the citizens amounted to two hundred and sixty-two thousand three hundred and twenty-two. This was the nineteenth Lustrum from the institution of the Censorship.

The same year the custom was first introduced for the citizens to wear crowns on their heads at the Games
 and

and Shews, to exprefs their joy and triumph for the victories gained over the enemy.

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Papirius prefided in the affemblies for the election of Consuls. Q. Fabius Gurges, the son of Fabius Maximus, was elected with D. Junius Brutus Scæva.

The plague, which raged both in the city and country, soon made all the successes of this year be forgotten. The books of the Sibyls were consulted, to know what remedy there was for it; and in them it was found that it was necessary to bring the God Æsculapius from Epidaurus to Rome: which could not be executed this year, because the two Consuls were employed in the field. They contented themselves therefore with appointing a day for solemn prayers to implore the protection of that God.

The first decade of Livy ends here, that is to say, the tenth book of his history. The whole work consisted of an hundred and forty, or an hundred and forty-two books. Only thirty of them are come down to us, and of them the last are not perfect. The loss of them cannot be sufficiently regretted, and in all appearance, will never be retrieved. Freinsheimius, an illustrious German, has with infinite pains and wonderful discernment collected all that is dispersed in ancient authors, as well Greek as Latin, concerning the parts of the Roman history, which are no longer extant in Livy, and has filled up almost all the * void places, and thereby, as far as was possible, restored what we have lost of him. The reader may consult the little I have said on this supplement and its author in the Ancient History, where I speak of Livy. He will spare me much trouble, in pointing out to me the places, from which I may extract what is wanting in this excellent historian, and often in supplying me with materials ready prepared. As the passages of the authors which he cites are sometimes very short, and for that reason in great number, to avoid the confusion which such frequent citations

* He has not filled up the void places in the five last books.

might occasion, I shall often quote only Freinsheimius, where the reader may find them referred to. The second decade of Livy (so ten books together are called) is of the number of those which are lost. It included the space of seventy-three years, from the 460th to the 533d year of Rome.

S E C T. II.

The Samnites take arms again, and defeat the army of Fabius Gurges. He is accused. His father obtains his pardon, and goes to serve under him as his lieutenant. The Romans gain a famous victory. L. Postumius being Inter-rex, causes himself to be elected Consul. The plague continues to rage at Rome. A serpent is brought from Epidaurus, which is said to be Æsculapius under the form of that animal. The distemper ceases. A temple is erected to him in the isle of the Tiber. Dispute between Postumius, and Fabius Consul the preceding year. Postumius takes several places. Colony of twenty thousand men settled at Venusia, and in its neighbourhood. Fabius triumphs over the Samnites. Postumius, on the expiration of his Consulship, is accused, and condemned. The Samnites and Sabines are reduced to ask peace. Three new colonies. Judges of criminal affairs instituted. Census. Fabius, Prince of the Senate. Domestic dissensions concerning debts. Laws passed in favour of the People. War with the Volturnians and Lucanians.

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Q. FABIVS GURGES.

D. JUNIVS BRVTVS SCÆVA.

Freinsh.
l. ii. c. 1
—9.
Zonaras,
Vol. II.

THE Samnites had been defeated and cut to pieces so many times, their losses had been so very great, especially the last campaign, and they were reduced to so weak a condition, that there was no appearance that they should have any thoughts of taking arms again, at least so soon, after such a series of bad suc-

cess. But the repeated defeats they had sustained, far from abating their courage through fear, served only to kindle in them, through a kind of despair, the desire of avenging themselves upon a people, who had made them suffer so many evils, and against whom they had conceived an hatred which rose to rage and fury. Papirius had scarce withdrawn his army from Samnium in order to its entering Rome in triumph with him, than they made new and more numerous levies than their past and still recent disaster seemed to admit. The news of the plague, which made great ravages in the city of Rome and all around it, and the little reputation and experience of the Consuls lately elected, filled the Samnites with a blind confidence and rash boldness, which suggested nothing to them but victories and triumphs. They began by ravaging the lands of the Campanians, whom they considered as the first authors of their misfortunes.

Rome did not leave its allies without aid and defence. The Consul Fabius was charged with this war. He set out with the legions, full of the ardor and courage with which his name and the glory of his father inspired him, and at the same time with no less contempt and indignation for an enemy so often defeated, and always ready to revolt. He assured himself, that with the least vigour against an enemy weakened to the degree the Samnites were, it was easy to reduce them for ever, and was in hopes of terminating a war for good and all, and that without difficulty, which had so long employed the Roman arms. He arrived in Campania with these thoughts, and advanced towards the camp of the Samnites with the utmost expedition. Their general had detached a party to take a view of the enemy. As soon as the Romans appeared, the detachment retired. Fabius believed it the whole army flying before him; and as if nothing was wanting to victory but dispatch, he advanced in disorder as he was, without giving his troops time to respire, taking a view of the country, or any other precaution, and gave the signal of battle.

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tle. The general of the Samnites had acted like a true Roman. He had posted himself very advantageously, had drawn up his troops in battle at his leisure, and had exhorted them to shew themselves men of courage by the most powerful arguments. The success of the battle was such as might be expected. The Samnites, who were quite fresh, and waited the coming up of the enemy, repulsed and broke the Romans with ease, who, already fatigued by a long march, had ran eagerly on, in expectation rather to plunder, than of a battle. Three thousand Romans were left upon the spot, and a much greater number wounded. Only the night, which came on very happily for them, saved the rest of the army, and prevented it from being entirely cut to pieces. They retired to a more favourable post, with intent to fortify themselves in it.

Zonar.

They found themselves in the most unhappy and deplorable situation imaginable, without provisions for the troops, remedies for the sick and wounded, or any means for reposing themselves, of which they were in so much want. The baggage had been left in the first camp which they had abandoned, the soldiers having brought away with them only their arms. They were in want of every thing, and of nothing so much as courage. The night passed amidst the groans of the dying, and the complaints of those who survived them, all expecting with terror and despair the return of day, which they believed would be the last of their lives. And indeed, weakened as they were by a considerable loss, and overwhelmed besides with fatigues, wounds, grief, and despair, they could not expect to be able to resist enemies, whose force and courage victory had undoubtedly much augmented. In this condition, wherein every thing was desperate, they were indebted to the Samnites themselves for their safety, whose mistake extricated them out of the extremity to which they were reduced. They believed, with what foundation is not said, that the army of the other Consul was at hand; and through fear of being taken

taken in the rear by troops newly arrived, if they staid to attack Fabius's camp, they retired, contented with the good success they had already had.

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These very successes and advantages gained from time to time by the Samnites, became the source of their misfortunes, and after the most bloody defeats, still put their arms into their hands, in hopes at length of prevailing over the Romans; in some sense, if I may be allowed to use the comparison, like men possessed with the love of Play, whom notwithstanding continual bad success, the smallest gain gives hopes of retrieving all their past losses by some happy run of the dice in their favour.

Whilst the Samnites gave themselves up entirely to the joy of so glorious a victory, Rome was in mourning and affliction. Less sensible to all other losses than to that of glory and renown, she saw with grief, that at the instant, when the longest and most obstinate war the Romans ever had, was upon the point of being terminated for ever, the rashness of the Consul had given it new birth, and rendered it more vigorous and terrible than it had ever been, by filling the Samnites with courage, confidence, and boldness. Not only the Tribunes, long accustomed to take advantage of such events for irritating the People against the Patricians, vented these complaints; the Senate itself expressed still far more violent discontent. After long and warm deliberations, it was decreed, that the Consul Fabius should return to Rome on a certain day to give an account of his conduct.

As soon as he arrived there, a croud of accusers declared against him, and cited him to take his trial before the People. It was not possible either to excuse or conceal his bad conduct in the battle. Consideration for his father Fabius, which seemed the only thing that could be of service to him, turned against him in the present conjuncture, and served only to aggravate his fault. And indeed, for the son of so great a man, nurtured and educated in the midst of his father's triumphs, not only to fully the glory of the Ro-

A.R. 460. man name, but the laurels of his ancestors, by a
 Ant. C. shameful defeat, that could be only ascribed to his
 292, imprudence, was considered as an unpardonable
 crime.

The People, generally prejudiced to excess against the Consuls, seemed determined not so much as to hear his defence. But when Fabius the father appeared as a suppliant, the sight of that venerable old man, round whom his victories and triumphs seemed to attend, soon changed their sentiments. He did not endeavour either to excuse his son's conduct, or to lessen his fault: but repeating with a modest air and tone the services of his ancestors and himself, he implored them to spare a father at his age so sensible an affront, and one so much to the disgrace of his whole house. He added, "That he however asked only, in favour of the Fabii, who almost from the origin of Rome had not a little contributed by their valour and conduct to its greatness, and in gratitude to the three hundred Fabii, who had defended the commonwealth at the price of their blood and the almost total extinction of their name, that they would pardon his son, if his fault were without remedy, and it was more advantageous to the State to punish than forgive him." "For," said he, "I have long learnt
 " to prefer the interests of the public to all other
 " motives, and I believe I have given during my
 " whole life sufficient proofs of my disposition in that
 " respect. Now as to what concerns my son, his
 " fault, I confess, is great: but it may prove infinitely useful to him, as well as to the commonwealth. Though it does not become a father to
 " praise his son; I cannot forbear saying, that mine
 " has good qualities. I have endeavoured to cultivate them by my cares, counsel, and an education
 " worthy of the name he bears. The temerity natural to his years, and too much confidence in himself, has hurried him into the precipice. The shame
 " to which he is now exposed will remedy them. In
 " attaining the maturity of more advanced years, he
 " will

“ will leave you nothing to apprehend from the le-
 “ vity of inconsiderate youth. Alas, I seem, Ro-
 “ mans, to have foreseen this misfortune, when I
 “ took so much pains in your assembly, to prevent
 “ my son from being elected Consul. At this time I
 “ make you a quite different request, and demand
 “ the Consulship for him. For it will be creating him
 “ Consul again, to pardon his fault, and put it into
 “ his power to retrieve it. And I will be security
 “ for him, that he shall retrieve it with advantage.
 “ To this end, I offer myself to serve under him as
 “ his lieutenant. I have still strength enough to sup-
 “ port the fatigues of war, and do my duty in a bat-
 “ tle. The remembrance of what the enemy have
 “ formerly seen me do in the field, may still intimi-
 “ date them. But what is more important, I ven-
 “ ture to promise you, that the martial ardor of the
 “ son, guided and moderated by the counsels of the
 “ father, shall soon wipe out by a glorious victory
 “ the shame which only his youth has drawn upon
 “ him.”

Fabius's offer was received with universal applause,
 and he was immediately appointed his son's lieutenant.
 The Consul took the field soon after, as much re-
 spected, and attended with as passionate vows and as
 great hopes on the side of the People at his depar-
 ture, as he had been ill received at his return. Upon
 the march, and afterwards upon his return, every
 thing passed according to the strictest rules of disci-
 pline. The allies, who were full of esteem for the
 valour and ability of Q. Fabius the father, of which
 they had often been witnesses, and of gratitude for
 the services they had received from him, executed all
 the orders he gave them with joy and dispatch. The
 army in general, impatient to blot out the ignominy
 of their defeat, and promising themselves every thing
 from a general under whom themselves and their fa-
 thers had so often defeated the Samnites, demanded
 eagerly to be led against the enemy. The Samnites
 on their side, flushed with the victory they had gained,

A. R. 460. desired a battle with no less ardor. In consequence;
 Ant. C. the one desiring to retain the glory they had acquired,
 292. and the other to retrieve their shame, both sides came to blows with equal ardor.

The Roman army began to give way, and Pontius Herennius, general of the Samnites, surrounded the Consul with a chosen body of troops, when Fabius, perceiving the danger of his son, spurred his horse into the thickest of the enemy. A body of cavalry followed him, representing to themselves how shameful it would be for them, if such combatants as they were, in the flower of their youth, should suffer themselves to be excelled in vigour and courage by an old man. This charge decided the fate of the battle. The Roman legions, animated by the example of the horse, sustained the enemy first, and soon after broke them. Herennius, who discharged all the duties of an able general and a brave soldier in this action, used all possible endeavours to rally his troops, stop those who fled, and repulse the enemy; but could not prevent them from flying, and lost the occasion of escaping himself. Four thousand Samnites with that general were made prisoners, and twenty thousand killed in the battle and pursuit. The camp of the enemy was taken with considerable spoils, which were afterwards much augmented by the plunder of the country, and the voluntary surrender of several places.

A single man occasioned all this change; that an army a few days before victorious, was cut in pieces by the same troops they had so lately defeated; and that the Consul had made the general prisoner who had put him to flight, an agreeable spectacle to the People, and a magnificent ornament of the triumph decreed him the next year, when he returned to Rome.

Freinsh. Whilst things passed thus in Samnium, D. Brutus
 l. 11. c. 10 the other Consul was no less successful against the
 —14. Heturians and Falisci.
 Zonar.

The Interrex L. Postumius Megellus, in the assembly wherein he presided, nominated himself Consul; which had no example, except Appius Claudius, whose conduct in that respect had been universally condemned.

Liv. l. 27.
c. 6.
Ib. l. 3.
c. 35.

L. POSTUMIUS, III.

C. JUNIUS BRUTUS.

A. R. 461.
Ant. C.
291.

Postumius was a proud man, and if we may believe Livy, had already given proofs of his haughtiness, in decreeing himself a triumph against the will of the Senate, and without the consent of the people. He sustained his character in this his third Consulship, and began by expressing great contempt for his colleague. The latter, who was a Plebeian, and a man of a modest and mild disposition, resigned the province of Samnium to him, without insisting upon the constant custom, according to which the provinces ought to have been drawn for by lots.

Dionys. a-
pud Vales.

All this while the plague continued to rage at Rome: this was the third year since it began, and no aid human or divine had abated its violence. We have already seen, that the Senate, after having consulted the books of the Sibyls, had resolved to bring the God Æsculapius to Rome, which could not be executed at that time on account of the wars, in which the commonwealth was engaged. Ten ambassadors were sent this year to fetch that God from Epidaurus to Rome: Epidaurus was a city of Peloponnesus, which passed for the place of his birth. Five miles from that city there was a temple of great fame, erected in honour of this God, and full of rich presents, sent thither by such as believed themselves indebted to Æsculapius for the recovery of their health. The ambassadors were conducted thither. Whilst they were admiring a marble statue of extraordinary magnitude, the work of Thrasymedes, a famous statuary of Paros, a great serpent came suddenly from the inmost part of the temple, and struck all the spectators with astonishment and religious

Liv. Epit.
11.
Val. Max.
l. 8. 2.
Ov. Met.
l. 12.
Auct. de
viris illust.
c. 22.

A. R. 461. religious awe. The priests, with a respectful air and
 Ant. C. tone, cried out, that the God resided in that serpent,
 291. and that he shewed himself from time to time under
 that form, but always for the good of mortals. He
 suffered himself to be seen during two days in the tem-
 ple; and then disappeared. The third, passing thro'
 a croud of spectators seized with admiration and re-
 spect, he went forwards directly to the port where the
 Roman galley lay, and having entered it, he placed
 himself in the cabin of Q. Ogulnius, the principal of
 the ambassadors, and continued there, after having
 folded himself in several circles from his tail to his
 head.

The Romans, highly pleased with the success of
 their voyage, and believing they had the God himself
 with them, set sail, and in a few days arrived happily
 at Antium. There, as the sea ran very high in effect
 of bad weather, which came on unexpectedly, and
 would not admit them to proceed on their voyage, the
 serpent, which during the whole passage had continued
 in the same place quiet and without any motion, glided
 to the porch of a very famous temple in that city.
 The place was planted with myrtles and palm trees,
 round one of which he twined himself, and continued
 hanging there by the long folds of his tail during three
 days. The Romans were in great alarm, lest they
 should not be able to make him quit that place; be-
 cause during the whole time he refused to take his
 usual nourishment. But he soon put an end to their
 disquiet by returning to the galley, and at last arrived
 at Rome. The joy on that account was universal.
 People came from all quarters of the city in crouds to
 see a sight so new, and which they could scarce con-
 ceive. Altars were erected on the side of the Tiber
 where he passed, incense burnt, and victims sacrificed.
 When the ship arrived at the place where the Tiber
 divides itself into two branches, and forms an isle, the
 serpent quitted it, and swam into that isle, after which
 he was seen no more. The Senators, concluding that
 the God had chosen that place for his abode, order-
 ed

ed a temple to be built there to Æsculapius : and at the same instant the plague ceased. This temple afterwards became very famous, and the magnificent presents with which it was enriched, denoted, shall I say the gratitude, or stupid credulity, of those who pretended to have been cured by invoking this God of medicine. I leave the reader to conjecture how much fraud must have been employed in this voyage of a serpent attended with so many wonders. The Abbot Tillemont, in the life of Marcus Aurelius, mentions an impostor who tamed serpents. His life is related at large in Lucian.

A. R. 461.
Ant. C.
291.

In Phi-
lospseud.

The Consul Postumius carried the same pride with him into his province, as he had shewn in the city in respect to his colleague. Fabius Gurgus, who had been Consul the year before, actually commanded in Samnium by order of the Senate in quality of Proconsul. Postumius wrote to him, " To quit his province as soon as possible : that himself was sufficient for the war there, and that he had no occasion for aid." Fabius replied, " he desired him to reflect, that having received his powers from the Senate, he could not quit the province without their order." This answer did not satisfy the Consul. When advice came to Rome of what had passed, it was apprehended that the misunderstanding of the generals might be pernicious to the public. Deputies were therefore sent to the Consul, to declare to him it was the intention of the Senate, that Fabius should remain in Samnium with his army. Far from complying with that order, Postumius is said to have explained himself in terms scarce credible. He was so bold as to say, " That as long as he should be Consul, it was not for him to obey the Senate, but for the Senate to submit to him." And to make good what he said by his actions, having dismissed the deputies, he marched his army immediately to Cominium, which Fabius was actually besieging, with the resolution to employ force against him, if he could not oblige him to retire by other means,

Freinsh.
l. 11. c. 15.
Dionys. &
Diod. a-
pud Valef.

A. R. 461.
Ant. C.
291.

The Roman armies would have exhibited a woeful scene to the enemy, if Fabius had determined to defend himself in the same manner he was attacked. But as he was naturally mild and moderate, and still more confirmed in that disposition on the present occasion by the salutary advice of his father, after having declared that he gave way, not to the Consul's phrenzy, but the public utility, he quitted the province. Some few days after, Postumius took Cominium. From thence he led his army to Venusia, and took that also. He did as much by several other places, which were either carried by assault, or surrendered by capitulation. In this expedition the enemy had ten thousand men killed, and above six thousand surrendered themselves to the victor, after having laid down their arms.

The Consul's actions were certainly great and important, but he spoiled them by a pride and self-sufficiency, that were quite ridiculous. He wrote the Senate an account of all he had done in Samnium, and told them that Venusia and the adjacent country was a very proper place for a colony. His proposal was approved, but the execution of it confided to others, without any mention of the Consul. A colony of twenty thousand men was sent thither, a number which might appear improbable, if amongst a people not to be subjected, and always ready to revolt, the Senate had not judged it necessary to send a considerable number of citizens, in order to keep them in awe, and to prevent them from rebelling.

Freinsh.
xi. 18.

For the rest, as the capricious and insolent disposition of Postumius had very much conduced to render him universally odious to all orders of the state; on the other hand, by way of contrast, it had not a little contributed to recommend Fabius to their favour. When he returned to Rome, and had given an account of the success of his campaigns, a triumph over the Samnites called Pentri was very willingly granted him.

Its

Its * finest ornament was Fabius the elder, who followed his son's chariot on horseback, with a more sensible joy to see him in that condition, in the midst of the applauses and acclamations of the people, than when entering Rome himself in triumph after his glorious victories, he carried the same Fabius, whilst an infant, by his side in his chariot, and seemed then forming him for his future greatness. The Consul distributed half the spoils to the troops, and caused the rest to be carried into the public treasury. Caius Pontius, general of the Samnites, who was led in this triumph with his hands tied behind him, was afterwards executed. He was a great Captain, who had long made head against the Romans, and had occasioned the excessive disgrace they had sustained at the pass of Caudium. He gave an illustrious testimony of the disinterestedness of the Romans of his age, in saying, † “ That if he had been born in times, when the Romans had learnt to take presents, he would have made the term of their power of short duration.”

A. R. 461.
Ant. C.
291.

Postumius, as much incensed at the honours granted Fabius, as at the refusal of those he had demanded in vain, seemed to make it his business to offend the Senate more and more. He vented his rage against his enemies with insult, and indifferently attacking both orders of the State, to mortify the Senate, he distributed all the spoils he had taken amongst the soldiers, and disbanded his army before it was possible to send him a successor. It is believed by some, and with sufficient probability, that what we have related of Postumius's triumph against the will of the Senate, in his second Consulship, should be placed here. However that were, he had no sooner quitted his offices, than two Tribunes cited him to a trial before the people. Besides the grievances of which we have spoke,

Dionys.
apud Val.

Liv. l. 10.
c. 37.

* Idem triumphantis currum, equo insidens, sequi, quem ipse parvulum triumphis suis gestaverat, in maxima voluptate posuit! nec accessor gloriose illius pompæ, sed auctor spectatus est. VAL. MAX. 5. 7.

† Si in ea tempora natus esset, quibus munera accipere Romani didicissent; se illos diutius imperare non fuisse passurum. CIC. de Offic. ii. 22.

A. R. 461. he was accused " of having employed on his own
 Ant. C. lands, before he took the field, two thousand legion-
 291. ary soldiers, forgetting they were soldiers, and not his
 slaves, and that they were confided to his command,
 not to improve his lands, but to acquire new ones for
 the public." The Tribunes in general declared against
 him, and fined him 500,000 Asses, which may be
 reckoned about twelve hundred and fifty pounds
 sterling.

A. R. 462. P. CORNELIUS RUFINUS.
 Ant. C. M'. CURIUS DENTATUS.
 290.

Liv. Epist. Under these Consuls, the Samnites, forced by the
 11. laying waste of their country, sent to ask peace of
 Flor. 1. 15. Curius, who permitted them to send deputies to Rome.
 Velleius 1. He also obliged the Sabines, who had taken arms, to
 14. have recourse to the clemency of the Roman People.
 They not only renewed the ancient treaty with them;
 but conferred the freedom of the city also upon them,
 though not with the right of suffrage. Curius obtain-
 ed a double triumph, after which he retired to his
 farm.

It was * at this time, that the Samnites, who had
 taken Curius for their patron and protector, deputed
 the principal persons of their nation to him, and offer-
 ed him considerable presents, to induce him to assist
 them with his credit in the Senate, in order to their
 obtaining favourable conditions of peace. They found
 him by the fire in his little house in the country, sit-
 ting upon a stool, and eating his dinner out of a
 wooden dish. It is easy to conceive that the feast and
 equipage suited each other. There † was nothing ad-

* M' Curius, exactissima norma Romanæ frugalitatis, idemque for-
 titudinis perfectissimum specimen, Samnitium legatis agresti se in scam-
 no assidentem foco, atque ligneo catillo cenantem (quales epulas ap-
 paratus indicio est) spectandum præbuit, &c. VAL. MAX. iv. 1.

Curio ad focum sedenti magnum auri pondus Samnites cum attulif-
 sent, repudiati ab eo sunt. Non enim aurum habere præclarum sibi
 videri dixit, sed iis qui haberent aurum imperare. CIC. de Senect. 55.

† Qui domum intraverit, nos potius miretur, quam supellectilem
 nostram. SENECA. Epist. 5.

mirable

mirable in this house, besides the master. After having opened the purpose of their deputation to him, they offered him the gold and silver which their state had ordered them to deliver into his hands. They knew Curius very little. He answered them in obliging terms, but absolutely refused their presents; and added with a greatness of soul truly worthy of a Roman, "That he thought it glorious, not to possess gold himself, but to command those that did." Such * was at that time the character of the Romans. In private life, they carried their simplicity and modesty so far, as not to blush at, or more properly, to glory in poverty: in public they sustained the honour of their offices with a dignity, and even loftiness, that seemed to denounce the future Masters of the Universe. This great man, the terror of the enemies of his country, and the admiration of his age, had for his whole estate a little farm of seven acres of land, as appears †; for he was not afraid to say in full assembly, that a man who was not contented with seven acres, was a pernicious citizen. Would one venture to compare the magnificent palaces of those great Lords, in which commonly nothing great is to be seen, but their pomp and vanity, with the cottage of Curius? for so that poor little habitation may well be called in my opinion. Cato went expressly to visit that house, which was in the country of the Sabines, near his own estate, and was never tired of contemplating it with an admiration mingled with respect, and a warm desire to imitate its master.

A. R. 462.
Ant. C.
299.

* Hæc ratio ac magnitudo animorum in majoribus nostris fuit, ut cum in privatis rebus suisque sumptibus minimo contenti, tenuissimæ cultu viverent; in imperio atque in publica dignitate omnia ad gloriam splendoremque revocarent. Quæritur enim in re domestica continentia laus; in publica dignitatis. Cic. pro Flacco, n. 28.

† Manii quidem Curii, post triumphos immensamque terrarum adjectum imperio, nota concio est, "Perniciosum intelligo civem, cui septem jugera non essent satis." PLIN, Nat. 18. 2.

A. R. 463.
Ant. C.
289.

M. VALERIUS CORVINUS.

Q. CÆDICUS NOCTUA.

Liv. Epit.
11.
Vell. I. 14.

Three cities received colonies; Castrum, Adria, † which has given its name to the Adriatic Sea, and Sena in the territory of the Gauls. Other writers date the settling of these colonies later.

Three officers were now instituted to try criminal affairs, and to preside at executions: They were called Triumviri Capitales.

In the Census made this year, the citizens amounted to two hundred and seventy-three thousand men.

Plin. Hist.
Nat. 7.41.

Q. Fabius Maximus was chosen Prince of the Senate. His father Fabius Ambustus had the same honour before, as his son Fabius Gurgus had after him: an extraordinary distinction, and observed by history of this illustrious house, to produce three Princes of the Senate successively from father to son in this manner.

A. R. 464.
Ant. C.
288.

Q. MARCIUS TREMULUS II.

P. CORNELIUS ARVINA II.

Every thing was quiet enough at this time abroad; but violent troubles began to break out at home in respect to the debts. (I shall treat that subject at the end of this section.) Appius Claudius, afterwards surnamed Cæcus, was created Dictator, in order to find some remedy for this evil. These troubles ran highest the year following.

A. R. 465.
Ant. C.
287.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

C. NAUTIUS.

Freinsh.
xi. 24--30.
Val. Max.
6. 1.
Dion. ap.
Vales.
Liv. Ep.
11.

The cruelty, and horrible lust of a private person, occasioned the tumult that arose under these Consuls. Veturius, son of the Consul of the same name, who had been delivered up to the Samnites after the treaty

* It is doubted whether it be this Adria situate in Picenum, or another in the country of the Veneti, which gave its name to the Adriatic Sea.

of the Furcæ Caudinæ, had been reduced by poverty to borrow money at large interest, which he was not able to pay his creditor, C. Plotius. He was delivered up to him, according to the barbarous custom of those times, which had often been condemned by the laws, but always ineffectually. That infamous usurer, not contented with exacting from the son of a Consul all the services of a slave, was for doing him bestial violence. The young Roman rejecting his shameful solicitations with horror, was cruelly scourged with rods : but having found means to escape out of prison, he went and presented himself before the Tribunal of the Consuls, attended with a croud of People, whom his sad condition had drawn together after him. The recent marks of the lashes he had received, were still visible upon his back. The Consuls, moved at so sad a spectacle, immediately made their report of it to the Senate, who committed Plotius to prison, and ordered all that were in custody for debt to be enlarged. Something of the like nature had already happened some years before.

A. R. 465.
Ant. C. 1
287.

Liv. 1. 8.
28.

The people, seeing they confined themselves to such slight punishments for such enormous crimes, were not satisfied, and murmured loudly against the Senate, for not going to the root of the evils ; for which purpose they were for having debts abolished in general. Animated by their Tribunes, they resolved to do themselves justice, quitted the city, and retired to mount Janiculum, determined not to re-enter Rome, till satisfaction was made them.

M. VALERIUS POTITUS.

C. ÆLIUS PÆTUS.

A. R. 466.
Ant. C.
286.

As the Senate relied little upon the new Consuls, recourse was had to the remedy usually employed in the last extremities, that is to say, to a Dictator. Q. Hortensius was nominated. He was a man that knew how to soften the rigid authority of his office with all the lenitives of a wise condescension. He

A. R. 466. knew, that one of the principal subjects of the People's
 Ant. C. discontent was the violation of the law Publilia, passed
 286. the 416th year of Rome, and the open contempt of
 their ordinances (Plebiscita). Whatever resistance he
 found in the Senate, he passed a new law to confirm
 That of which we have just spoke, which was in sub-
 stance, "That the whole Commonwealth should be
 held to observe the ordinances passed in the assemblies
 of the People." (A law to the same effect had been
 twice passed already, but always violated.) Though
 this was no great matter, the People were contented
 with it, and returned into the city, without having
 effected any thing for the present in respect to the
 debtors.

Liv. l. 3.
 c. 56, &
 l. 8. c. 12.

Unity being thus restored, the Dictator was taken
 with a sudden and violent disorder, occasioned, in all
 appearance, by the excessive pains and trouble, which
 the reconciliation of the two orders of the state had
 cost him, and died in the exercise of his office, a thing
 hitherto without example.

Ibid. l. 8.
 c. 12.

It is believed, that about this time a law concerning
 the suffrages was also passed. Anciently, the ordi-
 nances of the People had not the force of laws, till
 they were approved and confirmed by the Senate. In
 the year of Rome 416, it was ordained by the law
 Publilia, that before the People proceeded to give
 their suffrages, the Senate should previously give their
 consent and ratification to whatever should be institut-
 ed. It was manifestly the non-observance of this law
 that obliged its being renewed at this time. The Tri-
 bune Mænius proposed and passed it. It very much
 augmented the power of the People, but gave a mortal
 wound to the authority of the Senate, and at the
 same time to the wisdom of the government, and the
 public good.

Liv. Epit.
 11.

A war opportunely enough broke out at this time,
 first with the Volsinians, a people of Hetruria, which
 served to stifle entirely the remains of the division that
 had disturbed the tranquillity of Rome: and next
 with the Lucanians. The latter was occasioned as

follows. This people, whose neighbourhood their power and little respect for laws and justice rendered dangerous, obliged the inhabitants of Thurium, a city built out of the ruins of, and very near, the ancient Sybaris, by repeated injuries to have recourse to the protection of the Romans. War was declared against them. It is conjectured, that the success was in favour of the people of Thurium, because they erected a statue to the Tribune Ælius, who had induced the people to take their defence upon them.

A. R. 466.
Ant. C.
286.

S E C T. III.

Important war with the Gauls called Senones. Murder of the Roman ambassadors. Army of Cæcilius defeated by the Senones. Ruin of that people. Samnites conquered. War with the Tarentines: occasion of it. Their insults of the Romans. Romans again insulted by the Tarentines. War declared against them. They call in Pyrrhus King of Epirus to their aid, who sends them some troops. He soon after lands at Tarentum, having first suffered a rude storm. He puts an end to the idle and voluptuous life of the inhabitants. Horrid murder of all the citizens of Rhegium. Battle between the Consul Levinus and Pyrrhus. The latter is victorious by the means of his elephants. New troops are sent to Levinus. Pyrrhus approaches Rome: he is obliged to return directly. Character of that prince. Rome sends ambassadors to Pyrrhus concerning the prisoners. Instead of a mere exchange, the King proposes a peace. His private conversation with Fabricius. Feast given the ambassadors. They return to Rome. Pyrrhus sends Cineas thither, to treat of peace. The Senate deliberates upon the offers of Pyrrhus. Appius Claudius prevents a peace from being concluded. The Senate's lofty and noble answer. Return of Cineas to Tarentum.

A. R. 467.
Ant. C.
285.

C. CLAUDIUS CANINA.

M. ÆMILIUS LEPIDUS.

A. R. 468.
Ant. C.
284.

C. SERVILIUS TUCCA.

L. CÆCILIUS METELLUS.

Preparations were making for an important war with the Senones, a people of Gaul, settled on the coast of the Adriatic sea. They had been ten years at peace with the Romans, from the battle wherein Decius had devoted himself, and they had been defeated, except in having suffered the Hetrurians under-hand to raise troops amongst them.

A. R. 469.
Ant. C.
283.

P. CORNELIUS DOLABELLA.

C. DOMITIUS CALVINUS.

reinsh.

12. C. 1.

These two Consuls marched, the first against the Volsinians, and the other into Lucania. The Gauls declared themselves openly this year. They entered Hetruria with a more numerous army than ever, and formed the siege of Arretium. The inhabitants of that city were in alliance with the Romans. They applied to them as against a common enemy. The name of the Gauls had left a strong impression of terror in Rome, and no war with them was neglected. The deputies in consequence carried back a favourable answer, and the assurance of speedy aid.

But the Romans, that they might have nothing to reproach themselves with, began by sending ambassadors to the Gauls, to represent, "That the Arretini were under the protection of Rome; and that the Gauls being engaged in a treaty with the Roman people, justice required, that they should not employ their troops against the friends and allies of Rome." Whilst the ambassadors were going about to the towns of the Senones, one Britomaris of the royal family, an hot and violent young prince, whose father aiding the Hetrurians had been killed in a battle by the Romans, prompted by an inordinate desire of revenge, stopped the

the embassadors, killed them, and cut their bodies in pieces, and having even torn their ornaments and the marks of their dignity to rags, he scattered both about the country. This was a terrible declaration of war.

A. R. 469
Ant. C.
283.

It had not been thought proper at first to recal the Consuls from their provinces, and Metellus, Consul the year before, and now Prætor, had been charged with the command of the aid sent the Arretini. But when the news of the barbarous treatment of the embassadors by the Gauls, arrived in the city on one side, and in the Consul Dolabella's camp on the other, every body was seized with a kind of fury. Dolabella, leaving the Hetrurians, advanced by long marches with his army, cross the countries of the Sabines and Picenum, towards the frontiers of the Senones. The latter, who did not expect that irruption, and had not assembled all their troops, making head against Dolabella with a small number, and in disorder, were soon defeated and cut to pieces. The Consul did not give them time to look about them. He burnt the towns, destroyed the houses, ravaged the lands, put all to the sword who were of age to bear arms, carried off the women, children, and old men, and reduced almost the whole country to a frightful solitude. Britomaris did not escape the just vengeance due to his barbarous cruelty. He was made to suffer a thousand tortures, previously to his being led in triumph, after which he was put to death.

The fortune of arms was very different before Arretium. The Prætor Cæcilius having given the Senones and Hetrurians battle, his army was cut in pieces, himself left upon the spot with seven legionary Tribunes, and abundance of other brave officers: above thirteen thousand men were lost in this action.

This victory, as considerable as it was, did not console the Gauls for the ruin and desolation of their country, which was almost reduced into a desert by the irruption of the Romans. Transported with rage and fury, after having drawn together all their troops

A. R. 469.
Ant. C.
283. dispersed in Hetruria, they set out furiously to besiege Rome, in hopes of surprizing, and treating it as their ancestors had formerly done, when they marched against it from Clusium, a city of Hetruria as well as Arretium. Happily for Rome, as they were to pass through none but countries of the enemy, the obstacles they met with stopped the rapidity of their progress considerably, and gave the Romans time to take the necessary measures for giving them a good reception.

But they did not go so far as Rome. They met the Consul Domitius on their route, gave him battle, and were entirely defeated. Those who escaped the slaughter, in their fury and grief turned their arms against each other, and fell by their own hands. Thus was the impious and barbarous murder of the Roman ambassadors avenged by the total ruin and extirpation of a people not long before so numerous and powerful. As to the sad remains of the Senones, who had retired in no great number into the country of the Boii their neighbours, and Gauls also, this same year they were cut to pieces by the Consul Dolabella in a battle fought near the lake of Vadimon against the Boii and Hetrurians, whom the Senones had engaged to take arms in their quarrel. Those people, that is to say, the Boii and Hetrurians, were again defeated the year following.

It seems probable enough, that about this time the Romans became masters of the whole country formerly possessed by the Senones, and that nation being almost entirely extirpated in that part of Italy, that a colony was settled at Sena, a city of the Gauls, otherwise called Senogallia.

A. R. 470.
Ant. C.
282.

Q. ÆMILIUS.
C. FABRICIUS.

Val Max.
l. 1. c. 8. The Samnites, supported by the Lucanians and Bruttians, began the war again. They were entirely defeated in a battle, wherein the Romans believed that the God Mars assisted them in person. Twenty thousand

thousand of the enemy were killed in it, and five thousand taken, with the general, and twenty ensigns.

A. R. 470.

Ant. C.

282.

The inhabitants of Tarentum had not declared themselves openly hitherto against the Romans, tho' they saw their power perpetually augmenting, and extending itself as far as them, with abundance of fear and anxiety. They contented themselves with aiding their enemies underhand, by permitting them to raise troops in their territory, which they would not see.

Liv. Epit.

12.

Flor. l. 1.

c. 18.

Zonar.

Tarentum was a Greek colony, founded anciently by the Lacedæmonians, and was considered as the principal city of Calabria, Apulia, and Lucania. It was situated at the bottom of the gulph which bears its name, exercised commerce in all the neighbouring seas, and had a free trade with Istria, Illyria, Epirus, Achaia, Africa, and Sicily. It had amassed infinite riches, which were the source, as is usual, of incredible luxury, voluptuousness, and depravity of manners. A very judicious writer, of great authority, says, that there were more festivals, solemn games, and public feasts, in this city than days in the year. Its buildings were of extraordinary magnificence, especially a vast theatre, situated near the port, and facing the sea. This theatre occasioned in some measure the ruin of the power of Tarentum, by an accident which gave birth to the war with the Romans.

Strab. l. 6.

p. 280.

The Tarentines were celebrating games in this great theatre, when L. Valerius, who commanded the Roman fleet (*Duumvir navalis*) appeared with ten vessels, and was preparing to enter the port. Philocharis, a man of great power in the city, but so depraved in his manners, that the surname of Thais the famous courtesan had been given him, distinguished himself on this occasion. Pretending I know not what treaty, by which the Romans were prohibited sailing beyond the Lacinian promontory, he cried out, "It is necessary to oppose with vigour, and to humble the insolent pride of these Barbarians." The multitude, always feasting, always drunk, and incapable of any cool deliberation, applauded this discourse, and acted

Appian.

apud Fulv.

Ursin.

A. R. 470. in conformity to it. Vessels were immediatly put to
 Ant. C. sea. The Romans, who expected nothing less than
 282. a battle, fled. Five of their galleys escaped the pursuit of the Tarentines; the other five, surrounded on all sides, were driven into the port. Four of those galleys, with Valerius the commander of the fleet, were sunk, and the fifth taken. All who were capable of bearing arms were put to the sword, and the rest sold for slaves.

In the same furious disposition, they advanced against the inhabitants of Thurii, accusing them of having called in the Romans, and imputing to them as a treason to the state, "That being Greeks by origin, they had chose rather to call in a barbarous nation to their aid, than the Tarentines, to whom they were attached by the proximity of country as well as blood." The city was taken and plundered; the principal inhabitants were banished; and the Roman garrison had their lives saved, and were dismissed according to the terms of the capitulation.

When this news was brought to Rome, though the indignation of the People was proportioned to the insult they had received, however, to do nothing precipitately, and not to engage imprudently in a new war, it was thought proper to send ambassadors to carry the complaints of the Commonwealth to the Tarentines, and to demand, "That the prisoners should be restored; that what had been taken from the inhabitants of Thurii, or at least an equivalent, according to a just estimate, should be restored to them; that the exiles should be recalled; and that the authors of all these troubles should be delivered up to the Romans." The Tarentines, according to the custom of the Greeks, used to hold their assembly in the theatre. The ambassadors found it very difficult to gain admittance into it. When they entered, they found almost the whole multitude in a foolish kind of merriment, the effect of wine and debauch: for it was an holiday and a day of feasting. As soon as Postumius, the principal ambassador, began to speak,
 the

the whole assembly fell into an indecent laughter, and would scarce vouchsafe him the hearing. If any expression, that was not pure Greek, happened to escape him, which ought to have been no wonder from a stranger, new horse-laughes were heard on all sides: he was treated as an ignorant Barbarian: in short, they carried their insolence to such an excess, that without any regard to the law of nations, they drove the ambassadors out of the theatre with ignominy. Their phrenzy did not stop here. As the Romans were retiring through a great croud of the populace, who had assembled at the gates of the Theatre, a comedian or buffoon, called Philonides (for his name is preserved as a man of importance, whilst those of the principal persons of Tarentum are not known) coming up to them, had the insolence to urine upon their robes, which the whole Theatre applauded. "You may laugh now," cried Postumius; "but your mirth shall soon be changed into sorrow, and the spots in our garments washed out in your blood." Without any other answer they returned to Rome, where they found the new Consuls already entered upon office.

A. R. 470.
Ant. C.
282.

L. ÆMILIUS BARBULA.

Q. MARCIUS PHILIPPUS.

A. R. 471.
Ant. C.
281.

Upon the report made first in the Senate, and afterwards before the People, of the injurious treatment of the Roman ambassadors by the Tarentines, war was declared against them, and orders were given the Consul Æmilius, who had already set out for Samnium, to postpone all other affairs, and march against the Tarentines; and, if they did not make immediate and entire satisfaction, to attack them with the utmost vigour. Tarentum then began to open its eyes, like one after long drunkenness, and deep sleep. The enemy was advancing with a numerous army of good troops. It was therefore necessary to declare themselves, and come to an immediate resolution: that

Freinfh.
12. 10--26.

A. R. 471. is to say, either to determine upon a war with a power-
 Ant. C. ful and exasperated enemy, in which they saw great
 6281. inconveniences, and the more because they had made
 no manner of preparations for it; or come into the
 satisfaction required, which would be extremely shameful
 and mortifying. They deliberated and wavered a
 great while between these two points, for there was
 no medium to choose, without being able to resolve
 on either, because they found unmountable diffi-
 culties in both. At last, one of the assembly rising
 up, represented, "That they were much in the
 wrong to lose time in vain deliberations, without con-
 cluding any thing. That it was clear, unless people
 were wilfully blind, and had renounced all sense of
 honour, that the peace, as proposed by the Romans,
 ought to be considered as a shameful slavery, to which
 death itself was preferable. That consequently there
 was but one choice to make, which was war. That
 it must indeed be confessed, that they wanted a gene-
 ral to oppose against such enemies as the Romans, and
 to conduct an enterprize of such importance, without
 which they could not promise themselves good suc-
 cess: but that the thing was not without a remedy.
 Plut. in That it was necessary to seek that abroad, which they
 Pyrrhus, p. had not at home. That their ancestors on like occa-
 390, 391. sions had called in at different times from Peloponne-
 sus and Sicily the aid of Archidamus the son of Age-
 filaus, Cleonymus, Agathocles, and last of all, of
 Alexander of Epirus. That this latter country seemed
 to offer them such a general as they might desire, in
 the person of Pyrrhus, a very powerful, valiant and
 warlike prince, and one who was always ready to as-
 sist such as had recourse to him. That he would be
 the more inclined to comply, as it was not long since
 themselves had aided him with a considerable fleet
 against the Corcyreans." This advice pleased the as-
 sembly extremely. There was in the city a man of
 fine wit and great sense, called Meton. Upon the
 rumour of what passed in the Theatre, he came thi-
 ther with a crown of flowers carelessly put together on
 his

his head, and a torch in his hand, attended by a female minstrel. The Tarentines immediately began some to clap their hands, and others to laugh heartily. They ordered the She-musician to play, and bade Meton come into the midst of the assembly, and give them a song. The genius of a nation may be seen in a single circumstance of this kind. As soon as silence was made, Meton, instead of singing, spoke thus with a loud voice: “ Men of Tarentum, you are much in “ the right not to hinder such as are willing to be merry, “ and go about in masquerade, whilst it is in their “ power. And you yourselves, if you are wise, will “ make merry also, and enjoy a liberty whilst you “ may, which will be of short duration. For I give “ you notice, that as soon as Pyrrhus arrives here, “ you will have quite different affairs upon your hands. “ You must alter your manners, mend your conduct, “ and resolve to lead a new kind of life.” Those who were afraid of being delivered up to the Romans, if a peace were concluded, observing that this discourse made impression upon the people, fell in a body upon Meton, and drove him out of the assembly. The decree passed. It was unanimously resolved to call in Pyrrhus, and immediately ambassadors were appointed to propose the affair to him in the name of the Tarentines, and several other states in the neighbourhood.

Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, was of all the princes of his time the greatest Captain, and the boldest in forming enterprizes. He might have lived happy and quiet in his own dominions: but the warmth and impetuosity of his genius, and an ambition always restless and craving, could not bear inaction and repose, and required to be always in motion themselves, and in consequence to keep others so. The ambassadors sent not only from the Tarentines, but from all the Greeks of Italy, arrived in Epirus with magnificent presents for Pyrrhus. They had orders to tell him, that they wanted only a Leader of wisdom, experience, and reputation: that they had sufficient numbers

A. R. 471.
Ant. C.
281.

A. R. 471.
Ant. C. 281. bers of good troops, and that the forces alone of the Lucanians, Messapians, Samnites and Tarentines, when drawn together, composed an army of three hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse. It is easy to conceive how much such a proposal pleased Pyrrhus; who already promised himself the conquest of the whole country he was called in to aid. But the better to conceal his ambitious designs, he made use of artifice and dissimulation. Having received the ambassadors with great honour, he heard their proposal with coldness; he insisted strongly upon the inconveniencies he should be exposed to in quitting his dominions, and expressed his grief that it was not in his power to repay his friends and allies the Tarentines a service he had not long before received from them. This answer put the ambassadors into a consternation. They redoubled their instances, and pressed him still more warmly than they had done before. He suffered himself to be prevailed upon, and concluded the treaty, but insisted upon a condition to be inserted amongst the rest, that he should be detained in Italy for as short a time as possible. The Epirots readily came into this new project of their prince, and conceived a warm desire, and violent passion for this war.

Cic. de
divin. 11.
116.

If the poet Ennius may be believed, Pyrrhus, before he engaged in the war with the Romans, consulted the oracle of Delphi, to know the success of it. He was deceived by the ambiguity of the answer, which equally signified that Pyrrhus could conquer the Romans, and the Romans Pyrrhus.

Sio te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse.

Cicero proves clearly enough that this answer is an invention; and adds, that in his time the oracle of Delphi was fallen into supreme contempt.

During this interval the Roman Consul arrived. As the Tarentines made no overtures of peace to him, and he knew on the contrary, that they had sent an embassy to Pyrrhus, he began by ravaging their country,

try, took several places from them, and spread terror on all sides. Troops were sent from Tarentum to oppose the enterprizes of the Romans. They were several times beaten, and repulsed with loss into the city. The ravaging of the lands was begun again. Every thing was put to fire and sword, and the houses consumed by the flames were seen smoaking on all sides in the country. The desolation of Tarentum was excessive, and as the multitude are no less abject and timorous in adversity, than domineering and insolent in prosperity, they gave the command to Agis, who had always been for accommodating with the Romans. Some of the principal persons of Tarentum, who had been taken prisoners, and set at liberty by the Consul, related the great goodness with which the Romans had treated themselves and the rest of the prisoners, which augmented the desire and hope the people had of obtaining a favourable peace from them; and the whole city inclined to that way of thinking.

The arrival of Cineas made all these thoughts of peace and accommodation vanish. He was the confident, counsellor, and prime minister of Pyrrhus, and who before this expedition had the famous conversation with him known to every body, upon the happiness and tranquillity he might enjoy in his own dominions. I have repeated it elsewhere. Pyrrhus, in consequence of the treaty which he had lately concluded, sent him to the Tarentines with three thousand foot. As soon as he arrived, the command was taken from Agis, and given to one of those who had been sent ambassadors to Pyrrhus.

Some small time after, the King sent Milo to Tarentum, who put a good garrison into the citadel, and offered to take upon him the guarding of the walls, which the multitude accepted with great joy, charmed to be eased of all care and trouble by strangers. It was decreed, that the soldiers should have great pay, and that the King should be supplied with all the money he should have occasion for.

A. R. 471.
Ant. C.
281.

The Consul having received advice of the arrival of the troops from beyond sea, conceived thoughts of marching his army into Lucania, in order to settle them in winter-quarters there. There was but one way thither, and that very narrow, with the sea on one side, and steep impassable rocks on the other. The Tarentines informed of his design, had sent ships to the coast of the sea, full of balistas, scorpions, and other machines of war, by the means of which they poured a shower of stones and darts upon the foldiers as they passed, without its being possible for them to avoid them. The Consul had but one remedy for this unhappy inconvenience: this was to place the prisoners he had with him, who were before in the rear, upon the flank of his army towards the sea. The Tarentines, not to destroy their countrymen with the enemy, ceased discharging their machines, and retired. This is almost every thing that passed in the territory of Tarentum.

At Rome great care was taken in levying the troops for the following year, when the Commonwealth was to have several armies on foot; and in order to that, they began now for the first time, to list such of the citizens, as composing the last century, and having no income, were exempt from bearing arms: these were called Proletarii. But all these precautions would not have preserved Rome from the misfortunes with which it was threatened, if Providence had not reserved great men for these times, and it may perhaps be said, the greatest that Rome ever produced, Curius, Fabricius, Coruncanius: great, not by the splendor of birth, riches or pomp, but their abilities in military affairs, and still more by their probity, of proof against all things. And indeed, against a prince, who equally knew how to employ steel for conquering, and gold for corrupting, his enemies; men of invincible valour were necessary, and such as carried their disinterestedness as high as the contempt of riches, and even the love of poverty.

Tarentum was not idle on its side. It sent a great number of flat-bottomed vessels, galleys, and all sorts of transports to Epirus. Pyrrhus embarked twenty elephants, three thousand horse, twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, two thousand archers, and five hundred slingers on board of them. He did not stay for the spring to set out. When all was ready he sailed. He was scarce out at sea, when a dreadful storm arose, which dispersed his fleet, and cruelly tossed the ship he was on board of. At length, after having been violently driven by the tempest during almost the whole night, the wind being much abated, he arrived the next morning on the coast of the Messapians; who flew to give him all the aid in their power. They went also in quest of some of his ships, that had weathered the storm, and in which there were only a small number of horse, and two thousand foot, with two elephants. Pyrrhus having drawn them up in one body, marched with them towards Tarentum.

A. R. 471.
Ant. C.
281.

As soon as Cineas was apprized of his arrival, he set out with his troops to meet him. Pyrrhus, on arriving in Tarentum, was strangely surprized to find the inhabitants solely intent upon their pleasures, to which it was their custom to abandon themselves without reserve or interruption. They expected, that whilst he was fighting for them, they should continue quiet in their houses, employing themselves only in their baths, using the most exquisite perfumes, feasting, and diverting themselves. Pyrrhus concealed his thoughts for some time, and though the people had decreed him the supreme authority, he would not do any thing at first by force, and contrary to the will of the Tarentines, till he had news that his ships were safe, and the greatest part of his army had rejoined him. Finding himself then in a condition to make himself be obeyed, he spoke and acted like master. He deprived them of their feasts, their shews, and their assemblies of news-mongers. He made them take arms, and directed those, who were appointed to make

A.R. 471. make the levies, * to chuse tall well-proportioned
 Ant C. men; that as for him, he would take it upon himself
 281. to make them soldiers. He incorporated them into his own troops, to deprive them of the opportunities of caballing with each other, as they would have done if united together, and to form them in the same exercises. At musters and reviews he was severe and inexorable to all such as were defective in the least: so that there were many, who not being accustomed to so exact a discipline, quitted the city, believing it a condition of insupportable slavery, not to be permitted to live in voluptuousness.

Quint. l. 6. The whole city resounded with bitter complaints
 c. 3. against Pyrrhus. In company and at meals nothing was talked of but the tyrannical rigour of that prince. † Some young Tarentines, in the heat and liberty of wine, having spoke freely all that they thought of Pyrrhus, and the next day being informed against, and obliged to give an account to Pyrrhus himself of their conversation, which they could neither deny nor excuse, escaped by a pleasantry, which came very opportunely into their heads. One of them taking upon himself to speak: "Really, my Lord," said he, "if our bottle had not failed us, we should have done much worse; we should certainly have killed you."

Dio & Diod. apud Val. An event happened at the time of which we are speaking, that might have rendered the Romans extremely odious, though they had no share in it. The inhabitants of Rhegium, a Greek city situated at the extremity of Italy facing Sicily, from which it is separated only by the strait, terrified by the neighbourhood of so powerful a Prince as Pyrrhus, and by the

* Grandes eligerent, se eos fortes redditurum. FRON. Stratag. 6. 1.

† Exemplo sunt juvenes Tarentini qui multa de Pyrrho rege, securius inter cœnam locuti, cùm rationem facti reposcerentur, & neque negari res neque defendi posset, risu sunt & opportuno joco elapsi. Namque unus ex iis: "Imo," inquit, "nisi lagena defecisset occidisset te." Eaque urbanitate tota est invidia criminis dissoluta. QUINCT.

Tam urbana excusatio, tamque simplex veritatis confessio iram regis convertit in risum, VAL. MAX. 5. 1.

Carthaginian fleets, which cruized in those seas, had applied to the Romans. The latter had sent them four thousand men, drawn out of the colonies which the Romans had settled in Campania, under the command of Decius Jubellius, a legionary Tribune. This garrison soon assumed the manners of the inhabitants, who, like all the rest of the cities of that country, were abandoned to pleasures and luxury. They also conceived the design of taking their place, and of seizing their city, with all they possessed: a cruel scheme, which those perfidious wretches executed in a still more barbarous manner, by putting all the citizens to the sword, of whom they had invited the principal to entertainments, and afterwards obliging the wives and daughters to marry the murderers of their husbands and fathers. So enormous a crime did not remain unpunished, as we shall see in the sequel. The important wars which the Romans had upon their hands, undoubtedly prevented them from taking immediate vengeance of it. That care wholly engrossed them. To acquit themselves with honour in them, they elected two Consuls, both of great reputation.

A. R. 471.
Ant. C.
281.

P. VALERIUS LEVINUS.

TIBERIUS CORUNCANIUS.

A. R. 472.
Ant. C.
280.

In the division of the provinces between the Consuls, the war against Pyrrhus and the Tarentines fell to Levinus, and Hetruria to Coruncanius.

Levinus set out without loss of time, and marched in quest of the enemy. Pyrrhus was soon informed that the Consul was in Lucania, where he burned and destroyed every thing. Though he had not yet received the succours from the allies, as he believed it very shameful to suffer the enemy to approach nearer, and to ruin the country almost in his sight, he took the field with the few troops he had. But he sent an herald before him to the Romans, to ask them whether they would not agree, before the war began, to terminate their differences with the Greeks of Italy.

Zonaras.
Plut. p.
292, 293.

A. R. 472. by making him the judge and arbiter of them. The
 Ant. C. Consul Levinus answered the herald, " That the Ro-
 280. mans would neither take Pyrrhus for an arbiter, nor
 " feared him as an enemy." The answer is suffi-
 ciently lofty.

After the King had received it, he advanced with his troops, encamped in the plain between the cities Pandosia and Heraclea, and upon advice that the Romans were very near him, and encamped on the other side of the river Siris, he mounted on horseback, and approached the bank of that river to take a view of their situation. When he saw the appearance of their troops, their advanced guards, the fine order that prevailed universally, and the happy disposition of their camp, he was surprized; and addressing himself to one of his friends who was with him, (for so the ancients spoke, and Kings had friends :) " Megacles," said he, " the dispositions of these Barbarians are by
 " no means barbarous; we shall see how the rest will
 " answer them."

This view of the Roman army, and the security of Levinus, who had dismissed spies surprized in his camp, after having told them, that he had another body of troops still more numerous; all this gave Pyrrhus disquiet. He resolved not to hasten the battle, and to use delays as long as possible, in order to give the allies time to arrive, and to join their troops with his; besides which the Romans being in an enemy's country, a long delay would incommode them considerably, in making them consume their provisions and forage. He contented himself therefore with sending a great detachment to dispute the passage of the river with the Romans, in case they should venture to attempt it.

In the design which Pyrrhus had formed of deferring the battle, it was a great advantage to him, to have the Siris between the Romans and him. For nothing is more difficult than to pass a river in the sight of an enemy, and it is scarce possible to succeed in it, except in deceiving him by stolen marches, and pas-

passing the river at places that are not guarded. An almost certain means to prevent that inconvenience, would have been to have divided the great detachment mentioned before into several small bodies, and to have posted them along the river at proper distances in such a manner, that they might all have re-joined each other at the first signal. This is what was wanting on this occasion, and I have observed, that it is a very common fault. The Consul perceiving that Pyrrhus avoided a battle, made a feint of confining himself, till he could force him to it, to destroying the enemy's country, and for that purpose detached all his cavalry, which ravaged the whole flat country without finding any resistance. When they were a great way from the camp, on a sudden they turned towards the river, forded it, and fell unawares upon Pyrrhus's detachment, which expecting nothing less, fled, regained the gross of the army with precipitation, and left the passage open for the rest of the troops.

Pyrrhus, on this news, was in great perplexity, and ordered the officers of his infantry to draw up their troops in battle as soon as possible, and to wait his orders under arms. In the mean time, he advanced with expedition with all his cavalry, that amounted to about three thousand men, in hopes to surprize the Romans still passing the river with difficulty, and dispersed here and there without order. But when he saw a great number of Roman shields glittering on this side the river, and their cavalry marching against him in fine order, he closed his ranks, and began the attack. He was soon known by the beauty and splendor of his arms, which were very rich, but still more by his valour and intrepidity. He shewed by his actions, that the reputation he had acquired was not above his merit. He engaged in the battle without sparing himself, and beat down all before him: but he did not lose sight of the functions of a general, and in the midst of the greatest perils, retained the utmost coolness, gave his orders as if he had been remote from danger, and flew on all sides to re-instate affairs,

A. R. 472. and support those who were most pressed by the
 Ant. C. enemy.
 280.

In the heat of the action, an Italian horseman with spear in hand, confined himself solely to Pyrrhus, followed him every where with great ardor, and directed all his motions by those of the King. Having found a favourable moment, he aimed a great blow at him, which wounded only his horse. At the same time Leonatus of Macedonia killed the Italian's horse with his pike. The two horses being down, Pyrrhus was immediately surrounded by a croud of his friends who carried him off, and killed the Italian horseman, fighting with great valour. This adventure taught Pyrrhus to use more precaution, and to take more care of his person, than he did: an essential duty in a general, on whose life the fate of an whole army depends.

The King seeing his cavalry give way, sent his infantry orders to advance, and immediately drew it up in battle. It does not seem to have acted till now. Instructed by the danger to which he had just been exposed, by making himself too well known to the enemy by his distinguished armour, he gave his royal mantle and arms to Megacles, one of his friends, and having disguised himself in his, he charged the Romans with vigour. The latter received him with abundance of courage. The battle was very obstinate, and the victory long doubtful. It is said that both sides gave way, and returned to the charge seven times.

Pyrrhus changed his arms very opportunely for saving his life: but on the other side, that change had almost proved fatal to him, and snatched the victory out of his hands. The enemy fell in crouds upon Megacles, whom they took for the King. One of the horse who wounded and laid him upon the earth, after having stripped off the arms and mantle which he wore, rode full speed to the Consul Levinus, and shewed them to him, crying out that he had killed Pyrrhus. Those spoils being carried through all the ranks

ranks in a triumphant manner, filled the whole Roman army with inexpressible joy. Their cries of victory resounded on all sides; whilst the army of the Greeks was in universal consternation and discouragement.

A.R. 472.
Ant. C.
280.

Pyrrhus, who perceived the terrible effect of the mistake, ran through all the lines bareheaded, holding out his hands to his soldiers, and making himself known to them by his voice and gesture. The battle being renewed, the elephants at last principally determined the event of it. Pyrrhus had expressly reserved them to the end. This was the first time the Romans had seen this kind of animals; and every body knows, that * things which strike the senses in a sudden and unforeseen manner, give the mind trouble and terror, because they do not leave it time to examine them coolly. Their extraordinary form, enormous height, the towers full of combatants on their backs, all struck the Romans with dread. The horses were still more frightened, and not being able to bear the smell of them, which was quite new, flung, pranced, and either ran away with their riders, or threw them on the ground. These elephants breaking impetuously into the ranks of the Romans, spread fear on all sides, and crushed and trod down all that came in their way. Pyrrhus seeing them in this condition, charged them on a sudden with his Theffalian horse, which compleated their disorder, and obliged them at length to fly, after having made a great slaughter of them.

Plut. p.
394.

It was agreed, that Pyrrhus might have cut them entirely to pieces, if he had pursued them with more vigour. But his custom was not to push the enemy he had conquered to the utmost, lest their despair in another battle might serve them instead of courage, and prevent them either from flying or surrendering themselves. Besides which, the night,

* Videntur omnia repentina graviora. Tusc. l. 3. c. 28.

A. R. 472. which came on, put a stop to the pursuit, and saved
 Ant. C. those who fled.
 280.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes, according to Plutarch, that there was almost fifteen thousand men killed in this battle on the side of the Romans, and thirteen thousand on that of Pyrrhus. Other historians lessen the loss on both sides. It is certain that Pyrrhus lost the flower of his troops in it. Accordingly when somebody complimented him at his return to Tarentum on this victory: "I am irretrievably undone," said he, "if I gain such another." The next day, when he was considering on the field of battle, the bodies of the Romans, which he had ordered to be buried, to acquire the reputation of goodness and clemency; amazed to see that they had all their faces turned towards the enemy, and had died of glorious wounds, he cried out: "O! how easy it were for me to conquer the world with such soldiers!" He did all that he could, to induce those he had taken prisoners to list in his troops. He could not succeed: but he did not esteem them the less, and treated them with singular humanity, forbidding chains to be put upon them, and ordering that they should not be used with the other severities to which prisoners are commonly exposed.

Pyrrhus seized the camp of the Romans, which he found abandoned, made several cities renounce their alliance, ravaged the countries of the States that continued faithful to them, and approached within three hundred stadia of Rome, that is to say, about fifteen leagues.

The Lucanians and Samnites having joined him after the battle, he warmly reproached them for their delay. But it was easy to perceive in his air that he was infinitely pleased with having defeated only with his own troops and those of the Tarentines, without the aid of the allies, so numerous and warlike an army of the Romans.

Whilst Pyrrhus was industriously taking all the advantages, which he could hope from his victory, Le-
 vinus

vinus on his side was intent upon putting himself into a condition to retrieve his late loss as soon as possible. He visited the wounded, and took particular care of them. He drew together those who had been dispersed in the flight. He consoled all the soldiers, in praising the valour they had shewn in the action; attributing their defeat solely to that unknown species of monsters, against the attack of which it had not been in their power to prepare themselves; and lastly, in giving them hopes of making the enemy's joy short-lived, and of soon washing out in their blood the stain of the last battle, wherein in other respects the loss had been equal on both sides.

A. R. 472.
Ant. C.
289.

The news of this defeat afflicted Rome, but did not abate her courage. Some of the Senators imputed the cause of it to the Consul. Fabricius said, "That he did not reckon the Romans defeated by the Epirots, but Levinus by Pyrrhus." However, far from thinking of recalling him, it was decreed that new troops should be sent him as soon as possible. The levies were made with incredible passion, and two legions soon compleated. They set out without loss of time.

Plut. p.
394.

The Consul, encouraged by so considerable reinforcement, followed Pyrrhus at the heels, lost no occasion to harass his rear-guard, and very much distressed his army. Having been apprized, that he intended to make himself master of Capua, he prevented him by a forced march, and deprived him of all means of putting his design in execution. Pyrrhus turned his views upon Neapolis. But seeing his hopes frustrated in like manner on that side, he sought to console and make himself amends by an enterprize infinitely above all the rest: this was to attack Rome itself. And he lost no time. Having taken Fregellæ on his way, and crossed the countries of Anagnia and the Hernici, he arrived at Præneste, which was but twenty miles from Rome. The city was in no consternation. The magistrates had before provided for its safety. But another more considerable rein-

A. R. 472. Ant. C. 280. forcement arrived opportunely, which made its fecus rity perfect. Coruncanius, the other Consul, after having quitted Hetruria, had been recalled to the aid of his country, and was very near Rome with his victorious army. Pyrrhus having endeavoured ineffectually to make the Hetrurians take arms, and seeing himself between two Consular armies, rightly discerned that there was no safety for him, and marched back into Campania with the utmost expedition.

This expedition of the King of Epirus may give us some faint strokes to guide us in forming an idea of his genius and character. He cannot be denied to have had great qualities: an elevation, a greatness of soul truly royal, a peculiar attention to attaching persons of merit of all kinds to his service, a courage, a boldness, an intrepidity, which nothing could daunt, and which, as we have already observed, left him all his coolness and presence of mind in the greatest dangers, and in the very heat of the warmest actions. He passed undeniably for the most able general of his time in respect to the manner of embattelling an army, the art of encamping, and address in the choice of his posts, in short, to every thing relating to military knowledge and discipline. But he was a Prince of inconceivable levity; abandoned to his imagination; full of projects; always ready both to form new enterprizes, and to renounce them; never failing to flatter himself with good success, whilst the experience of the past did not render him more cautious for the future; and to say all in a word, the perpetual sport of a restless ambition, that drew him on from project to project, from country to country, in holding up to him continually a phantom of power and greatness, which he seemed every moment upon the point of seizing, but which always escaped him, without ever undeceiving or disgusting him.

When Pyrrhus, on his return into Campania, saw the Consul Levinus at the head of an army much more numerous than before his defeat, he was exceedingly surprized. He had conceived thoughts of giving him
battie

battle a second time : but the fight of his troops so considerably augmented, made him change his design, and resume his route to Tarentum.

A. R. 472.
Ant. C.
280.

In the mean time, the Senate deliberated upon the conduct it was necessary to observe in respect to the soldiers who had been taken prisoners in the last battle. It was a maxim of policy at Rome, from which they did not depart even in the most unfortunate times, as we shall see when we come to the battle of Cannæ, not to ransom the soldiers who had surrendered themselves to the enemy out of fear. But the case was different now. Most of the prisoners were of the cavalry, who had given extraordinary proofs of their bravery in the battle, but whom their horses, terrified by the strange sight, noise, and smell of the elephants, had thrown, and made incapable of defence. It was therefore concluded that they should be ransomed, and for that purpose three of the principal Senators were nominated deputies to Pyrrhus. These were P. Cornelius Dolabella, famous for the defeat of the Senones, C. Fabricius Luscinus, and Q. Æmilius Papus, who had been Consuls together two years before.

Pyrrhus being informed, that persons of such importance were deputed to him, believed they undoubtedly came to treat of peace ; which was what he wished extremely. To do them honour, he sent a considerable detachment to the frontier of the country of the Tarentines to escort them as a guard ; and when he knew that they were near, he went himself out of the gates of the city at the head of a body of his cavalry lightly armed, and conducted them to his palace, where they were treated with all possible distinction and magnificence. After the usual compliments, they opened the subject of their commission to the King, and told him they were come to treat concerning the ransom of prisoners, either by paying a certain sum for each, or by way of exchange.

Plut. 395.
397.
Dion. Ha-
licarn. ex-
cerpt. Leg.
P. 744.
748.

It was the custom of Pyrrhus not to conclude any affair of importance without having first communicated

cated

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280.

cated it to his council. Accordingly he assembled them upon this occasion. Milo was of opinion “not to restore the prisoners, to make the utmost of the victory they had gained that could be expected from it, and not to lay down their arms till the Romans were entirely conquered and subjected.” Cineas thought very differently. “Great King,” said he, addressing himself to Pyrrhus, “it is knowing the Romans very ill, to imagine that the blow they have received, has made them either more timorous or tractable. They never shew more constancy and greatness of mind than in adversity. The best counsel therefore, in my opinion, which can be given you, is to employ your wonted generosity on this occasion, to restore them their prisoners without ransom; and then to send ambassadors as soon as possible with magnificent presents, to negotiate a peace with them. You may now do so with honour, and upon advantageous conditions. But, my Lord, suffer me to tell you, you are a man, and things may change: do not let slip so favourable an occasion, perhaps the only one you may have.” The whole council applauded such good advice, and the King came into it.

The deputies were brought in, and Pyrrhus said to them: “You ask me, Romans, to dismiss your prisoners: But to restore you such brave soldiers, would be putting arms into your hands against myself. There is another shorter and more certain method; and that is for us to make a good peace with each other: I shall then restore them to you without ransom. I desire nothing more than to enter into a treaty of alliance and amity with a people so worthy of esteem and respect.” He spoke this in common to all the deputies; and afterwards took Fabricius aside, to discourse with him freely and at leisure.

When they were alone, the King spoke to him to this effect. “From the accounts which I have had of your great qualities, Fabricius, I exceedingly de-
fire,

“ fire, that you should be one of my friends. I am
 “ told that you are a great Captain; that justice and
 “ temperance form your character, and that you pass
 “ for a man accomplished in every virtue. But I
 “ know also, that you have no estate, and that in this
 “ point only Fortune has dealt hardly with you, in
 “ reducing you as to the conveniencies of life to the
 “ condition of the poorest Senators. To supply what
 “ you want on that side, I am ready to give you as
 “ much gold and silver as will set you above the most
 “ opulent persons of Rome. Do not believe I ima-
 “ gine that I do you a favour in this: It is I who
 “ shall receive one if you accept my offers. For I
 “ AM PERSUADED, THAT NO EXPENCE DOES A
 “ PRINCE MORE HONOUR, THAN TO MAKE THE
 “ FORTUNES OF GREAT MEN, REDUCED BY POVER-
 “ TY TO A CONDITION UNWORTHY OF THEIR
 “ MERIT AND VIRTUE, AND THAT SUCH AN USE
 “ IS THE NOBLEST A KING CAN MAKE OF RICHES.
 “ For the rest, I am far from expecting that you
 “ should do me any unjust or dishonourable service by
 “ way of acknowledgment. What I ask of you can
 “ only do you honour, and augment your power in
 “ your country. I conjure you first to assist me
 “ with your whole credit in bringing your Senate
 “ into my views, which I believe just and reasonable.
 “ Represent to them, I beg you, that I have given
 “ my word to aid the Tarentines, and the other Greeks
 “ on this coast of Italy, and that I cannot in honour
 “ abandon them, especially as I am at the head of a
 “ powerful army, with which I have already gained
 “ a battle. However, certain affairs have happened,
 “ that recal me into my own dominions; and this is
 “ what makes me more ardently desire peace. Be-
 “ sides which, I find it difficult to sustain the part I
 “ act here, and to see myself obliged to consider a peo-
 “ ple so worthy of being beloved as enemies. Let
 “ them change that name into friends, and they shall
 “ find a faithful ally in me. If my quality of King
 “ renders me suspected to the Senate, because many
 “ who

A. R. 472.
 Ant. C.
 280.

A. R. 472. “ who bear that name have made no difficulty open-
 Ant. C. 280. “ ly to violate the faith of treaties and alliances, be
 “ you yourself my guarantee, and join with me in
 “ assisting me with your counsels in all my enter-
 “ prizes, and in commanding my armies under me.
 “ I have occasion for a man of virtue, and a faith-
 “ ful friend ; and you, on your side, have occasion
 “ for a prince, who by his liberality may enable you
 “ to give a greater scope to the benevolence of your
 “ inclinations. Let us not refuse ourselves then, but
 “ let us mutually afford our aid to each other.”

Pyrrhus having spoke thus, Fabricius, after a moment's silence, replied in these terms : “ As you
 “ have already so favourable an idea of me, as well
 “ in respect to my personal conduct, as the admi-
 “ nistration of public affairs, it is needless for me to
 “ speak to you of them. You seem also sufficiently
 “ acquainted with my poverty, to spare me the
 “ trouble of telling you, that I have neither money
 “ to improve, nor slaves that bring me in any re-
 “ venue : that my whole estate consists in an house
 “ of little appearance, and a small field that sup-
 “ plies me with subsistence. If you believe how-
 “ ever, that poverty renders my condition inferior
 “ to that of any other Roman, and that whilst I
 “ discharge the duties of an honest man, I am the
 “ less considered, because not of the number of
 “ the rich ; permit me to tell you, that the idea you
 “ have of me is not just, and deceives you, whether
 “ you have taken that opinion from others, or judge
 “ so of yourself. If I do not possess great fortunes, I
 “ never did, and still do not believe, that my indi-
 “ gence has ever done me any prejudice either in
 “ public functions, or my private life.

“ Has my country, on account of my poverty,
 “ ever debarred me of those glorious employments,
 “ that are the object of the emulation of all great
 “ minds ? The greatest dignities are conferred upon
 “ me. I am placed at the head of the most illust-
 “ rious ambassadors. The most sacred functions of
 “ divine

“ divine worship are confided to me. When the most
 “ important affairs are to be deliberated upon, I hold
 “ my rank, and give my opinion in the council :
 “ I take place with the richest and most powerful ;
 “ and if I have any thing to complain of, it is of
 “ being too much praised and honoured. To dis-
 “ charge all these employments, I expend nothing of
 “ my own, no more than all the rest of the Romans.
 “ Rome does not ruin her citizens by raising them to
 “ the magistracy. She bestows upon those in office
 “ all the helps they want, and supplies them with
 “ liberality and magnificence. * For it is not with
 “ our city as with many others, where the public
 “ is very poor, whilst private persons possess im-
 “ mense riches. We are all rich, when the Common-
 “ wealth is so, because she is so for us. In equally
 “ admitting the rich and poor to public employments,
 “ according as she thinks them worthy, she makes
 “ all her citizens equal, and knows no other difference
 “ between them but merit and virtue.

“ As to what concerns my private affairs, far from
 “ complaining of my fate, I esteem myself the most
 “ happy of men, when I compare myself to the rich,
 “ and feel a kind of delight, and even pride, rise up
 “ within me from this condition. My little field,
 “ barren as it is, supplies me with all that is neces-
 “ sary, provided I take due care to cultivate it, and
 “ preserve its fruits. Do I want any thing more ?
 “ All nourishment is grateful to me, when seasoned
 “ with hunger. I drink with luxury, when I am a-
 “ dry. I taste all the sweets of repose when I am
 “ weary. I content myself with an habit that keeps
 “ out the cold : and of all the moveables that serve
 “ for the same use, the meanest are those I like best.
 “ I should be unreasonable and unjust, if I accused
 “ fortune. She supplies me with all that nature re-
 “ quires : as to the superfluous, she has not given it
 “ me : but at the same time I have learnt not to de-

* Privatus illis census erat brevis,
 Commune magnum,

HORAT.

“ fire

A. R. 472. " fire it. To have few wants is great riches. Of
 Ant. C. " what then should I complain? Not having this
 280. " abundance indeed, I am not in a condition to re-
 " lieve the wants of others; the sole advantage for
 " which the wealthy can be envied. But, whilst I
 " impart to the Commonwealth and my friends the
 " little I possess; whilst I render my country all the
 " services of which I am capable; and in a word,
 " do every thing that depends on me, with what
 " can I reproach myself? The desire of enriching my-
 " self never entered into my thoughts. As I have
 " been long employed in the administration of the
 " Commonwealth, I have had a thousand opportuni-
 " ties of amassing great sums of money irreproach-
 " ably. Could a more favourable one be desired,
 " than I had some few years ago? With the Con-
 " sular dignity I was sent at the head of a nume-
 " rous army against the Samnites, Lucanians, and
 " Bruttians. I ravaged a great extent of country;
 " I defeated the enemy in several battles; I took
 " many cities full of plunder and opulence; I en-
 " riched the whole army with their spoils; I re-
 " turned every citizen what he had supplied for the
 " expences of the war; and having received the
 " honour of a triumph, I sent four hundred talents
 " to the public treasury. After having neglected so
 " considerable a booty, of which I might have ap-
 " propriated whatever I thought fit; after having
 " despised riches so justly acquired, and sacrificed the
 " spoils of the enemy to the sense of glory, after the
 " example of Valerius Publicola, and other great
 " persons, who by their noble disinterestedness have
 " carried the power of Rome to such an height;
 " would it be consistent for me to accept the gold and
 " silver you offer me? What idea would the world
 " form of me? What example should I set my coun-
 " try? On my return to Rome, how should I sup-
 " port its reproaches, or even its looks? Would
 " not our Censors, those magistrates whose function
 " it is to watch over our discipline and manners,
 " oblige

“oblige me to give an account before all the world
“of the presents which you would make me accept?
“You therefore shall keep your riches, if you please,
“and I my poverty and reputation.”

A. R. 472.
Ant. C.
286.

I believe that Dionysius Halicarnassensis has put these discourses into the mouths of Pyrrhus and Fabricius: but in doing so, he has only expressed their sentiments in stronger colours, especially the latter's. For such was the character of the Romans in those glorious times of the Commonwealth. * Fabricius was truly convinced that there was more glory and real greatness in being able to despise all the King's gold, than in reigning.

How far are we from having such noble sentiments? † It would be deemed grossness and rusticity amongst us, and to reduce one's self to a state of meanness and misery, to be contented with so little, and not to extend one's desires beyond the mere necessities of life ‡. Our ignorance of true greatness occasions our not discerning any thing great except in luxury and riches. But these illustrious Romans judged better, and reserved their whole esteem and admiration, not for indifferent things, for accidental possessions foolishly employed, but for actions of solid wisdom and virtue.

Pyrrhus the next day was for surprizing the Roman ambassador, who had never seen an elephant, and for trying whether he was as intrepid as he was disinterested. And because constancy or weakness principally shew themselves in the first impressions of surprize, he ordered the captain of his elephants to arm the greatest of them, to bring him to the place where he was to be in conversation with Fabricius, and to keep him behind a tapestry in order to make him appear when he gave the signal. This being accordingly executed, and the signal given, the tapestry was drawn aside,

* Fabricius Pyrrhi regis aurum repulit, majusque regno judicavit regias opes posse contemnere. SENECA. Ep. 120.

† Jam rusticitatis & miseriæ est, velle quantum satis est. Ib. Ep. 90.

‡ Profecit omnes mortales in admirationem sui raperet (he speaks of wisdom) relictis his quæ nunc magna, magnorum ignorantia, credimus. Ib. Ep. 89.

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Ant. C.
280. and that enormous animal appeared on a sudden raising his trunk over the head of Fabricius, with an horrid and dreadful cry. Fabricius turning calmly towards Pyrrhus, said with a smile: "Neither your gold yesterday, nor your elephant to-day, can alter me."

That evening the discourse at table turned on many things: amongst the rest they talked of the affairs of Greece, and in particular of the different sects of Philosophers. Cineas dwelt particularly upon Epicurus, and repeated what the Epicureans thought of the Gods, and the remoteness which the wise man, according to them, ought to have from the administration of public affairs, and the government of states. He said, "That they made the great end and supreme good of man consist in pleasure; that they shunned dignities and offices, as the ruin and bane of that grateful indolence, in which they made happiness consist; that they ascribed neither love, hatred, nor anger to the Divinity; that they maintained he took no care of mankind, and that they banished him into a life of perfect tranquillity, where he passed whole ages void of all affairs, and plunged in an eternal circle of pleasures and delights." It is highly probable, that the soft and voluptuous life of the Tarentines gave occasion for this discourse. * Whilst Cineas was still talking, Fabricius, to whom this doctrine was entirely new, and who could not conceive how a man who advanced such maxims should set up for a sage, especially in a city distinguished above all others for wit and learning, cried out as loud as he could: "Great Hercules, may the Samnites and Pyrrhus follow no other doctrine, whilst they are at war with the Romans!"

Qui se sapientem profite-
retur.

* Sæpe audiivi à majoribus natu—mirari solitum C. Fabricium, quod cum apud regem Pyrrhum legatus esset, audisset à Thessalo Cyrena, esse quemdam Athenis qui se sapientem profiteretur: cumque dicere omnia quæ faceremus ad voluptatem esse referenda. Quod ex eo audientes M' Curium & T. Coruncanium optare solitos, ut id Samnitibus ipsique Pyrrho persuaderetur, quo facilius vinci possent, cum se voluptatibus dedidissent. Cic. de Senect. 43.

Which of us, to judge of the manners of the ancients from our own, would expect to find the subject of conversation amongst great warriors, turn not only upon affairs of policy, but matters of science and morality? Discourse of this kind, seasoned with wise reflexions and lively repartees, is certainly as good as talk, which from the beginning to the end of an entertainment, often extends little farther than to praise and extol the goodness of meats, the sauce of ragouts, and the excellency of the wine and liquors, with exclamations worthy of Epicureans.

Pyrrhus admiring the Roman ambassador's greatness of soul, and charmed with his prudence and wisdom, desired the amity and alliance of his republic still more passionately, instead of to make war with it. Taking him aside, he conjured him again, after he should have mediated an accommodation between the two states, to stay with him and to live in his court, where he should have the first place amongst his friends and captains. "I would not advise you to that," replied Fabricius, whispering him with a smile. "You don't know your own interest. For those who now honour and admire you, if they once knew me, would chuse rather to have me for their King than you." Pyrrhus, far from being angry at that answer, only laughed at it, and valued him still the more for it. He confided two hundred of the prisoners to him, upon condition, if the Senate would not agree to a peace, that they should be returned. He even permitted such of the rest as were willing to visit their kindred and friends, and to celebrate the feast of the Saturnalia with them, to follow the former upon the same condition.

Some days after the departure of the Roman ambassadors, Pyrrhus made his own set out. Cineas was at their head. We have said before, that he was his principal counsellor and confidant. He set a great value upon him, knowing his merit, and often said, "That he had gained more places by the eloquence of Cineas, than by his own arms." Cineas arrived at

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Rome with a magnificent equipage, and was received there with peculiar distinction. He conferred with the principal persons of the city, and sent to them all and to their wives, presents in the King's name. Not a single man of them would accept them. They all answered, as their wives did also, that when Pyrrhus should become the friend and ally of Rome by a solemn treaty, he should have no reason to be dissatisfied with any of the Romans.

During the small stay which he made at Rome, he took great care, like a man of sense and an able negotiator, to inform himself in the manners and customs of the Romans, and especially of those in the highest credit and reputation amongst them; to examine their conduct as well public as private; to study the form of their government; and to pry, as circumstantially as he could, into the forces and revenues of the Commonwealth.

When Cineas had been introduced into the Senate, he opened his master's proposals, who offered to restore all their prisoners to the Romans without ransom, promised to aid them in conquering all Italy, and demanded nothing more from them except their amity, and entire security for the Tarentines. He did not fail to employ all his eloquence on so important an occasion, to express the warm and sincere desire of Pyrrhus to make an alliance with a commonwealth so powerful, and so abundant in great men; and at the same time to set the urgent reasons in all their light, that obliged him to interest himself as he did for the inhabitants of Tarentum.

Many in the Senate, moved with the discourse of Cineas, seemed inclined to make peace with Pyrrhus, considering it as necessary, or at least as very advantageous, to the State: and this opinion was neither groundless, nor without reason. The Romans had lately been defeated in a great battle, and were upon the point of fighting a second. There was great cause to fear; for Pyrrhus's forces had been considerably augmented by those of several states of Italy his confederates.

federates. It was the victor himself who asked peace with as much earnestness as if he had been conquered, and in consequence the honour of Rome was safe. The deliberation continued several days; and as nothing got air abroad, it made Cineas very uneasy.

The courage of the Romans in these circumstances, had occasion for being animated by the famous Appius Claudius, an illustrious Senator, whom his great age, and the loss of sight, had obliged to retire from public affairs, and to confine himself to his house, which was a little commonwealth to him. * He had four sons men grown, and five daughters, without reckoning a great number of clients under his protection. Blind, and much advanced in years, as he was, he governed so numerous a family with wonderful order. His mind was always like a bent bow, and did not sink under, nor abandon itself to, the languor of old age. He was feared by his domestics, honoured by his children, and beloved by all men. He had known how to retain all the authority of command in his house, that was regarded as a school of virtue and love of the public, in which the ancient rules and customs of Rome were religiously observed.

Such was Appius. † Upon the spreading of a rumour in the city, that the Senate were inclined to accept the offers of Pyrrhus, he caused himself to be carried to the assembly, where every body kept a profound silence, as soon as he appeared. The venerable old man, to whom zeal for the honour of his country seemed to have restored all his pristine vigour,

* Quatuor robustos filios, quinque filias, tantam domum, tantas clientelas Appius regebat & senex & cæcus. Intentum enim animum, tanquam arcum, habebat; nec languescens succumbebat senectuti. Tenebat non modo auctoritatem, sed etiam imperium in suos. Metuebant eum servi, verebantur liberi, carum omnes habebant. Vige-
bat in illa domo patrius mos, & disciplina. Cic. de Senect. II.

† Ad Ap. Claudii senectutem accedebat etiam ut cæcus esset. Tamen is, cum sententia patrum ad pacem inclinaret, & fœdus faciendum cum Pyrrho, non dubitavit dicere illa quæ versibus persecutus est Ennius:

Quo vobis mentes, rectæ quæ stare solebant

Antehac, dementes sese flexere via?

Cic. de Senect. 6.

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280.

demonstrated by reasons equally strong and sensible, that they were going to ruin all the glory Rome had hitherto acquired by a shameful treaty. Then, transported with a noble indignation: "What," said he, "are become of those lofty discourses which you held, and which have been re-echoed throughout the earth, that if Alexander the Great had come to Italy in the time of our youth, and in the vigour of our fathers years, he would not have acquired the reputation of invincible; but that he would have added new glory to Rome, either by his flight or his death? And do you now tremble at the bare name of a Pyrrhus, who has passed his life in making his court to one of Alexander's guards, who wanders like an adventurer from country to country, to shun the enemies he has at home; and has the insolence to promise you the conquest of Italy with the same troops that have not been able to preserve him a small part of Macedonia." He said abundance of other things to the same effect, which re-animated the Roman generosity, and dispelled all the fears of the Senate.

Ptolomy.

* Cato, or rather Cicero, uses this example of Appius, to prove, that age does not make men incapable of being useful to their country. Great affairs are not effected by strength and activity of body, but by good sense, right reason, and wise counsels, founded in long experience; advantages which age, so far from impairing, augments and confirms. To what is the good steering of a vessel owing? Is it to the crew who run up and down, and are always in motion, or to the skill of the pilot, who seems quiet and idle, whilst he manages the helm? This is what Appius did on the oc-

* Nihil afferunt, qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant, similesque sunt, ut si qui gubernatorem in navigando agere nihil dicant, cum alii malos scandant, alii per foros cursitent, alii sentinam exhauriant: ille autem clavum tenens, sedeat in puppi quietus. Non facit ea quæ juvenes: at vero multò majora & meliora facit. Non viribus —aut celeritate corporis res magnæ geruntur, sed consilio, auctoritate, & sententia: quibus non modo non orbari, sed etiam augeri senectus solet. Cic. de Senect. 6.

caſion in queſtion. His authority ſwayed the whole Senate. By their common conſent and unanimous voices the following answer was given to Cineas. “ That Pyrrhus ſhould begin by quitting Italy. That then, if he thought fit, he might ſend to aſk peace. But that, as long as he ſhould continue in their country in arms, the Romans would make war againſt him with all their forces, even though he had beat a thouſand Levinus’s.”

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Ant. C.
280.

We ſee here ſome of thoſe grand ſtrokes which characterize the Roman people, as well as ſome of the great principles of policy, which raiſed them to ſo high a point of power and reputation; “ Never to give way to an enemy, in adverſity; and to ſhew at that time more courage and loſtineſs than ever.”

Cineas had received orders to quit Rome the ſame day, and he did ſo. The Senate’s answer ſtrangely ſurprized Pyrrhus. So amazing a conſtancy, which he was far from expecting, ſhewed him that he ill knew the Roman people, and that thoſe who had flattered him they were entirely diſcouraged by their defeat, had given him a falſe idea of them. When he aſked Cineas, what he thought of the Senate and Rome during his ſtay there; that wiſe miniſter, who was not accuſtomed to flatter, and who had a maſter to deal with that did not require adulation, replied: “ That the city ſeemed to him a temple, and the Senate an aſſembly of Kings.” Noble and juſt idea of both the one and the other! ſo much were the Gods univerſally reſpected in Rome, and ſo much dignity and grandeur were there in the deliberations of that auguſt body. And as to the number of the inhabitants, which he had obſerved in their cities and countries, Cineas told him, “ That he much feared Pyrrhus was fighting with an Hydra of Lerna, whom its very loſſes would multiply and ſtrengthen.”

S E C T. IV.

Census of the Roman citizens. Second battle with Pyrrhus near Asculum. Fabricius the Consul informs Pyrrhus that his physician had offered to poison him. Pyrrhus goes to Sicily to assist the Syracusans against the Carthaginians. The latter renew the treaty with the Romans. Rash enterprize of the new Consuls. Rufinus takes Crotona and Locri. Pyrrhus quits Sicily, and returns to Italy. Citizen punished for refusing to list. Third and last battle with Pyrrhus : victory gained by Curius. Famous triumph of that Consul. Pyrrhus deceives his allies, and steals away from Italy. Censorship remarkable for great severities.

A. R. 472.
Ant. C.
280. **T**HIS year the Census was completed by a Plebeian Censor for the first time. The number of the citizens amounted to two hundred and seventy-two thousand two hundred and twenty-two. This ceremony was performed with pomp and rites of religion. The minister in them was one of the Censors, to whom it gave a pre-eminence in point of honour and distinction over his colleague. Though the Plebeians had been admitted to the Censorship sixty-eight years, no Plebeian Censor had ever acted in this function hitherto.

Plin. l. 3.
c. 10. At this time may be dated the pretended project of Pyrrhus for laying a bridge over the sea between Hydruntum (Otranto) and Apollonia, to facilitate the passage and commerce between Epirus and Italy. The passage, according to Pliny, was fifty miles. The enterprize was absurd, but much in Pyrrhus's character, who, as well as Nero, was fond of bold and extraordinary projects : *incredibilium cupitor*.

Tacit.
Ann. l. 15.
c. 42.

A. R. 473.
Ant. C.
279.

P. SULPICIUS SAVERRIO.
P. DECIUS MUS.

Pyrrhus, at the beginning of the spring, had taken the field, and entered Apulia, where he had already taken

taken some cities. The new Consuls arrived there soon after with two Consular armies, and halted at Asculum near the enemy. Every thing denounced an approaching battle, and both sides prepared for it. The armies were separated only by a river. A report spread that the Consul Decius, after the example of his father and grandfather, intended to devote himself for his country; which terrified the army of Pyrrhus. He re-assured his soldiers, and told them that victory was not obtained by devoting one's self, but by fighting valiantly. And to remove all cause of fear, after telling them in what manner the Consul would be habited, in case he devoted himself, he gave them notice not to discharge their darts at him, but to take him alive. Zonaras adds, that Pyrrhus sent to tell Decius not to think of devoting himself; for if he did, he would have cause to repent it.

The Consuls, in order to be in a condition to give battle, caused Pyrrhus to be asked, whether he would pass the river, or expect them on his side. He chose the latter. The two armies were equal both as to number and valour, and each consisted of forty thousand men. The battle was fought with great obstinacy. The Romans sustained the phalanx of Pyrrhus, which was the most terrible part of his army, with abundance of courage. The elephants, which were no longer new to them, gave them less trouble. The ardour and resolutions of both armies were great, and it was very hard to separate them, which was not done till night, and after Pyrrhus had been wounded in the arm with a javelin, and his baggage plundered by the Apulians. Nothing certain can be said of the success, so much authors differ on that head. The most probable opinion is, that the loss was great, and almost equal on both sides. It is not known whether Decius devoted himself or not. Cicero in more places than one, affirms the first. The loss of the books of Livy, where the matters of which we are speaking, were treated at large, occasions great uncertainty and obscurity in this place. Whatever the event of this

A. R. 473.
Ant. C.
209.
Fremth.
13 c. 36.
— 52.
Zonar. l. 7.
c. 5.

Tusc. 1.
37.
De Fin.
2. 19.

battle near Asculum might be, there was no other action this year. New Consuls were however nominated at Rome.

A. R. 474.
Ant. C.
278.

C. FABRICIUS LUSCINUS II.

Q. ÆMILIUS PAPUS II.

These two illustrious Consuls had already been colleagues in this office. Whilst they were encamped, a stranger came to Fabricius with a letter from the King's physician, who offered to poison Pyrrhus, if the Romans would give him a reward proportioned to the service he should do them, in terminating so great a war without any danger to them. Fabricius, retaining the same fund of probity and justice in the midst of war, which furnishes so many pretexts for violating both, and knowing, that there are inviolable rights in respect even to enemies, was struck with just horror at such a proposal. As he had not suffered himself to be overcome by the King's gold, he believed also, that it was infamous to conquer the King by poison. After having conferred upon it with his colleague Æmilius, he immediately wrote to Pyrrhus, to advise him to be upon his guard against so black a treachery. His letter was conceived in these terms.

CAIUS FABRICIUS, and QUINTUS ÆMILIUS,
CONSULS:

TO KING PYRRHUS,
HEALTH.

“ YOU seem to judge ill both of your friends and
“ enemies ; and you will agree with us in this, when
“ you have read the letter, which has been wrote to
“ us. For you will see, that you make war upon a
“ people of worth and honour, and repose your whole
“ confidence in the vile and perfidious. It is not only
“ out of regard to you that we send you this advice,
“ but

“ but to ourselves, that your death may not give oc-
 “ casion for calumniating us ; and that the world may
 “ not think we had recourse to treachery, because we
 “ despaired of being able to terminate this war hap-
 “ pily by our valour.”

A.R. 474.
 Ant. C.,
 278.

Pyrrhus on the receipt of this letter, cried out : *
 “ This is Fabricius ; it is easier to make the sun quit
 “ his course, than to make him depart from justice
 “ and probity.” When he had fully discovered the
 truth of the fact mentioned in the letter, he punished
 his physician with death. And to testify his grati-
 tude to Fabricius and the Romans, he sent the Con-
 sul all the prisoners he had taken without ransom,
 and deputed Cineas to him again, to endeavour to
 conclude a peace with him. The Romans, who would
 neither accept a favour from the enemy, nor a reward
 for not having committed the most abominable injus-
 tice against him, did not refuse the prisoners, but re-
 turned them a like number of Tarentines and Sam-
 nites. And as to what regarded the treaty of peace
 and amity, they adhered to the first answer of the
 Senate.

Seneca, in comparing the action of Fabricius, of
 which we have just spoke, with his noble disinterested-
 ness in refusing the offers of Pyrrhus, and † represent-
 ing him as a man truly worthy of admiration, who
 adhered inviolably to the principles of probity, who
 shewed himself just and virtuous in the midst of the
 licentiousness of wars, and who knew that there are
 rules of honour even in regard to enemies, which
 cannot be violated without guilt : Seneca, I say, had
 reason to conclude, That not to suffer himself to be
 conquered by gold, and to disdain to conquer by poi-
 son, are two actions which arise from the same fund,
 the same greatness of soul. *Ejusdem animi fuit, auro
 non vinci, veneno non vincere.*

* Hic est ille Fabricius, qui difficilius ab itinere justī & honesti,
 quam à cursu suo sol averti possit. EUTROP.

† Admirati sumus ingentem virum—boni exempli tenacem ?
 quod difficillimum est, in bello innocentem, qui aliquid esse crederet
 etiam in hoste nefas. SEN. Ep. 120.

The

FABRICIUS, ÆMILIUS, Consuls.

A. R. 474.
Ant. C. 278. The same * Seneca asks, whether that illustrious Roman was very unfortunate, or much to be lamented, for cultivating his little estate with his own hands, when not employed by the Commonwealth, for making war no less against riches than Pyrrhus, and for being contented with the herbs and roots for his whole food, which his triumphant hands had planted and watered in his field?

He asks almost the same question in respect to Curius. Can † we believe, says he, that our Dictator, who gave the Samnites audience, whilst he was dressing his herbs over the fire with the same hands that had so often put the enemy to flight, and placed the triumphal laurel in the lap of Jupiter Capitolinus, led a less happy life than the famous Apicius of our time, who setting himself up for the great professor of good eating and drinking, has infected and corrupted the whole age by his unhappy skill in gluttony?

The ancients took great care to set their just value upon these truly estimable actions, and to perpetuate the remembrance of them. It is not the same amongst us, with whom the most memorable facts often remain buried in obscurity. Lewis XI. caused his perpetual enemy, Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, to be informed of the treachery of Campobasso the Italian.

I return to Pyrrhus. He was in great perplexity. Having lost his best troops and bravest officers, he rightly perceived that he could not set a new army on foot like the Romans, who ‡ even from their defeat derived new forces and new ardor to continue the

* Infelix est Fabricius, quod rus suum, quantum à Rep. vacavit, fodit? quòd bellum tam cum Pyrrho, quam cum divitiis gerit? quod ad focum cœnat illas ipsas radices & herbas, quas in agro repurgando triumphalis senex vulsit. *SENEC. de Provid. cap. 3.*

† Scilicet minus beatè vivebat Dictator noster, qui Samnitium legatos audit, cùm vilissimum cibum in foco ipse manu sua versaret, illâ qua jam sæpe hostem percusserat, laureamque in Capitolini Jovis gremio reposuerat; quam Apicius nostra memoria vixit! qui scientiam popinæ professus, disciplina sua seculum infecit. *SENEC. de Consol. ad Halicarn. c. 10.*

‡ Ab ipso ducit opes animumque ferro. *HORAT.*

war. Whilst these sad thoughts engrossed him, and he saw scarce any resource, and no honourable method for extricating himself from an enterprize, in which he had engaged too inconsiderately, a ray of hope and good fortune revived his courage. On the one side, deputies arrived from Sicily, who came to put Syracuse, Agrigentum, and Leontium, into his hands, and to implore his aid against the Carthaginians. On the other, couriers from Greece brought him advice, that Macedonia seemed to hold out her hands, and to offer him her throne. He determined for Sicily, and without loss of time sent Cineas thither before him, to treat with the people who called him in to their aid, and to assure them that he would immediately follow in person. Then, leaving a great garrison in Tarentum against the consent of the inhabitants, who saw with pain that Pyrrhus abandoned and however kept them in subjection, he promised them, in case they were pressed by the Romans, to fly with the utmost expedition to their aid, which he could easily do, as he was very near them. He had been two years and four months in Italy.

Besides the hope of making himself master of so powerful an island, he desired to be revenged on the Carthaginians, who had openly declared against him. They had sent Mago with an hundred and twenty galleys, to offer their service, and that of their fleet to the Romans against Pyrrhus, observing that against a foreign enemy, a foreign aid seemed sufficiently for their interest. Their offers were not accepted: the Senate answered, that Rome undertook no war she was not capable of terminating with her own forces. However, the treaty between the two States was renewed now for the fourth time. To the former articles was added, “ That whether the Romans or Carthaginians made a treaty with Pyrrhus, it should be expressly mentioned in it, that the two people should be at liberty to aid each other, when either of them should be attacked: That in such case, the Carthaginians should furnish ships; that each people should pay

A. R. 474.
Ant. C.
278.

Justin.
xviii. 2.
Val. Max.
iii. 7.

Polyb. iii.

A. R. 474. pay their own troops : That those of the Carthaginians should assist the Romans by sea, but that they should not be obliged to quit their ships against their will." The Carthaginians offered so powerful an aid to the Romans not so much out of consideration for them, as to make Pyrrhus incapable of going to Sicily, and to prevent him from interfering in their conquests there.

Pyrrhus's absence gave the Consuls opportunity to acquire some advantages over the Hetrurians, Lucanians, Brutians and Samnites.

A. R. 475.
Ant. C.
277.

P. CORNELIUS RUFINUS II,
C. JUNIUS BRUTUS II.

Cic. de
Orat. II.
268.
Aul. Gell.
iv. 8.

Rufinus was generally esteemed for his military abilities, and as generally decried for his avarice and passion for enriching himself, that occasioned his committing abundance of oppressions, which had made Fabricius, that great lover of poverty, his declared enemy. It was however the same Fabricius, who by his credit occasioned Rufinus to be nominated Consul, because in the present conjuncture, the Commonwealth wanted a good general, and none of those who stood for that office, seemed to him to have the necessary talents. When *Rufinus came to thank him for it, quite astonished at an interest he so little expected, Fabricius told him, " My reason for such a conduct is, because I had rather be plundered by the Consul, than sold by the enemy."

Freinsh.
xiv. 1.

The Consuls left the Tarentines quiet for some time, in order to attack the Samnites. The latter finding, that the whole weight of the war fell upon them ; that their country was destroyed ; and that they could not resist such numerous troops ; thought proper to take refuge, with their wives and children, and

* Cum Fabricio P. Cornelius, homo, ut existimabatur, avarus, & furax, sed egregie fortis & bonus imperator, gratias ageret, quod se homo inimicus Consulem fecisset, bello præsertim magno & gravi : nihil est quo mihi gratias agas, inquit ; se malui compilari quam venire. Cic. 2. de Orat. 268. Aul. Gell. IV. 8.

most valuable effects, upon very high and steep mountains. The Romans full of contempt for enemies that fled before them, undertook to attack them there, but without observing any order, and taking any precautions. Their temerity cost them dear. The Samnites, pursuing them with volleys of darts and stones in difficult places, killed a considerable number of them. Many fell down the precipices, and were miserably dashed to pieces. Others who could neither escape nor defend themselves were taken alive. The loss was great, and the shame still more so. The Consuls discontented with each other, and each attributing the disadvantage they had sustained to his colleague, divided in hopes of succeeding better, when they acted separately, and in their own names. Brutus continued with his legions in Samnium; and Rufinus advanced into the territories of the Lucanians and Brutians. The first thing he did there, was to ruin the country; after which he formed the design of a more important enterprize. This was the siege of Crotona, a very great and rich city, situate at the extremity of Italy, near the promontory of Lacinium, through which the river Æfarus ran. He did not rely upon taking it by force, but by intelligence, as he had been given reason to hope, because the inhabitants were highly dissatisfied with Pyrrhus. He would undoubtedly have made himself master of it; but the Crotoniates, whether they suspected any thing, or had been apprized of the conspiracy, had caused aid to come from Tarentum. Rufinus, who was not informed of this, having approached the walls with too much security, that new reinforcement of Lucanians commanded by Nicomachus, and supported by the garrison, made a terrible salley upon the Consul, put him into disorder, and killed abundance of his troops. He quitted the siege, and prepared to march away directly. That news soon spread in Crotona. At the same instant a prisoner who had escaped from the enemy's camp, arrived, and declared that Rufinus was going to attack Locri,

in

A. R. 475.
Ant. C.
277.

A. R. 475.
Ant. C.
277.

in effect of a promise made to open the gates to him. Another arrived presently after, who added, that the army of the enemy was upon the march. And accordingly the ensigns and troops were seen at distance in motion upon the way that led to Locri. No time was lost. Nicomachus set out with his Lucanians by by-ways to aid Locri. The march of Rufinus was only a feint. He returned immediately, fell suddenly on Crotona, and made himself master of it, almost before the inhabitants knew he was come back; a thick fog which rose very opportunely for him having favoured him so much. Nicomachus did not discover his blind credulity, till it was too late to retrieve it; and to compleat his misfortune, when he returned to Tarentum, he was attacked by Rufinus, lost part of his troops, and escaped himself with great difficulty. Upon this news, the inhabitants of Locri, who suffered the yoke of Pyrrhus with impatience, surrendered themselves to the Romans. Rufinus, on his return to Rome, received the honour of a triumph.

A. R. 476.
Ant. C.
276.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS GVRGES II.
C. GENVCIVS CLEPSINA.

The Samnites, Lucanians, and Brutians were vigorously pressed by the two Consuls. Reduced to great extremities they sent deputies to Pyrrhus, to let him know that if he did not aid them immediately, they were utterly undone: that they could support the Romans no longer, and that to prevent their entire ruin, they should be obliged to surrender themselves. This deputation arrived very happily to extricate him out of the difficulty he was under. Every thing had at first succeeded in Sicily beyond what he could have expected. Those good successes were as much the fruits of his mildness, generosity, and insinuating behaviour, as of his valour and ability in the art of war. Great prosperity is great temptation. It corrupted in him those amiable qualities, and made them degenerate into haughtiness, rigour, and even cruelty, and rendered

rendered him odious and insupportable to the States of Sicily. In consequence of this general disgust every thing tended to a revolution far from advantageous to him. He therefore was overjoyed with having an honourable pretext for leaving Sicily. On quitting it, reflecting upon the happy situation of the island, and the riches of its cities: "O my friends," said he to those who surrounded him, "what a fine field of battle do we leave to the Romans and Carthaginians?"

A. R. 476.
Ant. C.
276.

In his passage he was attacked and defeated first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the Mamertines, and driven by a violent storm, which destroyed part of his fleet: he did not arrive at Tarentum with twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, till after having undergone many misfortunes and disasters.

Rome in the mean time was much afflicted with a plague. To get rid of it, a ceremony, of which we have spoken before, was employed, which was to drive a nail into the temple of Jupiter in the Capitol; and for that purpose a Dictator was expressly nominated, who was, as is believed, Cornelius Rufinus.

M^r CURIUS DENTATUS II.

A. R. 477.

L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS.

Ant. C.

275.

The war was another scourge, which had lasted many years, and of which every body was very weary; so that when Curius was for making the levies as usual in the Capitol, and ordered the Citizens whom he thought proper to list, to be called by name, according to custom, none of them answered. He believed, that to put a stop to that disorder, the good of the public required an example to be made. Accordingly he ordered the names of all the tribes to be put into an urn: and the lot having fallen upon the tribe Pollia, and afterwards by a second operation of the like nature, upon a certain citizen of that tribe, he caused him to be summoned to list several times successively. As he did not comply, he ordered his effects

Val. Max.
vi. 3.

A. R. 477.
Ant. C.
275.

fects to be sold. Upon that he immediately ran and appealed to the Tribunes, who paid no regard to his appeal. The Consul then having declared, that the Commonwealth had no occasion for a citizen who refused her his obedience, sold both his estate and himself. This afterwards became a custom. Such severity was useful. The levies were made directly, and the Consuls set out, Lentulus for Lucania, and Curius for Samnium.

Pyrrhus immediately quitted Tarentum, and took the field in order to march against Curius. The Samnites retained a secret resentment for his having abandoned them to go to Sicily, and did not furnish him with the troops he demanded without difficulty. But their own interest, and the danger they were in, determined them to comply. He divided his army into two bodies. The one he sent into Lucania, to oppose Lentulus who was there, and to prevent him from marching to the aid of his colleague. As to him, with the second body he marched against M' Curius, who was intrenched in an advantageous post near the city of Beneventum, in expectation of the aid which was to come from Lucania.

For this reason Pyrrhus made haste to attack him. He chose the best of his troops, and the most warlike and best provided of his elephants, and set out in the close of the evening to surprize him in his camp. But early the next morning the Romans discovered him as he was coming down the mountains, on which night and the difficulty of the way had detained him longer than he expected. Curius quitted his entrenchments with some troops, and charged the first he came up with. Having put them to flight with loss, all the rest were seized with terror. A great number of them were killed, and some elephants taken.

This success emboldened the Consul to make his army quit their post in order to come to a general action in the open field. He had at first the advantage on one of his wings, and put the enemy into disorder. Pyrrhus then had recourse to his elephants,
and

and by their means made the other wing give way, and pushed it as far as the body of reserve. He there found good troops in arms and quite fresh. They had learnt in the last battle, that not only arms, but fire particularly, was necessary to be used for repulsing the elephants. For that purpose they had contrived a machine resembling a dart, of which the hollow iron was filled and wrapt round with combustibles, as pitch, tow, and the like. At the extremity the machine had a point in order to its sticking fast. They discharged these instruments lighted against the backs and towers of the elephants, and whether they stuck to the flesh or the tower, they continued burning, and strangely tormented those animals. Others pierced them with their pikes and darts. All together forced the elephants to turn their backs upon their own battalions: which occasioned such a confusion, and so great a disorder, that the Romans at last gained a compleat victory.

The Romans killed twenty-six thousand of the enemy in this battle, and took thirteen hundred, with eight elephants. Pyrrhus escaped to Tarentum with a small number of horse. His camp was taken. The disposition of it was admired, and afterwards used by the Romans. * Anciently they and the other nations of Italy had no camp marked out, the soldiers pitching their tents after the manner of shepherds, without observing lines or any other precaution, except not removing too far from their own corps. Pyrrhus was the first who gave them the example of inclosing the whole army within the compass of the same camp; the post of each body of troops being marked out in fixed places with wonderful order. The Romans, in process of time, made great improvements in that part of military knowledge which relates to encampments.

* *Castra antiquitus Romani ceteræque gentes passim per corpora cohortium velut mapalia constituere soliti erant, cum solos urbium muros nosset antiquitas. Pyrrhus, Epirotarum rex, primus totum exercitum sub eodem vallo continere instituit. FRONTIN. l. 4. c. 1.*

A.R. 477.
Ant. C.
275.

This last victory over Pyrrhus may be said in some sense to have been worth the conquest of all nations to the Romans, or at least to have contributed much towards it. For the valour they shewed in this battle, and the great things they had done in the others, against such an enemy as Pyrrhus, infinitely augmented their reputation, forces, and confidence in themselves, and caused them to be considered as invincible. By the victory over Pyrrhus, they became the indisputable masters of all Italy between the two seas. Sicily soon followed, where the wars with Carthage began: and after they had humbled that powerful rival, they found nothing that could oppose them.

Liv. Epit.
14.
Aul. Gell.
l. 17. c. 21.

This year, so glorious abroad for the success of the war, was rendered illustrious also at home by severity and zeal for the support of discipline and good manners in the city. Fabricius Luscinus and Æmilius Papus exercised the Censorship together with great union. They degraded several Knights and Senators. But the most extraordinary of their proceedings was the note of infamy which they set upon Cornelius Rufinus. He had been twice Consul, and once Dictator. The Censors excluded him from the Senate, and gave for their reason, that they were informed he had ten pounds of silver plate for his table. His family laboured long under this disgrace, and did not entirely retrieve it till Sylla, who was the first descendant of Rufinus that attained the Consulship. * One can scarce believe, says an author, that what would one day be considered in the same city as a poor and most contemptible quantity of plate, should ever have been condemned in it as an excess of luxury: so much in honour were simplicity and frugality in those happy ages. After the Census was completed, it was closed with the usual ceremonies. The number of the citizens were found to be two hundred and seventy-one thousand two hundred and twenty-four.

* Vix credibile est, intra idem pomerium decem pondo argenti & invidiosum fuisse censum, & inopiam haberi contemptissimam. VAL. MAX. l. 2. c. 9.

About the end of the year the two Consuls entered the city in triumph. Curius received that honour first. His triumph was the most illustrious, as well for the greatness of the events, as the joy occasioned by terminating so important a war successfully, and even the pomp and splendor of the Shew. Hitherto, as the Romans had only triumphed over the neighbouring States, most of whom were sufficiently poor; the whole sight consisted of little more than colours, broken arms, and chariots of the Gauls; and all the booty, of flocks and herds of great and small cattle. But in This the different nations whose captives were led in the front of the procession, and the magnificence of the spoils, extremely exalted the triumph. The Epirots, Thessalians, Macedonians, Apulians, Lucanians, and Brutians, were led in chains before the victor's chariot. Statues and the finest paintings of the most famous artists, gold, silver, purple, other rarities from beyond sea, with all that administered to the luxury of the Tarentines. But what struck the spectators, and attracted their attention most, was four elephants out of eight that had been taken. The rest had died of their wounds. The largeness, height, and figure of those animals, their trunk, which they moved on all sides, and which served them instead of an hand, the heavy towers on their backs, still almost astonished and terrified the spectators. * It is certain, that the Roman people beheld nothing with so much pleasure as those oxen of Lucania, (for that was the name the simplicity of the Romans of those times gave elephants) which following the victorious horse with their heads hanging down, seemed to have a sense of their captivity.

The other Consul's triumph was not till some weeks afterwards. It was very far from being so splendid as that which preceded it: but however, it deserves to be remembered. Lentulus had defeated the Sam-

* Nihil libentius pop. Romanus aspexit, quem illas, quas timuerat, cum turribus suis belluas: quæ, non sine sensu captivitatis, summissis cervicibus victores equos sequebantur. FLOR. l. i. c. 18.

A. R. 477. nites and Lucanians, and taken many of their towns.
 Ant. C. Not merit, but occasion only, had been wanting on
 275. his side; and the too shining glory of his colleague
 had somewhat eclipsed his.

At Rome nothing was seen but joy. The States of Italy and Pyrrhus were in very different dispositions. The first had long suffered that Prince's sway with pain, upon whose faith and aid they could no longer rely. The loss of the last battle had raised their discontent to the highest pitch, and in their present state of despair, they conceived a thousand violent thoughts. Pyrrhus was not ignorant of this, and revolved nothing but how to remove from Italy, and to find, if he could, a plausible pretext to cover his honour. The more this design engrossed him, the more he disguised it, in order to be in a condition to execute it with the greater safety and promptitude.

He saw his allies in the greatest sadness and dejection. He endeavoured to console them, and exhorted them not to be discouraged by one unfortunate accident. He represented to them, "That their loss in the last battle was not greater than that of the Romans in the first: That notwithstanding, that people, whatever conditions were proposed to them, would never hearken to a peace. That if they would imitate their constancy, and reserve themselves for better times, they might hope every thing. That they had troops sufficiently numerous to enable them still to support a long war. That as for him, he relied upon the powerful friends he had in Greece, from whom he expected certain and considerable aid." He talked in this manner, not that he was either much in pain about their interests, or had thoughts of continuing much longer in Italy, for he had already resolved to leave it as soon as possible, but to retain them within their duty, and to conceal his design. The better to cover it, he sent deputies to different Princes, to demand money of some, troops of others, and both of Antigonus, who was then master of Macedonia.

These

These hopes amused the allies for some time. However, he made preparations for his departure with the utmost secrecy. In this interval his deputy to Antigonus returned with that Prince's answer. But instead of the real one, he invented another according to his views, which he read to the principal persons of his allies. It promised great and speedy aids. The allies were all deceived, as well as the Romans in the neighbourhood, amongst whom this report was industriously spread. The next night he set sail, and landed in Epirus. What name would one give such a conduct amongst private persons? He left Milo in the citadel, and carried away eight thousand foot and five hundred horse with him.

Such was the issue of Pyrrhus's enterprize against Italy, which had continued six years. He afterwards formed others of the like nature: for, to define him a-right, he was a true adventurer, who often extricated himself out of the bad affairs in which his inconsiderate levity had engaged him, at the expence of his faith and engagements. He at last perished miserably in Argos two or three years after.

M' CURIUS DENTATUS, III.

SER. CORNELIUS MERENDA.

A. R. 478.
Ant. C.
274.

As Rome expected the continuance of the war with Pyrrhus, it was thought proper also to continue Curius in the Consulship. The retreat, or rather flight of that Prince perhaps deprived that illustrious Roman of a new victory: but it did not deprive him of the glory of having driven him out of Italy for ever by the great victory he had gained over him: for it was Curius who had contributed most to that event. There was even room to believe, that Pyrrhus did not care to measure his sword a second time with that Consul.

It must be confessed, that the latter years of which we have been speaking, were very productive both of great men and great actions. I do not mean only the

A. R. 478. victories gained over the enemy, the limits of the
 Ant. C. State considerably extended, valour and intrepidity.
 274. in battle, attended with a coolness and presence of
 mind, which see and weigh every danger without
 emotion, the knowledge of the art of war carried
 almost into perfection in every kind; in a word, all
 that makes great captains, and is called military
 merit and ability: I mean principally another kind
 of merit, which, sustained and ennobled by the first,
 has done the Roman Empire an honour peculiar to it-
 self, and which no other nation has since imitated:
 this consisted in simplicity, temperance, sobriety, and
 above all, a disinterestedness, that rose so high as the
 esteem and love of poverty: and that in the greatest
 statesmen, and most illustrious generals. I say it was
 this kind of merit, that did most honour to the Ro-
 man name: an honour, of which the long series of
 ages, which have since elapsed, have not been able to
 abridge the lustre. For we can almost still cry out with
 Lælius: “ * Which of us can hear Curius or Fabri-
 “ cius spoken of, without feeling his bosom glow
 “ with a kind of amity and love for them; and with-
 “ out being struck with admiration for their noble
 “ sentiments, in seeing them despise the things which
 “ the rest of mankind pursue with insatiable ardour?”
 Happy, had they known what was wanting to their
 good qualities, and was capable of rendering them
 truly virtuous!

* Quis est qui C. Fabricii, Man. Curii non cum caritate aliqua &
 benevolentia memoriam usurpet, quos nunquam viderit? quod eas res
 spernunt & negligunt, ad quas plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur.
 DE AMICIT. n. 28. Offic. l. 2. c. 38.

S E C T. V.

Embassy of Ptolomy Philadelphus to the Romans. Vestal punished with death. New colonies. Tarentum surrenders to the Romans. War with the Samnites entirely terminated. Return of the Roman ambassadors from Egypt. Censorship of Curius. The conquered enemies are deprived of part of their lands. Severe vengeance taken by Rome of the legion which had massacred the inhabitants of Rhegium. Money first coined at Rome. New colonies. War with the Picentes happily terminated. The peace of Italy entirely established by the submission of the Salentini and Umbrians. The Apollonians, and afterwards the Volsinians, implore the aid of Rome. Regulation in respect to the Censors. Number of the Questors doubled and augmented to eight.

C. FABIVS DORSO.

A. R. 479.
Ant. C.

C. CLAVDIVS CANINA, II.

273.

PTolomy Philadelphus King of Egypt, having received advice of the flight of Pyrrhus, sent to congratulate Rome upon that head, and to demand the alliance of the Roman people. An embassy from so remote and powerful a Prince gave the commonwealth great pleasure; and she sent four of the principal persons of Rome as ambassadors to thank him, and to conclude a treaty with him.

Freinsh.
l. 4. c. 38.
—49.

The Consuls gained several advantages over the Lucanians, Samnites, and Brutians, whom necessity and despair still kept in arms.

The Vestal Sextilia, convicted of having violated her vow, is punished with death, and buried alive.

Colonies are sent to Cosa in the country of the Volsci, and to Pæstum, otherwise called Posidonia, in Lucania.

A. R. 480.
Ant. C.
272.

L. PAPIRIUS CURSOR, II.

SP. CARVILIUS, II.

Pyrrhus perished in Argos this year.

The death of that Prince left the people of Italy no hope, nor any resource : such of them as were at liberty to make choice of what suited them best, came to an accommodation with the Romans upon the best conditions they could. But as for the Tarentines, the garrison Pyrrhus had left in their citadel kept them in awe. They were entirely at variance with Milo, who commanded, and in a state of real slavery. Tormented within by the governor, and having the Romans to fear without, they applied to the Carthaginians, and implored their aid. The latter, without loss of time, set sail with their fleet, in appearance to drive Milo out of the citadel, but really to defend it against the Romans, and to make themselves masters of it. As they were in possession of a considerable part of Sicily, they had a great interest in securing the coasts of Italy also to themselves, and in preventing them from falling into the hands of the Romans. In the mean time the Consul Papirius arrived. Tarentum in consequence was shut up on all sides, the Romans besieging the city by land, and the Carthaginians the citadel by sea. Papirius had more address than the latter, and shewed it on this occasion. He caused Milo to be sounded. He offered him the most advantageous conditions for himself and the inhabitants, and gave him all possible assurances of making them good. Milo, seeing nothing better for him to do, and having no other resource, engaged the Tarentines to surrender the city and citadel to the Consul. The Carthaginians were much surprized and afflicted at this stroke. To declare against the Romans in favour of Tarentum, was in some measure to violate the treaty with the Romans. This discontent already prepared the way for an open rupture.

Carvilius,

Carvilius, the other Consul, spared no pains also on his side to subject the Samnites. They surrendered themselves, but with better faith than they had done hitherto; and accepted in earnest the conditions the Romans thought fit to impose upon them. Thus at last was a war happily terminated, which had continued about seventy years, including some intervals of no long duration, which from time to time had suspended hostilities.

The Lucanians and Brutians were several times defeated, and also reduced to ask peace, which was granted them.

The two Consuls had an equal share in such advantageous events, acting in concert and even often together, and mutually aiding each other with their troops according to occasion. In consequence, they both triumphed together.

The embassadors being returned from Egypt, reported their commission in the Senate. They said, "That the King had received them in the most obliging and honourable manner conceivable. That on their arrival he had sent them magnificent presents: but that they had judged it more for the honour of the commonwealth to give an example of the moderation and disinterestedness which she makes her glory, and that they had desired the Prince to dispense with their acceptance of his presents. That at a solemn feast the day before their departure, the King had caused crowns of gold to be given them, all which they had placed upon his statues the next day. That lastly, the same day they set out, the King had given them far more magnificent presents than the first, reproaching them in an obliging manner for not having accepted them. That not to offend a Prince of so much goodness by reiterated refusals, they had accepted them with the most profound respect, and that the first thing they had done on arriving at Rome, had been to deposite them in the public treasury." They afterwards informed the Senate with what

A. R. 480.
Ant. C.
272.

A. R. 480. what marks of joy and acknowledgment Ptolomy had
 Ant. C. received the alliance of the Roman people.
 272.

This report gave the Senate exceeding satisfaction. They approved the whole, and thanked the embassadors especially “for having rendered the manners of the Romans venerable even to foreign nations by their sincere and perfect disinterestedness.” They decreed that the presents they had deposited in the public treasury should be restored to them. The People expressed no less satisfaction and admiration than the Senate had done.

* Every thing is perfect in this affair, and one cannot tell which to praise most, the liberality of the King, the disinterestedness of the embassadors, or the equity of the Senate and People. Happy State, happy government, where virtue is so generally in esteem and honour, and where its whole value is known! I do not speak of those shining virtues, which exhibit themselves as sights, which attract all eyes upon them, and make a great noise in the world: but, not to depart from my subject, of a virtue, simple, modest, and void of pomp, which does not suffer itself to be dazzled by the glitter of gold and silver, which despises what all the world greedily pursue, and which, however, all the world admires and applauds.

But the principle on which the conduct of these embassadors was founded, argues an elevation of sentiments, which ought to form the prevailing character of all persons in high stations. They were persuaded, that a man charged with public affairs, ought to have no views, but the glory and grateful satisfaction of having faithfully acquitted himself of his duty.

Val. Max. *De publico scilicet ministerio nihil cuiquam præter laudem*
 l. 4. c. 3. *bene administrati officii accedere debere judicantes.*

I do not think that I ought to leave my readers in ignorance of the names of these four illustrious Ro-

* Ita in iisdem, Ptolomæi liberalitas, legatorum abstinentia, Senatûs ac Populi Romani æquitas, debitam probabilis facti portionem obtinuit. VAL. MAX. l. 4. c. 3.

mans : That in my opinion were to deprive them of an honour to which they have the justest right. They were called Q. Fabius Gurges, C. Fabius Pictor, Numer. Fabius Pictor, and Q. Ogulnius. The first, Q. Fabius, who was at the head of the embassy, was chosen Prince of the Senate by the Censors. He had been twice Consul, and had triumphed both times.

A. R. 430.
Ant. C.
272.

It was in the year in which we are speaking, that the Cenfor M' Curius caused an aqueduct to be made for bringing the waters of the Anio into the city. He employed the money which arose from the spoils taken by him from the enemy in that work. This Curius was one of the greatest men of the Roman commonwealth, to which, as we have already observed, he did no less honour by his frugality, simplicity, and disinterestedness, that rose so high as a sincere contempt for riches and love of poverty, than by his military virtues, and glorious victories.

A private person having had the confidence to accuse him of having converted considerable sums out of the spoils taken from the enemy to his own use, he swore that no part of them had entered his house, except a wooden vessel which he made use of in sacrifices, and produced in public. One cannot help being moved with indignation at so extravagant and perverse an attempt. * But in a Commonwealth, jealous of its liberty to excess, accusers are suffered without regret, because a person unjustly accused may be acquitted, and a criminal cannot be condemned unless accused. Now it is better, says Cicero, that an innocent person should be exposed to some disagreeable affairs, that cannot hurt him, than to leave the guilty hopes, that their crimes should pass with impunity, because no body will venture to bring them before the Judges.

Auct. de
Vir. illust.

* Quare facilè omnes patimur quam plurimas accusatores ; quod innocens, si accusatus sit, absolvi potest ; nocens, nisi accusatus fuerit, condemnari non potest. Utilius est absolvi innocentem, quam nocentem causam non dicere. Cic. pro Rosc. n. 56.

A. R. 480. All the enemies of the Commonwealth being sub-
 Ant. C. 272. jected, the question was in the Senate, to deliberate
 Freinsh. upon the use it was proper to make of victory. There
 xv. 1--17. is reason to judge by the conduct, which the Romans
 had usually observed in respect to conquered people,
 that they deprived the Samnites, Lucanians, and all
 the rest who had borne arms against Rome, of part of
 their territories. History has preserved the particular
 manner in which the Tarentines were treated. They
 were ordered to deliver up their arms and their ships;
 their walls were demolished, and a tribute imposed
 on them: nothing was granted them but peace and
 liberty.

When all was tranquil in Italy, the first care of the
 Romans was to avenge the perfidy of the legion,
 which having massacred the inhabitants of Rhegium,
 had kept possession of their city ten years with impu-
 nity. As they saw, that the Roman arms prospered
 every day, they rightly conceived, that they should
 not long be left in repose, and prepared to make a
 vigorous defence.

Besides the ferocity which was in a manner become
 natural to them, they relied much upon the amity of
 the Mamertines, and the good success of their arms
 against the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus, whom they
 had caused to drop the design of attacking their city.
 They carried the spirit of rebellion to such an excess,
 that having entered Crotona by the assistance of some
 traitors, they presumed to put the Roman garrison to
 the sword, and to demolish the city.

A. R. 481.
 Ant. C.
 271.

L. GENUCIUS.

C. QUINTIUS.

L. Genucius, one of the new Consuls, marched a-
 gainst those rebels. Having driven them into their
 city, he besieged them there in form. They defend-
 ed themselves with the courage of lions, as they were
 desperate, and had nothing to expect, but to be
 punished with death. They even gained some ad-
 vantages

vantages over the Consul, and would have reduced him to the want of provisions, if Hiero had not sent him corn. That prince made a perpetual war with the Mamertines their allies, who had been guilty of the same crime at Messina, as they had committed at Rhegium. In consequence as much out of inclination, as to make his court to the Romans, he assisted the Consul, as a duty and with pleasure, in so important a conjuncture. The besieged at length reduced to the last extremity, were obliged to surrender at discretion. Only three hundred Roman soldiers fell alive into the Consul's hands. The rest were either dead before, or to avoid the shame of being executed, had fought like madmen till they were killed. Genucius immediately caused the deserters and thieves, who had fled in great numbers to Rhegium as to an asylum, to be put to death. As to the legionary soldiers, he carried them with him to Rome, in order that the Senate might determine of their fate.

The sentence was severe, and suited the atrocity of their crime. They were first carried to prison, and were all condemned to be whipt with rods, and to lose their heads. M. Fulvius Flaccus, Tribune of the People, opposed the decree of the Senate. However it was put in force, and the criminals were punished. But not to terrify the multitude by putting them all to death at once, fifty a day were carried to execution. The Senate forbade burying them, and ordered that none should go in mourning for them.

Divine Providence, which seldom suffers great criminals to escape its just vengeance, and often inflicts public and distinguished vengeance upon them in this life, to intimidate the bad, had punished Decius Jubellius, the author and ringleader of the black treachery, which had destroyed the inhabitants of Rhegium, some short time after he had perpetrated that horrible crime. Driven out of that city even by those who had been his accomplices, he took refuge at Messina, where he did not long enjoy the good reception he met with, at ease. He was afflicted with
a very

Appian
ap. Valef.
P. 554.
Diod. Ec-
log. 22.

A. R. 481.
Ant. C.
271.

a very painful disorder of the eyes. There was in that city a famous physician, who had been settled there a great many years. People did not know, or had forgot, that he was a native of Rhegium: for certainly if Jubellius had suspected it in the least, he would not have put himself into his hands. He therefore caused him to be sent for. The physician, transported with so happy an occasion of avenging his country, told him he had a remedy, of which the success was speedy and infallible, but very violent, and required patience. The hope of a cure made Jubellius consent to every thing. The physician accordingly applied his composition to his eyes, in which he had mixed powder of Cantharides, a most extreme corrosive, and recommended to him in a particular manner not to take off that dressing till he returned; after which he immediately retired from Messina. Jubellius soon felt the sharpest and most exquisite pains, as if burning coals had been applied to his eyes, and continued in inexpressible torments. After having long expected the return of his physician, he tore off the fatal dressing, the effect of which had entirely deprived him of sight, and left him in insupportable anguish during the rest of his life.

The city of Rhegium was restored to as many of its ancient inhabitants as could be drawn together, with their laws and liberty. This bloody execution, the report of which spread a great way, very much augmented the idea the people already conceived of the justice of the Romans, and contributed no less to acquire them the love of all the States of Italy, than their arms had done to make them feared.

A. R. 482.
Ant. C.
270.

C. GENUCIUS.
CN. CORNELIUS.

There was this year a war with the Sarsinates, a people of Umbria, who inhabited the Apennines. No circumstance of it is known.

Rome felt a very hard winter this year. There was snow in the Forum during forty days of an extraordinary depth. Aug. de Civ. Dei. iii. 17.

Q. OGULNIUS GALLUS.

A. R. 483.

C. FABIUS PICTOR.

Ant. C.

269.

This year silver money was coined in Rome for the first time, whereas hitherto it had only brass species. This was not because gold and silver money had not been known long before at Rome: but it was foreign, brought from abroad, and generally taken from the enemy, as were the forty talents of silver taken amongst the spoils of Pometia, of which Livy speaks in his first book. But copper money only had been coined at Rome till now. The opulence to which the Commonwealth had attained, occasioned it to think of coining silver. Liv. i. 51. c. 53.

P. SEMPRONIUS SOPHUS.

A. R. 484.

AP. CLAUDIUS CRASSUS.

Ant. C.

268.

A colony was sent now to Ariminum, a city of the Gauls, Senones, in Picenum: and another into Samnium to Maleventum, a name of bad augury, which was then changed into that of Beneventum.

The freedom of Rome had been granted the Sabines for some years: the right of suffrage was now added to it.

The war with the Picentes, the people of Picenum, after a sufficiently rude battle, and the taking of several of their principal towns, was terminated by the entire subjection of the whole nation. This was a great advantage, and a considerable augmentation of strength to the Commonwealth, as, according to Pliny the Naturalist, three hundred and sixty thousand Picentes submitted to the Roman People. To perpetuate the remembrance of so memorable an event the representation of it was stamped upon the silver money coined this year. Plin. i. 2. c. 13.

M. ATILIUS

A. R. 485.
Ant. C.
267.

M. ATILIUS REGULUS.
L. JULIUS LIBO.

To put an end to the conquest of all Italy, it only remained to subject the Salentines, who possessed the most western part of it upon the sea-coast, not far from Tarentum. The war was carried into their country under pretext, that they had received Pyrrhus into their ports and cities. The commodiousness of the port of Brundisium, which afforded a free access into all the neighbouring countries, was the principal cause of it. They were not subjected till the year following.

A. R. 486.
Ant. C.
266.

NUMERIUS FABIVS.
D. JUNIVS.

To these Consuls the Umbrians surrendered themselves on one side, and the Salentines on the other; which obtained them the honour of a triumph; and with these people all Italy was reduced, and universal peace established.

Rome hitherto had struggled, during almost five hundred years, with the several States that inhabited Italy, and could not yet pass the bounds of, nor extend its conquests beyond it. What appearance was there, that a people kept against their will for so many years within so narrow a compass, should one day, and in a space of time sufficiently short, make themselves masters of almost the whole world? What is Italy, in comparison with that vast extent of provinces and kingdoms, which it was destined to possess in Africa, Asia, and Europe; and of which it was successively to make conquests? This is what it was preparing for, without knowing it, by all the wars which it has hitherto sustained: or to speak more justly, this is what God himself disposed of, as he had prepared Cyrus and Alexander for the great conquests he had allotted them, and which he had caused to be clearly foretold by his prophets, as well as those
of

of the Romans. He had assigned fixed bounds for the duration of the kingdoms of Alexander's successors. Till then the Romans will be able to effect nothing against those kingdoms. But when the term prefixed shall arrive, they will reduce them all, each in its turn, into subjection to Rome. It is happy for us, that this conduct and peculiar attention of God over the kingdoms of the earth, which begin and end only when he pleases, has been revealed to us in the Scriptures.

A. R. 486.
Ant. C.
266.

The Romans, victorious over all the enemies that have exercised them so long within the extent of Italy, become from henceforth either the asylum or terror of the neighbouring cities and states, and employ their arms to support the weak oppressed, and to oppose the violence of oppressors. Noble and worthy use of the power granted by God to States and Princes, and which would do infinite honour to a powerful and formidable people, if, firmly determined to render themselves the protectors of innocence and justice, which is in some sort to hold the place of God upon earth, they do not give ear to ambitious policy, as the Romans will soon do, and become at length themselves unjust and violent usurpers.

The Apollonians were the first who had recourse to the Roman People. Apollonia is a city upon the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, valuable particularly on account of its port, which lies the nearest and most commodiously for landing in Greece from Brundisium. It is situated between Illyrium and Macedonia, against which it was not in a condition to defend its liberty. The Senate received very favourably the ambassadors it sent to Rome to demand the amity and protection of the Commonwealth. But an unlucky and unforeseen accident might have given the neighbouring States impressions very prejudicial to the reputation of Rome. Some young Senators in a dispute were so hot as to strike the ambassadors. The Senate perfectly comprehended of what consequence, and how necessary it was, to punish such a violence.

A. R. 486. They remembered what the suffering with impunity
 Ant. C. a violation of the laws of nations in respect to the
 266. Gauls had cost the Commonwealth. They therefore delivered up all the culpable to the ambassadors, without regard to their birth, rank, or even dignity, for one of them was Ædile. They were carried to Apollonia : but the inhabitants, solely attentive to the favour they had lately received for the Roman People, sent them back, after having treated them with the highest respect and politeness.

A. R. 487.
 Ant. C.
 265.

Q. FABIVS GVRGES III.
 L. MAMILIVS VITVLVS.

Another people nearer Rome than the Apollonians, and groaning under an equally cruel and infamous oppression, implored the assistance of the Romans that year. These were the Volstinians, a people of Hetruria, who by a very odd kind of conduct, and probably forced to it by the bad state of their affairs, had some years before, not only granted liberty to, and armed their slaves, but had even admitted them into the Senate. These strange Senators soon made themselves masters of the rest, and even of the State, and exercised incredible violences and cruelties both against the men and the women. The Volstinians, not being able to bear so barbarous and shameful a slavery, sent some persons secretly to Rome, who desired the Senate to give them audience in some private house, in order to keep the subject of their journey a secret. The relation of their sufferings moved the Senators with compassion, and they promised them a speedy and powerful aid. Unfortunately a friend of the master of the house where the assembly was held, who was sick in a neighbouring chamber, over-heard all that had been resolved, and gave advice of it immediately to the Volstinians. As soon as the deputies returned thither, both them and several of the principal persons were murdered. This was a new reason for hastening the aid. The Consul Q. Fabius arrived there

there with his army. The rebels were so bold as to march out against him: they were repulsed with great loss into the city, where the Consul besieged them in form. They defended themselves there with vigour, and made several brisk sallies, in one of which Fabius received a wound of which he died. But the courage of the Romans did not die with him, and only became the more furious from his death. They continued the siege, cut off provisions so effectually, and pressed the enemy so close, that the next year, when the Senate sent M. Fulvius, one of the Consuls, to terminate this enterprize, reduced to the want of all things, and not able to support the famine any longer, they surrendered at discretion. They were made to suffer the most cruel punishments. The city was destroyed, and other places assigned the remainder of the Volsinians, and the slaves who had been faithful to their masters. This expedition acquired the Consul a triumph.

A. R. 487.
Ant. C.
265.

Cn. Cornelius Blasio, and C. Marcius Rutilus, the latter for the second time, were elected Censors in the year 487. Marcius assembled the People immediately, and reproached them sharply for having chosen him Censor a second time, after their ancestors had abridged that office of two-thirds of its duration, on account of its too great authority. The moderation which he shewed on this occasion, acquired him the surname of Censorinus; and a decree was passed, whereby it was prohibited to confer the office of Censor twice upon the same person.

The number of Quæstors, or Treasurers, were doubled the same year. Hitherto there had been only four, two for the city, and as many for the army. But as the public revenues were very much increased in effect of the new augmentations of the dominions of the State, there was a necessity for nominating eight.

T H E
R O M A N H I S T O R Y.
C O N T I N U E D.

I N T R O D U C T I O N.

THIS introductory discourse will consist of two sections. In the first, I shall endeavour to give an idea of the government, character, and manners of the Carthaginians, who, in the part of the Roman history I am going to begin, will long occupy the scene, and have a most important share. In the second, I shall relate the different treaties, concluded between the Carthaginians and Romans before the Punic wars.

S E C T. I.

Origin, increase, power, character, manners, and defects of the Carthaginians.

BEFORE I enter into the wars of the Romans against Carthage, I think it necessary to give a brief account of the origin of that city, the extent of its power, with the character and manners of the Carthaginians. I have given a sufficient circumstantial plan of them in the first volume of the Antient History, in speaking of the Carthaginians, which I shall only abridge in this place.

Carthage in Africa was a colony of Tyre, the most famous city in the world for commerce *. Tyre long before its foundation had sent another colony into the same country, which built the city of Utica, famous for the death of the second Cato, commonly called Cato of Utica.

Authors differ very much concerning the time when Carthage was founded. It may be called the year of the world 3121, when Athaliah was King of Judah, thirteen years before Rome was built, and eight hundred and eighty-three before the birth of JESUS CHRIST. The epochas I have set down in the Antient History, are different from this, which I shall now follow.

Justin.
xviii. 4—
6.
Appian.
de Bell.
Pun. p. 1.

The foundation of Carthage is ascribed to Elisa, a Tyrian Princess, more known under the name of Dido. Her brother Pigmalion reigned at Tyre, who having put Sicharbas, otherwise called Sichæus, Dido's husband to death, with design to seize his great riches, she eluded her brother's cruel avarice by retiring secretly with all the treasures of Sichæus. After changing her course several times, she landed at length on the coasts of the gulf, where Utica was built, in the country called Africa Propria, six leagues from Tunis, a city well known at present from its corsairs, and settled there with her few followers, having purchased a piece of land of the inhabitants of the country.

Many that inhabited in the parts adjacent, invited by the hopes of gain, repaired thither in crowds to sell the new-comers the necessaries of life, and soon after settled there themselves. The multitude of these inhabitants, drawn together from different parts, became very great. The people of Utica, who considered them as their countrymen, sent deputies to them with great presents, and desired them to build a city in the place where they had first settled. The natives of the country, through an esteem and consideration

* Utica & Carthago ambæ inclytæ, ambæ à Phœnicibus conditæ : illa fato Catonis insignis, hæc suo. POMPON. MEL. c. 67.

common enough for strangers, did the same on their side. Thus every thing concurring with the views of Dido, she built her city, which was to pay an annual tribute to the Africans for the land bought of them. It was called Carthada *, Carthage, which in the Phœnician and Hebrew languages, that are very like each other, signifies The New City.

Carthage at first augmented its territories in the country about it: but its sway did not continue long confined to Africa. That ambitious city carried her arms abroad, conquered Sardinia, seized a great part of Sicily, and subjected almost all Spain; and having sent out powerful colonies on all sides, she remained mistress of the sea during upwards of six hundred years, and made herself a state, that for opulence, commerce, great armies, formidable fleets, but especially the valour and merit of her Captains, might dispute with the greatest Empires of the world. She was at the highest point of her greatness, when the Romans declared war against her.

The government of Carthage was established upon principles of profound wisdom; and it is not without reason, that Aristotle places this Republic in the number of those, which were the most esteemed by the antients, and which might serve as a model for others. He supports his opinion in the beginning with a reflexion much for the honour of Carthage, by observing, that down to his time, that is to say, for more than five hundred years, no considerable sedition had disturbed her tranquillity, nor any tyrant subverted her liberty. And indeed, mixed governments, like that of Carthage, where power is divided between the Nobility and the People, have the double inconvenience, either of degenerating into popular licence, through seditions on the side of the People, as was usual in Athens and all the Greek Republics; or into tyranny, on the side of the Great, by violating the public liberty, as happened at Athens, Syracuse, Co-

Arist. de
Rep. ii. 11.

* Karthahadath, or hadtha.

rinth, Thebes, and Rome itself in the time of Sylla and Cæsar.

The government of Carthage, like those of Sparta and Rome, consisted of three different authorities, which balanced, and mutually supported, each others: that of the two supreme magistrates called * Suffetes; that of the Senate, and that of the People. The Tribunal of the Hundred was afterwards added, which had great weight in the Commonwealth.

Liv. xxxiii
46, 47.

The Suffetes continued but one year in power. They were almost the same at Carthage as the Consuls were at Rome. It was a most considerable office, as, besides the right of presiding in the administration of justice, it gave them that of proposing and passing new laws, and of making those who received the public money bring in their accounts.

Aristot.
loco citat.
Polyb. xv.
706.

The Senate formed the council of state, and, like that of Rome, was in a manner the soul of all public deliberation. When opinions were uniform, and all the suffrages united, the Senate decided sovereignly and finally. When it was divided, and did not agree, affairs were referred to the People, in which case the power of deciding devolved to them. It is easy to comprehend the wisdom of this regulation, and how proper it was for putting a stop to cabals, for conciliating opinions, for supporting good counsels, and for making them take place; a body, like this, being extremely jealous of its authority, and not easily consenting, that affairs within its jurisdiction should be transferred to another authority. Polybius observes, that as long as the Senate had the direction of affairs, the state was governed with abundance of wisdom, and all its undertakings very successful.

It appears, from Aristotle, that the People voluntarily left the care of the public affairs, and the principal administration of them, to the Senate: and it was thereby that the Republic became so powerful.

* This name is derived from a word, which in the Hebrew and Phœnician signifies Judges.

This

This was not the same in the sequel. The People, become insolent through their riches and conquests, and not reflecting, that they were indebted for them to the prudent conduct of the Senate, resolved to share also in the government, and assumed almost all power to themselves. Every thing then was carried by faction and cabal; which was one of the principal causes of the ruin of the State.

The Tribunal of the Hundred consisted of an hundred and four persons. They were at Carthage what the Ephori were at Sparta; from whence it appears, that it was instituted to balance the power of the Great; but with this difference, that the Ephori were only five in number, and continued but a year in office, whereas the others were perpetual, and exceeded the number of an hundred, * They were intended to check the authority of the Generals, which, whilst they commanded the troops, was almost unlimited and sovereign; and this was conceived a means to subject it to the laws, in laying them under the necessity of giving an account of their administration to these judges on their return from the field. The wisest and best concerted institutions degenerate by degrees, and give place at length to disorder and licence, which break through all barriers. These judges, who ought to have been the terror of guilt and the support of justice, abusing their power, which was almost unlimited, became so many petty tyrants. † Hannibal being in office, after his return into Africa, from perpetual, as the authority of these judges was, made it annual, about two hundred years after the institution of the tribunal of the Hundred.

Aristotle, amongst some other observations which he makes upon the government of Carthage, remarks two great defects in it, very repugnant, in his opinion,

* Ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent; ut domi judicia legesque respicerent. JUSTIN. xix. 2.

† It appears that the name of Prætor, which Livy gives Hannibal, is used instead of Suffetes.

to the views of a wise legislator, and the rules of good policy.

The first of these defects consists, in conferring several offices at the same time on the same person, which in Carthage was considered as the proof of extraordinary merit. Aristotle considers this custom as highly prejudicial to the good of the public. And indeed, says he, when a man has only one employment, he is much more capable of acquitting himself well in it; affairs being then more carefully examined, and dispatched with greater expedition. We do not find, adds he, that this is practised either in armies or fleets. The same officer does not command two different bodies; nor does the same pilot steer two vessels. Besides which, the good of the state requires, that offices and favours should be divided, in order to excite emulation between persons of merit; whereas, when they are accumulated upon the same man, they often make him giddy in effect of so peculiar a distinction, and excite envy, discontent, and murmurs in others.

The second defect, which Aristotle finds in the government of Carthage, is, that in order to attain to the great offices, besides merit and birth, it was necessary to have a certain estate; and that in consequence poverty could exclude the most deserving persons; which he considers as a great evil in a State. For in that case, says he, virtue and merit being reckoned as nothing, and money as every thing, the admiration and avidity of riches seize and corrupt an whole city: besides that the magistrates and judges, who do not become so but at great expences, seem to have a right to indemnify themselves afterwards with their own hands.

We do not find, I think, any trace in antiquity, which argues, that the dignities, either of the State, or Judicature, were sold; and what Aristotle says here of the expences for attaining them at Carthage, falls no doubt on the presents, by which the suffrages
of

of those, who conferred offices, were brought ; which, as Polybius also observes, was very common amongst the Carthaginians, with whom no kind of gain was infamous. It is therefore no wonder, that Aristotle condemns a practice, of which it is easy to perceive the pernicious, the fatal, consequences. Polyb. vi. 497.

But, if he means that the rich and poor were equally to have the first dignities, as he seems to insinuate, his opinion might be answered by the general practice of the wisest Republics ; which without depressing or degrading poverty, have thought it necessary to give riches the preference ; because there is reason to presume, that those who have fortunes, have had a better education, think more nobly, are less liable to suffer themselves to be corrupted, and to do mean things, and that the very situation of their affairs renders them better affected to the State, more disposed to preserve peace and good order in it, and more interested to obviate all sedition and revolt.

Trade was, properly speaking, the occupation of Carthage, the peculiar object of its industry, and its determinate and prevailing taste. It was its great force, and principal support. Situated in the centre of the Mediterranean, and stretching out one hand to the east and the other to the west, by the extent of her commerce, she took in all the known regions of the earth. The Carthaginians, in making themselves the factors and dealers of all nations, were become the sovereigns of the sea, the tie that united the east, west and south, and the necessary channel by which they communicated.

The most considerable persons of the city did not disdain to trade. They applied themselves to it with the same industry as the meanest citizens : and their great riches never gave them a disgust for assiduity, patience, and the labour necessary for augmenting them. This acquired them the empire of the sea, made their Commonwealth flourish, enabled them to dispute preheminance with Rome herself, and raised them to so high a degree of power, that it cost the

Romans, at two several times, a cruel and doubtful war of more than forty years, to subdue this haughty rival. For Carthage may be considered as conquered after the second war. In the third she only expired nobly. For the rest, it is no wonder, that Carthage, which had her origin in the principal school of the world for commerce, I mean Tyre, had so sudden and so continual success in it.

Diod. iv.
312.

Diodorus observes with reason, that the silver and gold mines, which the Carthaginians found in Spain, were an inexhaustible source of riches, that enabled them to support such long wars with the Romans. The natives of the country had long been ignorant of the treasures contained in the bowels of the earth, or at least knew little of their use and value. The Phœnicians were the first that discovered them, and in exchange of merchandize of small value for those precious metals, amassed immense riches. The Carthaginians knew well how to improve from their example, when they had made themselves masters of the country; as the Romans did afterwards, when they had taken it from them. Polybius, cited by

Strab. iii.
147.

Strabo, says, that in his time forty thousand men were employed in the mines near Carthagera, and that they supplied the Roman people every day with twenty-five thousand drachmas, that is, about six hundred and fifty pounds sterling.

Carthage must be considered at the same time as a trading and as a warlike Commonwealth. It was a trading state by inclination and condition; and became warlike, first through the necessity of defending itself against the neighbouring people, and afterwards through the desire of extending its commerce, and aggrandizing its empire. This double idea is the true plan and character of the Carthaginian State.

The military power of Carthage consisted in alliances with Kings; tributary countries, from which she had soldiers and money; some troops composed of her own citizens; and mercenary soldiers, which she hired in the neighbouring states, without being obliged
either

either to raise or discipline them ; because they were entirely formed and disciplined before : chusing in each country the troops, which had most merit and reputation. From Numidia, she had a light, bold, impetuous, indefatigable cavalry, in which the principal strength of her armies consisted ; from the islands Baleares, she had the most excellent slingers in the universe ; from Spain and Africa a firm and invincible infantry ; from the coasts of the Gauls, troops of experienced valour ; and even from Greece itself, soldiers equally good for all the operations of war, whether in the fields or towns, in besieging or defending places.

Thus she could immediately set a powerful army on foot, composed of all the chosen troops of different States, without depopulating her countries or cities by new levies ; without suspending her manufactures, or disturbing the works of artisans ; without interrupting her commerce, or weakening her navigation. She acquired by the blood she bought, the possession of provinces and kingdoms, and made other nations the instruments of her greatness and glory, without contributing any thing to it of her own, except money ; which foreign States supplied her by her trade.

If she received any blows in the course of a war, those losses were like accidents foreign to herself ; which only grazed upon the outside of the State, without making any deep wounds either in the bowels or heart of the Republic. These losses were soon repaired by the sums, which a flourishing commerce, like a perpetual fund of war, and an ever-new restorative of the State, supplied to purchase troops, that were always ready to sell themselves ; and by the vast extent of the coasts in their possession, it was easy for them to raise in a little time as many seamen and rowers, as were necessary to work and mann their fleets, and to find skilful pilots and experienced captains to command them.

But all these parts fortuitously combined, had no natural, cordial, necessary tie. As they were united
by

by no common interest, to form them into a solid and unalterable body, none of them were sincerely affected for the success of affairs, and the prosperity of the State. They were not actuated by the same zeal, and did not expose themselves to dangers with the same courage, for a Republic, (which they considered as foreign, and therefore as indifferent;) as people would have done for their own country; the happiness of which constitutes that of all the citizens, who compose it.

On considerable losses, the allied † Kings were easily disunited from Carthage, either through the jealousy, which the greatness of a more powerful neighbour naturally causes; the hope of more advantages from a new ally; or the fear of being involved in the misfortunes of an old one.

The tributary provinces, disgusted by the weight and infamy of the yoke, which they bore with impatience, generally flattered themselves with the hopes of one more gentle, in changing their master: or, if servitude were inevitable, they were very indifferent as to their choice, as we shall see from many examples, which the sequel of this history will supply.

The mercenary troops, accustomed to measure their fidelity by the greatness and duration of their pay, were always ready, on the least discontent, or the slightest promise of greater hire, to go over to the enemy, against whom they came to fight, and to turn their arms against those, who had called them in to their aid.

Thus the greatness of Carthage, which sustained itself only by external aids, was shaken to its foundation, as soon as they were removed. And if, besides this, her commerce, which was her only resource, happened to be interrupted by the loss of a battle at sea, she believed herself upon the brink of ruin, and abandoned herself to discouragement and despair,

† As Syphax and Masinissa,

as appears clearly at the end of the first Punic war.

Aristotle, in the book wherein he treats of the advantages and inconveniences of the government of Carthage, does not condemn it for employing none but foreign troops; and one may infer from his silence on that head, that it did not fall into that error, till some time after. The revolts of the mercenaries, which immediately followed the peace of the islands *Ægates*, and of which the effects were so terrible, that Carthage, before her final ruin, never saw herself so near destruction, ought to have taught her, that there is nothing more unfortunate than a State supported only by foreign troops, in whom there is neither zeal, safety, nor obedience.

This was not the case in the Roman Commonwealth. As she had neither trade nor money, she could not pay for aids capable of enabling her to push her conquests with so much rapidity as Carthage. But at the same time, as she derived every thing from herself, and all the parts of the State within itself were united with each other, she had more assured resources in her great misfortunes, than Carthage had in hers. And hence it was, that she had no thoughts of asking peace after the battle of *Cannæ*, as the latter had asked it after the naval battle gained by *Lutatius*, at a time when the danger was much less urgent.

Besides the forces of which we have spoken, Carthage had a body of troops composed only of her own citizens; but it was not numerous.

This was the school, wherein the principal Nobility, and such as had elevation, talents, and ambition, for aspiring at the great offices, made their first appearance in the profession of arms. It was out of these, that all the general officers, who commanded the different bodies of troops, and had the principal authority in the armies, were chosen. This state was too suspicious to confide the command of them to foreign Captains. But she did not carry her diffidence for her own citizens, to whom she gave great power,

power, nor her precautions against the abuse they might make of it to oppress their country, so far as Rome and Athens. The command of her armies was neither annual, nor fixed to a limited time, as in the two other Republics. Many of her Generals retained it during a long course of years, and to the end of the wars, or of their lives; though they were always accountable for their actions to the Commonwealth, and liable to be recalled, when either a real fault, a misfortune, or the credit of an opposite faction, gave occasion for it.

Cic. de
Arusp.
n. 19.

It remains for us to speak of the character and manners of the Carthaginians. In the enumeration of the different qualities, which Cicero ascribes to different nations, and by which he defines them, he gives the Carthaginians art, ability, address, industry, and cunning, *calliditas*; which no doubt were used in war, but appeared still more in all the rest of their conduct, and were attended with another quality that borders close upon them, and was still less for their honour. Art and cunning naturally lead on to lying, double-dealing, and breach of faith; and by insensibly accustoming the mind to become less delicate in the choice of the means for attaining its ends, they prepare it for knavery and perfidy. * These were also in the number of the characteristics of the Carthaginians; and were so evident and so well known, that they became proverbial. To express a treacherous disposition, it was usual to say Carthaginian faith, *fides Punica*; and to describe a knavish turn of mind, no expression was either more proper, or had more energy, than *Punicum ingenium*, a Carthaginian genius.

The extreme desire of amassing riches, and the inordinate passion for gain, (a failing wherein the great danger of commerce consists) was amongst them the usual source of injustice and vile practices. A single

* Carthagenenses fraudulentis & mendaces—multis & variis mercatorum advenarumque sermonibus ad studium fallendi quæstus cupiditate vocabantur. Cic. Orat. 2. in Rull. n. 94.

instance will prove this. * During a truce, which Scipio had granted them at their earnest request, some Roman ships driven by a storm, arriving in sight of Carthage, were stopt, and seized by order of the Senate and People, who could not suffer so fine a prey to escape them. They were always for gaining in any manner, and whatsoever it cost them. The † inhabitants of Carthage, many ages after, owned, as St. Augustin tells us, on an occasion particular enough, that they had not degenerated from their forefathers in this point.

These were not the only vices of the Carthaginians. They had always something cruel and savage in their humour and genius, an haughty and imperious air, a kind of ferocity, which in the first emotions of anger hearkening to neither reason nor remonstrance, brutally hurried them on to the last excesses and violences. The People, timorous and crouching in their fears, were fierce and cruel in their rage, and at the same time that they abjectly trembled in the sight of their magistrates, in their turn made all in subjection to themselves tremble.

We here see the difference education makes between nation and nation. The people of Athens, a city always considered as the centre of politeness and erudition, were naturally very jealous of their authority, and difficult to manage: but they had however a fund of goodness and humanity, which made them compassionate to the misfortunes of others, and suffer the faults of their leaders with patience and lenity.

* Magistratus Senatum vocare, populus in Curia vestibulo fremere, ne tanta ex oculis manibusque amitteretur præda. Consensum est, &c. Liv. xxx. 24.

† A mountebank promised the inhabitants of Carthage to tell them their most secret thoughts, if they would come to him on a certain day. When they were all assembled, he told them, "That they all thought to buy as cheap, and sell as dear, as they could." They unanimously agreed laughing, that it was true; and consequently owned, says St. Augustin, that they were all unjust. "Vili vultis emere, & carè vendere. In quo dicto levissimi Scenici omnes tamen conscientias invenerunt suas eique vera & tamen improvisa dicenti admirabili favore plauserunt. S. Augustin. De Trinit. xiii. 3.

Cleon one day demanded, that the assembly should be dismissed, because he had a sacrifice to offer, and some friends to entertain. The people only laughed, and withdrew. At Carthage, says Plutarch, such a liberty had cost him his life.

Liv. xxii.
61.

Livy makes a like reflection on the occasion of Terentius Varro's return to Rome after the battle of Cannæ, which had been lost by his ill conduct; he was received by all the orders of the state, who went out to meet him, and thanked him for not despairing of the Commonwealth; him, says the historian, who would have had nothing to expect but immediate execution, had he been General at Carthage.

And indeed, at Carthage there was a tribunal expressly established for calling the Generals to an account for their conduct, and they were made to answer for the events of war. Bad success was punished there as a crime against the state; and a commander who had lost a battle, was almost sure to lose his life at a gibbet on his return; so hard-hearted was the disposition of that People, so violent, cruel, barbarous, and always ready to shed the blood of citizens, as well as that of strangers. The unheard of torments which they made Regulus suffer are a proof of this; and their history abounds with examples of the same kind, that give horror.

Q. Curt.
iv. 5.

They carried this ferocity of character into the worship of the Gods, which, one would think, should soften the manners of the most savage, and inspire sentiments of humanity and mercy. In great calamities, as in the time of the plague, they sacrificed human victims to appease the anger of their Gods; an action which deserved the name of sacrilege, much more than that of sacrifice: *Sacrilegium verius, quam Sacrum.* * They sacrificed a great number of children

Justin.
xviii. 6.

* Cum peste laborarent, cruenta sacrorum religione & scelere pro remedia usi sunt. Quippe homines ut victimas immolabant, & impuberes (quæ ætas etiam hostium misericordiam provocat) aris admovebant, pacem deorum sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vita Dii maxime rogari solent. JUSTIN, 16.

to them, without pity for an age which excites compassion in the most cruel enemies; seeking a remedy for their misfortunes in the greatest iniquity, and using barbarity to appease their Gods.

Diodorus relates an example of this cruelty, which cannot be read without horror. When Agathocles was upon the point of besieging Carthage, the inhabitants of that city, seeing themselves reduced to the last extremity, imputed their misfortune to the just wrath of Saturn against them; because instead of children of the first quality, which they used to sacrifice to him, they had fraudulently substituted the children of slaves and strangers in their stead. To make amends for this pretended crime, they sacrificed two hundred children of the best families of Carthage to that God; besides which, more than three hundred citizens offered themselves voluntarily as victims.

Is this, says Plutarch, adoring the Gods? Is it having an idea of them, that does them much honour, to suppose them desirous of slaughter, appeased with human blood, and capable of exacting and approving such sacrifices? Could one believe mankind susceptible of such an excess of madness and phrenzy? Men have not commonly so total a contradiction to all that is most sacred in nature in their composition. To sacrifice, to slaughter their children with their own hands; to throw them into flaming furnaces in cool blood; * to stifle their cries and shrieks, lest a victim offered with a bad grace should offend Saturn; what horrors are these! Sentiments so unnatural, so barbarous, and however adopted by whole nations, and by nations remarkable for the wisdom of their constitutions of government; the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Gauls, Scythians, and even the Greeks and Romans, and sanctified by the constant practice of many ages, could only be inspired by him, who was "a murderer from the beginning," and who delights only in the degradation, misery, and destruction of mankind.

Plut. de
ger. Reip.
p. 169—
171.

* Blanditiis & osculis [matres] comprimebant vagitum, ne flebilis hostia immolaretur. MINUC. FEL.

S E C T. II.

Treaties concluded between the Romans and Carthaginians before the first Punic war.

THE treaties which I repeat in this place will be of some use for shewing the condition of the two States, especially in respect to commerce, at the time they were made. We are principally indebted to Polybius for preserving them.

First Treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians.

A. R. 244.
Ant. C.
508.
Polyb. iii.
176—178.

This first treaty was made in the time of the first Consuls that were created after the expulsion of the Kings. It is as follows, says Polybius, as near as it was possible for me to interpret it, for the Latin of those times was so different from that now spoke, that the most expert find it difficult to understand certain things.

“Between the Romans and their allies on one side, and the Carthaginians and their allies on the other, there shall be an alliance upon these conditions. Neither the Romans nor their allies shall navigate beyond the * Fine Promontory, except driven by storms, or constrained by enemies. That in case they are forcibly driven thither, they shall not be allowed either to buy or take any thing except what is strictly necessary for refitting their ships, or the worship of the Gods, that is to say, for sacrifices; and that they shall depart in five days. That the merchants shall pay no duty, except those to the crier and the register: that whatever is sold in the presence of those two witnesses, the public shall be obliged to make good to the seller. That if any Roman shall land in the part of Sicily, subject to the Carthaginians, strict justice shall

* Where this Promontory was, is not exactly known; and the situation of the two cities mentioned in the following treaty is as uncertain.

be done him in all things. That the Carthaginians shall cease to commit any ravages in the countries of the Antiates, Ardeates, Laurentini, Circeii, Tarra-
cini, and of all people of Latium subject to the Ro-
mans. That they shall do no hurt even to such cities
there, as are not in the dependance of the Romans.
That in case they take any of them, they shall restore
them entire to the Romans. That they shall build no
fort in the country of the Latines: and that if they
enter it in arms, they shall not pass the night in it."

Second Treaty.

This second treaty was made an hundred and sixty A. R. 407.
years after the first, in the Consulship of Valerius Ant. C.
Corvus, and Popillius Lænas. It differs in some 345.
things from the former. "The inhabitants of Tyre
and Utica with their allies are included in this treaty.
Two cities little known, Massia and Tarsejum, are
added to the Fine Promontory, beyond which the
Romans were not to navigate. It says, that if the
Carthaginians take any city in the country of the La-
tines not subject to the Romans, they shall keep the
money and prisoners, but shall not settle in it, and
shall restore it to the Romans——That the Romans
shall not traffick nor build any city either in Sardinia
or Africa——That at Carthage and in the part of
Sicily, possessed by the Carthaginians, the Romans
shall have the same rights and privileges in respect to
trade, as the citizens." Livy, who has not mentioned Livy vii.
the first treaty, gives us no particulars of this, and 27.
contents himself with saying, "That Ambassadors
from Carthage being arrived at Rome to make a treaty
of alliance and amity with the Romans, it was accord-
ingly concluded with them."

Third Treaty.

Only Livy mentions this treaty, and says but few A. R. 447.
words of it. "The treaty with the Carthaginians Ant. C.
K 3 was 305.

Liv. ix. 43. was renewed this year for the third time, and presents were made with politeness and amity to the Ambassadors, who came to Rome on that occasion."

Fourth Treaty.

A. R. 475. About the time that Pyrrhus made a descent into
Ant. C. Italy, the Romans made a treaty with the Carthagi-
278. nians, wherein the same articles, as in the former, are
Liv. Epit. agreed on, with the following additions. "That if
xiii. agreed on, with the following additions. "That if
Polyb. iii. the one or the other should make an alliance with
180. Pyrrhus, this clause should be inserted in it; 'that in
' case either of them should be attacked, the other
' should be at liberty to give them aid.' That which
ever of the two states should be attacked, the Cartha-
ginians should always furnish ships, as well for the
transportation of soldiers and provisions, as for battle:
but that each should pay their own troops. That
the Carthaginians should aid the Romans even by sea,
if necessary. That no ship's crew should be forced
to quit it against their will."

Justin. It was probably in consequence of this treaty, that
xviii. 2. Mago, the General of the Carthaginians, who was
Val. Max. then at sea, came, by order of his masters, to acquaint
iii. 7. the Senate of the pain they were in, to see Italy at-
tacked by a powerful King, and to offer the Romans
Pyrrhus. an hundred and twenty ships, in order to enable them
to defend themselves with a foreign aid against a fo-
reign power. The Senate received him very graci-
ously, and expressed abundance of gratitude for the
good will of the Carthaginians; but did not accept
their offer; adding, that the Roman People entered
into no wars, but such as they were capable of sustain-
ing and terminating with their own arms.

These treaties, especially the first, give us occasion
to make some observations upon the condition of the
two states. By the first treaty it appears, that at the
time it was concluded, the Carthaginians were much
more powerful than the Romans. Besides the great
extent of their territories in Africa, they had conquer-
ed

ed all Sardinia, with part of Sicily, and were absolute masters of the sea, which enabled them to give other nations the law, and to prescribe them the bounds, beyond which they were not to carry their navigation. But Rome, which at that time had not long thrown off the yoke of regal power, was still struggling with her neighbours, and saw her dominion confined within very narrow bounds. This infant state, weak as it was, seemed however to have began to give Carthage umbrage, and matter of disquiet. Accordingly at the same time that she kept as fair as possible on the one side with the Romans, in courting their alliance, and giving them and their allies all the security they could desire, on the other, by limiting their navigation, she took wise measures to prevent them from having too much knowledge of the condition and affairs of Africa. However that were, the alliance with Rome was of great advantage to the maritime cities of their allies, as it secured them against the invasions of a people so powerful by sea as that of Carthage.

This same treaty informs us also, that from the time of the Kings there were citizens of Rome that applied themselves to traffick. And this was absolutely necessary in a state, which was obliged to have recourse to others for the necessaries of life, and especially for corn and other provisions. This is seldom mentioned by historians. Livy speaks of the election of a magistrate, who was to be charged with the care of provisions, and to establish a society of factors. In process of time commerce was one of the principal sources of the riches, which the Romans acquired; in effect either of following it themselves, or putting out their money to interest in trading ships, as Cato the Censor did. In his life mention is made of fifty dealers, who sent fifty ships to sea. That famous * Roman esteemed, and used this method of acquiring riches. Cicero explains himself more clearly up-

A. R. 259.
Liv. ii. 27.

Plut. in
Cat. p. 349

* Est interdum præstare populo, mercaturis rem quærere, ni tam periculosum fiet. CAT. Init. lib. de re rustica.

on this head, as I have already observed elsewhere. * As to trade, says he, when it is great, and extensive, and by bringing in from all parts a great abundance of things useful to life, gives every one the means of supplying themselves with what they want; it is not to be blamed, especially when carried on without fraud and imposition. It is even meritorious and laudable, if those, who apply themselves to it, are not insatiable, and content themselves with reasonable gains.

It is therefore certain, that the Romans used navigation at the beginning of the Republic, at least for trade. They afterwards applied themselves to it even for war, as Mr. Huet observes in his History of Commerce. In the 417th year of Rome, the Romans having overcome the Antiates, prohibited them all trade by sea, took † from them all their ships, burnt a part of them, and carried the rest up the Tiber to Rome, where they were laid up in the place appropriated to the keeping and building of ships. This is a proof that the Romans in those times applied themselves to naval affairs. In the 443d year of Rome the place of Duumviri is mentioned, whose ‡ office was to fit out, repair, and keep up the fleet. In the year 470, the Romans had a fleet of ten ships at sea commanded by the Duumvir Valerius. It was insulted by the Tarentines, which gave occasion for the war with that people.

It appears from the last treaty concluded in the time of Pyrrhus, and the silence of historians in respect to the navy of the Romans before the Punic wars, that till then the Romans had thought little of maritime

Freinsh.
xii. 7, & 8.

* Mercatura, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est. Sin magna & copiosa, multa undique apportans, multisque sine vanitate inperiens, non est admodum vituperanda. Atque etiam, si satiata quæstu, vel contenta potius—— videtur jure optimo posse laudari. Offic. i. 151.

† Naves Antiatum, partim in navalia Romæ subductæ, partim incensæ. Liv. viii. 14.

‡ Duo imperia eo anno dari cœpta per populum, utraque pertinentia ad rem militarem——alterum, ut Duumviros navales classis orandæ reficiendæque causâ idem populus juberet. Liv. ix. 30.

affairs,

affairs, though they had not totally neglected them; so that if it were necessary to have a considerable fleet for a war, they were not in a condition to fit one out: and it was for that reason they stipulated, that the Carthaginians should supply them with ships.

Treaties and alliances were made from time to time, as we see here, between the Romans and Carthaginians, but no real amity ever subsisted between them. — They feared, and perhaps mutually hated, each other. Their refusal of the aid in the last place, which Carthage offered the Romans against Pyrrhus, argues a people averse to having any obligations to the Carthaginians, and who then perhaps foresaw a rupture. Accordingly the last treaty between the two states was soon followed by the first Punic war.

T H E

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK THE ELEVENTH.

THIS book contains the history of the first Punic war, which continued twenty-four years, from the 488th to the 509th year of Rome.

S E C T. I.

Aid granted by the Romans to the Mamertines against the Carthaginians occasions the first Punic war. The Consul Appius goes to Sicily. He defeats Hiero, and enters Messina. He beats the Carthaginians, and leaving a strong garrison at Messina, returns to Rome, and has the honour of a triumph. Census completed. Institution of gladiatorial combats. Vestals punished. Two new Consuls go to Sicily. Treaty concluded between Hiero and the Romans. Punishment of soldiers who had surrendered themselves to the enemy in a cowardly manner. The Consuls return to Rome. Triumph of Valerius: first sun-dial at Rome. Nail driven on account of the plague. New colonies. The Romans, in conjunction with the troops of Syracuse, besiege Agrigentum. A battle is fought, in which the Carthaginians are entirely defeated. The city is taken after a siege of seven months. Perfidy of Hanno in regard to his mercenary soldiers. He is recalled, and Amilcar sent to succeed him. The Romans build and man a fleet, in order to dispute the sovereignty of the sea with the Carthaginians. The Consul Cornelius and seventeen ships are

are taken, and carried to Carthage. The rest of the fleet beats the Carthaginian General. Famous naval victory gained by Duilius near the coast of Myla. His triumph. Expedition against Corsica and Sardinia. Conspiracy at Rome suppressed in its birth.

HISTORY is now going to open a new series of things, and events to become far greater, and more important, than they have hitherto been. During the five hundred years from the building of Rome, the Romans have been employed in subjecting the states of Italy, (some by the force of arms, others by treaties and alliances,) and laying the foundations of an empire, which is to comprehend almost the whole universe. They are now going to reap the fruit of their domestic conquests, by the addition of foreign ones to them, which will begin by Sicily and the neighbouring islands; then like a conflagration that perpetually gains ground, they will go on in the Spains, Africa, Asia, Greece, and the Gauls: conquests, which, notwithstanding their vast extent, will cost them less time than that of Italy alone.

A body of Campanian adventurers, who were in the pay of Agathocles the tyrant of Sicily, having entered the city of Messina, which with a little variation is now Messina, soon after put some of the inhabitants to the sword, drove out the rest, married their wives, seized all their effects, and remained sole masters of the place, which was very important. They assumed the name of Mamertines. Polyb. l. i. p. 6; 11.

After a Roman legion by their example and aid, as we have already related, had treated the city of Rhegium in the same manner, the Mamertines, supported by those allies, became very powerful, and gave the Syracusans and Carthaginians, between whom the dominions of Sicily were then divided, much disquiet. That power was of short duration. The Romans, as soon as they had put an end to the war with Pyrrhus, having taken vengeance of the perfidious legion that had seized Rhegium, and restored the place to its ancient

tient inhabitants, the Mamertines continuing alone and without support, were no longer in a condition to oppose the forces of the Syracusans. The sense of their weakness, and the view of the approaching danger, wherein they were, of falling into the hands of their enemies, obliged them to have recourse to the Romans, and to implore their aid. But Hiero did not give them time to take breath. He attacked them vigorously, and gained a considerable victory over them, by which he saw himself in a condition to reduce them to surrender at discretion. But an unforeseen aid extricated them out of this extremity.

* Hannibal, General of the Carthaginians, who was accidentally at that time at the islands of Lipara near Sicily, having received advice of Hiero's victory, apprehended, that if he should entirely ruin Messana, the power of the Syracusans would become formidable to his country. For this reason, he immediately paid Hiero a visit; and under pretext of congratulating him upon his victory, he delayed him some days, and prevented him from setting out directly for Messana, as he intended. In the mean time he entered the city first himself; and finding that the Mamertines were inclined to surrender to the conqueror, he dissuaded them from it, by promising them powerful aids, and even making part of his troops immediately enter their city.

Hiero, perceiving that he had suffered himself to be over-reached, and that he was not in a condition to besiege Messana after the reinforcement which had just entered it, thought fit to return to Syracuse, where he was received with the universal joy of the inhabitants, and declared King, as I have related elsewhere with greater extent.

After Hiero's retreat the Mamertines resumed courage, and began to deliberate upon the choice they had to make. But they could not agree amongst

* The names Hannibal, Asdrubal, Adherbal, Hanno, and the like, were very common at Carthage. It were needless to tell the reader, that this is not the great Hannibal.

themselves. "Some affirmed that it was necessary to put themselves under the protection of the Carthaginians without the least hesitation : that it was for their advantage to do so on many accounts, besides its being become necessary, as they had received their troops into the city. Others maintained, on the contrary, that the Mamertines had no less to fear from the Carthaginians, than from Hiero. That it was to run headlong into voluntary slavery, to confide in a Republic, that had a powerful fleet upon the coasts of Sicily, was actually in possession of a great part of the island, and had long fought to make herself mistress of the rest. That consequently, the only choice they could make with safety, was to implore the aid of the Romans, a people as invincible in war, as faithful in their engagements, who had not a foot of land in Sicily, had no fleet, nor any experience in naval affairs, and had an equal interest to prevent as well the Syracusans as Carthaginians from becoming too powerful in Sicily. That lastly, as they had already sent Ambassadors to Rome, in order to put themselves under the protection of the Roman People, it would be a kind of insult to change their resolution on a sudden, and to have recourse to others."

Whilst things were in this condition at Messana, the affair was deliberated upon at Rome, which had for Consuls at that time

APPIUS CLAUDIUS CAUDEX.

M. FULVIUS FLACCUS.

A. R. 488.

Ant. C.

264.

The Roman Senate considering this affair in its different lights, found some difficulty in it. On the one side it appeared shameful and unworthy of the Roman virtue, openly to take upon them the defence of traitors and villains, who were directly in the same predicament with those of Rhegium, whom they had just punished so severely. On the other side, it was of the last importance to put a stop to the progress of the Carthaginians, who, not content with their conquests

Polyb.

l. 10, 11.

Zonar.

viii. 331.

A. R. 488, quests in Africa and Spain, had made themselves
 Ant. C. 264. masters of all the islands in the seas of Sardinia and Etruria, and would soon undoubtedly possess themselves of all Sicily, if Messana were abandoned to them. Now the distance from thence into Italy was not great, and to leave the entrance open, was in some measure to invite so powerful an enemy thither. The Senate was besides offended that the Carthaginians had aided the Tarentines.

These reasons, how strong soever they appeared, could not determine them to declare for the Mamertines: the motives of honour and justice prevailed on this occasion over those of interest and policy. But the People were not so delicate. In the assembly, which was held upon this occasion, it was resolved to aid the Mamertines. The Consul Appius Claudius, who had dispatched before him one of the Tribunes of his army, named Claudius also, to conciliate the favour of the inhabitants of Messana, set out with his army. In the mean time the Mamertines, partly by menaces and partly by surprize, drove the governor, who commanded for the Carthaginians, out of the citadel. His imprudence and cowardice cost him his life; for he was hanged at his return to Carthage. The Carthaginians, in order to retake Messana, made a fleet advance near Pelorus, and placed their infantry on the other side. At the same time Hiero, to take advantage of the occasion, for driving the Mamertines entirely out of Sicily, made an alliance with the Carthaginians, and immediately set out from Syracuse to join them.

Frontin. i.
 4--11.

During that time, Appius had advanced with the utmost diligence to aid the Mamertines. He had the streight of Messana to pass. The enterprize was dangerous, or more properly speaking, rash, and even, according to all the rules of probability, impossible. The Romans had no fleet, and only boats of a gross structure, which might be compared almost to the canoes of the Indians. For this seems to be implied by the term *caudicariæ naves*, which the ancients use
 in

in speaking of the fact I am now relating : and from thence came the Consul's surname Caudex. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, had a fleet well manned and very numerous. Appius in this difficulty, which would have disconcerted any other, had recourse to stratagem. Not being able to pass the streight, where the Carthaginians had posted themselves, he made a feint of abandoning the enterprize, and of marching back towards Rome, with all the troops he had to embark. Upon that news the enemy, who blockaded Messana on the side next the sea, having retired as if there was nothing farther to apprehend, the Consul, taking advantage of their absence and the darkness of the night, passed the streight, and arrived in Sicily.

A. R. 488.
Ant. C.
264.

We see here the terrible effects, with which a fault that seems slight at first, may be attended. Had the Carthaginians prevented his passage as they might very easily have done, and made themselves masters of Messana, which was an inevitable consequence of it, the Romans perhaps might never have been capable of landing in Sicily, nor in consequence of making all the conquests, that acquired them the empire of the universe. But Providence, that had allotted it to them, opened them the way to it on this occasion. It is remarkable, that this bold step of Appius, is the first made by the Romans out of Italy.

The place where he landed was not far from the camp of the Syracusans. He exhorted his troops to charge it at unawares, assuring them of victory in the surprize wherein they would find the enemy. It happened as the Consul had promised. Hiero, who expected nothing so little, had scarce time to draw up his troops in battle. His cavalry had some advantage at first ; but the Roman infantry having charged the gross of his army, soon broke and put it entirely to the rout. Appius, after having caused the dead bodies of the enemy to be stript of their spoils, entered Messana, where he was received as a preserver, come from heaven ; and made the joy of the Mamertines the greater and the more sensible, as they had scarce any hopes

Zonar.
viii. 324.

A. R. 488.
Ant. C.
264.

hopes of such an event. Hiero seeing himself defeated, almost before he saw the enemy, as he afterwards said himself, and suspecting, that the Carthaginians had given up the passage of the streight to the Romans, and disgusted long before by the perfidy of that people, made his troops decamp the next night with as little noise as possible, and returned to Syracuse with great diligence.

Appius freed from all apprehensions on that side, thought proper to take the advantage of the terror, which the noise of this first victory had spread even amongst the Carthaginians. Accordingly he marched to attack them in their camp, which seemed inaccessible, as well by its natural situation, as the intrenchments, with which it was fortified. And he was actually repulsed and obliged to retire with some loss. The Carthaginians, who considered this hasty retreat, as an effect of their bravery, and the enemy's fear, pursued them. This was what the Consul expected. He faced about; on which the fortune of the battle changed with the situation of the place. Their own courage was now all that either side had to trust to. The Carthaginians did not long maintain their ground before the Romans. A great number of them were killed. Some escaped into their camp, others into the neighbouring cities, and they did not dare to quit their intrenchments, as long as Appius continued in Messana.

Zonar.
viii. 384.

Seeing himself in consequence master of the field, he ravaged the whole flat country without opposition, and burnt the villages of the allies of the Syracusans. So general a consternation inspired him with the bold design of approaching Syracuse itself. Several battles ensued with very various success, in one of which the Consul was in great danger. He had recourse upon this occasion to stratagem. He dispatched an officer to Hiero, as if to treat of peace. The King willingly hearkened to that proposal. They had several interviews, and during those conferences, Appius insensibly retrieved the bad step he had made. Other proposals

posals passed between some private persons of the two armies. The Syracusans seemed to desire peace: but the King would not hear of it then; probably because the Consul, when out of danger, became more difficult.

A. R. 483.
Ant. C.
264.

These different motions took up great part of the year. The Consul returned to Messina, in which he left a strong garrison, capable of securing the city, and then went over to Rhegium, in order to return to Rome. He was received there with great applauses and universal joy. His triumph over Hiero and the Carthaginians was celebrated with the greater solemnity and concourse of people, as it was the first that had been obtained over nations beyond the seas.

At the closing of the Census this year by the Censors Cn. Cornelius and C. Marcius, the number of the citizens was found to be two hundred ninety-two thousand two hundred twenty-four, an exceeding great number, and which seems incredible, when we reflect upon the uninterrupted series of wars from the foundation of Rome, and the frequent plagues no less destructive than battles. One can never sufficiently admire the wise policy of the Romans for repairing all these losses, which was by incorporating great numbers of the people of the conquered states into the body of the Commonwealth: a policy established from the reign of Romulus, and afterwards practised with unalterable perseverance, which was the principal source of the greatness of Rome, and contributed very much to render her invincible, by making her superior to so many defeats, of which some seemed to make her eternal ruin inevitable.

Freinsh.
xv. 40---
42.

This same year gave birth to a cruel and savage custom, which however became very common in process of time, wherein the shedding of human blood, in the combats of the gladiators, was considered as the most agreeable sight that could be exhibited to the Roman People. It was introduced by the two brothers M. and D. Junius Brutus, to do honour to

A. R. 483. the funeral of their father. I shall say something on
 Ant. C. this head in its proper place.
 264.

The vestal Capparonia, convicted of breaking her vow of chastity, prevented the punishment by hanging herself. The corrupter and accomplices were punished according to the laws.

A. R. 489.
 Ant. C.
 263.

M'. VALERIUS MAXIMUS.

M'. OTACILIUS CRASSUS.

Polyb. i.
 16, 17.
 Freinsh.
 xvi. 43---
 48.
 Zonar.
 viii. 385.

The preceding year Rome had been obliged to send one of the two Consuls against the revolted slaves of Volturni in Tuscany. This year, not being diverted by other wars, she made the two new Consuls go to Sicily. They acted there in great concert, sometimes uniting, and sometimes dividing their troops; beat the Carthaginians and Syracusans on several occasions; and spread the terror of the Roman arms in such a manner almost throughout the whole island, that the cities sent from all sides to make their submission to the Consuls: their number amounted in all to sixty-seven, amongst which were * Tauromenium and Catina, two strong places.

Such speedy success induced them to advance towards Syracuse in order to besiege it. Hiero, who doubted his own forces, and those of the Carthaginians, and relied still less upon the faith of the latter, and who had a secret inclination for the Romans, in effect of the esteem universally conceived for their probity and justice, sent deputies to the Consuls to treat of peace. The accommodation was soon concluded. It was too much desired on both sides to be long in negotiating. The conditions of the treaty were: "That Hiero should restore to the Romans the places he had taken from them or their allies; that he should dismiss the prisoners without ransom; that he should pay an hundred talents of silver for the expences of the war; that he should remain in quiet possession of

* Now Taormina, or the eastern coast of Sicily. Catane, *ibid*.

Syracuse and the cities in its dependance." The principal of these were Acræ, Leontium, Megara, Netinæ, and Tauromenium. The treaty was soon after ratified at Rome. It was made only for fifteen years; but mutual esteem, and good offices on both sides, rendered it perpetual. The Romans had no ally more faithful, nor friend more constant than this Prince. Bringing him over from the side of the Carthaginians was doing every thing. He was of infinite advantage to them, especially in respect to provisions, the transportation of which was very difficult before, because the Carthaginians were masters of the sea, which had put the Romans to abundance of inconveniences the preceding year.

The Carthaginian General, who had sailed with a fleet to the aid of Syracuse, which he expected to find besieged, having received advice of the treaty concluded between Hiero and the Romans, returned faster than he came. The forces of the two new allies being united, they took a great number of cities from the Carthaginians.

The Consul Otacilius gave at that time an useful example of severity, in respect to military discipline, and very conformable to the Roman genius. Some Roman soldiers, on an occasion of danger, had submitted to pass under the yoke, to preserve their lives. When they rejoined the army, the Consul condemned them to incamp separately without the intrenchments, where they were in much less security than the rest of the army, being more exposed to the incursions of the enemy; besides which it was a permanent disgrace, that continually reproached them with their cowardice, and animadverted to them to wipe out the stain by some action of valour.

The winter approaching, the Consuls, after having left sufficient garrisons in the towns, returned to Rome with the rest of the troops. M^r. Valerius, who had distinguished himself this campaign in a peculiar manner, received the honour of a triumph, in which a sun-dial was carried, a new object to the Romans,

A. R. 489.
Ant. C.
263.

who till then had distinguished the hours, as the people do in the country, by the different height of the sun. The sun-dial was horizontal, and came from Catina. Valerius afterwards placed it upon a pedestal near the tribunal of harangues. He also caused a picture to be set up in the hall Hostilia, wherein his battle with Hiero and the Carthaginians was painted; which had not been done before, but afterwards became very common. * He was surnamed Messala, for having delivered the city of Messana from danger; which probably, after the departure of Appius Claudius, had been attacked again by Hiero and the Carthaginians. He was called at first Messana: which name was changed insensibly into that of Messala. Seneca, no doubt through inadvertence, says, that this surname was given him for taking the city of Messana.

Plin. vii.
60.

I said before that clocks were not known at Rome before the Consulship of Valerius. An ancient author, according to Pliny, gives the use of them a prior date, as early as the eleventh year before the war with Pyrrhus; but Pliny himself invalidates this testimony. The † sun-dial, which Valerius brought to Rome, having been made for the climate of Catina, did not agree with that of Rome, nor tell the hours right. About an hundred years after the Censor Marcius Philippus set up a more regular one near that of Valerius. In that interval they became common enough at Rome, as appears from a fragment of Plautus, that Aulus Gellius has preserved. It is an hungry parasite that speaks.

*Ut illum Dii perdant, qui primus horas repperit,
Quique adeo primus hic statuit solarium,
Qui mihi comminuit misero articulatum diem !*

* Primus ex familia Valeriorum urbis Messanæ captæ in se translato nomine Messana appellatus est, paulatimque vulgo permutante literas, Messala dictus est. SENEC. de brev. vit. c. 13.

† Quod cum ad clima Siciliæ descriptum, ad horas Romæ non conveniret, Marcius Philippus Censor aliud juxta constituit. CENSORIN. de die natali, cap. 22.

Nam

*Nam me puero uterus hic erat solarium,
Multò omnium istorum optimum & verissimum,
Ubi iste monebat esse, nisi cum nihil erat.
Nunc etiam quod est, non est, nisi soli lubet.
Itaque adeo jam oppletum est oppidum solariis,
Major pars populi aridi reptant fame.*

This kind of dial was of no use but when the sun shined. Five years after the Censorship of Marcius, another Cenfor (Scipio Nasica) set up one, which served both for day and night. It was called a Clepsydra. It shewed all the hours by the means of water, and some wheels that it turned. There is a description of it in Vitruvius, who, as well as Athenæus and Pliny, ascribes the invention of it to Ctesibius, a native of Alexandria, that lived under the two first Ptolomies. This Clepsydra differed from that first used by the Greeks, and afterwards by the Romans, to limit the time allowed the orators to plead; that was also used in the * armies to regulate the four watches of the night, of which each was three hours, when the sentinels were relieved. A. R. 595.
Vitruv.
ix. 9.

What a difference there is between the antient clocks, either public or private, and ours! I do not know, whether we have a due sense of so considerable a good, that includes so many conveniences: which certainly is not the effect of chance, but of God's beneficent attention to our wants.

All the world knows, that the most antient sundial mentioned in history, is that of Ahaz King of Juda, on which the prophet Isaiah made the shadow of the sun go back ten degrees. 2 Chron.
xx, 11.

I return to our history. The plague continuing to shew itself in the city, a Dictator was nominated for driving the nail, and putting a stop by that religious ceremony to the wrath of the Gods.

* Quia impossibile videbatur in speculis per totam noctem vigilantes singulos permanere, ideo in quatuor partes AD CLEPSYDRAM sunt divisa vigilæ, ut non amplius quàm tribus horis nocturnis necesse sit vigilare. VEGET, de re mil. iii. 8.

Some colonies were also settled at Esernia, Firmum, and Castrum, cities of Naples.

A. R. 490.
Ant. C.
262.

L. POSTUMIUS GEMELLUS.

Q. MAMILIUS VITULUS.

Polyb. i.
16—19.

These two Consuls had Sicily for their province, but with only two legions, which appeared sufficient since the alliance with Hiero; and that diminution eased Rome considerably on the side of provisions.

Having united their troops with those of the allies, they undertook the siege of Agrigentum, one of the strongest places of Sicily. Its natural situation and fortifications rendered it almost impregnable. The Carthaginians, who had foreseen that the Romans, emboldened by the considerable aids which they should have from Hiero, would undoubtedly form some important enterprize, and that they would probably attack Agrigentum, had made choice of it for their place of arms, and with that view had strengthened it abundantly with every thing necessary for a good defence. They at first had sent part of their troops into Sardinia, with design either to prevent or retard the passage of the Romans into Sicily. Finding that precaution ineffectual, they had made them return, and united them with a great body of auxiliary troops from Liguria, the Gauls, and especially from Spain.

The Consuls encamped within a mile from Agrigentum, and reduced the enemy to shut themselves up within the walls. The corn was now ripe, and actually upon the ground. As it was manifest, that the siege would be of long continuance, the Roman soldiers, solely attentive to cutting and bringing off the grain, dispersed themselves farther, and with less precaution, than was consistent with the proximity of a powerful enemy. This negligence was very near proving fatal to them, in the entire ruin of their army. The Carthaginians falling suddenly upon them, the foragers could not sustain so warm an attack, and were put to the rout. The enemy then advanced to
the

the camp of the Romans, and having divided their troops into two bodies, the one began to pull up the palisades, whilst the other attacked the guards posted there for the defence of the camp. Though the latter were much inferior in number to the Carthaginians, as they knew that to quit their post was capital with the Romans, they sustained the charge with inconceivable resolution. Abundance of them were killed, and still more on the side of the enemy. This vigorous defence gave time for aid to arrive, when the Carthaginians, who were engaged, were broke, and put to the rout. Those who had already pulled up part of the palisades, were surrounded on all sides, and almost all cut to pieces; the rest were pursued quite into the city. This action, in which the invincible valour of the Roman troops retrieved their negligence, rendered the enemy less disposed to make sallies, and the Romans more upon their guard in foraging.

A. R. 490.
Ant. C.
262.

Sallies accordingly were less frequent from thenceforth; and this determined the Consuls to divide their armies into two great bodies, and to post them in the front of two parts of the city; the one facing the temple of Esculapius, and the other upon the great road to Heraclea. They fortified the two camps with good lines of contravallation and circumvallation: the first, to prevent sallies: and the other to cut off the entrance of succours or provisions into the place. The space between the two camps was occupied by guards, posted at small distances from each other.

The Romans in all these operations had great aids from the States of Sicily, that had lately joined them. Their troops, in conjunction with those of the Romans, formed an army of an hundred thousand men. Convoys of provisions were carried for them as far as Erbesa, from whence the Romans brought them into their camp, which was not very remote. In effect of these supplies they abounded with every thing necessary.

A. R. 490.
Ant. C.
262.

The siege continued in this condition during almost five months, without any considerable action on either side, nothing passing but some slight skirmishes. But in the mean time, the Carthaginians suffered exceedingly, because being at least fifty thousand shut up in the place, they had consumed almost all their provisions, and had no hopes, that any supplies could be brought in; so good a guard did the Romans keep to shut up all the avenues. In consequence the evils they had already suffered, and those which they apprehended were to come, discouraged them entirely.

Hannibal, the son of Gisgo, who commanded in the place, had sent courier after courier, to demand aids and provisions. At length Hanno arrived in Italy with fifty thousand foot, six thousand horse and sixty elephants. He landed at Lilybæum with his troops, from whence he marched to Heraclea. The inhabitants of Erbesfa went thither to him, and promised to put their city into his hands, through which passed all the convoys for the Romans. Accordingly, by their help he made himself master of it; from whenceforth the besiegers were no less distressed by the want of provisions than the besieged. They were at length reduced to such extremities, that they deliberated more than once upon raising the siege; and they would have been reduced to do it, if Hiero, by attempting every kind of means, had not at last found one, for conveying some supplies to them, which gave them time to breathe.

Hanno informed that the Romans were greatly distressed both by famine and diseases, which are generally the effect of it; and on the contrary seeing his own troops in good condition, resolved to approach nearer the enemy, in order to bring them, if possible, to a battle. Accordingly he marched from Heraclea with his whole army and fifty elephants, and made the Numidian cavalry advance before him, after having given them the necessary instructions for drawing the Romans into an ambuscade. The Numidians acquitted themselves exactly of their commission, and ad-

advanced to the camp of the Consuls, with an air of contempt, and a kind of insult. The Romans did not fail to come out, and charge them immediately. The Numidians made some stand: and afterwards being broke, fled precipitately the same way that they knew Hanno was advancing. The Romans pursued them at the heels, till they came up to the main body of their army. The farther they were from the camp, the more difficult it was to retreat. Abundance of them, who could not get off, fell on the spot.

A. R. 490.
Ant. C.
262.

This success giving Hanno hopes of a complete victory, he seized an eminence, not above fifteen hundred paces from the Roman camp. However, tho' the two armies were so near each other, they did not come to a battle till long after; both sides equally apprehending an action, that could not but be decisive. The Romans in particular, being discouraged by the check their cavalry had received, kept close within their camp: But when they saw that their fear discouraged their allies, and on the contrary augmented the boldness of the enemy, they determined to march out. Hanno began then to fear on his side, and was in no haste to fight. Two months passed in this manner without any considerable action.

At length, at the warm instances of Hannibal, who informed him that the besieged could not hold out against the famine, and that many of them went over to the enemy, he resolved to give battle without farther delay, and agreed with Hannibal, that he should make a sally at the same time. The Consuls, who were apprized of this design, affected to remain quiet in their camps. This induced Hanno to offer them battle with more haughtiness. He advanced quite up to their intrenchments, and reproached them with their abject timidity. The Romans contented themselves with defending their camp, and only skirmished: which continually augmented the security of the Carthaginians, and their contempt of the enemy. At last one day, when Hanno came as usual to
attack

A. R. 490. attack the intrenchments, Postumius, according to
 Ant. C. 262. custom, made some troops march out only to repulse him, who fatigued and harrassed him from six in the morning till noon. Then, as Hanno was retiring, the Consul advanced at the head of all the legions to charge him. Though he was surpris'd, not expecting a battle, he fought with all possible valour; so that the victory continued doubtful almost to the close of the day. But, as his troops had been very much fatigued before the battle, without having taken any refreshment, and the Romans, who had prepared themselves in all respects, came on with quite fresh force and courage, the match was not equal. The defeat began by the mercenary troops of the first line, who could sustain the fatigue no longer. They not only abandoned their post, but throwing themselves with precipitation into the midst of the elephants, and upon the second line, disordered all the ranks, and drew all the rest after them. The other Consul had no less success on his side, and repulsed Hannibal, who had made a sally, with vigour into the city, and killed him abundance of men. The camp of the Carthaginians was taken. Three elephants were wounded, thirty killed, and eleven fell into the hands of the Romans. The men were either cut to pieces, or dispersed in flight. Of so numerous an army, some few escaped with their General to Heraclea.

Hannibal seeing that the Romans, after the fatigues of so rude an action, abandoned themselves to the joy of their victory, and were more remiss than usual in keeping guard, took advantage of that interval of inactivity and neglect, and quitted the city in the night at the head of his mercenary troops. The Romans, who were informed of his departure the next morning, immediately pursued him. But as he had got a great way before them, they could only come up with his rear-guard, part of which they handled severely enough. The inhabitants of Agrigentum, seeing themselves abandoned by the Carthaginians, put many of those that remained in the city to the sword, either to
 avenge

avenge themselves upon the authors of their miseries, or to make their court to the victors. They had not the better quarter on that account. Twenty-five thousand men of them were made slaves. Agrigentum was taken in this manner, after a siege of seven months. A great number of other places surrendered themselves in consequence to the victors. This victory was very useful and glorious to the Romans; but it cost them dear. During this siege, more than thirty thousand men of the Consul's army, and that of the States of Sicily, perished by different causes. As the approach of the winter would admit no farther enterprizes in Sicily, they returned to Messana in order to repair to Rome.

A. R. 490.
Ant. C.
262.

L. VALERIUS FLACCUS.

A. R. 491.
Ant. C.
261.

T. OTACILIUS CRASSUS.

Both the new Consuls had Sicily for their province, which then engrossed the attention of the Romans, and they repaired thither, as soon as the season would permit.

The grief which Hanno felt for his defeat, was augmented by the extreme perplexity he was in, on account of the revolt of the mercenary troops, and especially the Gauls, who complained with seditious cries, of not having had their pay for some months. He endeavoured to mollify them by magnificent promises of the great and speedy advantages which he designed them; and added, that there was a neighbouring city of which he was sure of making himself master by intelligence, and of which he intended them the plunder, that would make them ample amends for all that was due to them. They liked that proposal well; and imagining themselves very rich already, expressed their gratitude to him for his intentions in their favour, and congratulated each other upon the booty they were going to take. Hanno, however, had ordered his treasurer to go to the Consul Otacilius as a deserter, under pretext of being unwilling to deliver

Frontini
Strat. iii.
16.
Zonar.
viii. 386.

A. R. 491. Ant. C. 261. liver in his accounts to his General; and to give him advice, that four thousand Gauls had orders to repair the next night to the city of * Entella, which was to be surrendered to them by treachery; and that it would be easy to cut them all off, by laying an ambuscade. Though the Consul did not rely much upon the information of a deserter, he however did not think it proper to despise this piece of advice entirely, and posted an ambuscade at the place. The Gauls did not fail coming thither at the time. The ambuscade rose, attacked them at unawares, and put them all to the sword, but not without selling their lives dearly. Hanno in consequence had the double joy of discharging his debts without cost, and of destroying a considerable number of his enemies. How horrid was such a conduct! Hanno, on this occasion, well makes good the proverb applied to the Carthaginians: *Punica Fides*, Punic Faith. Could he flatter himself, that so black and detestable a treachery would remain unknown to men, and unpunished by the Divinity? Accordingly, at the end of this war we shall see Carthage brought to the very brink of destruction, from having broke her word with other mercenary soldiers, and refused to give them their arrears.

The Carthaginians, dissatisfied with Hanno, recalled him, and laid a great fine upon him. Amilcar, whom we must not confound with the father of Hannibal, was sent to command in his place. That new general, having no hopes of succeeding against the Romans in battle by land, conceived the design of transferring all the operations of the war to the side, on which the Carthaginians had indisputably the superiority, that is the sea. He therefore applied himself to cruizing with his fleet not only upon the coasts of Sicily, of which all the cities surrendered themselves to him, but on those of Italy, ravaging the country wherever he came. There was no new action this year in Sicily. A kind of partition was now made be-

• On the south side of the island, a little to the westward.

tween the inland and maritime cities. The first sided with the Romans, and the latter with the Carthaginians.

CN. CORNELIUS SCIPIO ASINA.

A. R. 492.

C. DUILIUS.

Ant. C.

260.

The fifth year of the first Punic war begins here. Polyb. i. The Romans had no reason to repent their having ^{20, 21.} undertaken it. Hitherto they had succeeded both in battles and sieges. However, as advantageous as their victory over Hanno might be, they rightly perceived, that as long as the Carthaginians continued masters of the sea, the maritime cities of the island would declare for them, and that they should never be able to drive them out of those places. Besides which, they were not satisfied, that Africa should remain in peace and tranquillity, whilst Italy was infested by the frequent incursions of the enemy. For Carthage was no less formidable by her fleets and naval armies, than Rome by her legions and land-forces. The Romans therefore now first conceived thoughts of building a fleet, and disputing the sovereignty of the sea with the Carthaginians. The undertaking was bold: but it shews the valour and greatness of mind of that People. When they went to Sicily, they had not a single ship, though ever so small, equipped for war, and had nothing to carry them over but the canoes, of which we have spoke, and some vessels borrowed of their neighbours. They had no experience of naval affairs, nor so much as a single workman of capacity in the building of ships. They even did not know the form of a quinqueremis, that is, a galley with five rows of oars, in which the principal strength of fleets consisted at that time. But luckily at the beginning of the war, they had taken one that had run ashore, which served them for a model. This industrious and ingenious People, whom no labour discouraged, and who turned every thing to their advantage, learnt from their enemies themselves

A. R. 492.
Ant. C.
260.

selves the art and means for subduing them. The Consuls presided in this new work. The Romans, animated by their warm exhortations, and still more by their example, applied themselves with incredible ardour and industry in building ships of all kinds. Whilst they were thus employed on one side, rowers were raised on the other, who were taught a manner of working entirely unknown to them before. They were made to sit upon benches on the side of the sea, in the same order as in ships, and to practise, as if actually at the oar, the different motions of falling back with a spring in pulling with their arms, and then of extending them forwards in order to renew the same motion, and that all together, in concert, and at the instant the signal was given. In the space of two months, an hundred galleys of five benches of oars, and twenty of three, were fitted out: so that, says an author *, one might almost have believed, that they were not ships built by art, but trees metamorphosed into galleys by the Gods. After the rowers had been exercised for some time in the ships themselves, the fleet put to sea. The command of the land-army in Sicily fell by lot to Duilius, and of that by sea to Cornelius.

Polybius gives us this account of the building of this fleet, and of the preparations of this first naval army of the Romans. We must not conclude from thence, that they had never used the sea. The contrary is proved by certain monuments, for the knowledge of which we are indebted to the same historian. But they never had a fleet, which deserved that name, nor probably ships of several benches of oars.

Polyb. i.
22. The Consul Cornelius had advanced before with seventeen ships. The rest of the fleet was to follow him at no great distance. Having confided too hastily in the people of Lipara, who had promised to surrender that island and city to him by treachery, he

* Ut non arte factæ sed quodam munere deorum conversæ in naves, atque mutatæ arbores viderentur. FLOR. ii, 2.

approached them, and was immediately surrounded by Carthaginian ships. He prepared to engage, and to make a good defence: but the General of the enemy having sent to parley with him concerning an accommodation, upon his promise he went on board his galley with his principal officers to treat about the conditions. He had no sooner entered it, than the perfidious Carthaginian seized his person, and all that accompanied him; and after having made himself master of all his ships, carried his prisoners to Carthage.

He was soon punished for his mean treachery. He had advanced with fifty ships to take a near view of the Roman fleet, to examine of how many ships it consisted, and in what manner their crews worked. Full of contempt for enemies, who were quite new to the sea, he had not used the precaution to draw up in battle, but went on without order. On doubling a cape, he met the Roman fleet, at the moment he least expected it. It rowed and made all possible sail, and fell upon that of the Carthaginians roughly. This was not a battle, but a chace. He lost the best part of his ships, and with great difficulty escaped with the rest.

The victorious fleet having been informed of what happened to Cornelius, sent advice of it to his Collegue Duilius in Sicily, where he was at the head of the land-forces, and also that it was arrived there, after having gained an advantage over the enemy. Duilius having left the command of his army to the Tribunes, repaired immediately to the fleet. As it was within sight of the Carthaginians at * Myle, they prepared for a battle.

As the galleys of the Romans, built grossly and in haste, were not very swift, nor easy to work, they had supplied that inconvenience by a machine invented on the occasion, and which was afterwards called

* Melazzo now, upon the north coast of Sicily.

A. R. 492.
Ant. C.
260.

Polyb. i.
22—24.
Zonar.
viii. 377.

A. R. 492. † Corvus, by the means of which they grappled with
 Ant. C. the enemy's vessels, boarded them against their will,
 260. and came immediately to blows.

The signal of battle was given. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of an hundred and thirty sail, commanded by Hannibal, of whom we have spoke before. He was on board a galley of seven benches of oars, which had belonged to Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, whom the blow they had just received, had not taught the wisdom of not despising their enemies, advanced proudly, less to fight than to take the spoils of the enemy, of which they conceived themselves already masters. They were, however, a little amazed at the machines, which they saw raised upon the prow of each ship, and which were new to them. But they were much more so, when the same machines directed against their ships and let fall on a sudden, grappled them whether they would or no, and changing the form of the fight, obliged them to come to blows as if they had been by land. The strength of the Romans consisted in close fight: for which reason, when they came board and board, by the means of their Corvi, they had a great superiority over the enemy, who excelled them only in agility, and address in working their ships, but were inferior to them in every thing else. Accordingly, they could not sustain the charge of the Romans. The slaughter was horrible. The Carthaginians lost thirty ships, amongst which was that of the General, who escaped in a boat not without difficulty.

He well knew what this defeat was to cost him, and immediately dispatched a friend to Carthage before the sad news of it could arrive there. On entering the senate he said: "Hannibal has sent me to ask you, whether he is to give the Consul battle, who has a numerous fleet under his command?" He was

† Polybius gives us a very circumstantial but very obscure description of this machine. There are several kinds of Corvi. Mr. Follard's dissertation upon this subject may be seen in his Polybius, Book I. p. 83, &c. and in the Arts and Sciences of the Antients there are plates and descriptions of them. See Sect. of Art Military.

answer-

answered unanimously, that there was no occasion to hesitate upon that head. "He has done so, Gentlemen," added he, "and has been defeated." This was putting it out of the power of his judges to condemn him; because they could not do it after what had passed, without condemning themselves. In consequence, at his return, he was only divested of the command.

After the General's flight, the ships that remained were at a great loss. They were ashamed to retire from the battle, without having shared in the danger, suffered any thing, or being pushed by the enemy: but they did not dare to attack him, so much did they dread those new and terrible machines, from which they could not escape. Accordingly, when they did make an effort, they were borne down by their means. In this second battle, and the former, fourteen ships were sunk and thirty-one taken; with seven thousand prisoners, and three thousand killed. Such was the success of the naval battle fought near the islands of Lipara.

The first good effect of the victory was the deliverance of * Segesta, which was very much pressed by the Carthaginians, and reduced to the last extremity. Duilius, after having caused the siege to be raised, attacked and took Macella †, Amilcar not daring to come against him. The campaign being almost over, the Consul returned to Rome. His absence reinstated the affairs of the Carthaginians considerably, and many cities either voluntarily returned to their obedience to them, or were reduced to do so.

It is easy to conceive with what tokens of joy Duilius was received at Rome. Extraordinary honours were paid the author of a kind of glory entirely new. He was the first of all the Romans to whom a naval triumph was granted. A monument of this victory was erected in the Forum, which was a *columna Rosstrata*

* On the west of Sicily, near the sea.

† A more inland place than Segesta.

A. R. 492.
Ant. C.
260.

of white marble, with an inscription that mentioned the number of ships which were either taken or sunk, and the sums of gold and silver brought into the treasury. This column subsists to this day, and its inscription is one of the most antient monuments of the Latin tongue, which was still very gross and imperfect in those times. Duilius in some measure perpetuated his triumph during his whole life. * For that purpose, when he returned at night from supping in the city, he always walked with a torch and a musician before him: an unexampled distinction of a private person, and which he assumed himself; so much confidence did the glory he had acquired, give him, and so much did it raise him above rules.

Florus ii.
2.

A. R. 493.
Ant. C.
259.

L. CORNELIUS SCIPIO.

C. AQUILIUS FLORUS.

Freinsh.
viii. 12—
22.

The provinces of these Consuls, as before, were Sicily and the fleet. The Senate left him, to whom the fleet should fall, at liberty to land in Sardinia or Corsica, if he thought fit. The lots gave this province to Cornelius, who immediately set out. This was the first expedition of the Romans against Sardinia and Corsica.

These two islands are so near each other, that they might be taken almost for one and the same: but they differ very much in the nature of their soil and climate, as well as in the genius and character of their inhabitants. Sardinia was otherwise called Ichnusa. It does not give place in extent to the greatest islands in the Mediterranean, nor for goodness to the most fertile. † Valerius Maximus, speaking of Sicily and Sardinia, calls them the abundant feeders and nourishers of Rome. It was rich in cattle, bore excellent corn in

* C. Duilium---redeuntem à cœna senem sæpe videbam puer. (It is Cato who speaks) Delectabatur cerco funali, & tibicine; quæ sibi nullo exemplo privatus sumpserat: tantum licentiæ dabat gloria. Cic. de Senect. n. 44.

† Siciliam & Sardiniam, benignissimas urbis nostræ nutrices. VAL. MAX. viii. 6.

great plenty, and had many mines both of gold and silver. The air has been counted bad in all seasons, but especially in summer. The principal city was Caralis, now called Cagliari, opposite to Africa, and has a good port.

Corfica, called by the Greeks Cyrenus, is not to be compared to Sardinia, either for extent or power. It is mountainous, rough, inaccessible, and uncultivated in many places. The inhabitants partake of the nature of the soil, and are of a gross and brutal disposition. They bear subjection with great reluctance, and are averse to all masters. They had several cities, but not much frequented: the principal were Aleria, a colony of the Phœceans, and Nicea, a colony of the Hetrurians. It is now divided into two parts, the one on this side of the mountains, in which there are five and forty small districts, that they call Pieves, wherein are Bastia the capital of the island, Balagnia, Calvi, Corte, Aleria, and the cape of Corfica; the other part beyond the mountains, in which there are one and twenty districts or Pieves; the principal cities are Ajazzo, Boniface, Porto-Vecchio, and Sarna.

The Carthaginians had long made war with the inhabitants of these two islands, and had at length possessed themselves of the whole country, except such places as were inaccessible and impracticable, to which no army could approach, and where it was impossible to force them. As it was more easy to overcome the bodies, than the minds of these people, the Carthaginians had recourse to a strange method in respect to them, which was to root up all their corn and other productions of the earth, in order to hold them in entire dependance, by obliging them to fetch every thing necessary to life from Africa, and by prohibiting them, upon pain of death, either to sow grain or to plant fruit-trees. Aristotle, who relates this fact, does not mention at what time it was. How capable was so cruel and inhuman a treatment to irritate a people naturally fierce, and enemies to every kind of subjection! To reduce them, it was necessary

De mirab.
Aufcult.
p. 1159.

A. R. 493.
Ant. C.
259.

not to root up the corn from their lands, but the love of liberty natural to all men from their hearts; or to speak more properly, pains should have been taken to soften and polish their manners, by treating them with gentleness and humanity. The Carthaginians in consequence could never make themselves entirely masters of this people, * sufficiently subjected to obey but not to be treated like slaves, as Tacitus says of the people of Great Britain.

The Consul Cornelius advances towards these islands, and first took Aleria in Corsica; after which all the other places surrendered themselves. From thence he went to Sardinia. He fell in, on his way, with the enemy's fleet, which he put to flight. He intended to attack Olbia; but finding himself too weak, and that city in too good a condition to defend itself, he renounced the siege, and returned to Rome in order to raise more numerous forces. At his return he was more fortunate. Having defeated and killed Hanno in a battle, he took the city. The Consul ordered the funeral of the Carthaginian general to be solemnized in an honourable manner; convinced that such an act of humanity, in respect to an enemy, would very much exalt the lustre of the victory he had gained. That action suits the probity and virtue of Cornelius, as attested by an antient inscription, which I shall repeat here, because it is short; but it includes the most perfect praise, in saying, that Cornelius held the first rank amongst the persons of worth and honour. *Hunc omnino plerumque consentient duonorum optimorum fuisse virum*: which according to the manner of later ages would be wrote, *Hunc unum plurimi consentiunt bonorum optimum fuisse virum*.

Oros. iv. 7.
Zonar.
viii. 386.

Rome saw herself exposed at that time within her own walls to an exceeding danger, from which she was preserved by extreme good fortune. The fact is as follows. The rowers, in the Roman fleets, were

* Jam domiti ut paveant, nondum ut serviant. TACIT. in vit. Agric. c. 13.

composed partly of freed-men, who from slaves had been made Roman citizens, and partly of soldiers furnished by the allies. Both the one and the other were called *socii navales*, as we find in several parts of Livy. They were listed, and took an oath, as soldiers. In the second Punic war, as the public treasury was exhausted, the citizens were obliged to furnish, and maintain at their own expence, a certain number of their slaves for rowers, according to the amount of their estates. At the time of which we are speaking, there were four thousand men at Rome, most of them Samnites, sent by the allies to make up the number of rowers. As they had a declared aversion for the sea-service, they were continually talking with each other upon the misfortune to which they were going to be exposed. This inflamed them to such a degree, that they formed the design of burning and plundering the city. Three thousand slaves entered into this conspiracy. Happily one of the officers of the Samnites discovered the plot, and informed himself in all the circumstances of it, which he immediately imparted to the Senate, who stifled it in its birth, and before it could break out.

The Consul Florus did no great exploits in Sicily. Cornelius, having driven the Carthaginian arms both out of Corsica and Sardinia, triumphed with great glory.

S E C T. II.

The Consul Atilius is preserved in great danger by the courage of Calpurnius Flamma, a Legionary Tribune. He beats the Carthaginian fleet. Regulus is elected Consul. Famous battle of Ecnoma gained by the Romans at sea. The two Consuls go to Africa, take Clypea, and ravage the whole country. Regulus continues to command in Africa in quality of Proconsul: his Collegue returns to Rome. Regulus demands a successor. Battle with the serpent of Bagrada. Battle gained by Regulus.

gulus. He takes Tunis. Hard proposals of peace offered by Regulus to the Carthaginians: they refuse them. The arrival of Xanthippus the Lacedæmonian revives the courage and confidence of the Carthaginians. Regulus is defeated in a battle by Xanthippus, and taken prisoner. Xanthippus retires. Reflexions of Polybius upon that great event. A new fleet built at Rome. The Carthaginians raise the siege of Clypea. The Consuls go to Africa with a numerous fleet. After gaining two battles, they put to sea again to return to Italy. The Roman fleet is dispersed by a dreadful storm upon the coasts of Sicily. The Carthaginians besiege, and take, Agrigentum. The taking of Panormus by the Romans is followed by the surrender of many places. The Romans, discouraged by several shipwrecks, renounce the sea. Lipara taken. Disobedience of an officer severely punished. Remarkable severity of the Censors. The Senate turn their whole efforts again to the war by sea. Famous battle by land near Panormus gained by the Proconsul Metellus over the Carthaginians. The elephants that were taken are sent to Rome. Manner in which they are made to pass the strait. The Carthaginians send Ambassadors to Rome to treat of peace, or of the exchange of prisoners. Regulus accompanies them. He declares against the exchange. He returns to Carthage, where he is put to death in the most cruel tortments. Reflexions upon the constancy and patience of Regulus.

A. R. 494.
Ant. C.
258.

A. ATILIUS CALATINUS,

C. SULPICIUS PATERCULUS.

Zonar.
viii. 388.
Liv. Epit.
xvii.
A. Gell.
iii. 7.

ATILIUS, to whom the command of the land-army in Sicily had fallen by lot, confined himself to the siege of Mytistrata *, a very strong place, which his predecessors had attacked at different times, but always without success. After a long resistance the Carthaginian garrison, tired with the cries and

* Situated westward, near the river Alæsus.

lamentations of the women and children, who eagerly demanded that an end should be put to the cruel evils the city had long suffered, quitted the place in the night, and left the inhabitants at liberty to dispose of their fate as they thought fit. The next morning they opened their gates to the Romans. Their submission, which was entirely voluntary, deserved the kindest and most indulgent treatment. But the soldiers, who had suffered the length of the siege with impatience, transported with fury, and hearkening only to revenge, put all to the sword without regard to age or sex, till the Consul, to put an end to the slaughter, caused declaration to be made, that the soldiers should have the money for which the prisoners were sold. Avarice prevailed over cruelty, and disarmed those frantic wretches. The citizens that escaped their fury were sold; and the place was plundered and afterwards destroyed.

The same Consul having entered a valley, commanded by an eminence, upon which the Carthaginian General was posted, could not have disengaged himself, and must have perished there with all his troops, but for the valour and boldness of one of his officers. He was called, according to the most common opinion, (for authors differ concerning the name of that brave man) Calpurnius Flamma, and was Tribune of a legion. After the example of the Decii, he exposed himself, with three hundred men intrepid like himself, to certain death to preserve the army. "Let us die," said he to them, "and by our deaths deliver the Consul and the legions." He set out, and found means to seize a neighbouring eminence. The enemy did not fail to go thither to dislodge him. Though their number was small, as they were determined to perish, they sold their lives dear, made an horrible slaughter, and defended themselves long enough to give the Consul opportunity to save the army, whilst the enemy was solely intent upon driving them from that eminence. The Carthaginians, seeing their design frustrated, retired.

Florus ii.
2.
Aul. Gell.
iii. 7.

A. R. 494.
Ant. C.
238.

The sequel of so heroic an action is quite wonderful, and exalts the lustre of it. Calpurnius was found in the midst of an heap of dead bodies both of his own men and the enemy, and was the only one that respired amongst them. He was covered all over with wounds; but happily not one of them was mortal, and was carried off and dressed: infinite care was taken of him; and being perfectly cured, he did his country good service long after. To be taken in this manner out of an heap of the dead, is almost to come out of the grave, and to survive one's self. Cato, from whom Aulus Gellius extracted the account of this courageous action, compares it to that of * Leonidas amongst the Greeks at Thermopylæ, with this difference, that the valour of the Spartan King was celebrated by the praises and applauses of all Greece, and the remembrance of it preserved in all histories, and transmitted down to posterity by paintings, statues, inscriptions, and every kind of public monuments that perpetuate the name and glory of great men: whereas a moderate and transient praise, a crown of turf (*corona graminæ*) was all the reward of the Roman tribune. How many heroic actions of our armies are at this day still less known and less celebrated than that of Calpurnius Flamma! He was very well satisfied with his fate, and thought himself sufficiently honoured. And indeed, † of all the crowns with which the exploits of the Roman citizens were rewarded, that of turf was far the most glorious, and took place even of those of gold set with diamonds. In these happy times the Romans were not at all sensible to interest, and would have thought it dishonour-

* Leonidas, Lacedæmonius laudatur, qui simile apud Thermopylas fecit. Propter ejus virtutes omnis Græcia gloriam atque gratiam præcipuam claritudinis inclutissimæ decoravere. monumentis, signis, statuis, elogiis, historiis, aliisque rebus gratissimum id ejus factum habuere. At Tribuno militum parva laus pro factis relicta, qui idem fecerat, atque rem servaverat. CATO, apud AUL. GELL.

† Corona quidem nulla fuit graminæ nobilior, in majestate populi terrarum principis, præmiisque gloriæ. Gemmatæ & aureæ----post hanc fuere, suntque cunctæ magno intervallo, magnæque differentia. PLIN. xxii. 3.

ing themselves to act from such mean and abject motives. Glory, and the pleasure of serving their country, were deemed the only rewards of virtue.

A. R. 494.
Ant. C.
258.

The Consul made an advantageous amends for his fault by reducing several cities of Sicily.

His colleague had at the same time such good success in Sardinia, that he ventured to go from thence with his fleet to Africa. The alarm was great there. Hannibal, who was at Carthage after his flight from Sicily, received orders to go against the Consul. The two armies were separated by a furious tempest, and both driven into the ports of Sardinia. A battle ensued near that island. Hannibal was defeated by his own fault, and had most of his ships taken. The troops, who ascribed their defeat to his temerity, avenged themselves upon him by crucifying him, which was the usual punishment amongst the Carthaginians.

Polyb. i.
25.

C. Duilius was Censor this year with L. Cornelius Scipio.

Fast. Capit.

C. ATILIUS REGULUS.

CN. CORNELIUS BLASIO.

A. R. 495.
Ant. C.
257.

Regulus was actually employed in * sowing his land, when the officers sent by the Senate, came to inform him, that he † was elected Consul. Happy times, when poverty was so much in honour, and Consuls were taken from the plow. Those hands enured to country labours, sustained the State, and cut to pieces the numerous armies of its enemies!

Some prodigies happened about this time upon the Alban mountain, in several other places, and in the city itself. The Senate ordered, that sacrifices should be offered, and the games, called *Feriæ Latinæ*, ce-

* For this reason he was surnamed Serranus.

† Illis temporibus ab aratro arcescebantur, qui Consules fierent--- Atilium sua manu spargentem semen, qui missi erant, convenerunt. Cic. pro Rosc. Amer. n. 50.

Sed illæ rustico opere attritæ manus salutem publicam stabilierunt, ingentes hostium copias pessum dederunt. VAL. MAX. iv. 4.

A.R. 495. lebrated again. For this purpose a Dictator was no-
Ant. C. minated.

^{257.}
Polyb. i. 26. The Consul Regulus, (this is not the great Regulus) who commanded the Roman fleet, having landed at Tyndarida, a city of Sicily, opposite to Lipara, and having descried the Carthaginian fleet under Amilcar in motion there without order, he set out first with ten ships, and commanded the rest to follow him. The Carthaginians seeing the enemy divided, and not in a good disposition, some only going on board, whilst others were weighing anchor, and the advanced guard very distant from those that followed, they stood towards that guard, surrounded and sunk all the galleys, except that of the Consul, which was in great danger: but as it was well supplied with rowers, and lighter than the rest, it happily extricated itself, and got clear. It was a great fault in the Admiral to advance rashly with so small a number of ships, without being apprized of the enemy's force. He had the good fortune to repair it soon. The rest of the Roman ships arrived presently after, drew up in a line, charged the Carthaginians, took ten of their ships, and sunk eight. The rest retired into the islands of Lipara.

A.R. 496.
Ant. C.
256.

L. MANLIUS VULSO.

Q. CÆDICIVS.

The last of these Consuls dying in office, to him was substituted

M. ATILIUS REGULUS II.

Polyb. i.
26---30.

The Romans had strengthened themselves exceedingly at sea the preceding years, and gained many battles; they however considered all the advantages they had gained hitherto, as trials and preparations for a great enterprize which they meditated: this was to attack the Carthaginians in their own country. The latter feared nothing so much, and to avert so dan-

dangerous a blow, resolved to come to a battle, what-
ever it cost them.

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256.

Dreadful preparations were made on both sides. The Roman fleet consisted of three hundred and thirty ships, and carried an hundred and forty thousand men, each ship having three hundred rowers, and an hundred and twenty combatants. That of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar and Hanno, had ten ships more, and men in proportion. I desire the reader to take particular notice of the greatness of this armament, which must give him a quite different idea, from what we usually have of the navies of the antients.

The Romans anchored first at Messana : from thence they left Sicily on their right, and doubling the cape of Pachynus, they bore away towards * Ecnoma ; because their army was in that neighbourhood. As to the Carthaginians, they advanced towards Lilybæum, and from thence to Heraclea of Minos. The two fleets soon came in sight. One could not behold two such great fleets and armies, nor be witness of the extraordinary movements they made in preparing for battle, without being struck with some dread at the sight of the danger, which two of the most powerful people of the earth were upon the point of experiencing.

The Romans kept themselves in a readiness to fight if the enemy offered them battle, and to make a descent in their country, if they did not prevent it. They chose the best of their land troops, and divided their whole army into four parts, of which each had two names. The first was called the first legion and the first squadron, and so of the rest, except the fourth, which was called the Triarii, a name given by the Romans to the last line of the land army.


Reflecting, that they were going to fight in the open sea, and that the enemy's strength consisted in

* Ecnoma, a city and mountain called Di licata, near the mouth of Himera, or Salis, upon the south side of Sicily.

A. R. 496. the lightness of their ships, they thought it necessary
 Ant. C. to fix upon a secure order of battle, and one which
 256. could not easily be broke. In order to this the two
 vessels of six benches of oars, on board of which
 were the two Consuls Regulus and Manlius, were placed
 in the front side by side. Each of them was followed
 by a line or file of ships, of which the one formed the
 first, and the other the second, squadron. The ves-
 sels of each line kept off, and enlarged the space in
 the middle in proportion as they drew up, and kept
 their heads turned outwards. The two first squadrons
 drawn up in this order, formed the two sides of an
 acute-angled triangle. The space in the middle was
 void. The third squadron formed the base of the
 triangle, extending in breadth from the end of the
 first squadron to that of the second. Thus the order
 of battle had the figure of a triangle. This third
 squadron towed the transports disposed in a long line
 behind it. And last of all was the fourth squadron,
 or the Triarii, which was so drawn up, as to extend
 at both ends beyond the line that preceded it.

This order of battle, adapted in the whole either to
 motion or action, and at the same time very difficult
 to break, was entirely extraordinary, and perhaps un-
 exampled, but without doubt founded upon good
 reasons, for which persons skilful in naval affairs can
 account, though above my comprehension. I con-
 tent myself, in order to assist the reader to conceive it
 the more easily, to exhibit the image of it to his eyes in
 this place.

Whilst all things were preparing in this manner,
 the Carthaginian Generals exhorted their soldiers, by
 telling them very succinctly, “ that by gaining the
 battle, they would have no war to sustain, except in
 Sicily ; whereas if they lost it, they would be obliged
 to defend their own country, and all that was dearest
 to them in the world.” They then gave orders for
 the troops to go on board their ships and prepare for
 battle, which the soldiers executed with joy and dis-
 patch, extremely animated by the powerful motives,
 which



1. Carthaginian Fleet:
2. Roman Fleet:
3. First Squadron:
4. Second Squadron:

PLAN of the NAVAL BATTLE
of ECNOMA

5. Third Squadron:
6. Transports towed
by the 3^d Squadron:
7. Fourth Squadron:

W. H. Jones Sculp.

which had just been laid before them in few words, and shewing a courage and confidence capable of intimidating the enemy.

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256.

The Carthaginian Generals, regulating the disposition of their fleet by that of the Romans, divided it into three squadrons, drawn up in one line. They extended the right wing towards the main sea, by removing it a little from the centre, as if to surround the enemy, and turned their heads towards them. To the left wing they joined a fourth squadron, drawn up in a curve line, inclining towards the shore. Hanno the General, who had been worsted at the siege of Agrigentum, commanded the right wing, and had with him the ships and galleys that were fittest by their lightness to surround the enemy. Amilcar, who had already commanded at Tyndarida, reserved the centre and the left to himself. During the battle, he made use of a stratagem, which might have occasioned the ruin of the Romans, if his fleet had made the use of it that they ought. As the Carthaginians were drawn up in a single line, which therefore seemed easy to be broke, the Romans began by attacking the centre. Upon which, in order to separate their army, orders were sent to the centre of the Carthaginians to retreat. Accordingly it fled; and the Romans suffering themselves to be carried away by their ardor, pursued those that gave way with a rash impetuosity. The first and second squadrons, in effect of this movement, separated from the third, which had the transports in tow; and from the fourth, in which were the Triarii intended to support them. When they were at a certain distance a signal was hoisted in Amilcar's ship, upon which those that fled, faced about vigorously against their pursuers. The battle now grew warm on both sides; the Carthaginians had the advantage of the Romans by the lightness of their ships, and their address and facility in advancing and retiring: but the vigour of the Romans in the charge, their Corvi for grappling with the enemy's ships, the presence of their Generals who fought at the head of them,

A. R. 496. them, and in whose fight they ardently desired to
 Ant. C. signalize themselves, inspired them with no less confidence
 256. than the Carthaginians had on their side. Such was the attack in this part of the fleets.

At the same time Hanno, who commanded the right wing, and in the beginning of the battle had kept at some distance from the rest of the navy, advancing into the open sea, veered about to charge the ships of the Triarii in the rear, and put them into confusion. On the other side, the Carthaginians of the left wing, who were near the land in a curve line, changed their situation, drew up in front, keeping their heads opposite to the enemy, and charged the third squadron, that had the transports in tow. That squadron immediately let go the vessels made fast to them, and came to blows. Thus the whole battle was divided into three parts, each engaging at a very great distance from the other. The victory was a long time doubtful, and wavered between both parties. But at length the squadron, commanded by Amilcar, not being able to resist longer, was put to flight, and Manlius made fast the ships he had taken to his own. Regulus went to aid the Triarii and transports with the galleys of the second squadron, which had not suffered at all. Whilst he was engaged with Hanno's fleet, the Triarii, who were almost reduced to surrender, resumed courage, and returned to the charge with vigour. The Carthaginians, attacked in front and rear, and surrounded by this new aid, in their confusion gave way and made off.

Things were in this state, when Manlius returned, and perceived the third squadron driven towards the shore by the left wing of the Carthaginians. The transports and Triarii being safe, Regulus and he joined, in order to extricate that squadron out of the danger in which it was. For it was in a manner besieged, and would infallibly have been defeated, if the Carthaginians had not contented themselves with hemming it in towards the shore, for fear of boarding and close fight. The Consuls arrived, surrounded the

the Carthaginians, and took fifty of their ships with all their crews. Some having stood in for the land found their safety in flight. Such were the events of the different attacks, in all which the Romans had the advantage, and gained a compleat victory. For twenty-four of their ships that were sunk, the Carthaginians lost thirty: no ship of the Romans fell into the hands of the enemy, and the latter had sixty-four taken.

The fruit of this victory was, as the Romans had projected, their sailing to Africa, after having refitted their ships, and supplied them with all things necessary for a long war in a strange country. The Carthaginian Generals seeing that they could not prevent their passage, would at least have retarded it for some weeks, in order either to give Carthage time to put itself into a condition of defence, or to send them the aids they expected. The question was to make proposals of peace to the Consuls. Amilcar did not dare to go to them in person, lest the Romans should seize him, by way of reprisal, for the Consul Cornelius Asina, treacherously taken five years before and sent in chains to Carthage. Hanno was bolder. He went to the Consuls, and declared that he was come to treat of peace with them, and to make, if possible, a good alliance between the two States. He heard however, some Romans about the Consuls murmur about Cornelius Asina, and actually say, that they ought to follow that example on this occasion. "If you do that," says Hanno, "you will be as bad as the Africans." The Consuls silenced their attendants, and addressing themselves to Hanno said: * "You need be under no apprehensions on that head: the faith of Rome secures you from that fear." They did not enter into a conference with him concerning an accommodation. They well perceived with what view he came: besides which, the great

* Isto te metu, Hanno, fides civitatis nostræ liberat. VAL. MAX. vi. 6.

A. R. 496. successes they promised themselves, made them pre-
Ant. C. fer war to peace.

^{256.}
Flor. ii. 2. Some days after the Consuls set out with the fleet, but not without extreme repugnance on the side of some soldiers and even officers, whom the name only of the sea, a long voyage, and the coast of an enemy greatly dispirited. Mannius, one of the legionary Tribunes, distinguished himself more than the rest, and from complaints and murmuring went so far as to refuse to obey. Regulus, who was a man of great steadiness and authority, pointing to the rods and axes carried by the Lictor, told him in a menacing tone, that "he knew how to make himself be obeyed."
* One fear got the better of the other, and the menace of present death made him a resolute navigator.

Polyb. i.
30, 31. They had a good voyage, without being crossed by any storm or other bad accident. The first ships came to an anchor on the coast near the promontory of † Hermæum, which lying in the gulf of Carthage, projects into the sea on the side towards Sicily. They waited there for the rest of the fleet, and when it came up, steered along the coast as far as Aspis, otherwise called ‡ Clypea. They landed there, and having drawn their ships ashore, they covered them with an intrenchment; and on the refusal of the inhabitants to open their gates, they besieged the place.

It is easy to conceive the trouble and emotion, which the arrival of the Romans occasioned amongst the Carthaginians. From the moment they received advice of the loss of the battle of Ecnoma, the alarm became general throughout the whole country. Convinced that the Consuls, encouraged by their great, and seemingly unexpected, success, would not fail to advance with their victorious troops to Carthage, if it

* Securi districta Imperator metu mortis navigandi fecit audaciam.
FLOR.

† It is believed to be the same as the promontory of Mercury or Hermæum, now called Good Cape.

‡ Now Quipia, below the promontory of Mercury.

were only to insult it; they were in continual apprehensions, and expected every moment to see the army of the enemy before their gates.

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Ant. C.
256.

The Consuls, on their side, as soon as they became masters of Clypea, after having fortified it well, made it their place of arms: they then dispatched couriers to Rome, to give the Senate advice of their successful landing, and to receive its orders concerning the farther operations of the war. In the mean time they dispersed themselves about the flat country, destroyed it in a terrible manner, carried off a vast number of cattle, with twenty thousand prisoners. They found the land rich and fertile, which had not felt the sword of an enemy since the irruption of Agathocles, that is to say, during fifty years.

The courier being returned from Rome brought back the Senate's orders, who had thought proper to continue Regulus in the command of the army in Africa as Proconsul, and to recal his colleague, with a great part of the fleet and army, leaving Regulus only forty ships, fifteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse. Part of the fleet might have been necessary for preserving the conquests in Sicily; but to reduce the forces of the Consul to so small a number of ships and men, was evidently renouncing the advantages to be expected from the descent in Africa.

Manlius, before winter came on, set out with the rest of the fleet and army. Zonaras tells us, that the Consul brought away many Roman citizens, who had been taken in the preceding years by the Carthaginians. and were delivered by him out of slavery. Perhaps Cornelius Asina, whom we shall see Consul again in a short time, was of that number. Manlius, at his return to Rome with great spoils, was extremely well received, and had the honour of a naval triumph granted him.

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Ant. C.
255.

SERV. FULVIUS PÆTINUS NOBILIOR.

M. ÆMILIUS PAULUS.

I have just said, that the Senate did not think it proper to recal Regulus from Africa, and to interrupt the course of his victories, but had continued him in the command of the army. No one was so sorry for this decree as him for whom it seemed so glorious. He wrote to the Senate to complain of it, and to demand that somebody should be sent to succeed him. One of his reasons was, "That a day-labourer, taking the advantage of the death of the husbandman who cultivated his small estate of seven acres, had ran away with all his working tools used in manuring: That his presence was therefore absolutely necessary, lest, if his field should happen to lie uncultivated, he should not have subsistence for his wife and children." The Senate decreed, That his field should be cultivated at the expence of the public; that working tools should be bought to supply the place of those which had been stolen; and that the Commonwealth should provide for the wife and children of Regulus. * Thus the Roman People made themselves in some measure the husbandman of Regulus. † And this was all that so rare an example of virtue, which will do honour to Rome during all ages, cost the public treasury.

How amazing was the simplicity of this conqueror of the Carthaginians! Some will perhaps call it, his rusticity. But let such term it as they will, the discerning will always perceive his exalted worth, and greatness of soul. For my part, I can't tell whether to admire him most at the head of armies, conquering the enemies of his country, or with the companions of his labours, cultivating his little field. We here

* Fuit næ tanti servum non habere, ut colonis ejus Populus Romanus esset. SENECA. de Consol. ad Helv. cap. 12.

† Tanti ærario nostro virtutis Atilianæ exemplum, quo omnis ætas Romana gloriabitur, stetit. VAL. MAX. iv. 4.

see, how much true merit is above riches. The glory of Regulus still subsists : for who can refuse him their esteem ? The wealth of the opulent perishes with them, and often before them, “ either in making no use, or a bad one of it.”

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Ant. C.
255.

The Carthaginians in the mean time had established two leaders to command in the city. Asdrubal the son of Hanno, and Bostar, and had made Amilcar return from Sicily, who had brought with him five thousand foot and five hundred horse. These three Generals, after having deliberated together concerning the present state of affairs, concluded unanimously, that it was not proper to keep the troops shut up within the walls, as had been done hitherto, nor to leave the Romans at liberty to ruin the whole country with impunity. The army in consequence took the field.

As for Regulus, he did not let his own lie still, but continually advancing, destroyed all the country in his way. Being come to a place through which the river * Bagrada runs, he found there, if historians may be believed, an enemy of a kind entirely new, which he did not expect, and from which his army had much to suffer : this was a serpent of enormous magnitude. When the soldiers went to the river to fetch water, he darted out upon them, and either crushed them to death with the weight of his body, smothered them with the folds of his tail, or killed them with his envenomed breath. The hard scales of his skin made him invulnerable to darts, and every other kind of weapons. It was necessary to plant catapultas and balistas against him, and to attack him in form like a citadel. At length, after many ineffectual discharges, a stone of a vast size flung with exceeding force, broke his back-bone, and laid him upon the earth. The soldiers were so much afraid of so terrible an enemy, though in a manner dead, that he was not entirely killed without difficulty. Regulus sent his spoils, that is to say his skin, six and twenty

Val. Max.
i. 8.

* A river between Utica and Carthage. It is now called Megrada.

A. R. 497. feet long, to Rome. It was hung up in a temple,
 Ant. C. where Pliny the Naturalist says, it was to be seen in
 255.
 Plin. viii. the time of the war of Numantia.

Polyb. i.
 31.

From Bagrada Regulus advanced to * Adis, one of the strongest towns of the country, and besieged it. The Carthaginians marched immediately to the relief of that place, and posted themselves upon an hill which commanded the camp of the Romans, and from which they could annoy them very much; but its situation rendered a great part of their army useless. For the principal strength of the Carthaginian forces consisted in cavalry and elephants, which were of no use except on plains. Regulus did not give them time to come down from thence: and to take advantage of the essential fault committed by the Carthaginian Generals, he attacked them in that post, and after a weak resistance, in which their own elephants did them more hurt than the enemy themselves, he put them to the rout. The plain secured the horse and the elephants. The victors, after having pursued the infantry for some time, returned to plunder the camp. In this action the Carthaginians had seventeen thousand men killed, and five thousand taken prisoners, with twelve elephants. The news of this victory, which soon spread universally, acquired the Romans not only the neighbouring, but very remote, countries, and in a few days almost fourscore cities and towns surrendered to them. Regulus, soon after, made himself master of Tunis, a place of importance, which brought him very near Carthage; it being only about twelve or fifteen miles from thence.

ibid. 31.

The enemy were extremely alarmed. Every thing had gone against them hitherto. They had been defeated by sea and land. More than two hundred places had surrendered to the victor. The Numidians committed greater ravages in the country than the Romans. They expected every moment to see themselves besieged in their capital. The peasants flying

* It does not subsist now, and where it was, is not known.

thither from all sides with their wives and children for refuge, augmented the confusion and trouble, and made them apprehend famine in case of a siege.

A. R. 497.
Ant. C.
255.

The Carthaginians seeing themselves without hope or resource, deputed the principal persons of their Senate to demand peace of the Roman General. Regulus, who apprehended the coming of a successor to deprive him of the glory of his exploits; and besides, seeing himself not in a condition, with the few troops that had been left him, to undertake the siege of Carthage, which was the sole means to terminate the war entirely in Africa, did not refuse to treat. He made some proposals of peace to the conquered; but they appeared so hard, that they could not hearken to them. These conditions were, "That they should give up all Sicily and Sardinia to the Romans; that they should restore them their prisoners without ransom; that they should ransom their own at such a price as should be agreed upon; that they should bear all the expences of the war, and pay an annual tribute." To these he added some other conditions no less mortifying: "That they should consider all those as friends and enemies, who were so to the Romans; that they should use no long ships; that they should have but one ship of war at sea; and that they should furnish the Romans, whenever required, with fifty galleys of three benches of oars entirely equipped." As he was assured the Carthaginians were reduced to extremities, he would abate nothing of these conditions, whatever instances the deputies made to him on that head; and through a presumption, with which great and unexpected successes are almost always attended, he treated them with haughtiness, affirming, that they ought to consider all he left them as great favour, adding with a kind of insult, "That they ought either to know how to conquer, or how to submit to the victor." So hard and haughty a treatment enraged the Carthaginians, and they resolved rather to perish with their swords in their hands, than

Zonar.
viii. 391.

Polyb.

A. R. 497. to submit to any thing so unworthy of the greatness
 Ant. C. of Carthage.

^{255.}
 Polyb. i. In this dreadful extremity a reinforcement of auxi-
 33---37. liary troops from Greece arrived very opportunely,
 amongst whom was Xanthippus the Lacedæmonian,
 educated in the Spartan discipline, and who had learnt
 the art military in that excellent school. When he
 had informed himself in all the circumstances of the
 last battle, had clearly perceived how it came to be
 lost, and seen with his own eyes, wherein the principal
 strength of the Carthaginians consisted; he declared
 publicly, and often repeated it in conversation with
 the other officers, that if the Carthaginians had been
 defeated, it was entirely owing to the incapacity of
 their Generals, who had not known how to employ
 the strength and advantages they had in their own
 hands. This discourse was related to the public Coun-
 cil, on whom it made great impresson. He was de-
 sired to repair thither. He supported his opinion
 with such strong and convincing reasons, that he
 made the faults which the Generals had committed
 evident to every body; and he shewed as clearly, that
 in observing a different conduct, the country might
 not only be secured, but the enemy driven out of it.

Such a discourse revived the courage and hopes of the
 assembly. They desired, and in some measure forced
 him, for he made a difficulty of it a great while,
 to take upon himself the command of the army.
 When they saw, in the exercises which he made the
 troops perform without the walls, his manner of draw-
 ing them up, of making them advance, retreat, or
 file off with order and promptitude; in a word, all
 the evolutions and movements necessary in the art mi-
 litary, they were quite astonished, and confessed that
 the most able Generals Carthage had ever produced
 till then, were ignorant novices compared with this.

Both officers and soldiers were struck with admira-
 tion; and what is very extraordinary, envy itself was
 mute and at rest, the fear of present danger and the
 love of their country suppressing all other thoughts in
 the

the minds of the Carthaginians. To the mournful A. R. 497.
 consternation which had spread amongst the troops, Ant. C.
 joy and gaiety succeeded on a sudden. They de- 255.
 manded with great cries and much ardour to be led
 on directly against the enemy; assured, said they, of
 conquering under their new General, and obliterating
 the shame of their past defeats. Xanthippus did not
 suffer this ardour to cool. The sight of the enemy
 only augmented it. When he was no more than twelve
 hundred paces from them, he thought proper to hold a
 council of war, in order to do honour to the Cartha-
 ginian officers by consulting them. They all with
 unanimous consent came entirely into his opinion, and
 promised to second him to the utmost. It was there-
 fore resolved to give battle the next day.

The army of the Carthaginians consisted of about
 twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and about
 an hundred elephants. That of the Romans, as near
 as can be conjectured from what has been said, (for
 Polybius says nothing of their number in this place)
 was fifteen thousand foot, and three hundred horse.

To see two armies engage, like these not numerous,
 but composed of brave soldiers, and commanded by
 able Generals, is very fine. In the tumultuous ac-
 tions between two or three hundred thousand comba-
 tants, there must be abundance of confusion, and it
 is hard, through a multiplicity of events, in which
 Chance seems to have a greater share than Counsel,
 to distinguish the real merit of the commanders, and
 the true causes of victory. But here nothing escapes
 the reader's curiosity, who sees distinctly the disposi-
 tion of the two armies; who seems almost to hear the
 orders given by the Generals; who follows all the
 motions made by the troops; who has in a manner
 before his eyes the most minute fault committed by
 either side, and in consequence is capable of judging
 with certainty to what the gaining or losing of the
 battle is to be ascribed. The event of this, though
 it may appear inconsiderable from the small number
 of combatants, is to decide the fate of Carthage.

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Ant. C.
255.

The disposition of the two armies was as follows. Xanthippus placed his elephants in the front in one line. At some distance behind them, he drew up in the manner of a phalanx in only one body, the infantry, consisting wholly of Carthaginians. The cavalry was posted on the wings. As for the foreign troops in their pay, the heavy-armed were placed upon the right between the phalanx and the cavalry; and the rest, composed of light-armed troops, were disposed by platoons on both wings amongst the cavalry.

On the side of the Romans, as they dreaded the elephants most, Regulus, to remedy that inconvenience, distributed the light-armed troops in the front upon a line. Next them he placed the cohorts behind each other, and posted his horse upon the two wings. In giving his main body less front and more depth, he took indeed wise measures against the elephants, says Polybius, but he did not provide against the inequality of horse, in which the enemy was much superior to him.

There requires no great knowledge in military affairs to perceive, the Carthaginians having four thousand horse, and the Romans but three hundred in all, that the Roman General ought to have avoided plains, and chosen posts where the enemy's cavalry could not act, and would have been of no service; which had been in some measure to deprive the Carthaginians of that part of their army upon which they relied most. Regulus himself knew, it was by a like fault, though of an opposite kind, that the Carthaginians had lost the preceding battle; that is, by having chosen a post, where they could make no use either of their horse or their elephants. It must be owned, that the lustre of so glorious a victory had dazzled him, and made him believe himself invincible, wherever he gave battle.

The two armies drawn up as I have said, waited only for the signal. Xanthippus gave orders to his light-armed troops, after they had discharged their
darts,

darts, to retire into the spaces between the troops in their rear; and, whilst the enemy were engaged with the Carthaginian phalanx, to come out on the side and attack them in flank.

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Ant. C.
255.

The battle began by the elephants, which Xanthippus made advance, in order to break the enemy's ranks. The Romans, to frighten those animals, raised great cries, and made an hideous noise with their arms. The Carthaginian cavalry charged that of the Romans at the same time; which made no great stand, being infinitely inferior to the other. The Roman infantry on the left, either to avoid the shock of the elephants, or because they were in hopes of dealing better with the foreign soldiers, that composed the right of the enemy's foot, attacked, defeated, and pursued them as far as their camp. Of those who opposed the elephants, the first were trod down, and crushed to death, defending themselves valiantly: the rest of the main body kept their ground for some time in effect of their depth. But when the rear-ranks, surrounded by the horse and light-armed troops, were obliged to face about in order to make head against them, and those who had forced their passage through the elephants, came to the Carthaginian phalanx, which had not charged, and was in good order, the Romans were broke on all sides, and entirely defeated. Most of them were crushed to death by the enormous weight of the elephants: the rest, without quitting their ranks, were exposed on all sides to the darts of the light-armed troops, and borne down by the horse. Only a very small number fled: but as it was in a flat country, the elephants and the Numidian cavalry killed most of them. Five hundred were made prisoners with Regulus.

The Carthaginians, after having taken the spoils of the dead, re-entered Carthage in triumph, with the General of the Romans and five hundred prisoners walking before them. Their joy was the greater, as some days before they saw themselves upon the brink of destruction. They could scarce believe their own eyes.

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Ant. C.
255.

eyes. Men and women, old and young, crouded to the temples to return the Gods their fervent thanks, and nothing was seen for several days but feasts and rejoicing. Regulus was shut up in a dungeon, where he continued five or six years, and suffered much from the cruelty of the Carthaginians. We see the Roman General defeated and taken prisoner: but his prison will render him more illustrious than his victories.

Xanthippus, who had so great a share in this happy change, wisely chose to retire soon after, and to disappear, lest his glory, hitherto unblemished and entire, after this first dazzling brightness, should deaden by degrees, and make him the mark of envy and calumny, which are always dangerous, but most so in a strange country, where a person is alone, without friends, and entirely destitute of aid.

De Bell.
Pun. p. 3.

Polybius says, that the departure of Xanthippus is differently related, and promises an account of it elsewhere: but that passage is not come down to us. We find in Appian, that the Carthaginians, actuated by a base and detestable envy of the glory of Xanthippus, and not being able to bear the idea of being indebted for their preservation to a stranger, under pretext of conducting him back to his own country honourably, with a numerous convoy of ships, gave secret orders to those, who had the command of them, to destroy the Lacedæmonian General, and all that accompanied him by the way: as if it were possible to bury with him in the sea both the remembrance of the services he had done them, and the horror of the crime which they committed in that respect. So black a guilt does not seem credible to me even in Carthaginians.

This battle, says Polybius, though not so considerable as many others, may give us some salutary instructions, which, adds he, is the solid fruit of history. That great master I endeavour to follow here.

First, Can one rely much upon good fortune, after what has happened in this place to Regulus? Haughty from his victory, and inexorable in regard to the conquered,

quered, he scarce vouchsafes to hear them; and soon after falls into their hands. Hannibal makes the same reflexion to Scipio, when he would persuade him not to suffer himself to be dazzled by the success of his arms. * “Regulus, said he, would have been one of the most extraordinary models of valour and success that ever was, if after the victory, which he gained in the very country where we now are, he had thought fit to grant our ancestors the peace they demanded. But from not having known how to check his ambition, and keep within the bounds of reason, the greatness of his elevation only served to make his fall the more shameful.”

A. R. 497.
Ant. C.
245.

In the second place, we see here the truth of what Euripides says, † “That one wise head is better than a multitude of hands.” One man, on this occasion, changes the whole face of affairs. On the one side, he puts troops to flight that appeared invincible: on the other, he revives the courage of a city and army that he found in consternation and despair.

And this, says Polybius, is the use to be made of reading. For there being two ways of learning and improving, the one by one’s own experience, and the other by that of others, it is much the wiser and more advantageous, to be taught by the faults of others than by one’s own.

The news of the defeat and taking of Regulus occasioned a great alarm amongst the Romans, and made them apprehend, that the Carthaginians, emboldened by their success, and irritated by the evils they had suffered, would conceive thoughts of coming to avenge themselves on Rome itself, and undertake to make Italy feel the same calamities which Africa had so lately experienced. For this reason the Senate ordered the Consuls to provide first for the safety of the

* Inter pauca felicitatis virtutisque exempla M. Atilius quondam in hac eadem terra fuisset, si victor pacem petentibus dedisset patribus nostris. Sed non statuendo tandem felicitati modum, nec cohibendo efferentem se fortunam, quanto altius elatus erat, eo scdus corrui. LIV. xxx. 30.

† Ὁς ἐν τοῦτον βόλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χεῖρας νικᾷ.

A. R. 497. country, by leaving the number of troops in it necessary to its defence; to apply themselves to the building of a considerable fleet; to set out as soon as possible for Sicily, and even to go to Africa, if they judged it proper, in order to keep the enemy employed in their own country.

Ant. C.
255.
Polyb. i.
37.

The Carthaginians at first thought only of re-establishing their affairs in Africa, of reducing the people that had revolted either by lenity or force, and of recovering the cities of which the Romans had made themselves masters. Clypea was the most considerable. The garrison which the Romans had left there made a vigorous defence, and kept the army of the Carthaginians long employed; so that, when they received advice of the extraordinary preparations making in Italy for putting a fleet to sea, they raised the siege, in order to apply themselves solely to fitting out one on their side, capable of disputing the landing of the Romans in Africa.

The Consuls had been so active, that in the beginning of the summer they had three hundred galleys compleatly fitted out, and ready to put to sea. They set sail without loss of time, and landed first in Sicily, where they left good garrisons in the cities that wanted them; and from thence they steered immediately for Africa. A great storm drove them to the island of Cossura, situated between Africa and Sicily, over-against the promontory of Lilybæum. They made a descent there, ruined all the flat country, and took the capital city, called by the same name as the island. From thence they gained the promontory of Hermæum, near which the city of Clypea is situated, where the Carthaginian fleet came to meet them. A rude battle was fought there, in which success was a long time doubtful. The aid which came very opportunely from Clypea, made the balance incline to the side of the Romans, and obtained them a compleat victory. The Carthaginians had above an hundred ships sunk, and thirty taken, with the loss of fifteen thousand men. The Romans lost only eleven hundred men.

men

men and nine ships. The fleet proceeded directly to Clypea, where the troops landed, and incamped near the city. The Carthaginians came thither soon after to attack them. A battle was fought by land. The Carthaginians were defeated again, and lost almost nine thousand men. Amongst the prisoners were several of the principal citizens of Carthage, who were carefully kept, in order to be exchanged for Regulus, and the other Romans of the greatest distinction.

A. R. 497.
Ant. C.
255.

The Consuls afterwards deliberated upon the measures it was necessary to take. The great advantages they had just obtained, made them at first believe it practicable to support themselves in Africa. But as all the neighbouring countries had been destroyed, they apprehended famine. It was therefore judged proper to withdraw the garrison of Clypea, and to sail for Sicily. They carried away great spoils, which were the fruits of Regulus's victories, that had been laid up by him in that city.

They might have had a good voyage to Sicily, and arrived safe in Italy, if the Consuls had known how to take good counsel. The pilots informed them that navigation would be dangerous, if delayed till between the rising of Orion and the Dog-star, at which time great storms usually happen (that time is fixed to the months of June and July). They took little notice of this advice, and amused themselves with besieging some maritime cities, which they were desirous of taking on their way. They soon found to their great misfortune the truth of the counsel they had neglected. On their departure one of the greatest storms arose they had ever known. Of more than three hundred and sixteen ships, scarce fourscore escaped, and even those were obliged to throw their equipage into the sea, without mentioning a great number of barks and small vessels which perished. The sea was covered with the dead bodies of men and other animals, and with the planks and wrecks of galleys from the coast of * Camarina, where this tempest had surprized the

Polyb. i.
38.

* Now called Torre di Camarana, upon the southern coast of Sicily.

A. R. 497. fleet, as far as the cape of Pachynus. The goodness
Ant. C. and generosity of King Hiero was a great consolation
255. and a very necessary relief to them in this sad disaster.
He supplied them with cloaths, provisions, and such
arms as the ships had occasion for, and convoyed them
as far as Messina.

The Carthaginians knew well how to take advantage of the misfortune of their enemies. After having retaken the city and island of Cossura * in their way, they landed in Sicily, formed the siege of Agrigentum, under their General Carthalon, took that city in a few days, which received no aid, and destroyed it entirely. It was to be feared, that all the other places of the Romans would have the same fate, and be obliged to surrender: but the news of a powerful armament preparing at Rome, gave the allies courage, and induced them to make head against the enemy. Accordingly in three months two hundred and twenty galleys were in a condition to put to sea.

A. R. 498.
Ant. C.
254.

CN. CORNELIUS SCIPIO ASINA II.
A. ATILIUS CALATINUS II.

This is the same Cornelius, who when Consul seven years before, had been taken by the Carthaginians in an ambuscade near the islands of Lipara, and carried to Carthage, where he was shut up in a prison, and treated with indignities, “† Who would believe, cries an author, that this Cornelius should be led from the Consular purple to a dungeon, and from a dungeon be restored to the Consular purple? He experienced this double change in the space of some years, and became a captive from a Consul, and a Consul from a captive.” Vicissitudes of this kind are rare; but it suffices that they are not without example, to

* Now Pantalerea, an island between the kingdom of Tunis and Sicily.

† Quis crederet illum à duodecim securibus ad Carthaginiensium proventurum catenas? Quis rursus existimaret à Punicis vinculis ad summa Imperia perventurum fastigia? Sed tamen ex Consule captivus, ex captivo Consul factus est. VAL. MAX. vi. 9.

instruct the wise man not to suffer himself to be too much depressed by bad, nor too much exalted by good, fortune.

A.R. 498.
Ant. C.
254.

The two Consuls, having taken with them some ships which they found on their way at Messina, almost the only ones that had escaped the last wreck, landed in Sicily with a fleet of two hundred and fifty sail at the mouth of the river * Himera, and made themselves masters of the city of Cephaleidia, which is but eighteen miles from it. They failed of taking Depra-num, of which they were obliged to raise the siege. They immediately formed another of much greater importance: it was that of † Panormus, the principal city in subjection to the Carthaginians. They first seized the port. The inhabitants refusing to surrender, they applied themselves to surrounding the city with intrenchments. As the place supplied them with wood in abundance, the works advanced considerably in a short time. The attack was carried on with vigour. Having beaten down a tower on the side next the sea with their machines, the soldiers entered the breach, and after having made a great slaughter seized the exterior city called the New City. The old one did not hold out long. As it began to want provisions, the besieged offered to surrender upon condition only of having their lives and liberty granted them. Their offer was not accepted. They were obliged to pay a certain ransom, which was two minæ, or about five pounds an head. Fourteen thousand persons were ransomed at that price, which amounted to about seventy thousand pounds sterling. The rest of the populace, who amounted to thirteen thousand, were sold with the plunder.

Polyb. i.
39.

The taking of this city was followed by the voluntary surrender of many other places, the inhabitants ‡

* There are two rivers of this name, one of which runs towards the north, and the other towards the south. It is the first, of which we speak here, now called Fiume grande.

† Palermo, the capital of Sicily, upon the northern coast of the island.

‡ The Jetini, Soluntini, Petrinienfes, Tyndaritani, &c.

of which drove out the Carthaginian garrisons, and espoused the part of the Romans. The Consuls, after these glorious expeditions, returned to Rome.

A. R. 499.
Ant. C.
253.

CN. SERVILIUS CÆPIO.

C. SEMPRONIUS BLÆSUS.

Polyb. i.
40.

These Consuls went to Africa with a fleet of two hundred and sixty ships. They made descents there, took some places, and carried off abundance of plunder. No important expedition passed there, because the Carthaginians always prevented them from taking any commodious post. They had re-established their affairs well throughout the whole country, having retaken all the places of which Regulus had made himself master, and reduced all those that had revolted to return to their duty. Amilcar went all over Numidia and Mauritania, quieted those countries every where, and laid a fine upon the people, by way of satisfaction, of a thousand talents, (about fifty thousand pounds) and twenty thousand oxen. As to the principal persons of the cities, who were accused of favouring the Romans, he hanged to the number of three thousand of them. We see here a sensible instance of the Carthaginian character.

The Consuls having been driven by the winds to the island of the * Lotophagi, called Meninx, in the neighbourhood of the lesser Syrtes, experienced a danger that shews how † little they were acquainted with the sea, of which the ebbing and flowing were a matter of novelty to them. The water being fallen, they were surprized to see themselves almost on dry land, and believing themselves lost, they threw abundance of things overboard in order to lighten the ships. The return of the tide surprized them no less, but in an agreeable manner : for it delivered them from

* In the kingdom of Tunis.

† As the sea does not ebb and flow, except in certain particular parts of the Mediterranean, it is the less surprizing that the Romans were ignorant of its doing so at the Syrtes.

an imaginary danger, which they thought without remedy. The rest of the voyage was favourable enough to them, as far as the cape of * Palinurus, which projects into the sea from the mountains of Lucania. When they had doubled it, a violent storm arose on a sudden, and sunk them above an hundred and fifty large ships, without including a great number of barks and other small vessels.

A. R. 499.
Ant. C.
253.

So many losses of ships upon the neck of each other, which could not be repaired but at immense expences, afflicted the Romans extremely, and made them believe, it was not the will of the Gods that they should have the sovereignty of the sea. The Senate in consequence decreed, that no more than sixty ships should be fitted out to guard the coasts of Italy, and to transport provisions, and other necessary munitions to the armies that made war in Sicily.

One of the Censors being dead, the other abdicated, according to the custom long established; which occasioned the Census to be put off till the ensuing year.

C. AURELIUS COTTA.

P. SERVILIUS GEMINUS.

A. R. 500.
Ant. C.
252.

They retook a city in Sicily called Himera, or † Thermæ Himerenses.

C. Aurelius forms the siege of Lipara, a city of the island of the same name. Being obliged to return to Rome, to take the auspices again, he confides the care of the siege to Q. Cassius, a legionary Tribune, with orders only to keep a good guard for the preservation of the works, and express command not to attack the place in his absence. The young officer, hurried on by an immoderate desire of glory, attacked the place at the head of his troops. His rashness was well punished. The besieged made a furious salley, in which he lost a great number of men, repulsed him-

Val. Max.
ii. 4.

* Capo Palinuro : a cape of the kingdom of Naples.

† Termine, at the north-west of Sicily, and the mouth of the river of the same name.

A.R. 500. self to his camp, which he defended with great difficulty, and afterwards burnt all the works. The Consul's return soon reinstated every thing. The town was taken, and a great slaughter made in it. He then thought proper to punish the officer; who was degraded, publicly scourged with rods, and obliged to serve in the lowest rank of the foot as a private soldier.

Liv. v. 28. When Lipara was taken, the descendants of Timasitheus were exempted from all tributes and taxes, in gratitude for the signal service which he had rendered the Commonwealth an hundred and forty years before. He was at that time supreme magistrate at Lipara. He caused a gold cup which the Romans had sent to Delphi, and which had been taken by the pirates of Lipara, to be restored; gave the Ambassadors a good convoy to Delphi; and afterwards reconducted them in safety to Rome. The action was noble: but the gratitude of the Roman People, as warm after so many years as if the service had been quite recent, is highly remarkable, and well worthy of praise.

Since the misfortune of Regulus, the elephants, which had greatly contributed to it, had spread so great a panic amongst the Roman troops, that they were almost afraid to look the enemy in the face, and to hazard a battle with them. This change, which the Carthaginians perfectly discerned, joined with the resolution, which they knew the Senate had taken to fit out no new fleets, gave them hopes, that, if they made ever so little effort, it would be easy for them to recover all Sicily.

App.apud They were in want of money, the public treasury being exhausted by the enormous expences, with which a war that had continued twelve years, had cost them. They sent an ambassador to Ptolomy King of Egypt, (this was Ptolomy Philadelphus) to desire him to lend them two thousand † talents of silver.

Fulv. Urf.

† About three hundred thousand pounds.

Ptolomy, who had entered into a treaty of amity with the Romans, having endeavoured ineffectually to reconcile the two States as mediator, declared to the Ambassadors, that though he much desired to oblige the Carthaginians, he could not do it in the present conjuncture, because it would be a violation of the faith of treaties to aid one ally with money or troops against another.

The Plebeians were admitted to share in the dignity of Pontifex Maximus this year for the first time. Liv. Epit. xviii. Ti. Coruncanius had this office conferred upon him.

The new Censors completed the Census at this time: this was the thirty-seventh Lustrum. Val. Max. ii. 9. The citizens capable of bearing arms were found to be two hundred and ninety-seven thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven. This Censorship was severe and rigorous. Thirteen Senators were degraded. Their horses were taken from four hundred of the Roman youth, and they were reduced into the lowest class of the people. The cause of so disgraceful a punishment was the complaint which the Consul Aurelius Ærarii facti. had made against them at the Tribunal of the Censors; that on a pressing occasion in Sicily, they had refused to obey when commanded to assist at the works. The Consul induced the Senate to add another punishment to this inflicted by the Censors. It was resolved, that they should not be allowed their past years of service, and should be obliged to begin them again. It was by such examples of severity, that military discipline was strictly preserved amongst the Romans, upon which the whole success of armies depends, and which contributed more than any thing to raise the Roman greatness to the height it attained.

L. CÆCILIUS METELLUS.

A. R. 501.
Ant. C.
251.

C. FURIUS PACILUS.

Nothing considerable passed this year. The Consuls, who went to Sicily, did not attack the enemy, Polyb. i. 41. and were not attacked by them. Asdrubal, however,

A. R. 501.
Ant. C.
251.

a new General of the Carthaginians, was lately arrived with two hundred galleys, an hundred and thirty elephants, and twenty thousand horse and foot. This inactivity, which in protracting the war exhausted the treasures of the State, gave the Senate reason to examine again into the resolution which had been taken to build no more fleets, on account of the great expences which they cost the Commonwealth. "The Senate saw, that they were falling into the same inconveniences by the prolongation of the war. Since the defeat of Regulus, the Roman troops had not shewn the same ardour as before. Whilst every thing generally succeeded in the battles by land, they could neither terminate any thing, nor drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily, whilst they continued masters of the sea. Besides which, there was something shameful and unworthy of the Roman character, in suffering themselves to be discouraged by losses not occasioned by their fault, but by misfortunes not to be avoided by human prudence." These considerations determined the Senate to resume their former plan, and to employ the principal efforts of the Commonwealth again at sea.

A. R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

C. ATILIUS REGULUS II.

L. MANLIUS VULSO II.

Polyb. i.
41---43.

These Consuls were appointed to provide a fleet, and to fit it out with every thing necessary. L. Metellus was continued in the command of the army in Sicily as Proconsul, where he remained, whilst his colleague returned to Rome for the election of Consuls.

In the mean time Asdrubal, seeing there was but one Roman General, with half the forces, in Italy, and reflecting, that the Roman army, when together, though almost every day drawn up in battle in the sight of the enemy, was afraid to engage; he believed, that the time was come for hazarding an action; and the rather because his troops demanded it with ardour, and suffered all delays with impatience.

He set out from Lilybæum, and having crossed the country of Selinuntum by a very difficult route, he arrived in the territory of Panormus, and incamped there.

A.R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

The Proconsul Metellus was then in that city with his army. It was at the time of harvest, and he had come thither in order to give the inhabitants an opportunity of cutting and bringing in their corn with security. Having been informed by some spies Asdrubal had in the city, that he was come with design to give battle; in order to confirm him in that resolution, and render him less upon his guard, he made a feint of being afraid, and kept himself close within the walls. This conduct emboldened the Carthaginian General extremely. He ravaged the flat country without opposition, put all to fire and sword, and advanced haughtily to the very gates of Panormus. Metellus continued quiet, and to give Asdrubal a still worse idea both of the courage and number of his troops, he suffered only few of his soldiers to appear upon the walls. Asdrubal hesitated no longer. He made all his troops, as well horse as foot, and all his elephants, advance to the walls of the city, near which he fixed his camp with so much security and contempt for an enemy, who did not dare to shew himself, that he did not so much as surround it with intrenchments.

The sutlers and servants, that followed the army, had brought abundance of wine into the camp. The mercenary soldiers did not spare it, and full of liquor excited a tumult, and raised such confused and violent cries, as drunkenness is apt to occasion. The Proconsul thought this the time for acting. He began by making his light-armed troops march out in order to bring the enemy to a battle; which did not fail to take effect. Advancing insensibly after each other, the whole army at last quitted the camp. Metellus posted part of the light-armed troops along some of the fosses of the city, with orders; if the elephants

A. R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

approached, to pour their arrows upon them in abundance; and, when they found themselves pressed, to go down into the fossé, in order to come up again soon after, and harraßs the elephants. And that they might not want darts, he caused a great quantity of them to be carried to the walls, and made some of the common people throw them down from time to time into the works. He also placed his archers along the walls. As for himself, he stayed with his heavy-armed troops at the gate of the city, which fronted the left wing of the enemy, in readiness to come out when proper.

In the mean time the light-armed troops, who had began the action, sometimes pushed by the multitude of the enemy, retired towards the city in good order, and sometimes reinforced by new troops sent them by the Consul, maintained the fight. On the side of the Carthaginians, the commanders of the elephants, desiring to have the principal honour of the victory, and to deprive Asdrubal of it, without waiting for orders, made their heavy animals move on, and pursued those who retired towards the city quite to the fossés. Here they were expected. The archers upon the walls, and the light-armed troops upon the side of the fossés, poured a continual shower of darts and arrows upon them. The elephants, wounded in many places, would obey no longer their guides, and growing furious, turned upon the Carthaginians, broke and beat down their ranks, and crushed to death all that came in their way. This was the usual inconvenience of elephants. Metellus sallied in the midst of this disorder and confusion, which served him as a signal. Finding the enemy in the condition he had foreseen, he had no difficulty to bear them down and put them to the rout. The slaughter was very dreadful both in the battle and the pursuit: to compleat their misfortune, the Carthaginian fleet arrived in this sad conjuncture, and so far from being in a condition to give them any aid, became the occasion of a new and greater evil. As soon as it appeared, blind with their fears,

fears, they ran precipitately towards it, as to their sole refuge; and tumbling over each other, were either trampled on by their own troops, crushed to death by the elephants, killed by the enemy who pursued them, or drowned in the sea, endeavouring to swim to the ships. Asdrubal escaped to Lilybæum. He was condemned during his absence at Carthage; whither when he returned without knowing what had passed against him, he was put to death. He was one of the greatest Generals Carthage had ever produced. A single misfortune made that barbarous State forget all the services he had rendered it. Rome did not act in that manner.

A. R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

The Romans had scarce ever gained a greater victory than this. It revived the valour of their troops, and entirely dispirited the Carthaginians; so that during the whole duration of this war, they never dared to hazard a battle by land. Twenty thousand Carthaginians perished in this action. Twenty-six elephants were taken in it, and all the rest the next and the following days. The Proconsul perceiving, that those who did not know how to manage those animals, would find it difficult to take and bring them off in the furious condition they then were, straggling about the country, caused proclamation to be made by an herald, that life and liberty should be granted to such, as should assist in taking some of them. The Carthaginians embraced with joy so favourable an occasion of softening their fate. They at first took those that were the least furious, and which they knew best, and by their means allured all the rest without difficulty. Metellus sent them all to Rome, to the number of an hundred and forty-two.

The Consul's manner of transporting them, which was not easy, because he had no ships proper for that use, was as follows. First, a great number of empty casks were provided, which were fastened together two and two by the means of a piece of timber placed between them, to prevent them from beating against each other, and from separating. On these

Frontin i.
7.
Plin. viii.
9.

A. R. 502. were laid a kind of floor made of planks, and covered
 Ant. C. 250. with earth and other materials, and on the sides a kind of breast-work, or little wall, was raised to prevent the elephants from falling into the water. They entered them from the shore without difficulty, advanced upon the sea without perceiving it, and by the help of these floats, arrived on the opposite shore, as if they had never been off the land. Metellus caused all his elephants to be transported in this manner to Rhegium, and from thence they were carried to Rome, where they were exposed in the Circus: a sight, which gave the people as much pleasure as they had hitherto given terror to the troops.

Freinsh.
 xviii. 57
 —66.

The considerable losses, which the Carthaginians had sustained as well by land as sea for some years, determined them to send Ambassadors to Rome, to treat of peace; and in case they could not obtain a favourable one, to propose the exchange of prisoners; and especially of some, who were of the principal families of Carthage. They believed that Regulus might be of great service to them, especially in respect to the second article. He had a wife and children at Rome, besides a great number of relations and friends in the Senate, and his cousin-german actually Consul. There was reason to presume, that the desire of quitting the sad condition wherein he had languished so many years, of returning to his family which he loved tenderly, and of being reinstated in a country, where he was universally esteemed and respected, would infallibly induce him to second the demand of the Carthaginians. He was therefore urged to join the Ambassadors in the voyage to Rome for which they were preparing. He did not think proper to refuse this demand: the sequel will shew what his motives were. Before he set out, he was made to take an oath, that in case he did not succeed in his demands, he would return to Carthage, and he was even given to understand, that his life depended on the success of his negotiation.

When

When they were near Rome; Regulus refused to enter it; giving for his reason, that it was not the custom of their ancestors to give the Ambassadors of an enemy audience within the city. The Senate being assembled without the walls, the Ambassadors, after having declared the purpose of their coming, retired. Regulus would follow them, though the Senators desired him to stay; and he did not comply with their request, till the Carthaginians, whose slave he considered himself to be, had given him their permission.

It does not appear that mention was made of any thing relating to peace; or at least, nothing farther: the deliberation turned upon the exchange of prisoners. Regulus, being desired by the Senate to give his opinion, replied, that he could not do it as Senator, having lost that quality, as well as that of a Roman citizen, from the time he fell into the hands of the enemy; but he did not refuse to say what he thought as a private person. The conjuncture was delicate. Every body was touched with the misfortune of so great a man. He had only one word to say, says Cicero, to recover with his liberty his fortune, dignities, wife, children, and country: But that word seemed to him contrary to honour and the good of the State. He regarded only the sentiments with which fortitude and greatness of mind inspired him.

* Those are the virtues, says Cicero, speaking of Regulus, which teach men to fear nothing; to despise all human things; to prepare for the worst that can happen; and, I will add with † Seneca, to go wherever duty calls them, through the greatest dangers, without regard to any other interest whatsoever. He therefore ‡ frankly declared, “ That they ought not

* Magnitudo animi & fortitudo—Harum enim est virtutum proprium, nihil extimescere, omnia humana despicerè, nihil quod homini accidere possit, intolerandum putare. *Offic. iii. 100.*

† Calcat is utilitatibus ad eam (virtutem) eundum est, quocumque vocavit, quocumque misit, sine respectu rei familiaris. *SENEC. de Benef. vi. 1.*

‡ Hoc caverat mens provida Reguli,
Dissentientis conditionibus

A. R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

to think of exchanging prisoners : that such an example would have consequences fatal to the Commonwealth : that citizens who had been abject enough to give up their arms to the enemy, were unworthy of compassion, and incapable of serving their country. That as for himself, at his years, the loss of him ought to be considered as nothing ; whereas they had several Carthaginian Generals in their hands in the vigour of life, and capable of doing their country great service for many years."

It was not without difficulty that the Senate gave in to an opinion which was to cost so dear, and was unexampled, unheard of, in the case wherein Regulus was. Cicero in the third book of his Offices, examines whether Regulus, after having given his opinion in the Senate, was obliged to return to Carthage, and to expose himself to the most cruel torments, rather than break an oath extorted from him by force, and made to an enemy who knew not what it was to be faithful to his engagements, and from whom he had nothing to fear, any more than from the wrath of the Gods, who are * incapable of anger.

Cicero refutes this frivolous manner of reasoning with a kind of indignation. What ought to be considered in an oath, and make it be observed, says he, is not the fear of being punished for breaking it, but the force and sacred nature of it. For † "an

Fœdis, & exemplo trahenti
Perniciem veniens in ævum ;
Si non periret immiserabilis
Captiva pubes——
Auro repensus scilicet acrior
Miles redibit ! Flagitio additis
Damnum——

Erit ille fortis.

Qui perfidis sese credidit hostibus ;
Et marte Pœnos proteret altero.

Qui lora restrictis lacertis
Sensit iners, timuitque mortem !

HOR. Od. v. l. 3.

* It was the opinion of some philosophers, that the Divinity was never angry, and that men had nothing to fear from his vengeance.

† Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa. Quod autem affirmatæ, quasi deo teste, promiseris, id tenendum est. Offic. iii. 104.

oath

“ oath is a religious affirmation.” Now what is affirmed in this manner, and which God is called upon to witness, must be observed through respect for faith engaged, that faith of which Ennius happily says ; *

“ O sacred and divine faith, by whom Jove himself swears, how worthy art thou of a place in the highest part of temples !” Whoever violates his oath, therefore, violates this faith so sacred and venerable. War itself has its rights, which ought to be observed inviolably with respect to all enemies whatsoever ; and to pretend, that faith engaged to one that has no faith himself, is void, is endeavouring to cover the guilt of infidelity and perjury by a pretext that cannot be maintained.

A. R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

From what has been said it must be concluded, that all which fear and meanness of spirit induce men to act, might have been imputed to Regulus, if in giving his opinion upon the exchange of prisoners, he had regarded rather his own, than the interests of the Commonwealth ; or, if instead of returning, he had remained at Rome ; and that such actions ought to be considered as criminal, shameful, and infamous. It is Cicero that says all this : And we may see from it, how high human wisdom is capable of attaining, which is always far short, when the question is to go back to the first principles of things : and that, building up its morality without relation to God, without the fear of being punished by him, without the hope of pleasing him, it deprives virtue of its only solid motive and real support.

Regulus did not hesitate concerning the choice he ought to make. That illustrious † exile set out from Rome to return to Carthage, without being moved

* O fides alma, apta pinnis, jusjurandum Jovis.

† Fertur pudicæ conjugis osculum,
Parvosque natos, ut capitis minor,
A se removisse, & virilem
Torvus humi posuisse vultum,
Donec labantes consilio Patres
Firmaret auctor nunquam aliâs dato,
Interque mœrentes amicos
Egregius properaret exul,

A. R. 502. either by the great grief of his friends, or the tears
 Ant. C. of his wife and children, and with the tranquillity of
 250. a magistrate going to his country-house in a vacation
 from business. However, he was not ignorant of the
 torments prepared for him. Accordingly, when the
 enemy saw him return, without having obtained the
 exchange, and knew that he had even opposed it,
 there was no kind of torments which their cruelty did
 not inflict upon him. They kept him a great while
 in a dark dungeon, from whence after having cut off
 his eyelids, they brought him out on a sudden to ex-
 pose him to the sun, when its heat was greatest. They
 afterwards shut him up in a kind of chest stuck full of
 spikes, which never suffered him to rest night or day.
 At length, after having long tortured him with exces-
 sive pains, and by keeping him continually awake,
 they nailed him to a cross, the most usual kind of
 punishment amongst the Carthaginians, upon which
 he expired.

Such was the end of this great man. * Something
 had been wanting to his glory, if his constancy and
 patience had not been put to so rude a trial. It is
 not prosperity but misfortunes, which shew virtue in
 its lustre, place it in all its light, and make known
 how far its force extends. It is a Pagan that talks in
 this manner; but he did not know the use of the
 great truths he taught. † When you see the good,

Atqui sciebat quæ sibi barbarus
 Tortor pararet. Non aliter tamen
 Dimovit obstantes propinquos,
 Et populum reditus morantem,
 Quàm si clientum longa negotia
 Dijudicatâ lite relinqueret,
 Tendens Venafranos in agros,
 Aut Lacedæmonium Tarentum.

HOR. Od. V. l. iii.

* Adversus aliquid incurrat oportet, quod animus probet. SENECA.
 ad Marc. c. 6.

Marcet sine adversario virtus. Tunc apparet quanta sit, quantum
 valeat, quantumque polleat, cum, quid possit, patientia ostendit. Id.
 de Provid. c. 2.

† Quem (virum bonum) parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis
 exactor, sicut severi patres, durius educat. Itaque cum videris bonos
 viros, acceptosque diis, laborare, sudare, per arduum ascendere;
 malos.

says Seneca again, oppressed by the wicked, afflicted and tormented, think not that God forgets them. He treats them as a good father does his children, whom he loves, but at the same time forms with severity for wisdom and virtue. God has not a weak tenderness for the virtuous, that induces him to treat them with gentleness and favour: he tries, he enures, and takes pains to make them worthy of him. † A tyrant may exercise his power upon their bodies; but it extends no farther. He can do nothing on the soul, which is a sacred asylum inaccessible to his stripes. ‡ In the midst of torments they remain tranquil, and inviolably attached to their duty. They feel, but they surmount, them. And this is the picture of Regulus, the hero of paganism in point of courage and patience; but, unfortunately for him, the martyr of vanity, of the love of glory, and of a vain phantom of virtue.

A. R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

It is remarkable, that Polybius does not say a word of all this prodigious constancy.

The Senate having been informed of the tragical death of Regulus, and the unheard-of cruelty of the Carthaginians, delivered up the most distinguished of their prisoners to Marcia his wife, and to his children. They put them into a chest stuck with iron spikes, in order to repay them with interest the pains, in which Regulus had ended his life; and left them five whole days without nourishment, at the end of which Bostar died of hunger and misery. But Amilcar, whose constitution was more robust, lived five days longer by the side of Bostar's corpse, with whom he had been shut up, in effect of nourishment, which was

Zonar.
viii. 394.
A. Gell.
vi. 4.
Diod.
apud Val.
lxxiv.

malos autem lascivire, & voluptatibus fluere; cogita filiorum nos modestia delectari, vernularum licentia; illos disciplina tristiori contineri, horum ali audaciam. Idem tibi de Deo liqueat. Bonum virum in deliciis non habet: experitur, indurat, sibi illum præparat. Ibid.

† Corpusculum hoc—huc atque illuc jactatur. In hoc supplicia, in hoc latrocinia, in hoc morbi exercentur: animus quidem ipse facer & æternus est, et cui non possunt injici manus. De Consolat. ad Helv. cap. xi.

‡ Est omnibus externis potentior, nec hoc dico, non sentit illa, sed vincit; & alioquin quietus placidusque contra incurrentia attollitur. De Provid. c. 2.

A. R. 502. only given him to prolong his torments. At length
 Ant. C. the magistrates, being informed of what passed in
 250. Marcia's house, put a stop to these inhumanities,
 sent the ashes of Bostar to Carthage, and ordered the
 rest of the prisoners to be treated with more lenity.
 In my opinion, however the Carthaginians might have
 deserved that barbarity, the Senate ought not to have
 delivered them up to the resentment of a woman, and
 that a contrast of humanity had been a more noble
 revenge, and more worthy of the Roman name.

S E C T. III.

*Triumph of Metellus. Siege of Lilybæum by the Romans.
 Treason discovered in that city: A considerable relief
 enters it. Bloody action round the machines. They are
 set on fire. Vain disposition of the Consul Clodius.
 Battle of Drepanum: loss of the Roman fleet. The
 Consul Junius goes to Sicily. New disgrace of the Ro-
 mans at Lilybæum. They happily avoid two battles.
 The Roman ships entirely destroyed by a great storm. A
 Dictator is nominated. Junius takes Eryx. Amilcar
 Barcas is appointed to command in Sicily. Several per-
 sons fit out privateers and plunder Hippona. Birth of
 Hannibal. Exchange of prisoners. Two new colonies.
 Census. A Roman lady cited before the People, and
 fined. Amilcar takes the city of Eryx. New Roman
 fleet built, and fitted out by private persons. Postu-
 mius the Consul kept at Rome on account of his being a
 priest. The Senate forbids Lutatius to consult the divi-
 nations of Præneste. Battle at the islands Ægates
 gained by the Romans. Treaty of peace between Rome
 and Carthage. End of the first Punic war. Sicily
 becomes a province of the Roman People.*

A. R. 502.
 Ant. C.
 250.
 Freinsh.
 xix.
 Liv. Epit.
 xix.

TO the grief occasioned by the deplorable end of
 Regulus, succeeded the joy, which the grateful
 sight of the triumph of L. Metellus gave the whole
 city, before whose chariot walked thirteen great offi-
 cers

cers of the Carthaginian army, and an hundred and twenty elephants. I have already said, that those animals were again shewn to the people in the Circus, after which they were all killed, because it was not judged proper to use them in the Roman armies.

It is observed that provisions were very cheap this year : a bushel of corn, a Congius (about a gallon) of wine, thirty pounds of dry figs, ten pounds of oil of olives, twelve pounds of meat, were all of the same price, and cost only one As ; and the As, the tenth part of the Roman Denarius, which according to many learned writers was only ten pence, was in value only one * penny. Polybius tells us, that in his time the bushel of wheat in Italy was actually worth fourteen Oboli. that is to say, six pence half-penny, and the bushel of barley half as much. A bushel of wheat was a soldier's subsistence for eight days. At the time of which we are now speaking, the extraordinary expences they had been obliged to be at in fitting out fleets, had exhausted the public treasury, and made money very scarce ; which had occasioned the price of provisions to be so low.

The cruelty of the Carthaginians in regard to Regulus, had inflamed the Romans with a strong desire of revenge. The two Consuls set out for Sicily with four legions, and a fleet of two hundred ships, to which they added forty, which they found at Panormus, without including a great number of small barks. After having held a council of war, and maturely considered the measures it was necessary to take, they formed the bold design of attacking Lilybæum. It was the strongest place the Carthaginians had in Sicily, of which the loss would necessarily be attended with that of all the places they retained in the island, and leave the Romans a free passage into Africa. This siege, which was of great length, and could not be terminated but with the war, may be considered as the master-piece of the Roman art and capacity.

* Or less : for according to others, the Denarius was only sevenpence three-farthings.

A. R. 502.

Ant. C.

250.

Polyb. i.

43.

The figure of Sicily is that of a triangle, of which each point is a promontory. That at the south, which projects into the sea, is called * Pachynus. That called † Pelorus, situated at the north, bounds the streight on the west, and is about twelve furlongs, (or Stadia) something more than half a league from Italy. The third and last is called ‡ Lilybæum. It is opposite to Africa, at the distance of about a thousand stadia, (or fifty leagues) and lies to the south-west. Upon this last cape stands the city of the same name. It was well fortified with walls, and surrounded with a deep ditch, and morasses formed by the sea water. The entrance into the port is by these marshes, and the way dangerous to those, who are not perfectly well acquainted with it.

It is easy to conceive the ardor on both sides in attacking and defending the place. Imilco commanded in it. He had ten thousand troops, without including the inhabitants; and we shall soon see, that he was considerably reinforced. The Romans having established their quarters before the city, on both sides of it, and having fortified the space between the two camps with a fossé, an intrenchment and a wall, they began the attack by the tower nearest the sea towards Africa. Continually adding new works to the former, and advancing on, at length they threw down six towers on the same side as that we have just mentioned, and undertook to beat down others with their battering rams. Imilco spared no pains to prevent the progress of the besiegers. He repaired the breaches, made countermines, and watched every occasion for setting the machines on fire; and in order to effect that, engaged night and day; and sometimes with greater loss on both sides, than is usual in field battles.

Whilst he was making so generous a defence, the foreign soldiers, Gauls and others, formed a conspiracy

* Now the cape of Passaro.

† The fare of Messina.

‡ Capo Boco.


True Longitude as concluded from astronomical Observations.


Longitude according to $\frac{1}{2}$ Estimate of Degrees in $\frac{1}{2}$ Hypothesis of $\frac{1}{2}$ Earth as Spherick.
The Longitude is computed here from $\frac{1}{2}$ Meridian of Paris.

SICILY

FOR MR ROLLIN'S
ROMAN HISTORY

BY M^r D'ANVILLE
Geographer to the K^g of France
Dec. 1740.





amongst themselves to give up the place to the Romans. Happily for the besieged, the treason was discovered, and rendered abortive immediately.

A. R. 502.
Ant. C.
250.

The Carthaginians were not asleep in respect to the danger to which Lilybæum was exposed. They fitted out fifty ships, and gave the command of them to Hannibal, the son of Amilcar, with orders to sail directly, and like a man of courage to seize the first favourable occasion for throwing himself into the place. Hannibal put to sea with ten thousand soldiers well armed, came to an anchor at the islands * Ægusæ, between Lilybæum and Carthage, and with the first brisk gale that blew, made all the sail he could, advanced with intrepid courage through the enemy's fleet, boldly entered the port, and landed his soldiers; the Romans, who were surprized and afraid of being driven into the port by the violence of the wind, not daring to dispute the passage with him.

Imilco, with a view to his design of burning the machines of the besiegers, and desiring to make use of the good disposition, in which the troops of the place, and those lately landed, seemed to be; the former because they saw themselves relieved, and the latter, because they had suffered nothing hitherto, called an assembly of them both, and by a speech, wherein he promised those who signalized themselves, and all in general, presents and rewards from the Commonwealth of the Carthaginians, enflamed their zeal and courage to such a degree, that they all cried out, he had only to dispose of them immediately as he thought proper. The General, after having expressed his satisfaction in their good will, dismissed the assembly, and bad them take some repose at present, and for the rest to expect orders from their officers.

Soon after he assembled the principal persons amongst them; assigned them their several posts; told them the signal, and time for the attack; and ordered their leaders to be ready at the hour fixed. This was

* Favognane, upon the western coast of Sicily.

A. R. 502. executed, and the works attacked in several places
 Ant. C. early in the morning. The Romans, who had fore-
 250. seen this sally, and kept upon their guard, flew on all
 sides where aid was necessary, and made a vigorous de-
 fence. The battle soon became general, and bloody.
 For twenty thousand men sallied from the city, and the
 besiegers were still more numerous. The action was
 the warmer, as the soldiers fought pell-mell without
 keeping their ranks, and followed only their own impe-
 tuosity. This attack, in which the troops engaged
 hand to hand, and rank to rank, formed several dis-
 tinct engagements, rather than a single action. But
 the cries, and hottest service, were about the machines:
 for the intent of the salley was against them. They
 fought with such emulation and ardor, on one side
 only to destroy, and on the other only to defend,
 them. On both sides they fell in their posts rather
 than abandon them to the enemy. The besieged with
 torches, tow, and fire in their hands, poured on all
 sides upon the machines with such fury, that the Ro-
 mans were several times reduced to the last extremity,
 and upon the point of giving way. In the mean
 time, as a great slaughter was made of the Carthagi-
 nians, without their being able to effect their design,
 their General, who perceived it, caused a retreat to
 be sounded; and the Romans, who were very near
 losing all their preparations, at last remained in pos-
 session of their works, and preserved them without
 the loss of any.

When the action was over, Hannibal put to sea in
 the night; undoubtedly believing, that the Romans,
 fatigued with so rude a conflict, would be less strict in
 keeping guard. He carried away with him the horse
 of Lilybæum, which could only be an incumbrance
 in a besieged place, and might be of service elsewhere.
 He got off undiscovered, and took the route of Dre-
 panum, where Adherbal, the Carthaginian General,
 was. Drepanum was a place advantageously situated,
 with a fine port an hundred and twenty stadia (six
 leagues)

leagues) from Lilybæum, and the Carthaginians had always had the keeping of it much at heart.

The Romans, animated by the advantage they had just gained, renewed their attacks of the place with still greater ardor than before ; the besieged not daring to make a second attempt to burn the machines ; so much were they discouraged by the loss sustained in the first. But a very high wind rising on a sudden, some of the mercenary soldiers took notice of it to the General ; adding, that the occasion was entirely favourable for setting the machines of the besiegers on fire, and the more as the wind sat directly against them ; and they offered themselves for that service. Their offer was accepted. They were supplied with every thing necessary for that enterprize. All the machines took fire in a moment, without its being possible for the Romans to prevent it ; because in this conflagration, which became almost universal in a very short time, the wind drove the smoke and sparks in their eyes, and prevented them from discerning where to apply their aid, whereas the others saw clearly where to direct their discharges, and throw their fire. This accident made the Romans despair of carrying the place by open force. Besides which, provisions were so scarce, that they were reduced to subsist wholly upon horse-flesh ; and the diseases, which succeeded, killed almost ten thousand men in a short time. They were therefore absolutely resolved to abandon the siege. But Hiero, King of Syracuse, having sent them corn in abundance, revived their courage, and exhorted them in the strongest terms not to renounce their enterprize. They therefore contented themselves with changing the siege into a blockade, and surrounding the city with a line of contravallation ; they posted their army all around it, resolved to expect that from time, which they were not in a condition to effect, by a shorter method.

A. R. 522
Ant. C.
252.
Polyb. i.

Diod. Ib.

A. R. 503.
Ant. C.
249.

P. CLODIUS PULCHER.

L. JUNIUS PULLUS.

When Rome was informed of what passed at the siege of Lilybæum, and that part of the troops had perished there, that bad news, far from dejecting the citizens, seemed to renew their ardor. Every one was in haste to give in his name for the service. Ten thousand men were presently raised, who passed the freight, and marched by land to join the besiegers.

Diod.
apud Val-
lef.
Liv. p. 270.

The province of Sicily had fallen by lot to the Consul Clodius, and he was gone thither. He was a man of a cruel, proud, violent disposition; full of his Nobility, still more conceited of his own merit, and despising all others; incapable of taking counsel, and however, always forming hardy enterprizes that had great occasion for it. As soon as he arrived in Sicily, he began by condemning the conduct of the Consuls his predecessors before the troops, accusing them of negligence and cowardice, and reproaching them with having passed their time in feasting and pleasure, instead of carrying on the siege with vigour.

Polyb. i.
49.

To deprive the besieged of the means of receiving either advices or aids, he undertook to shut up the entrance of the port by filling it up: a great and bold design, but rash, and found to be absolutely impracticable! And what rendered Clodius more blameworthy, was, that his predecessors had already attempted to fill up the entrance of the port ineffectually. The sea was too deep in that place, and nothing thrown into it remained where it was necessary. The waves, and the rapidity of the current, carried away, and dispersed the materials, before they came to the bottom.

Polyb. i.
51—53.

As he was determined, at any price whatsoever, to signalize himself, he conceived thoughts of another enterprize, which was to attack Adherbal at Drepanum. He assured himself of victory, and was firmly per-

persuaded, that he should surprize the enemy, because, after the loss which the Romans had lately sustained at Lilybæum, the Carthaginians, who did not know they had received a considerable reinforcement, could not imagine that they should think of putting to sea. With this hope, he made choice of two hundred ships, on board of which he put his best seamen, and the flower of the legions. The troops embarked with joy, because the passage was not long, and besides, according to what the Consul had told them, they could not fail of great spoils. The better to cover his design, he made the fleet set out in the night, without being perceived by the besieged. At day-break the advanced guard being in sight of Drepanum, Adherbal, who expected nothing less, was surprized, but not disconcerted. He immediately drew up his ships upon the coast, gave orders for them to put to sea, and to follow the ship he was on board of, keeping an eye always upon it. He would not fight in the port; where, not having room to extend his lines, to veer and tack, and to run between the ships of the enemy, he would have lost all the advantages of the lightness of his own vessels; and could not avoid being boarded by the Romans, which he feared most of all.

He accordingly set forwards first, gained the open sea, and made his fleet file off under the rocks on the side of the port opposite to that through which the enemy was to enter. The Consul, who had began to make his right wing enter the port, surprized at the movement of the Carthaginians, sent orders to the ships of his right, which were already in the port, to tack about, and to join the gross of the fleet. This motion occasioned infinite confusion. For the ships, which were in the port, running foul of those that were entering it, put them into exceeding disorder, and even broke their oars. The trouble and confusion with which this bad manner of working the ships was attended, had began to alarm and discourage the army; when an action of the Consul's entirely

A. R. 503.
Ant. C.
249.

Cic. de
Nat. Deor.
ii. 7.
Flor. ii. 2.

A. R. 503.
Ant. C.
249.

discouraged the troops, and made them lose all hope and resolution. The Romans, at least the common people, had great faith in the auspices and augury. At the moment the battle was going to begin, somebody came to tell Clodius, that the chickens would neither come out of their coop, nor eat. He ordered them to be thrown into the sea; adding with a tone of raillery, * “If they won’t eat, let them drink.” This jest, says Cicero †, cost him many tears, and the Roman People a great disaster. All these observances of auspices and auguries were, at bottom, mere grimace: but they constituted part of the religion of those unhappy times; and to seem to despise them, was making one’s self to be considered as an impious wretch, and an enemy to the Gods. In the mean time, as fast as any ship disengaged itself, the officers immediately made it draw up along the coast, with its head facing the enemy. At the same time Adherbal, advancing into the main sea, drew up his galleys in one line, opposite to those of the Romans, which, posted near the shore, waited for the ships that were coming out of the port: an order of battle that was very pernicious to them. The two fleets approaching near each other, and the signal being given on both sides, the charge began. All was equal enough at first, because the troops that engaged were the flower of both the land armies: but the Carthaginians by degrees had the better. And indeed they had many advantages over the Romans during the whole battle. Their ships were built so as to move every way with great agility; their rowers were very expert; and they had taken the wise precaution to draw up in the open sea. If any of their ships were pressed by the enemy, they retired without running any risque; and light as they were, it was easy for to stand off. If the enemy advanced to pursue

* Abjici eos in mare jussit, dicens: “Quia esse nolant, bibant.” VAL. MAX. i. 4.

† Qui risus, classe devicta, multus ipsi lacrymas, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit. De Nat. Deor. ii. 7.

them, they turned, kept in motion round him, took him in flank, and beat against him perpetually; whereas the Roman ships could not tack without difficulty, on account of their heaviness, and the little experience of their rowers; which occasioned a great number of them to be sunk. As they fought near the land, and had left themselves no room to move in behind them, they could neither extricate themselves out of danger when pressed, nor carry aid where it was necessary. Thus a great part of their ships remained immoveable upon the banks of sand, and the rest were dashed to pieces against the land. Only thirty escaped, which being near the Consul, fled with him; disengaging themselves as well as they could along the shore. As it was necessary, in order to arrive at the army before Lilybæum, to pass through the Carthaginians, he adorned his galleys with all the marks of victory, and by that stratagem amused the enemy, who considering him as victorious, believed that his whole fleet followed him. All the rest, to the number of ninety-three, with their crews, fell into the hands of the Carthaginians. The Romans lost eight thousand men in this action, who were either killed or drowned; and twenty thousand soldiers, mariners, and rowers, were taken and carried to Carthage.

A. R. 503.
Ant. C.
249.

Frontin.
Strat. ii.
13.

Oros. iv. 8.

So considerable a victory did Adherbal's prudence and valour as much honour amongst the Carthaginians, as it covered the Roman Consul with shame and ignominy.

This was not the last disgrace the Romans experienced this year. They had appointed L. Junius one of the Consuls to carry provisions, and other munitions of war, to the army before Lilybæum, and sixty ships were given him for a convoy. Junius having arrived at Messana, and augmented his fleet there with all the ships that came to him from Lilybæum and the rest of Sicily, set out with the utmost diligence for Syracuse, where he arrived without incurring any danger. His fleet consisted of an hundred and twenty long ships, and about eight hundred

Polyb. i.
53—56.

A. R. 503. transports. He gave half of the latter, with some of
 Ant C. the others, to the Quæstors, with orders to carry provisions
 249. to the camp directly. As for himself he stayed at Syracuse for the ships, which could not follow him from Messina, and to receive the corn with which the allies of the inland country were to supply him.

About this time Asdrubal, after having sent all the men and ships he had taken in the last victory to Carthage, formed a squadron of an hundred sail, thirty of his own, and seventy which Carthalon, who had the joint command with him, had brought, put that officer at their head, and ordered him to sail for Lilybæum, to fall unexpectedly on the enemy's ships at anchor there, to take as many as he could, and burn the rest. Carthalon took this commission upon him with pleasure. He set out at day-break, burnt part of the enemy's fleet, and dispersed the rest. The terror spread into the Roman camp. They ran with great cries to their ships. But, whilst they were carrying them aid, Imilco, who had perceived early what passed, sallied from the city, and fell on them on another quarter with his foreign troops. It is easy to conceive the consternation of the Romans, when they saw themselves attacked on both sides at the same time.

Carthalon having taken some ships, and burnt others, removed a little from Lilybæum, and posted himself in the way from * Heraclea, in order to observe the new fleet of the Romans, and prevent it from arriving at the camp. Informed afterwards by those he had sent out as scouts, that a considerable great fleet approached, consisting of all kinds of ships, (it was that which the Consul had sent before him under the Quæstors) he advanced to meet the Romans, and offer them battle; believing after his first exploit, that he had only to shew himself in order to conquer. The squadron, which came from Syracuse, were apprized, that the enemy was not far off. The Quæstors, not believing themselves in a condition to ha-

* A city on the southern coast of Sicily.

zard a battle, stood in to a small allied city called Phintias †, where there was not a port indeed, but where the rocks rising above the land, formed a kind of road commodious enough. They landed there, and having planted as many catapultas and balistas, as the city would supply them with, they expected the Carthaginians. The latter no sooner arrived but they resolved to attack. They imagined, that in the terror the Romans were, they would not fail to retire into this little inconsiderable place, and abandon their ships to them. But the affair not taking the turn they had expected, and the Romans defending themselves with vigour, they retired from that place, where they were very much exposed; and carrying off with them some transports which they had taken, they sailed to the river Halycus, where they continued to observe what route the Romans would take.

A. R. 503.
Ant. C.
249.
Diod. in
Eclog.
p. 880.

Diod. ib.

Junius having made an end of all he had to do at Syracuse, doubled the cape of Pachynus, and made sail for Lilybæum, without knowing any thing of what had happened to those he had sent before him. This news coming to Carthalon, he made all sail with design to give the Consul battle, whilst separated from the other ships. Junius saw the numerous fleet of the Carthaginians at a great distance. But being too weak to sustain a battle, and too near the enemy to fly, he chose to come to an anchor near Camarina, on a coast amongst absolutely inaccessible cliffs; chusing rather to expose himself to the danger of perishing on the rocks, than to fall with his fleet into the hands of the enemy. Carthalon was far from giving the Romans battle in such difficult places: He seized a promontory, came to an anchor, and having placed himself between the two fleets, watched what passed in them both.

A dreadful storm beginning to threaten, the Carthaginian pilots, very expert in such cases, foresaw what was going to happen. They gave Carthalon notice of it, and advised him to double the cape of Pachynus as soon as possible, and shelter himself from

† Near the mouth of the Himera, mount Ecnomus, and Gela.

A. R. 503. the storm. That General prudently gave in to this
 Ant. C. advice. It required abundance of labour and pains
 249. to pass the cape: but at length they effected it, and
 placed the fleet out of danger. The storm broke out
 soon after. The two Roman fleets being in places
 exposed and uncovered, were so roughly treated, that
 not a single plank of them fit for use escaped, except
 Diod. ib. two ships, which the Consul employed in taking in
 such as had the good fortune to survive the wreck,
 either by throwing themselves on shore, or being
 driven thither by the storm: and the number of these
 was very considerable. This accident, which highly
 favoured the Carthaginians, and strengthened their
 hopes, entirely dejected the Romans, already much
 weakened by their former losses. They renounced
 the sea, determined never to fit out any more naval
 armaments, and to keep only some transports for the
 convoys, which they sent from time to time to Sicily,
 giving up in that manner a superiority to the Cartha-
 ginians, which they could no longer dispute, and even
 not well assured of having the advantage entirely over
 them by land.

These sad news gave both Rome and the army be-
 fore Lilybæum the most sensible affliction, but did
 not make them raise the siege: they even took just
 measures to send provisions thither. Rome thought
 only of placing authority in better hands than those in
 which it then was: for she was equally dissatisfied with
 both Consuls, whose bad success was attributed to the
 contempt, which both had expressed for religion.
 Clodius had already been recalled to Rome to give
 an account of his conduct. Accordingly it was re-
 solved, that a dictator should be declared to command
 the armies in Sicily. Hitherto none who had been
 invested with that important charge, had exercised
 it out of Italy.

Suet. in Clodius had orders to nominate this Dictator. One
 Tib. p. 2. cannot tell what name to give his extravagance of
 conduct upon this occasion, of which there is no ex-
 ample. As if he had made it his business, by degrad-
 ing

ing and rendering the principal office of the State contemptible, to insult the majesty of the Senate and People, and to exasperate them more and more against himself, he pitched upon one Glicias of the dregs of the people, who had served him as a serjeant or register, Dictator. The indignation of the public then broke out against that unworthy Consul: he was obliged to abdicate, and immediately cited before the People. It is said, that a sudden storm dissolved the assembly, and saved him. Atilius Calatinus was nominated Dictator in the room of Glicias. He appointed Cecilius Metellus master of the horse. They both set out for Sicily; but acted nothing memorable there.

A.R. 503.
Ant. C.
249.

Val. Max.
viii. 1.

Liv. Epit.
xviii.

Junius, who had remained in Sicily, endeavouring to cover his faults and misfortune by some considerable exploit, found means to hold secret intelligence in Eryx, and had the city delivered up to him. Upon the top of the mountain called by the same name, was the temple of Venus Erycina, undoubtedly the finest and richest of all the temples of Sicily. The city was situated a little below this summit, and the only way up to it was a long and very steep one. Junius posted part of his troops on the top of the mountain, and the rest at the bottom, near a little town called Egithalla, which he fortified, and where he left eight hundred men in garrison. After having taken these precautions, he conceived he had nothing to fear. But Carthalon having landed his troops there in the night, took the little town. Part of the garrison was killed, and the rest took refuge in the city of Eryx.

Polyb. i.
56.

Diod. in
Eclog.
p. 841.

History tells us nothing certain from this time concerning Junius. Some authors believe he was taken by Carthalon in the expedition we have just related: others, that foreseeing what would happen if he returned to Rome, he prevented his condemnation by a voluntary death.

Zonar.
Val. Max.

Writers differ also concerning the celebration of the secular games. Some place it in the year of which we

Censorin.
de die
Natali.
c. 17.

we are speaking, others fourteen years after, in the Consulship of P. Cornelius Lentulus, and C. Licinius Varus.

A. R. 504.
Ant. C.
248.

C. AURELIUS COTTA II.
P. SERVILIUS GEMINIUS II.

No great events happened in the following years, till the decisive battle, which terminated the war. Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, father of the great Hannibal, succeeded Cartholon in Sicily, from whence he set out with his fleet for Italy, and ravaged the countries of the Locri and Brutii.

Rome, under endless obligation to Hiero, in order to express her gratitude, remitted the annual tribute he had engaged to pay her, and entered into a stricter amity with him than ever.

A. R. 505.
Ant. C.
247.

L. CÆCILIUS METELLUS II.
NUM. FABIVS BUTEO.

Zonar.
viii. 397.

The Senate had resolved to act no longer by sea : but private persons induced them to supply them with ships to cruize against the enemy, upon condition of restoring them at their return, and of keeping the prizes they should take for their own use. A considerable number of galleys were lent them, which they fitted out at their own expence. They ravaged the coasts of Africa, and having entered the port of the city of * Hippo, they set the ships they found in it on fire, burnt many houses of the place, and carried off a considerable booty. Whilst they were employed in plundering, the inhabitants shut up the mouth of the port with chains. The Romans were in great perplexity ; but their industry extricated them. When a galley came near the chains, all the men on board went to the poop, that immediately raised its head above the chain, at which instant they returned to the

* It is believed to be Hippo Diarrhyfus, situated near Utica, twenty-five or thirty leagues from Carthage.

head, and the poop rising in its turn, the vessel cleared herself, and went over. By this means all the ships escaped the danger, and arrived at Panormus, where they were attacked by the Carthaginian fleet, which they put to flight. A. R. 505.
Ant. C. 247.

The Cōsuls were at that time employed, the one at the siege of Lilybæum, and the other at that of Drepanum. Amilcar harraressed them perpetually from the post which he had occupied, in which way things continued several years. No pains were spared on either side. New stratagems, feints, surprizes, approaches, and attacks, passed every day: however, though nothing was omitted, nothing decisive passed. Polyb. i.
58.

What ought to make this year most remarkable, is the birth of the great Hannibal. What he says himself, after the battle which he lost in Africa against Scipio, in the 550th year of Rome, at which time he was five and forty years old, authorizes the dating of his birth in the present year, which is the 505th of Rome. Polyb. xv.
709.
Liv. xxx.
37.

A considerable great number of prisoners had been taken on both sides many years, and an exchange was agreed on. The cartel was settled at the rate of about six pounds an head. Most prisoners had been taken from the Carthaginians, who paid the balance in money according to the rate stipulated. ib. xxii.
23.

Two new colonies were settled; the one at Æsulum in Hetruria, and the other at Alsium in Umbria. Vell Pat.
i. 14.

The Censur, taken by Atilius Calatinus and Manlius Torquatus, concluded at this time with the usual ceremony of the Lustrum: this was the thirty-eighth. The number of the citizens amounted to two hundred and fifty-two thousand two hundred and twenty-two; which was almost fifty thousand less than at the last Censur: a considerable decrease occasioned by the wars, and frequent shipwrecks. Fast. Cap.
Liv. Epit.
xix.

A. R. 506.
Ant. C.
246.

M. OTACILIUS CRASSUS II.
M. FABIVS LICINIUS.

Liv. Epit.
xix.
A. Gell.
x. 6.
Suet. in
Tib. c. 2.

This year a Roman lady was cited before the People as guilty of treason; a thing of which there was no example. She was the sister of Clodius Pulcher, whose ill conduct had occasioned the loss of the Roman fleet. One day returning from the games, the throng of the people in the streets obliged her chariot to drive slow, on which the following words escaped her in a loud voice: "Oh that my brother could but revive, to command the fleet again!" The multitude incommoding her, she desired the diminution of it. Notwithstanding all the endeavours of her relations and the friends of her family, who were the principal persons of Rome, and remonstrated, that the laws did not punish indiscreet words, but only criminal actions, she was sentenced to pay a fine, which was applied in building a little chapel to Liberty.

A. R. 507.
Ant. C.
245.

M. FABIVS BUTEO.
C. ATILIUS BULBUS.

Vell. Pat.

A colony was sent to Fregellæ a city of Hetruria, only three leagues from Alsiun, where one had been settled two years before.

Flor. ii. 2.

A battle was fought near the island of Ægimurus, which was fatal to both sides; to the Carthaginians by their defeat, and to the Romans by the shipwreck, which followed soon after.

Frontin.
iii. 10.

Amilcar found means to make troops and provisions enter Lilybæum.

A. R. 508.
Ant. C.
244.

A. MANLIUS TORQUATUS II.
C. SEMPRONIUS BLÆSUS.

Polyb. i.
59.
Diod.
Eclog.
xxiv. p.
831.

We have said before, that the Romans had made themselves masters of Eryx. Having posted a good body of troops on the top of the mountain, and another at the bottom, they believed, that they had no-
thing

thing to fear for a city situate between both, and the rather, because its situation alone seemed to secure it entirely from danger. But they had to do with an enemy, whose vigilance and activity ought to have kept them always upon their guard. Amilcar made his troops advance in the night, and marching at their head a league and a half with profound silence round the mountain, he made himself master of the city, after having killed part of the garrison, and caused the rest to be carried prisoners to Drepanum. One cannot conceive how the Carthaginians could sustain themselves in this post, attacked as they were both from above and below, and not being able to receive convoys, except from one place on the coast in their possession. By such strokes, as much and perhaps more than by the gaining of a battle, the ability and wise boldness of a commander may be known.

A. R. 503.
Ant. C.
244.

The war, in this small space upon the mountain of Eryx, was more warm and vigorous than it is possible to imagine. Amilcar, posted between two bodies of troops, the one above and the other below, was besieged by the latter, as well as the other by him. The attacks and defence were sustained on both sides with equal ardour. Neither rested night or day. They had learnt not to suffer themselves to be surprized. They knew that a single moment might be decisive. Sometimes victorious, and sometimes defeated, yet they did not lose courage. Neither the scarcity of provisions, fatigues, nor the dangers which they suffered for two years, could induce either side to yield. This double siege, for it may well be called so, terminated only with the war.

Under the Consuls of this year a colony was sent to Brundisium in the territory of the Sallentini, twenty years after that country had been subjected by the Romans.

Vell. Pat.
i. 14.

L. Cæcilius Metellus succeeded Ti. Coruncanius as Pontifex Maximus, who was the first Plebeian that had this dignity.

A. R. 509.
Ant. C.
243.

C. FUNDANIUS FUNDULUS.

C. SULPICIUS GALLUS.

Five years were passed without any considerable event on either side. The Romans had believed that they should be able to take Lilybæum with their land-forces : but finding it spun out to a great length, they returned to their first plan, and made extraordinary efforts for arming a new fleet. The public treasury was exhausted ; but that defect was supplied by particulars ; so much did the love of their country sway with the People. Every body according to their ability contributed to the common expence, and on the credit of the public, which engaged to repay in time the sums lent for this armament, no hesitation was made in advancing the money for an expedition, on which the glory and safety of the Commonwealth depended. One fitted out a ship at his own expence ; others joined two or three together to do the same. In a very short time two hundred galleys of five ranks of oars were ready to put to sea. They were built upon the model of one taken from the enemy of extraordinary swiftness. In the course of the Punic wars, we shall see more than one example of this generous love of the Romans for their country, which constituted one of the principal parts of their character. But the Commonwealth was also true to her engagements. Thus the public faith, which we cannot repeat too often, is an assured resource to a State on great occasions. To commit the least breach of it, is transgressing the most essential rule of good policy, and leaving a diffidence in the minds of a people, for which there is often no remedy. This sudden resource, which Rome seems to have little reason to expect after her recent losses by sea, enabled the Commonwealth to compleat the conquest of Sicily, and afterwards to proceed to the other conquests, which the Divine Providence had allotted her.

C. LUTATIUS CATULUS.

A. R. 510.

A. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS.

Ant. C.

242.

Postumius prepared to go with his colleague for Liv. Epit. Sicily, where they promised themselves some great^{xix.} event this year. But as he was Flamen Martialis, Tacit. An. iii. 71. priest of Mars, (and the priests could not remove from Val. Max. i. 1. Rome) Metellus the grand Pontiff would not let him set out for his province. In process of time this strict regularity was dispensed with.

The Senate shewed a like delicacy also in respect Ibid i. 3. to religion, by forbidding Lutatius to consult the divinations of Præneste, which were given by lot, *Prænestinas Sortes*, being against a Roman Consul's having recourse to foreign ceremonies. All kinds of predictions amongst the antients were called *Sortes*. There were different species of them. The *Sortes* of Præneste were very antient and famous throughout Italy. They were small pieces of wood, inscribed with enigmatical characters, contained in a coffer, which the priests kept with great care in the temple of Fortune. When a person went to consult this oracle, the priests brought out this box, and made a child stir the little pieces of wood several times; after which he drew at a venture. The priests pretended to find the answer to the demands of the querists, in the characters inscribed upon them. Cicero * with reason derides the stupid credulity of people, who suffered themselves to be imposed upon by a gross cheat, founded only on one side in the avarice of the priests, and on the other in the superstition of those who came to consult the oracle.

As the two Consuls could not set out for Sicily, Liv. Epit. and one did not suffice for supporting the weight of^{xix.} so important a war, two Prætors were created this year for the first time, (for hitherto there was but one, whose sole function was to administer justice) and Q.

* Tota res est inventa fallaciis, aut ad quæstum, aut ad superstitionem, aut ad errorem. De Divinat. ii. 85.

A.R. 510. Valerius Falto, one of them, had orders to accompany
 Ant. C. Lutatius, and to share with him in the cares of the war
 242. as his Lieutenant. As soon as the winter was over, they set out for Sicily with a fleet of three hundred galleys, and seven hundred transports. Two Prætors were always created for the future, though there was no occasion for them in the army. They both remained at Rome to administer justice, the one between citizens and citizens, who was called *Prætor urbanus*; and the other between citizens and strangers, called *Prætor peregrinus*.

Polyb. i. Lutatius landed in Sicily, when he was least expected there. The fleet of the enemy was retired into Africa, because they did not believe, that the Romans had any thoughts of putting to sea again. He made himself master of the port of Drepanum, and of all the advantageous posts in the neighbourhood of Lilybæum, which the retreat of the Carthaginians left without defence. He made his approaches round Drepanum, and disposed every thing for the siege. The machines had soon made a breach, and the soldiers were preparing for the assault with the Consul at their head, when he was dangerously wounded in the thigh. The soldiers, by whom he was very much beloved, abandoned the attack to serve him, and followed him in a body to the camp, whither he was carried. Whilst his wound was curing, he did not lose time. Foreseeing, that the enemy's fleet would not be long before it arrived, and having always before his eyes what had been judged at first, that the war could be terminated only by a naval battle, without losing a moment's time, he exercised his crews so as to form them for the design he had of attacking the enemy, and by his assiduity in this practice, of mere sailors he made them excellent soldiers in a very short time.

The Carthaginians, much surprized that the Romans should dare to appear again at sea, and desiring that the camp at Eryx might not want the necessary munitions, fitted out ships immediately, and having supplied them with grain and other provisions, they made this

Polyb. i.
60--62.

Q.ros. iv.
10.

this fleet depart, and gave Hanno the command of it. He sailed first to the island of Hiera, with design to land at Eryx, without being perceived by the enemy, to unlade his ships there, to add all the best troops at Eryx to his naval army, and to go with Amilcar to offer the enemy battle.

A. R. 510.
Ant. C.
242.

The Consul was not well recovered of his wound, when he was apprized, that the fleet of the enemy approached. Conjecturing what the views of the Carthaginian Admiral might be, he chose the bravest and most experienced troops in his land-army, and sailed for * Ægusa, an island situate opposite to Lilybæum. There, after having exhorted his people to behave well, he gave the pilots notice to prepare for a battle the next morning.

At the break of day, seeing the wind, which favoured the Carthaginians, was much against him, and that the sea was extremely rough, he paused at first concerning the measures he should take. But he afterwards reflected, that if he engaged during that foul weather, he should only have the naval army, and ships laden and heavy to deal with: that, on the contrary, if he waited till it was calm, and suffered Hanno to join the camp at Eryx, he would have ships lightened by unlading their freight upon his hands, as also the flower of the land-army, and, which was still more formidable than all the rest, the ability and intrepidity of Amilcar. All these reasons determined him to seize the present occasion. These motives for the conduct of a General, explained in this manner by one more able as a captain than as a writer, for such Polybius was, add infinite value to the narration of facts, and are in a manner their soul.

The Consul had chosen troops, good mariners who had been well exercised, and excellent ships built, as we have said, upon the model of a galley taken some time before, which was the most compleat the Romans had ever seen of the kind. On the side of the Carthaginians every thing was the reverse. As they

* One of the Ægates.

A. R. 510. had been sole masters of the sea for some years, and
 Ant. C. the Romans did not dare to face them, they considered
 242. them as nothing, and themselves as invincible. On the first report of the motion the latter were making, Carthage sent out a fleet equipped in haste, in which every thing argued precipitation: the soldiers and mariners were all mercenaries, newly raised, and as void of experience, courage and zeal, as interest in the common cause. This appeared entirely in the battle. They could not sustain the first attack. Fifty of their ships were sunk, and seventy taken with all on board. The rest, with the help of a wind that sprung up very opportunely for them, retired to the little island from whence they set out. The number of the prisoners exceeded ten thousand.

Hanno retired to Carthage with what ships he could save. He there lost his life, the usual treatment of unsuccessful Generals. Rome did not act in that manner; and her policy in this respect, besides being more conformable to the humanity which the Romans always professed, was more advantageous to the State and the service in the field, by leaving the Generals, who had failed of success, time to retrieve either their fault or their misfortune.

Oros. iv. Lutatius, after the action, advanced to Lilybæum,
 10. and joined the besiegers. After having given his troops some rest, he marched them to Eryx, where he gained an advantage over Amilcar, undoubtedly in a battle by land, and killed him two thousand men.

Polyb. i. When this bad news was brought to Carthage, it
 63, 64. occasioned the more surprize and consternation, as it had been little expected. The Senate did not lose courage. The desire of continuing the war was not wanting; but the state of their affairs opposed it. As the Romans were masters of the sea, it was no longer possible to send either provisions or troops to the armies in Sicily. They therefore sent dispatches immediately to Amilcar Barcas, who commanded there, and left it to his prudence to act as he should think most expedient. That great man, as long as he had
 the

the least reason to hope, had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid valour, and the most consummate wisdom. But as he had now no resource, he sent deputies to the Consul to treat of a peace and alliance: prudence consisting, says Polybius, in knowing how both to resist, and to yield when necessary.

A. R. 510.
Ant. C.
242.

Lutatius, besides his particular interest in not leaving the glory of terminating so important a war to a successor, knew how weary the Roman People were of one so ruinous, which had exhausted their forces and revenues; and he had not forgot the unfortunate consequences of Regulus's inexorable and imprudent haughtiness. He therefore made no difficulties about treating, and dictated the following terms. THERE SHALL BE, IF THE ROMAN PEOPLE APPROVE IT, AMITY BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS. THE CARTHAGINIANS SHALL EVACUATE ALL SICILY. THEY SHALL NOT MAKE WAR AGAINST HIERO, NOR CARRY ARMS AGAINST THE SYRACUSANS OR THEIR ALLIES. THEY SHALL RESTORE ALL THE PRISONERS TAKEN FROM THE ROMANS WITHOUT RANSOM. THEY SHALL PAY THEM, IN THE SPACE OF TWENTY YEARS, * TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EUBOIC TALENTS OF SILVER. The simplicity, exactness, and perspicuity of this treaty, which says so many things in few words, and regulates all the interests of two potent States and their allies by sea and land, are worth observing in this place.

The Consul had demanded, that the troops in Eryx should deliver up their arms. Barcas absolutely refused to come into that article, and declared that he would hazard the last extremities, and even perish, rather than consent to such an infamy. He only agreed to pay eighteen Roman Denarii (about nine shillings) for each soldier of that garrison.

Cor. Nep.
in Amilc.

Liv. xxi.
41.

* This sum is, about three hundred and nine thousand pounds sterling.

A. R. 510.
Ant. C.
242.

When these conditions were brought to Rome, the People not approving them in the whole, sent ten Deputies to regulate the affair finally upon the spot. They made no alteration in the main of the treaty. "They only shortened the terms for the payments of the money, and added to the sum imposed by the Consul a thousand talents, to be paid immediately for the charges of the war, and that the Carthaginians should quit all the islands between Italy and Sicily." It is necessary to observe, that Sardinia is not included in this treaty. Lutatius was continued in the command in Sicily, to regulate the affairs and government of the new conquest.

Thus terminated one of the longest wars mentioned in history, as it subsisted four and twenty years without interruption. The ardour for disputing empire was equally obstinate on both sides. Abundance of resolution, abundance of greatness of soul, appear both in the enterprizes and execution of both parties. The Carthaginians take place in their knowledge of naval affairs; their skill in building ships, their address and facility in working them; the experience of their pilots; their knowledge of the coasts, creeks, roads, and winds; and lastly, their abundant riches for supporting the expences of a rude and long war. The Romans had none of these advantages: but valour, zeal for the public good, love of their country, a noble emulation for glory, and a warm desire to extend their dominion, served instead of all they wanted in other respects. It is surprizing to see them, entirely new to, and unexperienced in, naval affairs, not only make head against the most expert and most powerful nation of the world at sea, but gain many naval battles against them. No difficulties, no misfortunes, were capable of discouraging them. They lost, in the course of this first Punic war, either in battles or by storms, seven hundred galleys. The constancy of the Roman People may be judged from hence. They undoubtedly would not have made peace in the same circumstances, wherein we have just seen the Carthaginians

ginians demand it. A single unfortunate campaign discourages them; many do not shake the resolution of the Romans.

A. R. 510.
Ant. C.
242.

As to the soldiers, there is no comparison between those of Rome and those of Carthage; the first being infinitely superior to the latter in point of courage. As to the Generals, Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, was undeniably the most distinguished both by his conduct and valour. During all this war, no General has appeared on the side of the Romans, whose extraordinary talents can be considered as the cause of victory: so that it was solely by the constitution of the State, and, if I may venture to say so, her national virtues, that Rome triumphed over Carthage.

When we consider at one view the whole series of the first Punic war, we seem to see something like what passed in the combats of the antients, between two equally strong and robust Athletæ, who full of courage and ardour, animated by the warm desire of conquering, and by the cries of the spectators, engage in fight, beat with their fists, wrestle, lift one another off the ground, shake each other violently, throw one another down, rise that moment with new vigour, employ strength, art, and all imaginable agility and address; till at last both being down again, after having struggled a great while upon the sand, turned each other over and over, and twisted in a thousand different manners, one of the two getting the upperhand, reduces his adversary to ask quarter, and to confess himself conquered. Such was very near the case between the Romans and Carthaginians in the war of which we have been speaking.

Q. LUTATIUS CERCO.

A. R. 511.
Ant. C.
241.

A. MANLIUS ATTICUS.

Lutatius and Valerius remained in Sicily, the first in quality of Proconsul, the other as Proprætor. They in concert made all the necessary regulations for establishing good order there, and fixed the taxes and

Q 4

duties,

A. R. 511. duties, that each city was to pay the Commonwealth.
 Ant. C. They applied themselves particularly to remove all
 241. cause and occasion of troubles and revolt. In order to this they disarmed all the Sicilians, who had declared for Amilcar, and ordered the Gauls, who had deserted from the same Amilcar to the Romans, whilst they were in garrison upon mount Eryx, to quit the island, and to go and settle elsewhere, supplying them with the ships necessary for that purpose. They made their pretext for an order, which must seem very hard to those troops, the crime they had committed in plundering the temple of Venus upon mount Eryx; which had rendered them odious to the whole island. From thenceforth the part of the island, which had been under the Carthaginians, became a province of the Roman People. The rest of it formed the kingdom of Hiero. After the whole had been regulated, Lutatius and Valerius returned to Rome. A triumph was decreed Lutatius; on which Valerius having represented that he had equally contributed to the success of the Roman arms, added, it was but just, as he had shared with Lutatius in the cares and dangers of the battle, that he should also share with him in the honour and reward of it. What made most in favour of the Prætor's cause, was, that the Consul, who was not perfectly cured of his wound, had not been able to act; so that Valerius had performed the functions of General in this battle. Lutatius opposed his demand as contrary to custom and unjust; pretending that it was unusual, and contrary to the laws, to equal two officers in the distribution of honours, of which the one was inferior and subordinate to the other. The dispute growing warm on both sides, they agreed to refer it to the arbitration of Atilius Calatinus, who, in regard to the superiority of Lutatius's power, which his opponent could not contest with him, decided the difference in his favour. Notwithstanding this sentence, as Valerius had distinguished his merit in an extraordinary manner in this war, the honour of a triumph was also granted him.

I have

I have said, that part of Sicily was become a province of the Roman People. The Romans called the countries which they conquered out of Italy, Provinces. These countries were governed as conquered countries: and though the people of them were called allies of the State, and not Subjecti, they however had not the entire enjoyment of their own laws, and did not chuse their own magistrates. Rome sent them every year a Prætor and a Quæstor; the first to administer justice; and command the troops when necessary; and the other to receive the duties, which the countries newly conquered paid the victors.

A. R. 511,
Ant. C.
241.

Sicily was the first that received law from the Romans. Cicero, in one of his orations against Verres, gives it a fine praise: “ * She was the first, says he, of all foreign nations, that sought our amity; that adorned our empire by becoming its province; and taught our ancestors how glorious it was to command States abroad.” After having extolled the constant fidelity of that island to the Commonwealth; its particular consideration for the Publicani, that is, those who collected the taxes, whose name was odious every where else; its extraordinary fertility in excellent corn, which made Cato the Elder call it the granary of Rome, and the nursing mother of the Roman People; he adds, addressing himself to the People: “ † The provinces and tributary countries are to you what their farms and estates are to individuals, of which the nearest to Rome, are the most esteemed, and those which give the most pleasure. Thus Sicily, which is almost at the gates of Rome, is dearer and more agreeable to you than all the other provinces of the empire.

In Verr. 3.
n. 2—7.

* Omnium nationum exterarum princeps Sicilia se ad amicitiam fidemque populi Romani applicuit: prima omnium, id quod ornamentum imperii est, provincia est appellata: prima decuit majores nostros, quam præclarum esset exteris gentibus imperare.

† Et quoniam quasi quædam prædia populi Romani sunt, vestigia nostra atque provinciæ: quemadmodum propinquis vos vestris prædiis maximè delectamini, sic populo Romano jucunda suburbانيتas est hujusce provinciæ.

Of the Combats of the GLADIATORS.

THEY called those gladiators, who killed one another in the amphitheatres to divert the people.

The antient custom of sacrificing captives, or prisoners of war, to the manes of great men who died in battle, made way for these combats. Thus Achilles in Homer sacrifices twelve young Trojans to the manes of Patroclus; and in Virgil, Æneas sends captives in like manner to Evander, in order to their being sacrificed at the funeral of his son Pallas.

As it seemed barbarous to massacre these captives like beasts, it was decreed, that they should fight with each other, and use all their address to save their own lives, and to kill their adversaries. This seemed the least inhuman, because they might escape death in the end; and their lives were in their own hands, and depended on their dexterity in defending themselves.

It was in the 488th year of Rome that this kind of shews was first exhibited to the Roman People, when the two brothers M. and D. Brutus caused their father's funeral to be celebrated with pomp. The Romans were not the authors of this custom. It subsisted before amongst other people of Italy; and Livy speaks of it in the 444th year of Rome, as practised amongst the Campanians, who even entertained themselves with this barbarous diversion at their feasts. The Romans at first exhibited these combats of gladiators only at the funerals of illustrious men: but it became an entirely common custom in process of time; and private persons set down in their wills how many couples of gladiators should fight in that manner after their deaths. These gladiators were called *Buſtuarii*, because they fought round the funeral pile, *Buſtum*.

At first the number of gladiators, who were made to fight, were not very great: but it increased continually,

nually, as is usual. In the 536th year of Rome, the sons of M. Æmilius Lepidus brought out twenty-two pairs of gladiators at the funeral of their father. This shew continued three days, and was celebrated in the Forum of Rome. In the 552d year, the sons of M. Valerius Levinus exhibited twenty-five pairs of gladiators in the same ceremony. In 569, seventy, and in 578, seventy-four, fought on the like occasion. Liv. xxxi. 50.
Liv. xxxix. 46.
& xli. 28.

In order to supply men for these kind of combats, it was necessary to prepare the combatants long beforehand. The profession of gladiator became an art. There were masters to teach them the use of arms; who were called Lanistæ by the Latines. People learnt to fight, and exercised themselves that way.

Two sorts of persons shared in these combats: the one forced, that is to say, slaves and condemned criminals; the other voluntarily and of their own accord. The latter were freemen, who hired themselves for this infamous use, and set a price upon their blood. The master of the gladiators made these last swear, that they would fight till they died. They* engaged themselves accordingly by oath religiously to discharge all the duties of a good and faithful gladiator: they devoted themselves body and soul without reserve to their masters; and agreed, in case they refused to serve, to suffer death either by fire, sword, or under the strokes of the lash. Liv. xxviii. 21.

This kind of shews began in grief and mourning, having been employed at the celebration of funerals: but in process of time pleasure and joy adopted them, and they became the most grateful and affecting diversion of the Roman People, who crowded to them with incredible passion. † Cicero says, that no other

* In verba Eumolpi sacramentum juravimus, uti, vinciri, verberari, ferroque necari; & quicquid aliud jussisset, tanquam legitimi gladiatores domino corpora animosque addicimus. PETRON. c. 17.

† Id spectaculi genus erat, quod omni frequentia atque omni genere hominum celebratur: quo multitudo maximè delectatur—Equidem existimo nullum tempus esse frequentioris populi, quàm illud gladiatorium; neque concionis ullius, neque verò ullorum comitiorum. PRO SEXT. 124. & 125.

assembly, either for the public affairs, or the election of magistrates, was so numerous as this, and that an infinite multitude of citizens of all ranks and conditions were present at them.

The gladiators had different names from the different arms they used. To avoid prolixity, I shall repeat only three or four kinds of them in this place.

RETIARII. They were armed with a trident or three-grained spear, and carried a net, which they threw over the heads of their antagonists, in order to entangle them in such a manner, as to make them incapable of defending themselves.

THRACES. They were so called from being armed like the Thracians with a kind of dagger, poniard, and round buckler. Horace mentions them :

Thrax est Gallina Syro par ? Serm. ii. 6.

* MYRMILLONES. It is believed from a passage in Festus, that this name was given them on account of their being armed, like the Gauls, with a long sword and buckler, and an helmet, the crest of which was usually a fish.

SAMNITES. They were undoubtedly so called from their being armed like the Samnites, whatever that armour was. They are often mentioned by authors. Livy ix. Livy says : *Campania ab superbia, & odio Samnitium, gladiatores, quod spectaculum inter epulas erat, eo ornati armarunt, Samnitiumque nomine appellarunt.* And Horace Ep. 2. l. 2. race :

*Cædimur, & totidem plagis consumimus hostem,
Lento Samnites ad lumina prima duello.*

De Orat. Cicero has : *Neque est dubium, quin exordium dicendi vehemens & pugnax non sæpe esse debeat. Sed, si in ipso illo gladiatorio vitæ certamine, quo ferro decernitur, tamen ante congressum multa fiunt, quæ non ad vulnus, sed*

* Retiario pugnanti adversus Myrmillonem cantatur, " Non te peto, piscem peto : quid me fugis Galle ? " quia myrmillonicum genus armorum Gallicum est, ipsique Myrmillones antè Galli appellabantur, in quorum galeis piscis effigies inerat. FESTUS.

ad speciem valere videantur: quanto hoc magis in oratione expectandum, in qua non vis potius quam delectatio postulat? Atque ejusmodi illa prolusio debet esse, non ut Samnitum, qui vibrant hastas ante pugnam, quibus in pugnando nihil utuntur: sed ut ipsis sententiis, quibus proluserunt, vel pugnare possint. I shall cite another very fine and very remarkable passage of Cicero's upon the same subject in the sequel.

These gladiators, as I have already said, were instructed and formed for combats by a fencing-master, who took great care to give them good and solid nourishment, in order to their being strong and robust, which constituted their principal merit, and very much augmented their price. It was necessary also that they should be large and well-shaped, to give the spectators the greater pleasure. * Seneca tells us, in more than one place, that they fought naked; which I can scarce believe. The fencing-masters sold them very dear, either to the magistrates, who were obliged by their offices to give this kind of shews; or to private persons, who to conciliate the favour of the People, and obtain their suffrages, entertained them with these games, which were infinitely agreeable to them. Cicero, during his Consulship, prohibited this method of canvassing offices by a law. Those who exhibited these shews, were called Editores. The madness for the gladiatorial combats rose so high as to make them follow the example of the Campanians, and entertain themselves with this brutal pleasure in the midst of feasts.

Orat. pro
Sext. n.
133.

By way of prelude to these combats, as we have seen in the passage of Cicero, they made abundance of motions, discharged their darts in the air, and attacked each other gently, and only for the sake of shew. But they soon came to close fight and wounds, from which the blood that flowed was presently a part of the entertainment.

* Mutuos istus nudis & obviis pectoribus excipiunt——Nihil habent quo tegantur, ad istum totis corporibus expositi. SENECA. Epist. vii.

These unhappy victims of the cruel pleasure of the Romans were not permitted to shew the least sign of regret or fear in combat. It was a crime for a gladiator to vent the least complaint when wounded, or to ask quarter when overcome. In those cases the people expressed their indignation against him: "Kill *,
 " burn, whip him to death," cried they. " What,
 " does he go on timorously, does he meet the
 " stroke like a coward! He falls with no spirit! He
 " hath not the courage to die with a good grace!"
 Did ever Barbarians talk in such a manner!

But indeed this fear and want of spirit were very rare: from whence we may observe with amazement, what impressions habit and example are capable of making upon the mind of man, and even upon the mean and mercenary. A † gladiator believed himself disgraced, when matched with one inferior to himself in strength and dexterity; convinced, that there is no glory in conquering, when there is no danger in fighting. This principle of honour, almost generally implanted in the minds of those who appeared upon the Arena, and which made them superior to all human fears, is proposed by Cicero in more than one place, as an admirable model of courage and constancy; by which he intended to animate himself and others to suffer every thing for the preservation of liberty, and the defence of the Commonwealth.

Tusc. ii.
 41.

" What ills, says he, do not the gladiators, that is, wretched Barbarians, suffer? Which of them, that has been well trained up, does not chuse rather to receive the mortal stroke, than to avoid it in a shameful manner? How often do we see that all they propose is to please their master (that is him who has bought them for the shews) or the people? When

* Occide, ure, verbera. Quare tam timidè incurrit in ferrum? quare parum audacter occidit? quare parum libenter moritur? SENEC. Epist. vii.

† Ignominiam judicat gladiator, cum inferiore componi: & scit eum sine gloria vinci; qui sine periculo vincitur. SENEC. de Provid. cap. 3.

covered with wounds, they send to their masters, to ask whether they are satisfied; and declare, if they are, that they die contented. * Do we ever hear a gladiator of the least merit vent a single groan? Does he ever change colour and turn pale at the sight of danger? Which of them not only in combat, but when not able to fight any longer he falls down to receive the mortal stroke, suffers the least sign of fear to escape him? Such force has example, habit, and reflection! ‘What! shall a Samnite, a slave, a man of nothing, a wretch without a name,’ be capable of such a constancy of soul, and shall a man born for glory, when the question is to suffer pain or confront danger, not be able, whatever inward weakness he may be conscious of, to encourage and strengthen himself by the motives of reason and sense of honour? Some persons think the gladiatorial shews cruel and inhuman, and perhaps not without reason, as exhibited at present. But were only criminals condemned to die exposed to these combats, they would be, in my opinion, a good lesson, not to the ears but eyes, to teach men to despise pain and death bravely.”

Cicero, in another passage, exhorts himself and all ^{Philip. ii.} good citizens to courage and constancy by the example of the gladiators: it is in speaking against Antony, the enemy of the public peace and tranquility, who menaced the subversion of the State. “† If in these unhappy times the last hour of the Commonwealth be arrived, (which may the gods forbid) let us imitate those generous gladiators, who do not fear to

* Quis mediocris gladiator ingemuit? quis vultum mutavit unquam? quis non modò stetit, verumetiam decubuit turpiter? quis cum decubuisset, ferrum recipere jussus, collum contraxit? tantum exercitatio, meditatio, consuetudo valet! Ergo hoc poterit

“ Samnis, spurcus homo, vita illa dignu locoque :—”

vir natus ad gloriam, ullam partem animi tam mollem habebit, quam non meditatione.& ratione corroboret?

† Quod si jam (quod dii omen avertant!) fatum extremum reip: venit: quod gladiatores nobiles faciunt, ut honestè decumbunt, faciamus nos, principes orbis terrarum, gentiumque omnium, ut cum dignitate potius cadamus, quam cum ignominia serviamus.

die,

die, provided it be with honour: Let us, who are the lords and sovereigns of the nations of the earth, chuse rather to fall with glory, than to live enslaved with infamy."

It was these sentiments of valour and constancy, that constituted the most sensible pleasure of the spectators. * They only despised such of the gladiators as expressed timidity, became suppliants, and implored quarter: on the contrary, those who behaved with fortitude and greatness of soul, and generously offered themselves to the mortal stroke, they were truly solicitous to preserve. The people decided the fate of the combatants: for those who gave the shews usually referred that to them. The fist doubled with the thumb erect was the signal of death to the victors.

*Munera nunc edunt, & verso pollice vulgi
Quemlibet occidunt populariter.* JUVENAL.

The † people believed themselves treated with contempt, when the gladiators did not willingly present themselves to receive the mortal stroke. They were enraged, as if some injury had been done them, and from mere spectators became their declared adversaries.

It is amazing, that so great a number of persons could be found to enter into a profession, which, properly speaking, was devoting themselves to death. That number, which was at first very moderate, became exceeding great in the latter times of the Commonwealth, and under the Emperors. Julius Cæsar, in his Ædileship, exhibited three and twenty pair of gladiators. Gordian, before he was Emperor, gave these shews twelve times in a year, that is to say, once a month. In some of these there were five hundred

Plut. in
Cæs. p. 709.
Capit. in
Gord.

* In gladiatoris pugnis timidos, & supplices, & ut vivere liceat obsecrantes, etiam odisse solemus: fortes, & animosos, & se acriter ipsos morti offerentes, servari cupimus. CIC. pro Milone, n. 92.

† Gladiatoribus populus irascitur, & tam iniquè, ut injuriam putet quod non libenter pereunt. Contemni se judicat; ut vultu, gestu, ardore de spectatore in adversarium vertitur. SENECA, de Ira, i.

pairs of gladiators, and never less than fifty. But what may seem almost incredible, long before him, Trajan, the model of good Emperors, had given these shews to the people an hundred and twenty-three days together, during which time ten thousand gladiators appeared on the Arena. Dio in Trajan.

They were formed at Rome into different companies; and the people took the part of one against another, with a violence and fury that often terminated in bloody seditions. The example of the capital was soon followed by the other cities, and the whole empire was infected with a sanguinary diversion, the horror of which Seneca expresses in few words. “Man, says he, the sacred creature man, is esteemed of so little value, that we make it a sport, a diversion, to mangle and butcher him.” *Homo, sacra res homo, jam per lusum & jocum occiditur.* Ep. 96.

And even before Rome was become the capital of the known world, Antiochus Epiphanes, King of Syria, in imitation of the Romans, had introduced the combats of gladiators in his dominions. † Livy observes, that these shews at first gave the spectators more horror than pleasure, whilst they were new to them; and it was only slowly, and by degrees, that they accustomed themselves to them. At their beginning, the first wound put an end to the combat: but growing familiar with blood from frequently seeing it shed, and these shews at length, all horrible as they were in themselves, usually ending with the death of one of the combatants, they became their most common and most grateful diversion. Liv. xli. 20.

It is remarkable that the Athenians, who were naturally beneficent and humane, never admitted bloody shews into their city. And when it was proposed to establish combats of gladiators there, in order not to give place in that respect to the Corinthians: “First Lucian in vit. Demonaet. p. 1014.

† Gladiatorum munus, Romanæ consuetudinis, primò majore cum terrore hominum insuetorum ad tale spectaculum, quàm voluptate, dedit: deinde, sæpius dando, & modò vulneribus tenus, modò sine missione etiam, familiare oculis gratumque id spectaculum fecit.

“ throw down,” cried out an * Athenian from the midst of the assembly, “ the altar which our forefathers above a thousand years ago erected to Mercy.” And indeed, one must have renounced all sense of humanity and compassion, and become barbarous and savage, to see the blood of one’s fellow-creatures shed not only without pain, but with joy and delight.

M. Aurel.
vit.
Diod.
apud Va-
les, p. 718.

Some Pagan Emperors, moved with the sad effects of this murderous custom, endeavoured to moderate it. It was in this view, that Marcus Aurelius retrenched the enormous expences employed in these combats, and would not suffer the gladiators to fight with each other except with very blunt swords, like files; so that they could shew their address without any danger of being killed. But this was one of those excessive evils, which require as excessive remedies. None of the Emperors had dared to use any such. This honour was reserved for Christianity, and it cost many efforts and much time to effect it; such profound root had the evil taken, and so much had it established itself by the long prescription of many ages, and the opinion of the world, that these combats were acceptable to the gods, to whom, for that reason, they offered the blood of gladiators lately spilt by way of sacrifice, as several of the fathers observe.

Constantine the Great was the first Emperor, who made laws to prohibit the cruel shews of the gladiators. Lactantius had represented to him in his Institutions, an admirable work which he inscribed to him, how much shews in general, but especially those of the gladiators, were dangerous and destructive.

All the authority of Constantine did not suffice for abolishing them, and Honorius was obliged to renew that prohibition. Prudentius, the Christian poet, in his poem against Symmachus, had exhorted him to deliver Christianity from this reproach: but the Em-

* This was Dæmonax, a famous philosopher, whose disciple Lucian had been; he flourished in the reign of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.

Theodo-
ret. V. 26

peror was induced to it by a particular occasion, which the reader, I believe, will not be offended at my inserting here. An holy hermit of the east named Telemachus, came to Rome, where the phrenzy for the shews still prevailed, and went to the amphitheatre like the rest, but with a very different intention. When the combat began he went down into the arena, and used his utmost endeavours to prevent the gladiators from killing each other. This was an unexpected sight which much offended all the spectators. In consequence, full of the spirit of him who was an homicide from the beginning, that is to say of the devil, who alone could inspire men with this barbarous thirst of human blood, they fell upon the new combatant, the enemy to their diversion, and stoned him to death. Honorius, being informed of what had passed, absolutely prohibited such pernicious shews. The blood of the martyr obtained that from God, which the laws of Constantine could not effect; and from thenceforth the combats of gladiators were heard of no more at Rome. “ Thus, says Mr. Tillemont, from whom I have extracted this account, God crowned even before men an action, which the wise men of the world, and perhaps part of those of the church, would probably have condemned as an indiscretion and a folly; but folly from God is wiser than all the wisdom of men.”

All the holy bishops, all true believers, had the same horror for these combats of the gladiators as this generous hermit. “ * How, cries out St. Cyprian, is one man deprived of life for the pleasure and diversion of another? Is knowing how to kill, an art, a science, a profession? Murther is not only committed, but taught by rule. Can any thing be more inhuman? can any thing be more horrid? To learn to kill, is discipline, and to put it in practice, glory.”

* Homo in hominis voluptatem perimitur: & ut quis possit occidere, peritia est, usus est, ars est? Scelus non tantum geritur, sed docetur! Quid potest inhumanius, quid acerbius dici? Disciplina est, ut perimere quis possit: & gloria est, quod peremit. S. CYPRIAN.

Of the COMBATS of the GLADIATORS.

Lactantius, in the work which I have cited above, shews how criminal those are, who assist at these fights. † If the person, says he, who is present at a murder [without preventing it if he can] makes himself an accomplice of the crime, and if in that case, the witness is as criminal as the assassin, it follows, that the spectator of these combats is as much a murderer, as the gladiators themselves: that consenting to the effusion of blood, he is responsible for it as well as he that sheds it; and applauding him that kills, is himself deemed to have killed, though by the hand of another. The shews of the theatre are no less to be condemned.

I shall conclude this brief discourse upon the combats of the gladiators, with repeating a fact from St. Austin upon this subject, to which I desire the serious attention of my young readers. Alipes, a young man of one of the best families of Tagasta in Africa, where St. Augustin was also born, went to Rome to study the civil law. One day some young persons his friends, who also studied the law, meeting him by chance, asked him to go with them to see the combats of the gladiators. He rejected this proposal with horror, having always had an exceeding aversion for so horrid a sight, as the shedding of human blood for diversion. His resistance only made them the more earnest; and using that kind of violence, which is sometimes committed between friends, they carried him with them whether he would or no. "What are you doing," said he? "You may drag my body thither, and place me amongst you at the amphitheatre: but can you dispose of my mind and eyes, and make them attentive to the shew? I shall be there, as if I were not there, and shall triumph both over it and you." They arrived at the am-

† Quod si interesse homicidio, sceleris conscientia est; & eodem facinore spectator obstrictus est, quo & admissor; ergo & his gladiatorum sceleribus non minus cuore perfunditur qui spectat, quam ille qui facit; nec potest esse immunis à sanguine, qui voluit effundi, aut videri non interfecisse, qui interfectori & favet, & præmium postulat. Quid scena? num sanctior? LACT. in Institut.

phitheatre, and found it in the height of the ardor and transport of these barbarous pleasures. Alipes at first shut his eyes, and prevented his soul from sharing in so horrible a phrenzy; and it had been happy for him, if he could have shut his ears also! They were struck with violence by a cry raised by the whole people on the occasion of a mortal wound given a gladiator. Overcome by curiosity, and believing himself superior to all things, he opened his eyes, and received that moment a greater wound in his soul, than the gladiator had just received in his body. * As soon as he saw the blood run, far from taking off his eyes, as he had flattered himself he should, he fixed them with exceeding eagerness upon it, and intoxicating himself, without knowing it, with that barbarous pleasure, he seemed to drink deep of cruelty, inhumanity, and phrenzy; so much was he transported out of himself. In a word, he left the place quite changed from what he was before, and with such a passion for the shews, that he breathed nothing else; and from thenceforth, it was he that dragged his companions to them.

He could not, and did not deserve to quit that abyss, like many others that perish in it. But God, who thought fit to make him a great saint and bishop, and to teach youth by his example to diffide in themselves, and their own good resolutions, and to avoid dangerous assemblies, after having suffered him to see all his weakness, cured him entirely by a reflexion of St. Austin's upon the combats of the gladiators, which seems to have escaped that saint by chance in a rhetorical lecture, at which Alipes was present, but which was the effect of God's views of mercy in respect to him from all eternity.

* Ut vidit illum sanguinem, immanitatem simul ebibit; & non se avertit, sed fixit aspectum, & hauriebat furias & nesciebat, & delectabatur scelere certaminis, & cruenta voluptate inebriabatur.

T H E

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK THE TWELFTH.

THIS twelfth book contains the history of twenty-three years, from the end of the first Punic war, to the beginning of the second.

S E C T. I.

Joy for the peace with Carthage interrupted by the overflowing of the Tiber, and a great fire. Census. Two new Tribes. Livius Andronicus. Games called Floralia. Wars with the Ligurians and Gauls. Revolt of the Mercenaries against the Carthaginians. Sardinia taken from the Carthaginians by the Romans. Ambassadors sent to the King of Egypt. Arrival of Hiero at Rome. Secular games. Expeditions against the Boii and Corsicans. Death of one of the Censors. Rome confirms the peace granted to the Carthaginians. Sardinia subjected. Reflexions upon the continual wars of the Romans. Vestal condemned. Census. The poet Nævius. Differences between the Romans and Carthaginians. Troubles occasioned by a law proposed by Flaminius. Expeditions against Sardinia and Corsica. First triumph upon the Alban mountain. Census. Teuta succeeds her husband Agron King of the Illyrians. Complaints to the Senate concerning their piracies. Census. Teuta causes a Roman Ambassador to be killed. Expedition of the Romans into Illyrium. Treaty of peace between the Romans and Illyrians.

Q. LUTATIUS CERCO.

A. R. 511.
Ant. C.

A. MANLIUS.

241.

THE joy occasioned at Rome by the glorious Orof. iv. peace, which had lately terminated the war with 11. the Carthaginians, was interrupted by sad and unhappy events, which occasioned infinite damage there. The Tiber, swollen by the sudden overflowing of several other rivers that run into it, overflowed also on a sudden, and overspread great part of the city with so violent a rapidity, that it threw down many edifices. As this inundation was of long continuance, the waters, which remained a great while in the low parts of Rome, undermined by degrees the foundations of the houses, and occasioned many of them to fall down.

The overflowing of the Tiber was soon followed by a terrible fire, which began in the night, but how Liv. Epit. xix. was not known, and having soon made its way into Orof. iv. 11. several quarters of the city, destroyed a great number of the citizens and houses. This conflagration Plin. vii. 43. consumed almost all the structures round the Forum, and amongst the rest the temple of Vesta. Here the eternal fire, kept by the Vestal virgins, gave place to a transitory one. Those priestesses, having no thoughts but of escaping from the flames by flight, left to the goddess the care of preserving herself, and all that belonged to her. The Pontifex Maximus, L. Cæcilius Metellus, more courageous and religious than the vestals, threw himself into the midst of the flames, and brought off the Palladium (the certain pledge, in their sense, of the eternity of their empire) and the other sacred things. He lost his sight, and had half one of his arms burnt off on this occasion. The People, to reward so generous and laudable a zeal, granted him the singular, and till then unheard-of, privilege, of being carried to the Senate in a chariot.

A. R. 511. riot. * A great and exalted distinction, but merited
 Ant. C. 241. by a most memorable and sad event.

In the Census made this year by C. Aurelius Cotta, and M. Fabius Buteo, which was the thirty-ninth, the number of the citizens was two hundred and sixty thousand.

Two new tribes added to the old ones, the Velina and Quirina, completed the number of thirty-five, at which the tribes continued fixed from thenceforth.

This would be the proper place for making some observations upon what relates to the tribes of Rome; but I defer speaking of them, till I come to the end of the twelfth book, to avoid interrupting the chain of our history.

Liv. Epit. A kind of frantic emotion, which induced the
 xix. Falisci to take up arms against the Romans, obliged
 Zonar. the latter to make the two Consuls march against
 viii. them. The expedition continued only six days. It was terminated in two battles. The first was doubtful: in the second the Falisci lost two thousand men. So considerable a loss brought them to their reason, and they surrendered themselves to the Romans, who deprived them of their arms, horses, part of their effects, slaves, and half their territory. Their city, which by its natural situation, and the fortifications which art had added to it, had inspired them with a senseless confidence, was removed from the steep eminence on which it stood into the flat country. The Roman People, exasperated by their frequent revolts, intended to inflict a much severer vengeance upon them; but being informed that they had expressly declared in surrendering, that it was not to the power but to the faith of the Roman People they submitted, that single word instantly calmed their rage; that they might not seem to be wanting to the faith of their engagements and justice.

* Magnum & sublime, sed pro oculis datum—Memorabili causa, sed eventu misero. PLIN. vii. 43.

C. CLAUDIUS CENTHO.

A. R. 512.

M. SEMPRONIUS TUDITANUS.

Ant. C.

240.

This year was remarkable for new shews of the theatre, wherein the poet Livius Andronicus introduced tragedies in imitation of the Greeks; and by the institution or revival of the games, called Floralia, for obtaining the fruits of the earth in abundance from the Gods. These games were celebrated in process of time with excessive licentiousness.

Liv. And.

Freinsh.

xx.

A Latin colony was now settled at Spoletum, a city of Umbria.

C. MAMILIUS TURINUS.

A. R. 513.

Q. VALERIUS FALTO.

Ant. C.

239.

This year is famous for the birth of the poet Ennius. I have related elsewhere what is known of his life and writings.

Ant. Hist.

TI. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.

A. R. 514.

P. VALERIUS FALTO.

Ant. C.

238.

Rome had two wars to sustain under these Consuls; the one against the Gauls, who were incessantly committing hostilities, and the other against the * Ligurians, new enemies to her. Valerius lost a first battle against the Gauls, and gained a second, wherein he killed forty thousand of the enemy, and took two thousand prisoners. Gracchus gained a considerable victory over the Ligurians, and ravaged a great part of their country. From Liguria he went to Sardinia and Corsica, from whence he brought off a great number of prisoners.

From the treaty of peace between Rome and Carthage, which put an end to the first Punic war, the Carthaginians had a terrible war upon their hands in Africa against the mercenaries, whose revolt brought

Polyb. i.

65—79.

* Their country extended as far as the river Arnus, on the south of the Apennines.

A. R. 514. Carthage to the very brink of destruction. I have re-
 Ant. C. 238. lated the events of that war in the history of the Car-
 Polyb. i. thaginians.

84. In the extreme danger the latter were in, they were obliged to have recourse to their allies. Hiero, who was very attentive to the events of that war, had granted the Carthaginians all they asked of him; and redoubled his pains, when he saw the rapid progress made by the strangers; rightly perceiving it was not for his interest, that the Carthaginians should be utterly crushed, lest the power of the Romans, having no balance, should become too formidable to himself: In which, says Polybius, his wisdom and prudence may be discerned. For it is a maxim not to be neglected; that a power is not to be suffered to augment to such a degree, as to make its neighbours incapable of disputing even their just rights with it.

The Romans, on their side, during this war of the Carthaginians against the strangers, had always acted with great justice and moderation in regard to the former. A slight quarrel in respect to some Roman merchants, who had been seized at Carthage for carrying provisions to the enemy, had embroiled them. But the Carthaginians, having discharged those citizens on the first demand, the Romans, who piqued themselves upon their justice and generosity in all things, had restored them their amity, served them in all things that depended on them, and prohibited their merchants to carry provisions to the enemies of the Carthaginians.

The mercenaries in Sardinia, after the example of those in Africa, threw off the yoke of obedience. They began by murdering Bostar, who commanded them, and all the Carthaginians he had with him. Another General was sent in his room. All the troops he brought with him went over to the revolters, crucified him, and destroyed all the Carthaginians in the island, by inflicting the most cruel torments upon them. Having attacked all the places one after another,

ther, they soon made themselves masters of the whole country. A. R. 514.
Ant. C.
238.

The inhabitants of the island, and the mercenaries, soon quarrelled, and came to blows. The latter having ineffectually implored the aid of the Romans, who would not at that time engage in a war manifestly unjust, were entirely driven out of the island, and took refuge in Italy. In this manner the Carthaginians lost Sardinia. Hitherto the Romans had acted in an irreproachable manner in respect to them. They had absolutely refused to give ear to the proposals made by the Sardinian revolvers, who called them in to take possession of the island. They even carried their delicacy so far, as to refuse the people of Utica for subjects, though they came of themselves to submit to their power. A people, capable of such great generosity, would be highly laudable, had they persevered in it.

The Romans, afterwards, were not so delicate; and it would be hard to apply here the favourable testimony, which Cæsar gives of their faith to their engagements in Sallust *. “ Though in all the wars of Africa, says he, the Carthaginians committed a-bundance of breaches of faith even in times of peace and truce, the Romans never acted in the same manner with respect to them; more intent upon what was worthy of them, than upon what justice would admit them to do against their enemies.”

The mercenaries who had retired, as we have said, into Italy, at length determined the Romans to make themselves masters of Sardinia. The Carthaginians received advice of this with extreme sorrow, pretending, and not without reason, that they had a much juster right to Sardinia than the Romans. They therefore raised troops to avenge themselves on those who had made the island take up arms against Polyb. i.
88, 89.

* *Bellis Punicis omnibus, cum sæpe Carthaginenses, & in pace & per indusias, multa nefanda facinora fecissent, nunquam ipsi per occasionem talia feceret magis, quod se dignum foret, quam quod in illos jure fieri posset, quærebant. SALLUST. in bello Catilin.*

A. R. 514.
Ant. C.
238.

them. But the Romans, under pretext that those preparations were made against them, and not against the people of Sardinia, declared war against Carthage. The Carthaginians, exhausted in all respects, and scarce beginning to respire, were not in a condition to sustain it. It was therefore necessary to comply with the times, and submit to the strongest. They made a new treaty, by which they abandoned Sardinia to the Romans, and engaged to pay a new sum of twelve hundred talents (about an hundred and fifty-five thousand pounds) to redeem themselves from the intended war.

It is difficult, not to say impossible, to justify or excuse the conduct of the Romans upon this occasion. They had at first, as we have said, refused the offer of the mercenaries of Sardinia, because it would have been too great a blot in their reputation to have received the island from the hands of those usurpers, as well as the most gross and infamous infraction of treaty. They staid, till time should afford them an occasion of war, which they could support with some colour of reason, and they believed they had found it in the preparations made by the Carthaginians against Sardinia; pretending, that they were arming against them. But what probability was there, that a people entirely exhausted, as those of Carthage then were, should think of breaking the treaty of peace, and wantonly attacking the Romans, more powerful than ever they had been? Where is that faith, that integrity, that justice, that magnanimity, which sometimes do the Romans so much honour? Polybius, their great admirer, makes no reflexion upon this conquest of Sardinia, and concludes his account of it with only saying, "That this affair had no consequence." It had none immediately, because the Romans were the strongest: but was one of the principal causes, of the second Punic war, as we shall soon see.

Liv. xx. 1.

L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS CAUDINUS.

A. R. 515.
Ant. C.

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS.

237.

Under these Consuls there were some wars not considerable against the Gauls settled on this side of the Po, and the Ligurians.

About the same time Ambassadors were sent to Ptolomy King of Egypt (this was Ptolomy Euergetes, ^{Eutrop. l. iii.} the son of Ptolomy Philadelphus) to offer him aid against Antiochus King of Syria, surnamed Θεός, God, with whom they believed him still at war: but he had made an accommodation, which dispensed with his accepting the aid that was offered him.

Rome was exceedingly rejoiced to see Hiero King ^{Ibid.} of Syracuse arrive there, a Prince attached to the Commonwealth by the ties of a sincere amity, and an inviolable fidelity. Eutropius says, that he came to Rome to see the Secular games, which, according to some authors, were really to be celebrated the year following for the third time, and for which they were then making preparations. In order to make plenty reign at Rome, where there was to be a great concourse of people of many countries, that generous Prince made the Roman People a present of two hundred thousand bushels of corn. I shall explain the ceremonies observed in these games at the end of this section.

P. CORNELIUS LENTULUS CAUDINUS.

A. R. 516.

C. LICINIUS VARUS.

Ant. C.
236.

M. Æmilius and M. Livius Salinator were nominated to preside in, and have the care of, the Secular games.

The war with the Boii, with which Lentulus was charged, was terminated without costing the Romans any blood, by a bloody division which arose suddenly between the Boii, and the auxiliary troops they had called in from the other side of the Alps.

A.R. 516.
Ant. C.
236.

Licinius had sent M. Claudius Glicias before him into Corsica with part of his troops. The latter, forgetting who he was, had the senseless and criminal vanity to desire that the glory of terminating this war might be ascribed to him, and concluded a treaty with the Corsicans upon his personal authority. When Licinius arrived with the rest of his army, he paid no regard to a treaty made without authority. He attacked the Corsicans with vigour, and subjected them. Claudius, the author and guarantee of the peace, was delivered up to them; and as they refused to receive him, he was put to death in prison.

The Census was not completed this year, because one of the Censors died in his office.

Zonar.
viii.
Oros. iv.
12.
Diod. in
Excerpt.
zi.

Corsica and Sardinia, at the secret instigations of the Carthaginians, who gave them hopes of a powerful aid, prepared to take up arms again. As those two islands were very weak of themselves, their revolt did not much alarm Rome: but she was not without apprehension of seeing a new war break out with the Carthaginians. To frustrate the effect of it by being beforehand with them, it was resolved to levy troops without loss of time. On the first rumour of this the Carthaginians, amongst whom the news had occasioned an universal alarm, having sent deputies after deputies to Rome, at last dispatched ten of the principal persons of the city, with orders to employ the most earnest and most humble entreaties, to obtain, that they might be suffered to enjoy the peace, which the Roman People had granted them. As they were not heard more favourably than the first deputies, Hanno, the youngest of the Ambassadors, intrepid and full of a noble pride, took upon him to speak, and said in a lively and bold accent: "Romans, if you are determined to refuse us the peace we have bought of you, not for one or two years, but for ever, restore Sicily and Sardinia to us, which were the price we paid for it. Amongst private persons, when any thing is bought, it is not acting with honour and honesty to keep the goods and not restore the money."

“money.” The comparison was just and unanswerable : and the Romans accordingly, lest so flagrant an injustice should entirely disgrace them with the neighbouring nations, gave the Ambassadors a favourable answer, and sent them back satisfied.

A. R. 516.
Ant. C.
236.

C. ATILIUS BULBUS II.

M. MANLIUS TORQUATUS.

A. R. 517.
Ant. C.
235.

Manlius, to whom Sardinia had fallen by lot, having defeated the enemy on several occasions, subjected the whole island to the Romans ; which acquired him the honour of a triumph.

Rome at that time had neither enemies nor war, which had not happened for almost four hundred and forty years, and the temple of Janus was shut for the second time ; a ceremony which implied a general peace. It had been shut for the first time in the reign of Numa ; and will not be so for the third till that of Augustus.

It is not easy to conceive how Rome, that at first was neither very rich nor very powerful, could sustain continual wars during so many years, without having ever had time to take breath ; how she could support the expences, which were a necessary consequence of them ; and how the Roman citizens came not to be tired of wars, which drew them away from their families, and made them incapable of cultivating their lands, in the product of which their whole riches consisted.

We must remember, that the Romans, properly speaking, were a nation of soldiers, born to use the expression, in the midst of arms, enemies to repose and inaction, and breathing nothing but wars and battles. In the early times of the Commonwealth, till the siege of Veii, the wars were very short, and often of not above ten or twenty days duration. They instantly took the field, gave battle, and the conquered enemy, to preserve their territory from farther ravages, made their accommodation, and the Romans returned home.

A.R. 517.
Ant. C.
235.

home. From the establishment of pay for the soldiers, and the augmentation of the Roman dominions, the campaigns were longer, but they usually did not exceed six months, because it was the interest of the Consuls, who commanded the armies, to terminate the war speedily, in order to have the honour of triumphs.

As to what regards the expences necessary for paying and subsisting the troops, it is observable, that the wars which ruin and exhaust other States, enriched the Romans, as well in respect to the public, as individuals. Those who quitted Rome very poor, often returned very rich in the spoils they had taken during the campaign, either in the towns carried by assault, or in the camps of the enemies, which they had forced; of which the Consuls, in order to conciliate the favour of the troops, often granted them the plunder; and the hopes of this recompence was a very strong bait, a powerful attraction, which made them sustain the rudest fatigues, not only with patience but with joy.

The war was not less useful, nor less lucrative to the State, than to particulars. When the conquered enemies demanded peace, it was an usual preliminary to require of them, that they should begin by reimbursing all the expences of the war; and the Roman People, by the conditions of the treaty, usually obliged them to pay sums more or less considerable, in order to weaken and keep them within the bounds of subjection by this kind of pecuniary punishment, that often completed their ruin, and made them incapable of soon taking up arms again. The Generals on their side, who had no thoughts of enriching themselves but the State, by the spoils which they took from the enemy, piqued themselves, on entering Rome in triumph, upon exposing the gold and silver, which they brought back from their expeditions, to the eyes of the people, and caused to be carried into the public treasury. These reasons, and many others, which for the sake of brevity I omit, shew, that it is no wonder the Romans were almost always under arms, without being disgusted

disgusted by so rude and laborious a condition. Besides which, all these wars, in the design of Providence, which destined the Roman People to be the future sovereigns of the whole world, were a kind of apprenticeship to them, during which they were preparing themselves, without knowing it, and by a kind of instinct, for the great conquests, which were to subject all the kingdoms and empires of the world to them.

The general peace, which, as we said before, the Romans enjoyed, was not of long duration. It was interrupted some few months after, out of Italy by Corsica and Sardinia, and in Italy by the Ligurians.

L. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS.

SP. CARVILIUS MAXIMUS.

A. R. 518.

Ant. C.

234.

These three wars were terminated in a short time, and without abundance of difficulty, by the two Consuls and the Prætor Postumius.

The vestal Tuccia, convicted of having abandoned herself to a slave, killed herself to avoid the usual punishment, to which she had been condemned.

The Censors this year made all the citizens of age to marry, swear, that they would take wives in order to supply the Commonwealth with subjects. This singular and unusual conduct gives room to conjecture, that the number of the Roman citizens had been found by the Census to be considerably diminished.

The poet Cn. Nævius of Campania, who had served in the first Punic war, gave his first dramatic pieces to the public this year.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS VERRUCOSVS.

M. POMPONIUS MATHO.

A. R. 519.

Ant. C.

233.

The Fabius elected Consul for the first time this year, is the famous Fabius Maximus, of whom we shall soon speak in the war with Hannibal, and who will do the Commonwealth such great services. He was called Verrucosus from a little wart upon his lip.

Suet. in
Fab. p. 174.

A. R. 519.
Ant. C.
233.

He was called also *Ovicula* in his infancy, that is to say, Little Sheep, upon account of his tenderness and sweetness of temper, and seeming stupidity. For his composed and calm turn of mind, his silence, the little passion which he had for the pleasures of his years, the slowness and difficulty with which he learnt what was taught him, his sweetness of disposition and complacency for his companions, passed in the sense of those, who did not examine nearly into him, for so many marks of dullness and heaviness of genius. Only a very small number of the more discerning saw, thro' that serious and grave air, a profundity of good sense and judgment, and through that character of slowness and inactivity, incomparable magnanimity and the courage of a lion. Actuated afterwards, and, to use the expression, roused by the state of things, he fully convinced all the world, that what they had taken for slowness and inertia in him, was gravity; what they called timidity, was wise reserve and prudence; and what passed for want of activity and boldness, was only constancy and resolution.

Sardinia and Liguria revolted again. Liguria fell by lot to Fabius, and Sardinia to Pomponius. As the Carthaginians were suspected to excite these defections underhand, Rome sent Ambassadors to them, under pretext of demanding the sums, which they had engaged to pay at different times. They also forbade them, in very rough terms, to intermeddle in the affairs of the islands belonging to the Roman People; with menaces to declare war against them if they disobeyed. The Carthaginians were recovered from their alarms, and had began to resume courage, since Amilcar their General had not only quelled the several people of Africa, who had revolted, but had also augmented considerably the dominions of Carthage by the victories which he had gained in Spain. They answered the Ambassadors therefore with haughtiness; and as the latter, according to their instructions, presented them with a dart and a caduceus, the symbols of war and peace, adding, that they had to chuse
either

either the one or the other; they replied, that they would not make that choice; but would accept whichsoever of the two the Romans should think fit to leave them. * Zonaras relates this fact thus, who is a writer of no great authority. The thing in itself is little probable. The Romans were too haughty to go back after such advances. And the resemblance between what Zonaras tells us here, and the declaration of war, which followed the taking of Saguntum, cannot but render his account suspected. They parted then without determining any thing, and with a mutual hatred on both sides in their hearts, that waited only for an occasion to shew itself. The inhabitants of Sardinia, and the Ligurians, were easily defeated by the Consuls, who acquired the honour of triumphs by their several expeditions. They were overcome, but not finally subdued, and took up arms again the next year, but with no great success.

A. R. 519.
Ant. C.
233.

M. ÆMILIUS LEPIDUS.

A. R. 520.
Ant. C.
232.

M. PUBLICIUS MALLEOLUS.

The domestic feuds between the Senate and People, which had been suspended by the war against the Carthaginians, were revived this year, on the occasion of a law proposed by C. Flaminius, Tribune of the People, for the distribution of certain lands in the territories of the Picentini and Gauls, which had belonged to the Senones. The Senate strongly opposed this law, as they foresaw, that its consequences might be very pernicious to the Commonwealth, in exasperating the Gauls, and supplying them with a pretext for taking up arms against the Romans; which the remembrance of what they had suffered from them, made the Fathers extremely apprehend. They tried entreaties and threats on this account, but always to no purpose. They went so far as to order the magistrates to keep troops in readiness to oppose the violence of

Polyb. ii.
109.
Val. Max.
v. 4.

* Zonaras lived in the XIIth century, about the year 1120.

A. R. 520.
Ant. C.
232.

the Tribune. But the tenacious haughtiness of Flaminius would neither be prevailed upon by prayers, nor shaken by menaces. He paid no greater regard to the wise remonstrances of his father, who expostulated with him at first, how wrong it was to set himself up as he did, for the head of a cabal; and then he talked to him in stronger terms, as a father has a right to speak to his son. The Tribune persisted firmly in his resolution; and having assembled the People, had already begun to read his law, when his father, transported with just indignation, advanced towards the tribunal of harangues, and seizing him hold by the hand, made him come down, and go away with him. I do not know whether there be a fact in history, that better shews how great, and how much respected, paternal authority was at Rome. This Tribune, who had despised the indignation and menaces of the whole Senate, in the very heat of contention, and before the eyes of the People, so zealous for the law he proposed, suffers himself to be taken away from the Tribunal like a child by the hand of an old man: and, which is no less admirable, the assembly, which saw its hopes entirely frustrated by the removal of the Tribune, continued quiet, without shewing by the least murmur or complaint, that they condemned an action so bold, and in appearance so contrary to its interests. But the promulgation of this law was only deferred, and another Tribune having joined Flaminius, it was passed soon after. According to Polybius it became very pernicious to the Roman People, and occasioned the war made against them by the Gauls about eight years after.

A. R. 521.
Ant. C.
231.

M. POMPONIUS MATHO.

C. PAPIRIUS MASO.

These two Consuls set out, the one against Sardinia, and the other against Corsica: expeditions, which gave the Roman troops more trouble than they did them

them honour at first. But at length they were reduced into provinces of the Roman People. A. R. 521.
Ant. C.

A divorce was seen this year at Rome for the first time. Sp. Carvilius Ruga repudiated his wife, whom he however loved exceedingly, solely upon account of her barrenness; to which he was determined by the regard he had for the oath he had taken, as well as the rest of the citizens, to marry in order to have children, and to propagate subjects for the Commonwealth. Though he acted thus through a kind of necessity, and with the advice of his friends, his conduct was universally condemned, and rendered him extremely odious. 231.
Dion. Hal.
ii. 96.
Val. Max.
ii. 1.

Another novelty appeared this year. The Consul Papirius pretended to have deserved, and in consequence, demanded a triumph for having reduced Corsica: the Senate, however, refused him that honour. He assumed it himself, and triumphed on the Alban mountain: an example which was afterwards followed, and became sufficiently common. Ibid. iii. 6.

M. ÆMILIUS BARBULA.

M. JUNIUS PERA.

A. R. 522.
Ant. C.
230.

The forty-first Census was taken this year.

The Consuls were charged with the war against the Ligurians, which had no consequence at that time.

Another war in a country, into which the Romans had not penetrated hitherto, employed their attention. This was Illyricum, the same as is now called the coasts of Dalmatia. This region was divided amongst several States. The Ardyæi, one of these nations, had some time before a King, whose name was Agron, who had made himself more powerful than any of his predecessors. This King, who was lately dead, left an infant son, called Pineus, under the tuition of his second wife Teuta, that was not the young Prince's mother, and nevertheless administered the government in quality of guardian and regent during his minority. Polyb. ii.
98.
Zonar.
viii.

Under this administration the Illyrians exercised with entire liberty, and even by public authority, the

A. R. 522. occupation of Corsairs throughout the Adriatic sea,
 Ant. C. 230. and on the coasts of Greece; and amongst other piracies took several merchants of Italy, who set out from the port of Brundisium, and even killed some of them. The senate at first laid no great stress upon the complaints brought against these pirates. But as their insolence encreased every day, and with it the complaints of the injured, it was thought proper to send Ambassadors to demand satisfaction for several grievances that were specified, and in particular to declare, that the Romans had taken the little island of Issa * into their protection. The Illyrians insulted it in every manner, because it had renounced their alliance, and actually besieged it in form.

At this juncture the Roman Ambassadors, Caius and Lucius Coruncanius, arrived. At their audience, they complained of the injuries their merchants had sustained from the Illyrian Corsairs. The Queen suffered them to speak without interruption, assuming airs of pride and haughtiness. When they had done, she made answer, that for her part she would not give the Romans any cause of complaint, nor send any pirates against them; but that it was not the custom of the Kings of Illyricum to prohibit their subjects from cruizing at sea for their private advantage. On those words, the youngest of the Ambassadors was seized with indignation, and with a liberty Roman indeed, but not proper at that time, “ Amongst us, “ Madam, said he, one of our noblest customs, is to “ avenge in common the injuries done to particulars; “ and, with the favour of the Gods, we shall act in “ such a manner as shall soon induce you to reform “ the custom of the Illyrian Kings.” The Queen, like an haughty violent woman, was so sensibly stung with that answer, that without regard to the law of nations, she ordered the Ambassadors to be followed and killed with part of their train: the rest were imprisoned; and she carried her cruelty so far, as to burn

* This island is situated in the Adriatic gulf.

the pilots of the ships that had brought them from Italy. It is easy to conceive, how much the Romans were incensed, when they received advice of so barbarous a fact. The first thing they did, was to do honour to the memory of the Ambassadors, by erecting them statues in the Forum. At the same time they made preparations for war, levied troops, fitted out a fleet, and declared war against the Illyrians in all the forms.

The Queen began then to be in great alarm. She was a woman of amazing levity and inconstancy of mind, and had nothing fixed and certain in her nature, and from the proudest and rashest audacity, fell immediately into the meanest discouragement, and most abject fear. Accordingly, when she saw herself upon the point of having so formidable a power upon her hands, she sent deputies to the Romans, with offers to restore all those who had been made prisoners, and were still living; and farther to declare, that the pirates had killed some Romans without her orders. It is probable that she raised the siege of Issa. Though the satisfaction was but slight, and did not answer the enormity of the crime committed by the Illyrians, as it gave room to hope that the affair might be terminated without taking arms, or shedding blood, Rome accepted it for the present, suspended the departure of the troops, and only demanded, that the authors of the murder should be delivered up. This delay made the Queen resume her former character. She flatly refused to deliver up any person whatsoever to the Romans; and to act conformably to that refusal, she made her troops set out to besiege Issa again.

L. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS II.

CN. FULVIUS CENTIMALUS.

A. R. 523.
Ant. C.
229.

In the beginning of the spring, Teuta having caused a great number of ships to be built, had sent them to ruin the country of Greece. Part of them sailed

A. R. 523, to * Corcyra, (now Cursoli) and the rest anchored at
 Ant. C. † Epidamnum. The latter, who intended to sur-
 229. prize that city, having failed in that design, rejoined
 the former, and repaired to Corcyra, which called in
 the Achæans and Etolians to its aid. After a rude
 battle at sea, in which the people of Illyricum, sup-
 ported by the Acarnanians, had the advantage, Corcyra
 being no longer in a condition to sustain the attack of
 the enemy, capitulated, and received a garrison, com-
 manded by Demetrius of ‡ Pharos. The Illyrians
 then returned to Epidamnum, which they besieged
 again.

The Romans, as may easily be judged, did not
 continue quiet. The Consul took the field. Ful-
 vius had the command of the fleet, which consisted
 of two hundred ships, and Postumius his colleague that
 of the land-army. Fulvius sailed first to Corcyra, be-
 lieving he should arrive in time to its aid. But tho'
 the city was surrendered, he did not abandon his first
 design, as well for the sake of knowing exactly what
 had passed there, as because he held intelligence with
 Demetrius. For the latter having been disserved with
 Teuta, and fearing her resentment, had given the
 Romans to understand, that he would deliver up
 Corcyra, and all under his command, to them. The
 Romans landed in the island, and the Corcyreans de-
 livered up the Illyrian garrison; and the whole island
 submitted; conceiving that the only method to secure
 themselves for ever from the insults of the Illyrians.

The Romans having fitted out a powerful fleet, and
 at the same time sent a land-army into Teuta's do-
 minions, on the one side cleared all the posts occupied by
 the Illyrians in the Adriatic sea; and on the other, re-
 duced Teuta to seek her safety in the midst of her
 country, by removing from the coast. They gave

* This island lies opposite to Dalmatia. It was called Corcyra
 Nigra, to distinguish it from another, situated over-against Epirus, now
 called Corfu.

† It is otherwise called Dyrrachium, now Durazzo. It borders up-
 on New Epirus.

‡ An island in the Adriatic sea.

several places in Illyricum to Demetrius, to reward the services he had done them. When the campaign was over, Postumius, one of the two Consuls, took up his winter quarters near Epidamnus, in order to awe the Ardyæi, and the countries newly subjected.

A. R. 523.
Ant. C.
229.

Early in the spring, Teuta, seeing herself without resource, sent Ambassadors to Rome to demand peace. She laid the blame of all that had passed upon her husband Agron, whose plan and enterprizes she had been obliged to follow, and continue. The peace was concluded, not in her name, but that of Pineus, Agron's son, to whom the kingdom belonged. It was agreed, "that Corcyra, Pharos, Issa, Epidamnus, and the country of the Atintanes, should continue in the possession of the Romans; that Pineus should retain the rest of his father's dominions; that he should pay a tribute to the Romans; and what was the most important article of all to the Greeks, that he should not navigate beyond the city of Lissus with more than two ships, and those not armed for war." Teuta, either voluntarily, or by order of the Romans, quitted the administration of the government, which was transferred to Demetrius, with the title of guardian of the young king.

Dio.
Zonar.

Thus ended the war of Illyricum. Postumius sent Ambassadors the following year to the Ætolians and Achæans, in order to explain to them the reasons which had induced the Romans to undertake this war, and to enter Illyricum. They related what had passed there; they read the treaty of peace concluded with the Illyrians, and afterwards returned to Corcyra, very well satisfied with the good reception which they had met with from both those people. And indeed this treaty was very advantageous to the Greeks, and delivered them from great matter of fear. For the Illyrians did not declare only against some part, but all Greece; and infested the whole neighbouring country with their piracies.

This was the first time the Roman arms attacked Illyricum, and the first alliance made by embassy between

tween

A. R. 523.
Ant. C.
229.

tween the Greeks and Romans. The latter sent Ambassadors at the same time to Corinth and Athens, who were very well received, and treated with great honours by both cities. The Corinthians declared by a public decree, that the Romans should be admitted to be present at the celebration of the Isthmian games, as well as the Greeks. The Athenians also ordained, that the Romans should be granted the freedom of Athens, and might be initiated into the great mysteries.

Of the SECULAR GAMES.

THE Secular games were so called, because they were celebrated from age to age: but authors do not agree concerning the time included in an age. Till the time of Augustus, the exact space of an hundred years were understood by that word. The priests called Sibyllini, to make their court to that Prince, who passionately desired, that the secular games should be celebrated in his time, declared, that the oracle of the Sibyl, which ordained the celebration of them, intended by the time of an Age the space of an hundred and ten years; and in virtue of this interpretation, the secular games were celebrated then for the fifth time, that is to say, the 737th year of Rome: and this opinion Horace has followed in his *Carmen Seculare*, of which we shall soon speak.

The Emperor Claudius returned to the opinion of an hundred years; and celebrated the secular games sixty-four years after those of Augustus. Domitian afterwards resumed the system of an hundred and ten years. Historians have observed, that people laughed at the herald's proclamation, when he invited the people to games, which none had seen, nor ever should see again.

The term Age is not the only difficulty upon this head. The origin, occasion and epocha of the institution of these games, are not less uncertain, and form

Tacit.
Annal. xi.
11.
Suet. in
Claud.
n. 21.

form a matter of dispute amongst the learned, into which the plan I have proposed to myself, does not admit me to enter. Very able critics believe, that these games were instituted by Valerius Publicola, after the expulsion of the Kings, and celebrated for the first time the 245th year of Rome, which is the first of the re-establishment of liberty. It appears, they were not solemnized exactly at the end of each century; there being many reasons which might oblige the deferring, and even interrupt the celebration, of them.

The principal ceremonies in them were as follow. Some time before these games were celebrated, the magistrates sent heralds to all the States of Italy in the Roman dependance, to invite them to be present at a festival, that they never had, nor ever should see again.

Some few days before the festival, the priests who had the keeping of the books of the Sibyl, who were augmented by Sylla to the number of fifteen, from which they retained the name of Quindecemviri, those priests sitting on seats in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, distributed certain things to the whole people, called Lustralia, that is to say, things proper for purifying them, as torches, pitch, and sulphur. Every one brought wheat, barley and beans thither, to be sacrificed to the Parcae or Destinies. In this temple, and that of Diana upon mount Aventine, they passed whole nights in offering sacrifices to Pluto, Proserpine, and other divinities.

When the time of the festival arrived, it began by a solemn procession of the priests of all the colleges, the magistrates, all orders of the Commonwealth, and the People dressed in white robes, crowned with flowers, and carrying branches of palm in their hands. They went in this manner from the Capitol to the field of Mars. The statues of the Gods were placed upon cushions, and a great banquet was served up to them, according to the custom usually observed in the public ceremonies of religion.

They

They sacrificed in the night to Pluto, Proserpine, the Destinies, * Illithya, and the earth; and in the day to Jupiter, Juno, Apollo, Latona, Diana, and the Genii. Only black victims were sacrificed to the first.

The first night of the festival, the Consuls, followed by the Sibylline priests, repaired to a place called Terentus, upon the banks of the Tiber, where the secular games had their birth. They caused three altars to be erected there, which they sprinkled with the blood of three lambs, and upon which they caused offerings and victims to be burnt. During the night, all parts of Rome shone with innumerable fires and illuminations.

The second day of the festival, the women of all ranks went to the Capitol, and to the other temples, to offer their vows and prayers to different divinities.

The third day, when the festival ended, twenty-seven boys, and as many girls, of illustrious birth, whose fathers and mothers were still alive, were divided into different choirs, and in the temple of Apollo Palatinus sung hymns and canticles in Greek and Latin, expressly composed for this ceremony, wherein they implored for Rome the aid and protection of the Gods whom they had lately adored with sacrifices.

During the three days which this festival continued, shews of all kinds were exhibited to the people.

It is said, that there was an antient oracle in the Sibyl's books, which informed the Romans, that as long as they should celebrate games at the beginning of every age in honour of certain Gods therein named, Rome should continue to flourish, and that all nations should be subjected to her.

We have a model of the hymns, that were sung as part of the ceremonies we have related, in the Secular Poem of Horace composed by the order of Augustus the 736th year of Rome; a poem justly considered as

* The goddess who presided at the birth of children, called otherwise Lucina.

one of that poet's finest pieces. I shall repeat only two strophes or stanzas of it; from which the merit of the rest may be judged.

*Alme Sol, curru nitido diem qui
Promis & celas, aliusque & idem,
Nasceris : possis nihil urbe Roma
Visere majus.*

May Sol, whose late and early rays
Are ever bright and ever new,
In all the climates he surveys,
No greater state nor empire view.

CREECH. Hor.

How elegant, and at the same time how sublime is the style of these verses?

*Dii probos mores docili Juventæ
Dii Senectuti placidæ quietem :
Romulæ genti date remque, prolemque,
Et decus omne.*

Ye Gods, with virtue bless the young,
Secure the old from toil and care ;
Exalt our state, our race prolong,
And make us rich, and great in war. Ib.

Can more, or more important vows be included in four verses? I am charmed in a particular manner with those which regard youth: docility and probity of manners.

S E C T. II.

The power of Carthage, which augmented every day, alarms the Romans. Building of New Carthage. Treaty of the Romans with Asdrubal. Creation of two new Prætors. Alarm on rumours of a war with the Gauls. Cause and occasion of this war. Irruption of the Gauls into Italy. Preparations of the Romans. First battle near Clusium, in which the Romans are defeated. Battle and famous victory of the Romans near Telamon. Reflection upon this victory. Census. The Boii surrender at discretion. Battle of Adda between the Gauls and Romans. Discontent of the Romans in respect to Flaminius. Character of Marcellus. New war with the Gauls. The spoils, called Spolia opima, gained by Marcellus. Triumph of Marcellus. The Romans subject Istria. Hannibal charged with the command in Spain. Demetrius of Pharos draws the arms of the Romans upon himself. Census. Various undertakings of the Censors. War of Illyricum. Æmilius gains a victory over Demetrius. Illyricum is subjected by the Romans. Archagathus the physician. New colonies.

A. R. 523.
Ant. C.
229.

L. POSTUMIUS ALBINUS II.
CN. FULVIUS CENTIMALUS.

Polyb. ii.
101.
App. Her.
258.

THE Romans had terminated the war with Illyricum happily: but they had besides great matter of alarm and disquiet. On the one side they had been informed by true reports, that the Gauls were preparing to take arms against them: on the other, the Carthaginian power which augmented every day in Spain, gave them just apprehensions. They therefore thought seriously of keeping things quiet on that side, before they attacked the Gauls.

Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, Hannibal's father, of whom much has been said in the war of Sicily, after having commanded the armies nine years in Spain, and subjected several powerful and warlike nations to Car-

Carthage, had been unfortunately killed in a battle. A. R. 523.
 Asdrubal, his son-in-law and successor, who had inhe- Ant. C.
 rited part of his hatred for the Romans, treading in 229.
 his steps, had added new conquests to those of his
 predecessors; employing however rather address and
 persuasion than arms. Amongst the services which
 he rendered the State, one of the most important,
 and which contributed most to extend and strengthen
 the power of his Commonwealth in Spain, was the
 building of a city, which was called New Carthage,
 and since Carthagera. Its situation was the most
 happy the Carthaginians could desire for keeping
 Spain in awe.

The great conquests which Asdrubal had already
 made, and the high degree of power to which he had
 attained, made the Romans resolve to apply themselves
 attentively to what passed in Spain. They were an-
 gry with themselves for having been so long asleep in
 respect to the augmentation of the dominions of Car-
 thage, and thought in earnest of retrieving that fault;
 especially since the people of Saguntum, who saw
 themselves upon the point of being subjected to the
 yoke of the Carthaginians, had sent deputies to the
 Romans to implore their aid, and to conclude an alli-
 ance with them.

SP. CARVILIUS MAXIMUS II.

A. R. 524.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS VERRUCOSVS II.

Ant. C.

228.

Such was the disposition of the Romans in respect
 to the Carthaginians. They had no laws at that
 time to prescribe to the Carthaginians, and dared not
 take arms against them. They had enough to do
 to keep themselves upon their guard against the
 Gauls, who menaced them, and whom they expected
 almost every day. It seemed most expedient to take
 advantage of Asdrubal's pacific disposition in order to
 make a new treaty, till they should have disengaged
 themselves from the Gauls, an enemy, who only
 watched an occasion for hurting them, and whom it
 was

A. R. 524.
Ant. C. 228. was absolutely necessary to distrust, not only for making themselves masters of Italy, but for keeping quiet possession of their own immediate country. They therefore sent Ambassadors to Asdrubal, and in the treaty they made with him, without mentioning the rest of Spain, they only required, that he should not carry the war beyond the Iberus, which should serve as the barrier to the two nations. It was also agreed that Saguntum, though situated on the other side of the Iberus, should retain its laws and liberties.

A. R. 525.
Ant. C. 227.

P. VALERIUS FLACCUS.

M. ATILIUS REGULUS.

Liv. Epit. xx. To the two Prætors who had been instituted at Rome, two more were added this year, the one for Sicily, and the other for Sardinia and Corsica.

A. R. 526.
Ant. C. 226.

M. VALERIUS MESSALA.

L. APUSTIUS FULLO.

Plut. in
Marcel.
p. 299.

The rumour of the preparations of war making by the Gauls, occasioned great alarm at Rome. These were the enemies whom the Romans always dreaded most, remembering that in former days they had made themselves masters of Rome, and that from that time a law had been made, which divesting the priesthood of the privilege of being exempt from serving in war, obliged them to take arms like the rest of the citizens, when the question was to march against the Gauls. The war with them was called *Tumultus Gallicus*,* which expressed much more than the word *bellum* alone. For many citizens were exempt from serving in other wars; but in that against the Gauls all privileges and exemptions ceased.

Ibid.
Zonar.
viii. 19.

What augmented the consternation, at the time of which we are speaking, was an oracle pretended to be found in the books of the Sibyl, which said,

* Gravius autem tumultum esse, quàm bellum, hinc intelligi licet, quòd bello vacationes valent, tumultu non valent. CIC. PHILIP. viii. 3.

“ that the Greeks and Gauls should take possession of
 “ Rome :” *Romam occupaturos*. To avert the effect of
 so fatal a prediction, the Pontiffs suggested a strange
 method, which was to bury two Greeks and two Gauls,
 men and women, alive; pretending that the oracle would
 thereby be fulfilled. What absurdity, and at the
 same time barbarity, was this in a people, who valued
 themselves in every thing else, upon their humanity
 and good-nature! The same equally impious and
 cruel ceremony was again employed at the beginning
 of the second Punic war.

A. R. 526.

Ant. C.

226.

Oros. iv.

12.

Liv. xxii.

40.

The principal cause of the present war, was the
 distribution made seven or eight years before by the
 Romans of the lands of Picenum, from whence they
 had driven out the Senones. This was done at the
 instigation of C. Flaminius, Tribune of the People.
 We have seen, that the Senate strongly opposed this
 enterprize, of which it foresaw the consequences. Se-
 veral nations of the Gauls entered into the quarrel of
 the Senones, and especially the Boii, who bordered
 upon the Romans, and the Insubrians. They were
 persuaded, that the Romans did not attack them only
 for the sake of commanding and giving the law, but
 to ruin and destroy them entirely in driving them out
 of the country. With these thoughts the Insubrians
 and Boii, the two most powerful people of the nati-
 ons, entered into a league, as we have just said; and
 even sent to the other side of the Alpes, to solicit
 the Gauls that inhabited upon the banks of the
 Rhone, called * Gæfates, from serving in the field
 for a certain pay; for, says Polybius, that is the pro-
 per signification of their name. They sold their ser-
 vice to all who desired to employ them in war. In
 order to induce their Kings to arm against the Ro-
 mans, they made them a considerable present. “ They
 set before their eyes the greatness and power of that
 people: they soothed them with the view of the im-

Polyb. ii.

111, 119.

* According to some authors the name of Gæfates is taken from a
 kind of arms which they used, and called Gæsum.

A. R. 526.
Ant. C.
226.

menſe riches, which they could not fail of acquiring by victory over them: they repeated the exploits of their anceſtors, who having taken arms againſt the Romans, defeated them in the open field, and took their city.”

This diſcourſe enflamed the Gauls to ſuch a degree, that an army more numerous, and compoſed of braver and more warlike ſoldiers, was never known to march out of thoſe provinces. When they had paſſed the Alps, the Inſubrians and the Boii joined them. The * Veneti and † Cœnomani were brought over to the Romans by the Ambaſſadors who had been ſent to them: which induced the Gallic Kings to leave part of their forces in the country, to guard it againſt thoſe people. The Inſubrians were the moſt powerful of the Gauls who had ſettled in Italy; and next to them the Boii. The firſt inhabited the country beyond the Po, whoſe capital was Milan; the others, that on this ſide of that river.

The Romans, who had been long apprized of the preparations making by the Gauls, had not failed to prepare alſo on their ſide. They had made new levies, and given their allies notice to hold themſelves in readineſs. And in order to know exactly all the troops, which they could ſet on foot in caſe of neceſſity, they had ordered the registers of all the provinces, ſubject to them, to be brought in, wherein the number of all the youth fit to bear arms was exactly ſet down.

This number would appear incredible, if not atteſted by an author certainly well worthy of belief: this is Polybius, who very probably had ſeen and conſulted the registers, that proved its reality. I ſhall repeat this account as it ſtands in that hiſtorian. It will ſhew us in what condition the Roman People were, when Hannibal entered Italy, which happened ſome few years after; and how formidable the Roman

* People that inhabited the country at the bottom of the Adriatic gulph.

† People between the Po and the foot of the Alps. Their principal cities were Breſcia, Cremona, Mantua,

forces were, when that great Carthaginian ventured to attack them.

Number of the troops, which the Romans could set on foot at the time of the war with the Gauls, spoken of in this place.

THIS account consists of two parts. In the first Polybius gives the number of the troops that actually served: in the second, the number of those which could have been raised in case of necessity. It includes the forces of the Romans, and those of their allies.

I. Troops which actually served.

Four Roman legions took the field with the Consuls, each consisting of five thousand two hundred foot, and three hundred horse. They had with them a body of the troops of the allies, to the number of thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse.

Above fifty thousand foot and four thousand horse, as well Sabines as Tyrrheni, upon the general alarm, flew to the aid of the Romans, and were sent to the frontiers of Tyrrhenia under the command of a Prætor.

The Umbrians and Sarfinates, to the number of twenty thousand, came in also from the Appenines, and with them as many of the Veneti and Cœnomani, who were posted upon the frontiers of Gaul; in order to oblige the Boii, by entering their country, to recal part of their forces for its defence.

At Rome, to prevent a surprize, an army was kept in readiness, which on occasion served as auxiliary troops, and consisted of twenty thousand Roman foot, and fifteen hundred horse, and of the allies thirty thousand foot, and two thousand cavalry.

All these troops together amounted to two hundred and one thousand five hundred men: 43500 Romans, and 158000 allies.

II. *Troops which might have been raised upon occasion.*

The registers sent to the Senate, in order to know the number of troops, on which they might rely in case of necessity, contained as follows.

Of the Latines, fourscore thousand foot, and five thousand horse.

Of the Samnites, seventy thousand foot, and seven thousand horse.

Of the Japyges and the Messapians, fifty thousand foot, and sixteen thousand horse.

Of the Lucanians, thirty thousand foot, and three thousand horse.

Of the Marfi, Marrucini, Ferentini, and Vestini, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse.

The Romans had actually in Sicily, and at Tarentum, two legions, each composed of four thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred horse, which on occasion might be employed against the Gauls.

Besides these, the Romans and Campanians could raise two hundred and fifty thousand infantry, and twenty-three thousand cavalry.

All these men capable of bearing arms, as well amongst the Romans as the allies, amounted to the number of five hundred and sixty-six thousand eight hundred men. Some error must have crept into this account; for seventeen hundred men are omitted in it. With the addition of them, the two sums, that is, of the troops actually employed against the Gauls, and of those which might have been raised occasionally, agree with the total set down by Polybius.

This total was seven hundred and seventy thousand men. A cotemporary author, who served in this war, makes it eight hundred thousand: this was Fabius. The power of the Romans may be judged from hence. And yet it is this mighty people that Hannibal comes to attack, with scarce twenty thousand men.

The number of troops actually employed against the Gauls, was very considerable, and amounted, as we have seen, to more than two hundred thousand men : and this is not wonderful, as aids of all kinds, and from all sides, came to join the Romans. For the irruption of the Gauls had spread such terror in Italy, that the provinces did not think they were carrying arms any longer for the Romans, nor that the power of Rome was only aimed at. Their fears were for themselves, their country, their cities, and it was for that reason they were so well-inclined, and so ready to execute all the orders that were given them.

L. ÆMILIUS PAPUS.

C. ATILIUS REGULUS.

A.R. 527.
Ant. C.
225.

As soon as the Romans received advice, that the Gauls had passed the Alps, they made L. Æmilius march to Ariminum, to stop the progress of the enemy on that side. One of the Prætors was sent into Hetruria. Atilius had set out before for Sardinia, which had revolted, but he soon compelled it to return to its obedience.

The Gauls took their route through Hetruria, probably to avoid meeting Æmilius's army, with fifty thousand foot, twenty thousand horse, and as many chariots. They destroyed the country without fear or opposition : after which they advanced to Rome. They were already in the neighbourhood of Clusium, a city three days march from that capital, when they were informed that the Roman army, commanded by the Prætor, followed them close, and was upon the point of coming up with them. They immediately faced about in order to give it battle. The two armies did not come in view till towards sun-set, and incamped at a very small distance from each other. When night came on, the Gauls kindled fires, and having ordered their cavalry to follow them, as soon as the enemy saw them in the morning, they retired

A. R. 527.
Ant. C. 225. without noise towards * Fesulæ, where they took up their quarters, with design to stay there for their cavalry; and when it had joined the main body, to fall unexpectedly upon the Romans, who pursued it. The latter, at the break of day, seeing that horse, and no foot, believed that the Gauls were fled, and set forward to pursue them. When they approached, the Gauls shewed themselves, and charged them. The action began with great vigour on both sides: but the Gauls, who were superior in number, and emboldened by the success of their stratagem, had the advantage. The Romans lost at least six thousand men there: the rest fled to an advantageous post, where they intrenched themselves. The Gauls at first intended to force them in it; which was the best thing they could have done: but they changed their opinion. Fatigued and harrassed with their march the night before, they chose rather to take some rest, and leaving only a guard of cavalry round the eminence to which the Romans had retired, they deferred attacking them till the next day, in case they did not surrender of themselves. Occasion is to be seized; and often, when neglected, never recurs.

During this time, L. Æmilius, who had incamped near the Adriatic sea, having received advice, that the Gauls had thrown themselves into Hetruria, and approached Rome, came with the utmost expedition to the aid of his country, and arrived very opportunely. Having incamped near the enemy, the Romans, who had retired, perceived his fires, and rightly suspecting it was him, resumed courage. They dispatched, as soon as possible, some of their people unarmed during the night, and through a forest, to acquaint the Consul of what had passed. Æmilius, without losing time to deliberate, commanded the Tribunes, as soon as day should begin to appear, to set out with the infantry. As to him, he put himself at the head of the cavalry, and advanced directly towards the eminence.

* Fesoli, a city of Tuscany;

The chiefs of the Gauls had also seen the fires during the night, and conjecturing that the enemy were near, they held a council of war. Aneroestus their King said, "That after having taken plunder of such great value," (for they had ravaged a great part of Italy, and the spoils they had taken in prisoners, cattle and baggage, were immense) "it was not proper to expose themselves to a second battle, nor to run the risque of losing all. That it was better to return into their own country. That after they had disencumbered themselves of their plunder, they would be in a better condition, to resume their arms against the Romans, if it were judged proper." All coming into this opinion, they decamped before day, and took their route along the sea-side through Hetruria.

Though Æmilius had reinforced his army with those who had taken refuge upon the eminence, he did not however believe it prudent to hazard a pitched battle. He therefore chose to follow the enemy, and to lie upon the watch for times and places, in which he might distress them, and retake the plunder.

By singular good fortune, the Consul C. Atilius was returned from Sardinia, and at this instant landing his legions at Pisa; and, in order to march them to Rome, took the same route by which the Gauls were moving towards him. At Telamon, a city and port of Hetruria, some of the foragers of the Gauls having fallen in with the Consul's advanced guard, the Romans took them. Upon being interrogated by Atilius, they related all that had passed; adding, that there were two armies in the neighbourhood, that of the Gauls very near, and that of Æmilius at their heels. The Consul was much concerned at the loss the Roman army had sustained at first: but was exceeding glad that he had surprized the Gauls on their march, and to find them between two Roman armies. He immediately commanded the Tribunes to draw up the legions in battle, to give their front as much extent as the ground would admit, and to advance

A.R. 527. gently towards the enemy. Upon the way there was
 Ant. C. an eminence, at the foot of which the Gauls were ob-
 225. liged to pass. Atilius hasted thither with his cavalry,
 and posted himself on the top of it, with design to
 begin the battle first, and convinced, that he should
 thereby acquire the greatest share in the glory of the
 event. The Gauls, who believed Atilius at a great
 distance, seeing the eminence occupied by the Romans,
 suspected nothing, but that Æmilius had taken a
 compass with his cavalry during the night, in order to
 seize the advantageous posts first, and to cut off their
 passage. Upon that they also detached their horse,
 with some light-armed troops, to drive the Romans
 from the hill. But having learnt from a prisoner that
 it was Atilius who had seized it, they drew up their
 infantry in battle with the utmost expedition, and
 disposed it back to back, so that it formed a front
 before and behind. They took this order of battle
 upon the report of the prisoner, and the real occasion,
 to defend themselves both from those whom they
 knew they had in the rear, and those whom they were
 to have in their front.

Æmilius had indeed heard of the landing of the
 legions at Pifa, but did not imagine they were so
 near. He was apprized of that aid, only by the en-
 gagement of the troops upon the eminence. He also
 detached some cavalry thither, and at the same time
 made his infantry march against the enemy in the
 usual order

In the army of the Gauls, the Gesatæ, and after
 them the Insubrians, formed the front Æmilius was
 to attack. At their backs were the* Taurini and
 Boii, who faced on the side Atilius was advancing.
 The chariots were placed on the wings, to prevent the
 enemy from taking them in flank; and the plunder
 was bestowed on a neighbouring mountain, with a
 detachment to guard it. This disposition was as well

* Taurini, or Taurisci, were Gauls that inhabited the country
 beyond the Po, where Turin is.

conceived as could be, in the necessity the Gauls were of making head against two armies, that were to attack them at the same time, the one in front and the other in the rear. This obliged them to fight courageously, as it made them unable either to give ground or to fly. The Insubrians were seen with their * drawers, (*braccati*) and without any thing on them except their † light cassocks. The Gesatæ, in the front ranks, whether out of vain-glory or courage, had even thrown off their cloaths, and kept only their arms, lest the bushes which grew there in some places should stop and prevent them from acting. Besides which this was an usual custom amongst the Gauls; and the Gallo-Grecians in their battles with the Romans in Asia, engaged in the same manner half naked, according to Livy. It often cost them dear; and on the present occasion the Gesatæ paid for their rashness.

A. R. 527.
Ant. C.
225.

The first attack was made at the eminence, and as the cavalry that fought were numerous on both sides, the three armies saw all their motions. Atilius lost his life in the action, wherein he distinguished himself by a valour and intrepidity that bordered upon rashness, and his head was carried to the Kings of the Gauls, who caused it to be shewn on the end of a pike to their whole army. Notwithstanding that loss, the Roman cavalry did their duty so well, that they continued masters of the post, after gaining a complete victory over that of the enemy.

The battle of the infantry began afterwards. This, says Polybius, was a singular spectacle, of which not only the sight, but the mere relation, has something wonderful. For a battle fought between three armies all together, is certainly one of a very particular kind and disposition. The Gauls had great obstacles and dangers to surmount in the necessity they were under of fighting on both sides, which seemed to diminish

* Bracca, a kind of breeches, which covered the body from the waist to the knees.

† Sagum, a military cassock, peculiar to the Gauls.

their

A. R. 527. their forces to half their strength: but at the same
 Ant. C. time drawn up back to back, they covered themselves
 225. reciprocally from all attacks in the rear. And what
 was still most capable of contributing to their success,
 no means of flight was left; and if they once suffered
 themselves to be defeated, they had no resource, nor
 any hopes of escaping, which is a very powerful mo-
 tive to induce troops to fight with courage.

As to the Romans, seeing the Gauls inclosed be-
 tween two armies, and surrounded on all sides, they
 could not but entertain great hopes of the battle.
 The extraordinary disposition indeed of those troops,
 drawn up back to back, the cries and kind of howling
 of the soldiers before the battle, the dreadful sound
 of the horns and trumpets without number, the noise
 of which the neighbouring ecchos made the mountains
 rebellow on all sides, all this might strike them with
 some dread. But at the same time the sight of the
 rich collars and bracelets, with which most of the
 Gauls adorned their necks and arms, according to the
 custom of their nation, animated the Romans with
 the hopes of considerable spoils.

The archers advanced in the front of the first line,
 according to the custom of the Romans, and began
 the action by a dreadful shower of darts. The Gauls
 of the hindermost ranks did not suffer extremely
 from them: their drawers and cassocks defending
 them. But those in the front, who did not expect
 this terrible prelude, and who had nothing to cover
 their bodies, were exceedingly incommoded by it.
 They knew not how to keep off the shafts. Their
 shields were not sufficiently large to cover them: they
 were naked from their waists upwards, and the larger
 their bodies were, the more they were exposed to the
 darts. To revenge the wounds they received upon
 the archers was impossible; they were at too great a
 distance; besides which, how could they advance
 through so great a flight of darts? In this perplexity,
 some transported with rage and despair, threw them-
 selves inconsiderately into the midst of the enemy, and
 volun-

voluntarily abandoned themselves to death; others pale, dispirited, and trembling, gave way, and broke the ranks behind them. The pride and haughtiness of the Gesatæ was humbled in this manner from the first attack.

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Ant. C.
225.

When the archers retired, the main body of the Roman legions having advanced in order to push the enemy, the Insubrians, Boii, and Taurini received them with vigour. They fought with such obstinacy, that notwithstanding the wounds with which they were covered, they could not be driven from their posts. If their arms had been the same as those of the Romans, they perhaps had not been defeated. They had indeed bucklers as well as them to ward off blows; but their swords did not do them the same service. Those of the Romans cut both with the edges and points, whereas theirs were blunt at the end. Besides which, as the blades were thin and weak, they bent immediately, and the soldiers lost time in straitening them to make them fit for service.

These troops sustained this attack no longer than till the Roman cavalry came down from the eminence, and charged them full speed in flank. The infantry were then cut to pieces without quitting their posts, and the cavalry entirely put to the rout. Forty thousand Gauls remained upon the spot, and at least ten thousand were taken prisoners, amongst whom was Concolitanus, one of their Kings. Aneroeftus escaped with some of his people to a retired place, where he killed himself with his own hands; and his friends did the same.

Æmilius having gathered the spoils, sent them to Rome. As to the plunder taken by the Gauls, he caused every thing to be restored to the right owners. Then marching through Liguria at the head of the legions, he entered the country of the Boii, which he abandoned to the discretion of the soldiers, to reward them for the pains they had taken, and for the courage they had shewn in the battle. Soon after he returned to Rome with his whole army, and was received

A. R. 527. ceived there with the greater joy, as this war had oc-
 Ant. C. 225. casioned incredible consternation. All the standards, collars, and bracelets he had taken, he employed in the decoration of the Capitol. The rest of the spoils served to adorn his triumph. The Gauls, who were prisoners, says Florus, were expressly made to appear in it with their * belts on, to accomplish the vow which they had made, not to quit them till they had ascended the Capitoline hill. Accordingly they did not take them off till they came thither, when they were made to do so with shame, and the derision of the whole people. Thus ended this formidable irruption of the Gauls, which not only threatened the ruin of all Italy, but of Rome itself.

The victory gained over the Gauls in the battle of Telamon, is one of the most famous and compleat mentioned in the Roman History. To examine all the circumstances of it closely and with attention, it is evident, that it was not the effect of human industry but divine Providence, which destined the Romans to great things, and watched over them in a peculiar manner.

Three Roman armies are in Hetruria precisely at the time the battle is going to be given, without either of them having received news of the other; without the Generals, who commanded them, having received certain advice of the arrival of their colleagues; without their having concerted any thing between them, or even knowing where the enemy was. If the Gauls, after having killed the Prætor six thousand men, had pursued the rest to the eminence, to which they retreated, as good sense required, the whole had been cut to pieces: but they suspended the attack till the next morning. Precisely in this night the Consul Æmilius arrives, without knowing any thing of what had passed, and delivers the Prætor's troops. The Gauls resolve to return home. On

* Non prius soluturos se baltea, quàm Capitolum ascendissent, juraverant. Factum est: victos enim Æmilius in Capitolio discinxit. FLOR. ii. 4.

their way they meet Atilius the other Consul, who was just arrived from Sardinia. They are now enclosed between two armies, and obliged to give battle. Had the Consuls arrived a little later, at some distance from each other, the Gauls, by attacking them separately, might have cut both their armies to pieces. Ought so miraculous a concurrence of circumstances, all decisive in respect to the victory, to be considered as the effect of chance, especially when we are told by the Scriptures, that God was preparing a great empire for the Romans? And is not the conjuncture of time, in which the war with the Gauls happened, that is to say, exactly between the two Punic wars, very remarkable? What had become of Rome, if enemies so terrible as the Gauls had joined the Carthaginians in attacking her? An invisible power watched over, and she was so unhappy, as to ascribe to her false divinities a protection, that proceeded from the only true God, whom she did not know.

A. R. 257.
Ant. C.
225.

Before the election of the new Consuls, the Census was closed for the forty-second time.

Fasti Capitol.

T. MANLIUS TORQUATUS II.

A. R. 528.
Ant. C.
224.

Q. FULVIUS FLACCUS II.

After the success of the preceding year, the Romans not doubting but they were in a condition to drive the Gauls out of all the countries in the neighbourhood of the Po, as well on this, as on the other, side, made great preparations of war, and levied troops, that took the field under the two new Consuls. This irruption terrified the Boii, and they chose to submit. For the rest, the rains were so great, and the plague made such ravages in the Roman army, that this campaign elapsed without any other memorable event.

Polyb. ii.
119.

A. R. 529.
Ant. C.
223.

C. FLAMINIUS.

P. FURIUS PHILUS.

Polyb. ii.
119—121.

These Consuls entered the country of the Insubrians, at the part of it where the * Addua falls into the Po. According to the best authors, this is the first time the Romans passed that river. Having been very roughly handled in their passage and incampments, and rendered incapable of acting, they made a treaty with the Insubrians, and quitted their country. After a march of several days they passed the Clusius, now called La Chiesa, entered the country of the Cenomani their allies, in conjunction with whom by the bottom of the Alps they fell again upon the plains of the Insubrians, where they plundered and burnt all the villages. The chiefs of that people, seeing that the Romans were fully determined to extirpate them, made the utmost efforts to defend themselves, and to the number of fifty thousand men came boldly, and with a terrible mien, and incamped in view of the enemy.

Plut. in
Marcel.
p. 299.

At this instant a courier arrived from the army, dispatched by the Senate with letters for the Consuls. Whether Flaminius had been apprized of their contents by his friends, or suspected them, he did not think proper to open them, before he gave battle, and inspired his colleague with the same resolution.

The Consuls, seeing themselves exceedingly inferior in number to the enemy, designed at first to make use in this battle of the Gallick troops in their army. But reflecting, that the Gauls were not reputed to make any scruple of infringing treaties, and that treachery was the more to be apprehended, as the question was to make Gauls fight against Gauls, they were afraid to use those they had with them in an affair so delicate and important; and to guard against all treason, they made them pass the river, and after-

* Now called the Adda.

wards broke the bridges. As for themselves, they remained on this side, and drew up in battle on the bank, in order that having a river not fordable behind them, they might have no hopes of safety but in victory.

A.R. 529.
Ant. C.
223.

Polybius does not approve the conduct of Flaminius in this last point, nor such a disposition of his troops, as left them no room to fall back. For, if the enemy during the battle had made an effort, and gained ever so little ground of his army, it had been beat down and tumbled into the river. The valour of the Romans happily preserved them from this danger.

All the honour of this battle was due to the Tribunes, who instructed the army in general, and each soldier in particular, how it was necessary to behave in it. In former battles they had observed, that the ardor and impetuosity of the Gauls, till they had received some check, made them indeed very formidable in the first charge: but that their swords had no points, that they hurt only with the edges, and that but once at a time: that those edges became blunt, and the blades bent from one end to the other: that if the soldiers, after the first blow, had not time to set them against the ground, and to straiten them with their feet, they were of no service. To prevent the Gauls from making use of them, the Tribunes conceived a means which perfectly succeeded. They made the first line take the arms of the * Triarii, that is to say, the javelin or half-pike, with orders after they had used it, to resume their swords, and to come to close fight; which was happily executed. The Romans therefore began the action by pushing their pikes vigorously at the faces of the Gauls, who to turn aside their blows, made use of their sabres, by which their edges were soon blunted. The Romans then threw down their pikes, and with their swords charged the enemy with great fury, and so near, that they made them almost entirely incapable of using

* The Triarii formed the third line.

A.R. 529. their sabres, which cut only downright; whereas the
 Ant. C. Roman swords, that had sharp points, wounded by
 223. thrust and not by downright blows. Levelling their
 points therefore at the breasts and faces of the Gauls,
 they made an horrible slaughter of them at this time.
 Eight thousand were left upon the spot, and twice as
 many made prisoners. The spoils were immense.

We have said, that a courier arrived at the army
 immediately before the battle, with a letter for the
 Consuls. Flaminius did not open it till after the de-
 feat of the enemy. The Senate alarmed by several
 prodigies, had consulted the augurs, and on their an-
 swer, which was, that there was some defect in the
 creation of the Consuls, had sent the letter, of which
 we are speaking, to order the Consuls to return imme-
 diately to Rome, to abdicate their offices, and expressly
 to prohibit their undertaking any thing against the
 enemy. Upon reading this letter, Furius believed it
 necessary to return directly to Rome; and it is very
 probable, that he would not have any share in the
 battle, which has been just fought, for there is not
 any mention of him in it. Flaminius represented to
 his colleague, "That these orders were only the effect
 of a cabal jealous of their glory. That the victory
 they had just gained, was a certain proof, that the
 Gods were not angry with them, and that there had
 been no irregularity in their nomination to the Con-
 sulship. That as for himself, he was determined not
 to return to Rome, till he had put an end to the war,
 which he had so happily begun; and not to quit his
 office before the time. He added, that he would
 teach the Romans, by his example, not to suffer them-
 selves to be grossly imposed upon by frivolous supersti-
 tions, and the idle imaginations of the augurs." As
 Furius persisted in his opinion, the army of Fla-
 minius, which was afraid of not being safe in the
 country, if that of his colleague retired, prevailed
 with him to continue there for some time; but he
 would form no enterprize, out of respect for the or-
 ders of the Senate. Flaminius made himself master
 of

of some strong places, and of one of the most considerable cities in the country. The spoils were very great; and he gave them all to the soldiers, in order to conciliate their favour in the dispute which he rightly foresaw he should have with the Senate.

A. R. 529.
Ant. C.
223.

Accordingly, when he returned to Rome, they did not go out to meet him, as was the custom, and a triumph was at first refused him. He found them extremely incensed against him, not only because he had not set out immediately, when recalled by the Senate, which was a criminal disobedience; but still more, because knowing the answer of the augurs, he had paid no regard to it, and had even spoke of it in an impious and irreligious manner. For, says Plutarch, the Romans had a great respect for religion, making all their affairs depend on the will of the Gods alone, and severely condemning even in those, whose successes had been greatest, all neglect, all contempt for the divinations authorized by the laws of their country: so much were they persuaded, that what contributed most to the safety of their Commonwealth, was not, that their Magistrates and Generals should conquer their enemies, but that they should always be submissive to the Gods. What a lesson is this for us, and how great a reproach, if we were less religious than Pagans!

Plut. in
Marcel.
p. 299.

It was the Senate principally, who had declared against Flaminius: but the favour of the People, which he had gained when Tribune, prevailed over all the opposition of the Senators. Flaminius obtained the honour of a triumph; and by a necessary consequence it could not be refused to his colleague. But immediately after the ceremony they were both obliged to abdicate their office. In all the conduct of this Flaminius, it is easy to perceive the temerity, which, some few years after, made him lose the battle of Thraymenus against Hannibal.

Plutarch, on the occasion of the contempt which Flaminius had expressed for the auspices, relates a very singular fact. Two priests of the most considerable

Ibid. p.
300.

A. R. 529.
Ant. C. 223.
derable houses in Rome, Cornelius Cethegus and Q. Sulpicius, were divested of the priesthood; the first for having offered the entrails of the victim contrary to the prescribed order and ceremonies; and the latter, because during the time he was offering a sacrifice, the rod, which was on the top of the cap worn by the priests, called Flamines, fell down. This was carrying scruple a great way. But, as excessive and superstitious as it was, it at least shews, how far the reverential awe of those charged with the sacerdotal office ought to go amongst us.

A. R. 530.
Ant. C. 222.

M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS.

CN. CORNELIUS SCIPIO CALVUS.

Plut. in
Marcel.
p. 298.

The first of the Consuls is the famous Marcellus, of whom much will be said in the war with Hannibal, and who will be five times Consul. According to * Plutarch, he was the first of his house surnamed Marcellus, that is to say, Martial. He seemed born for war, robust of body, personally brave, a man of wit and execution, ardent and daring in battle, but gentle, modest, and cool in all other respects. He had a great taste for the Greek literature, (in which the Latines were hitherto but smatterers) but that taste went no farther than to esteem and admire those who distinguished themselves in it. As to himself, engrossed by war, he had not leisure to apply to eloquence so much as he could have desired. Whilst he was very young, he had deserved the crowns and other rewards, conferred by the Generals upon valour; and his reputation encreasing every day, the People chose him Curule Ædile, and the Priests created him an Augur. He always discharged the functions of the offices given him with honour.

Ibid. 300.

At the time that he was elected Consul, the Gauls sent Ambassadors to make proposals of accommodation. The Senate was sufficiently inclined to peace,

* Plutarch is contradicted by Livy in this circumstance, who l. viii. n. 18. mentions one M. Claudius Marcellus, as Consul.

but Marcellus animated the People against the Gauls, and determined them for the war. The latter, reduced to take arms, made preparations for a last effort. They raised about thirty thousand men amongst the Gæsataë, whom they kept in readiness, against the enemy's coming. In the spring the Consuls entered the country of the Insubrians, and having incamped near Acetræ, a city between the Po and the Alps, they besieged that place. As they had seized the advantageous posts first, the Insubrians could not give it aid. However, to make the enemy raise the siege, they made part of their army pass the Po, and besieged Clastidium, a small town which the Romans had lately subjected. Upon this news Marcellus at the head of the cavalry and part of the infantry, hastened to the aid of the besieged. The Gauls, leaving Clastidium, marched to meet the Romans, and drew up in battle. They already considered him as defeated, seeing the small number of foot that followed him, and making flight of his horse. For being very dexterous in battles on horseback, as the Gauls were in general, and believing they had a great advantage on that side, on this occasion they also saw themselves much superior to Marcellus in number.

They therefore marched directly to him with an impetuosity full of fury, and great menaces, as assured of victory. Their King Viridomarus, superbly mounted, was in the front of his battalions and squadrons. Marcellus, to prevent them from surrounding him in effect of the small number of his troops, extended the wings of his cavalry as far as he could, and made them occupy a great extent of ground, by weakening them in depth, till they presented a front almost equal to that of the enemy.

When they were upon the point of engaging the Gauls, he made a vow to consecrate the best arms taken from the enemy to Jupiter Feretrius. At that instant the King of the Gauls perceiving him, and judging from several marks, that he was the General of the Romans, he spurred his horse against him

A. R. 530. full speed, calling upon him with a loud voice to defy
 Ant. C. him to a combat, and brandishing a long and weighty
 222. spear. He was a very well made man, superior in
 stature even to the other Gauls, who were generally
 very large; besides which he glittered in such a man-
 ner, his armour being enriched with gold and silver,
 and adorned with purple and the most lively colours,
 that he seemed like lightning breaking from the
 clouds.

Marcellus, struck with this splendid appearance,
 cast his eyes over the enemy's battle, and seeing no
 armour so fine as this King's, he did not doubt but
 those were the arms he had vowed to Jupiter. Spur-
 ring against him therefore with the utmost vigour, he
 pierced his enemy's cuirass with his spear. The stroke,
 augmented by the swiftness and impetuosity of his
 horse, was so forcible, that it threw the King on his
 back to the ground. Marcellus turned upon him,
 and gave him a second and third wound, which killed
 him entirely; and leaping instantly from his horse, he
 stripped off his arms, and taking them up lifted them
 towards heaven as an offering to Jupiter Feretrius,
 praying that God to grant the like protection to all his
 troops. The defeat of the King drew on that of his
 army. The Roman cavalry charged the Gauls with
 impetuosity, who at first made some resistance. But
 that horse having afterwards surrounded and attacked
 them in flank and rear, they gave way on all sides.
 Part of them were pushed headlong into the river:
 but much the greater number were put to the sword.
 The Gauls, who were in Acetræ, abandoned the place
 to the Romans, and retired to Milan, which was the
 capital of the Insubrians.

The Consul Cornelius followed them close, and be-
 sieged them there. As the garrison was very numerous,
 and made frequent sallies, the besiegers had much to
 suffer, and were very rudely handled. Every thing
 changed aspect, when Marcellus appeared before the
 place. The Gæfataë, who were informed of the de-
 feat of their troops, and their King's death, having
 deter-

determined at all events to return into their own country, Milan was taken, and the Insubrians surrendered all their other cities to the Romans, who granted them peace upon reasonable conditions; contenting themselves with depriving them of part of their territory, and exacting certain sums from them, and to reimburse the expences of the war.

At length, after some few years more than five hundred, we see all Italy, from the west to the east, that is to say, from the Alps to the Ionian sea, subjected to the Romans.

The Senate decreed the honour of a triumph only to Marcellus; and his triumph was one of the most remarkable Rome had ever seen, as well from the great riches and quantity of fine spoils, as the multitude, and prodigious stature of the captives, and the magnificence of the whole procession. But the most new and most agreeable object was Marcellus himself, carrying the armour of the Barbarian King to Jupiter. For having caused the trunk of an oak to be cut, he formed a trophy, by disposing those arms in proper order upon it.

When the whole pomp was set out, he got into his chariot drawn by four horses abreast, and taking the trunk of an oak so drest up, he passed through the whole city with his trophy on his shoulders: it had the form of an armed man, and constituted the most superb ornament of his triumph. The whole army followed him in magnificent arms, singing the songs composed for this ceremony, and songs of victory to the praise of Jupiter and their General.

As soon as he came in this order to the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, he fixed up and consecrated this trophy. He was the third and last General, who had the glory of obtaining the spoils called *spolia opima*. We have spoke elsewhere of what the Romans understood by that term. We shall only observe here that Romulus was the first who obtained the *spolia opima*, after having killed Acron King of the Cæninenses: Cornelius Cossus the second, who defeated and killed

A. R. 530. Tolumnius King of the Veientes : and the third Mar-
 Ant. C. cellus, after having killed Viridomarus King of the
 222. Gauls.

The Fasti say, that Marcellus triumphed over the Gauls and Germans. This is the first time the Germans are mentioned in the Roman History. Those whom the Romans call Germans in this place, are undoubtedly the Gæsatæ.

The Romans were so much rejoiced on account of this victory, and the conclusion of this war, that they caused a gold cup to be made of part of the plunder, which they sent to Delphi to Apollo Pythicus, as a monument of their gratitude ; liberally divided the spoils with the cities that had embraced their party ; and sent a great part of them to Hiero King of Syracuse, their faithful friend and ally. They also paid him the value of the corn which he had given the Romans during the war with the Gauls.

Diod.
 Eclog.
 xxv. 4.

A. R. 531.
 Ant. C.
 221.

P. CORNELIUS.
 M. MINUCIUS RUFUS.

The two Consuls were sent against new enemies, the people of * Istria, pirates by profession, who had either taken or plundered some Roman merchant ships. They were soon obliged to submit.

Hannibal succeeded Asdrubal this year, and was placed at the head of the armies in Spain.

A. R. 532.
 Ant. C.
 220.

L. VETURIUS.
 C. LUTATIUS.

Demetrius of Pharos, forgetting the obligations he was under to the Romans, and even going so far as to treat them with contempt, because he had seen the terror into which the Gauls had thrown them, and besides foresaw that they would soon have the Carthaginians upon their hands, thought he might ravage the cities of Illyricum, that belonged to the Romans,

* Province of the State of Venice.

with impunity. For this purpose, he sailed with fifty ships beyond † Lissus, contrary to the faith of treaties, by which he was obliged not to pass beyond that city with more than two ships, and those not armed for war; and he plundered the islands Cyclades, and laid them under contribution. He had engaged the newly subjected people of Istria, and the Atintani, in his party, and flattered himself, that he should receive a considerable aid from the King of Macedonia, with whom he was united by their common interests. War was declared against him, and without loss of time preparations were made for it. The Romans took all possible care to preserve the peace of the provinces situated to the east of Italy; in order not to have several enemies upon their hands at the same time, and to put themselves into a condition to support the war against the Carthaginians with vigour.

A. R. 532.
Ant. C.
220.

In the mean time the Census was compleated for the forty-third time. The number of the citizens amounted to two hundred and seventy thousand two hundred and thirteen. L. Æmilius and C. Flaminius were then Censors.

The multitude of the freedmen dispersed confusedly into all the Tribes, had hitherto excited abundance of troubles. The Censors, after the example of Fabius Maximus, included them in the four Tribes of the city.

Flaminius, in the same Censorship, made a great way, or road, which led to Ariminum, and built the Circus; both which took their names from him.

M. LIVIVS SALINATOR.

L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS.

A. R. 533.
Ant. C.
219.

The care of the war of Illyricum against Demetrius Polyb. iii. was confided to these Consuls; of which the latter is 173, 174. the father of him who conquered Perseus King of Macedonia. Upon the news that the Romans were

† This city, now called Aleſo, was the last in Illyricum, upon the frontier next Macedonia and Epirus.

A. R. 533.
Ant. C.
219.

preparing to attack him, he had put himself into a condition to give them a warm reception. He threw a strong garrison into Dimullum, with all the necessary munitions. He caused the principal citizens, whom he suspected, to be put to death; gave the government to those whom he believed in his own interest; and chose throughout the whole kingdom, of which he had the administration, six thousand of the bravest men to guard Pharos.

The Consul Æmilius arrived in the mean time in Illyricum; and because the enemy relied much upon the strength of Dimullum, which they believed impregnable, and the provision they had made for its defence, he resolved, in order to daunt them, to open the campaign with the siege of that place. He animated each of the principal officers in particular, and carried on the works on several sides with so much diligence, that the place was taken by storm the seventh day. This sufficed to make the arms of the enemy fall out of their hands. They immediately came from all the cities to surrender themselves to the Romans, and to put themselves under their protection. The Consul received them all upon such conditions as he thought most convenient, and immediately set sail to attack Demetrius himself in Pharos.

Having been informed, that the city was strong, the garrison numerous and composed of chosen troops, and that it had provisions and all other munitions in abundance, he was afraid, that the siege would be difficult, and of long duration. To avoid that inconvenience, he had recourse to a stratagem. He landed during the night in the island with his whole army; posted the greatest part of it in woods and other covered places, and at day-break put to sea again, and in open view entered the port nearest the city with twenty vessels. Demetrius perceived him, and thinking to make nothing of so small a force, marched to the port to oppose the descent of the enemy. They were scarce come to blows, than the action growing hot, fresh troops came perpetually from the city to the

the aid of those engaged. At length the whole garrison was drawn out. The Roman troops, who had landed in the night, having set out by ways covered from view, arrived at that moment. Between the city and the port there was a steep eminence. This they seized, and thereby cut off the communication with the city of those who had quitted it to attack the Consul. Demetrius then thought no longer of preventing the Romans from landing. He drew up his troops, exhorted them to do their duty, and led them on to the eminence, with design to fight in line of battle. The Romans, who saw that the Illyrians approached with impetuosity and in good order, advanced against them and charged them with astonishing vigour. Whilst this passed, the Romans who had just landed, attacked them in the rear. The Illyrians, surrounded on all sides, were in extreme confusion and disorder. At length, pushed in front and rear, they were obliged to fly. Some escaped into the city; but the greatest part of them dispersed into the island by secret ways. Demetrius got on board ships which he had at anchor in concealed places; and putting to sea during the night, arrived happily at the court of Philip King of Macedonia, where he passed the rest of his life. He contributed much by his flattery and pernicious counsels, to pervert and corrupt the disposition of that prince, who in the beginning of his reign had acquired general esteem; and it was he principally, that to avenge himself, induced Philip to declare against the Romans, whereby he drew a long train of misfortunes upon himself. How much care ought young Princes to take in the choice of those, in whom they place their confidence, and with what caution ought they to remove all from about their persons, in whom they discover a disposition to flattery!

Polyb.
apud
Valef.
l. vii.

Æmilius, after this victory, entered Pharos by storm, and demolished it, after having given the plunder of it to his soldiers. All Illyricum received the law from the Romans. The throne was reserved
to

A. R. 533. to the young Pineus, who had no share in the revolt
 Ant. C. of his guardian. Some new conditions were added to
 219. the former treaty concluded with the Queen Teuta,
 his mother-in-law.

At the end of the summer, when every thing had been regulated in Illyricum, the Consul returned to Rome, which he entered in triumph. All the honours were paid him, and all the applauses given him, which the address and valour he had shewn in the war of Illyricum deserved.

In this relation we have followed Polybius, who speaks only of Æmilius; Livius his colleague, must however have shared in the success of the war; because it is certain that he triumphed: of which what is now to follow, is an evident proof.

Both of them, after the expiration of their office, were cited before the People, and equally accused of having converted part of the spoils to their own use, and of not having observed a just and reasonable equality in the distribution they had made of the rest to the soldiers. Æmilius did not get over this trial without difficulty; and all the Tribes, except the Mæcian, condemned Livius. This indignity gave him the most sensible affliction. He quitted Rome, retired into the country, renounced the public affairs and all commerce of the world, till the emergencies of the Commonwealth obliged him to resume his usual course of life. We shall see him act in the Censorship in a very extraordinary manner.

Liv. xxvii.
34.

Ibid. xxix.
37.

It was in this Consulship, that Archagathus came from Peloponnesus to Rome, where he was the first that exercised the profession of a Physician. He had the freedom of the city conferred upon him, and was honourably entertained and lodged at the expence of the public. I have spoke of him elsewhere.

Ant. Hist.

Under the same Consuls colonies were sent to Placentia and Cremona, which very much exasperated the Boii and Insubrians against Rome.

Val. Max.

We have seen elsewhere how attentive the Romans were not to admit new forms of worship, and foreign religions.

religions. They were expressly prohibited by a law of the twelve tables, unless the public authority intervened. Notwithstanding the vigilance of the magistrates, new ceremonies were introduced from time to time in Rome. The Consul, of whom we have been speaking, found the worship of Isis and Serapis, Egyptian divinities, almost universally established amongst the populace. The Senate decreed, that the chapels, which had been erected to them, should be demolished. No mason could be found, that would assist in the execution of this decree, such deep root had superstition taken in the minds of the people. If we may believe Valerius Maximus, the Consul Paulus Æmilius was obliged to perform this office himself; who laid aside his Consular robe, and demolished those monuments of the Egyptian worship with an ax.

A.R. 533.
Ant. C.
219.

The same author relates another fact, which happened at the same time, and appears still more fabulous. Whilst the Prætor Ælius Pætus Tubero was dispensing justice on his tribunal in the Forum, a woodpecker came and perched upon his head, where it continued quietly. The fact seemed singular. The augurs, who were consulted immediately, replied, that if the Prætor let the bird live, it would be much for the good of his family, but very bad for the Commonwealth; and that the contrary would happen, if he killed it. He did not hesitate a moment; he tore the woodpecker to pieces, and the event is said to have verified the answer. Seventeen of his family perished in the battle of Cannæ.

Val. Max.
v. 6.

I promised to speak of the Tribes of Rome at the end of this book, to which I proceed.

DIGRESSION UPON THE TRIBES OF ROME.

IN the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, there are several learned dissertations of Mr. Boindin's upon the Roman Tribes, from which I have extracted the greatest part of what I shall say in this place, that seemed necessary for giving the generality of readers a sufficient idea of this subject, which often recurs in the Roman History.

A certain number of the people, whom Romulus had distributed into three districts or quarters of the city, were at first called a Tribe, perhaps from that division; though Livy says, l. vi. c. 5. *a Tributo*. These three Tribes were divided according to the difference of the three nations of which the Roman People were then composed: the first founders of the colony were called Ramnenses, or Ramnes; the Sabines, Titenses; and the Tuscans, Luceres.

Servius Tullius having suppressed the ancient Tribes, of which the names were no longer retained, except in the centuries of the cavalry, instituted new ones. The Romans were at that time pent up within very narrow bounds, and their frontiers did not extend beyond five or six miles, their whole territory consisting of the country round Rome, which was afterwards called *Ager Romanus*, bounded on the east by the cities of Tibur, Preneste, and Alba; on the south by the port of Ostia, and the sea; on the west by that part of *Hetruria*, which the Latines called *Septempagium*; and on the north by the cities of Fidenæ, *Crustumium*, and the river Anio, now called the *Teverone*.

In this small extent of country, were contained all the Tribes instituted by Servius Tullius; that is to say, four in the city and * seventeen in the country.

* What Livy says, ii. 27. that the Tribe instituted the 259th year of Rome, was the one and twentieth, leaves room to conclude, that Servius Tullius instituted only sixteen rustic Tribes.

The four of the city were denominated from its four principal quarters, and were called Suburana, Esquilina, Collina, and Palatina. They took place of all the rest at first, not only because they were instituted first, but because they were then the most honourable, though they afterwards fell into contempt. Dionysius of Halicarnassus relates, that Servius Tullius assigned these Tribes to the Freedmen.

It is probable, that Servius Tullius at first divided the territory of Rome into seventeen parts, of which he formed as many Tribes, that were called Rustic Tribes, to distinguish them from those of the city. All these Tribes were called at first by the names of the places where they were situated. But most of them having afterwards taken the names of Roman families, only five of them retained their antient names, of which in consequence the exact situation may be determined.

The Romans augmented the number of their Tribes from time to time, in proportion as that of their citizens encreased, and as they conquered new tracts of country from the different nations of Italy, to which they sent colonies composed of antient citizens, in order to lay the foundations of their empire in them. * And this was in reality the best method for extending their power. For all these colonies were so many advanced posts, which served not only to cover their frontiers, and to awe the provinces in which they were situated, but to spread the spirit and taste of the Roman government in them, by the privileges and immunities they enjoyed. It was not till after the famous siege of Veii, and till the Romans had made themselves masters of part of Hetruria, that they instituted † the four first of the fourteen Tribes, which are ascribed to the Consular times in the 368th year

* Hoc in genere, sicut in ceteris Reip. partibus, est operæ pretium diligentiam majorum recordari, qui colonias sic idoneis in locis contra suspicionem periculi collocarunt, ut esse non oppida Italiæ, sed propugnacula imperii viderentur. In RULL. ii. 73.

† Tribus quatuor ex novis civibus additæ, Stellatina, Fromentina, Sabatina, & Anienfis, Liv. vi. 5.

of Rome. They afterwards added others to them from time to time for the same reasons, till the Tribes Velina and Quirina were instituted in the country of the Sabines, which were the last of the fourteen instituted by the Consuls. With the four city Tribes, and the seventeen Rustic of Servius Tullius, they made up the number of thirty-five, of which the Roman People were ever after composed.

When all the States of Italy were made free citizens of Rome, eight new ones were created for the multitude of new-comers. But they did not subsist long, and the Tribes were reduced again to the number of thirty-five.

It only remains for us to speak of the political form of the Tribes, and to shew the different uses made of them under the Kings, and under the Consuls.

Though the Sabines and Tuscans, whom Romulus had incorporated with the Romans, formed only one and the same people with them, those nations however composed three different Tribes, that lived separately, and without mingling with each other, till the time of Servius Tullius. They were equally subject to the Prince's authority, but had each a Chief of their own nation, who were a kind of Lieutenants to him, on whom he relied for their behaviour. These chiefs had other officers under them, to whom they confided the care of the *Curiaë*: for each Tribe was divided into ten *Curiaë* or different quarters, each of which had its magistrate called *Curio*, who was also the minister of the sacrifices, and religious festivals of the *Curia*. Besides this, each Tribe had its *augur*, who had the care of the auspices.

All the *Curiaë* had an equal share in the honours civil and military. It was in their general assembly, called *Comitia Curiata*, that the most important affairs of the publick were decided. For though the State was monarchical at that time, neither the power of the Prince was so arbitrary, nor the authority of the Senate so absolute, as to exclude the People from a great share in the government. They not only had a right
to

to determine in respect to war or peace, but could either receive or reject laws, and had even the liberty to elect all such as were to have any authority under them. For as there were no other Comitia at that time but those of the Curix, in which all the citizens equally had voices, and the number of the Plebeians in each Curia far exceeded that of the Patricians and Knights, the elections almost always depended on their suffrages.

This induced Servius Tullius to institute the Comitia Centuriata, (assemblies by centuries) in which the rich and great had all power, as we have shewn elsewhere; to suppress the antient Tribes, which till then had shared in the government; and to establish new ones, to whom he left no authority, who served only to divide the Roman territory into districts, and to express the place of the city and country, where each citizen inhabited.

As the Rustic Tribes were composed at that time only of citizens, who lived in the country, and cultivated their own lands; and all who resided at Rome, were included in those of the city, the latter were at first the most honourable. But in process of time, the Censors having degraded them by including the whole populace and freedmen in them, the Patricians affected to be removed into the Rustic Tribes, and especially into the last and most remote, because the first instituted by Servius Tullius, and which were nearest Rome, were coveted by new citizens.

From the establishment of the new plan laid down by Servius Tullius, the Tribes had no share in the public affairs. The assemblies by Curix and Centuries divided all authority: and even the assemblies by Curix were held almost solely for form's sake, and on account of the auspices, which were peculiar to them. The Great were entirely masters in the assemblies by centuries, wherein the Consuls, and in process of time, all the other principal magistrates were elected, and the most important affairs of the State transacted.

The

The Roman People, who probably at first were amused by the grateful thoughts of being eased in respect to contributions, and serving public offices, and had not considered the consequences of the change introduced by Servius Tullius in the State, felt all the effect and weight of it in the sequel. They perceived with a very sensible mortification, that for a trivial advantage, they had suffered themselves to be deprived of all authority in the government, of which the great had entirely possessed themselves, and abused strangely in order to keep them in a kind of slavish subjection. They did not extricate themselves out of this state till sixty years after, by the vigour and resolution of their Tribunes, who made the first attempt towards it in the affair of Coriolanus, whom they brought to a trial before the People assembled by Tribes: this is the first time the Comitia by Tribes are mentioned.

The Tribunes did not stop there. They had no sooner assumed the right of assembling the People with the Senate's permission, than they made use of it to render the assemblies by Tribes frequent, and soon after found means to transfer the election of the Plebeian magistrates, which till then had been chosen by the Curia, to the Tribes: An enterprize, says * Livy, which as it wore no very offensive outside at first, occasioned no great apprehensions; but in the sequel gave a fatal blow to the authority of the Patricians.

In these assemblies the magistrates of the second class, *minores Magistratus*, and all those of the People were elected; as the Tribunes of the People, the Plebeian Aediles, the Questors, the Legionary Tribunes, many other officers who had different functions, *Triumviri rerum capitalium*, *Triumviri Monetales*, and others. In the same Comitia by tribes the laws called Plebiscita were passed, by which at first only the People were bound, but which afterwards had the

Liv. ix. 46.

* Haud parva res, sub titulo prima specie minimè atroci, ferebatur; sed quæ patriciis omnem potestatem per clientium suffragia creandi quos vellent Tribunos auferret. Liv. ii. 56.

force of laws also in respect to the Senate, and the latter were even obliged previously to give their consent and approbation to them. It was in the same assemblies, that the peace with the Carthaginians, Liv. xxxi. 43. and that with Philip King of Macedonia, were included.

By degrees and succession of time, the People, whose authority had been so much weakened in the beginning, got possession of all the honours civil, military, and even sacred. By that means every thing became equal, and the Patricians enjoyed no advantage that the Plebeians did not share with them.

Cic. in
Rull. ii.
17, 18.

In some assemblies only seventeen of the Tribes were summoned. These were the Comitia, in which the great Pontiff was created.

T H E

ROMAN HISTORY

CONTINUED.

BOOK THE THIRTEENTH.

THIS book contains the beginning of the second Punic war: the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal; his passage into Italy over the Alps; the battles of Ticinus, Trebia, and the Lake of Trasymenus. It includes also the first advantages of Cn. Scipio in Spain.

S E C T. I.

General idea of the second Punic war. Amilcar's hatred of the Romans. Oath which he makes his son Hannibal take, whilst an infant. The like disposition in Asdrubal, his successor. He causes Hannibal to come to the army. Character of the latter. Hannibal is charged with the command of the troops. He prepares for the war with the Romans by the conquests he makes in Spain. He besieges Saguntum. Embassy of the Romans to Hannibal, and afterwards to Carthage. Alarcus endeavours in vain to persuade the people of Saguntum to an accommodation. Taking and destruction of Saguntum. Trouble and grief, which the ruin of Saguntum occasions at Rome. War resolved there against the Carthaginians. Partition of the provinces between the Consuls. The Roman Ambassadors declare war against the Carthaginians. Frivolous reasons of the Carthaginians.

nians to justify the siege of Saguntum. True cause of the second Punic war. Roman Ambassadors go to Spain, and afterwards to Gaul. Hannibal prepares for his march to Italy. Review of the Carthaginian forces. Hannibal's journey to Gades. He provides for the safety of Africa, and for that of Spain, where he leaves his brother Asdrubal.

IN beginning to relate the war which the Romans Liv. xxi. 1. sustained against the Carthaginians under Hannibal, I may justly declare, that it is one of the most memorable wars come down to us in history, as well as one the most worthy of a curious reader's attention, whether we consider it in respect to the boldness of enterprizes, and the wisdom of the measures put in execution; the obstinacy of the two rival peoples efforts; the promptitude of resources in their greatest misfortunes; the variety of unexpected events; the uncertainty of the final issue; and lastly, the uniting of the finest models of every kind of merit with the most instructive lessons history can supply, as well in respect to war as polity, and the art of governing. Never did states or nations more powerful, or at least more warlike, take arms against each other; and never had those in question appeared in a higher degree of power and glory. Rome and Carthage were undoubtedly at that time the two principal States of the world. Having already tried their strength and military abilities in the first Punic war, they perfectly knew each other: and in this second war, the fortune of arms was balanced in such a manner, and the successes so compounded with vicissitudes and variety, that the side which triumphed, was that which found itself nearest to the danger of being destroyed. How great soever the forces of the two people were, their mutual hatred may almost be said to be still greater; the Romans, on one side, being enraged to see a vanquished enemy the first to resume the arms, which had succeeded so ill before, against their conquerors; and the Carthaginians, on the other, pretending to have been

X 2

treated

treated by the Romans after their defeat with insupportable inhumanity and avarice.

Hannibal brought to this war an hatred for the Romans of an older date, and which he had inherited from his father. He was the son of Amilcar * Barcas, who having been overcome by those formidable enemies, had himself signed the shameful but necessary treaty, which had put an end to the first Punic war. But in ceasing to make war with them, he had not ceased to hate them. † His lofty spirit could not brook the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. He was particularly enraged at the manner, in which those equally unjust and rapacious conquerors had possessed themselves of the last of the two islands, by taking an advantage, during peace, of the bad state of the affairs of the Carthaginians in Africa, to force them to abandon it; and not only that, but to have the cruelty to impose a new tribute upon them at the same time.

He was always, from the peace of the islands Ægates till his death, at the head of the Carthaginian armies. But whilst he made war either in Africa against the rebellious mercenaries, or in Spain against the different states which he subjected, it was apparent from his conduct, that he meditated greater and bolder designs than those he was actually executing.

Polyb. iii. It is said, that whilst Amilcar was sacrificing one day, to render the Gods propitious in the war he was going to make in Spain, after having happily terminated that of Africa, his son Hannibal took him round the neck, and conjured him to take him along with him to the army, employing for that purpose all the caresses usual at his age, a language of great power

* From which name the party, that favoured the interests of Amilcar and his family at Carthage, was called, The Barcinian faction.

† Angebant ingentis spiritus virum Sicilia Sardiniaque amissæ. Nam & Siciliam nimis Seleri desperatione rerum concessam; & Sardiniam inter motum Africæ, fraude Romanorum, stipendio etiam superimposito, interceptam. Liv. xxi. 1.

over the mind of a father, who tenderly loved his son. The same authors add, that the General, charmed with so noble a disposition in a child of nine years old, took him up in his arms, and placing him near the altar, made him swear with his hand upon the head of the victim, that he would declare himself the enemy of the Romans, as soon as he should be of age to bear arms. The sequel will shew, that he kept this oath most punctually.

If Amilcar had lived much longer, it is certain, that he would have carried the war into Italy himself, as Hannibal did afterwards. It was only deferred by the too early death of that General, and the too great youth of his son.

During this interval, Asdrubal, to whom Amilcar Polyb. ii. had married his daughter, supported by the immense 123. credit which the Barcinian faction had both amongst the people and in the army, made himself master of the government, notwithstanding the endeavours used by the Great to prevent it. He was better qualified to negotiate than make war, and was no less useful to his country from the alliances which he had the dexterity to concert with strangers, by the means of gaining their chiefs, than if he had obtained many victories in the field. Asdrubal made a treaty with the Romans: for we are obliged to repeat in this place some facts, for the greater convenience of the reader. By this treaty it was agreed, without any explanations concerning the rest of Spain, that the Carthaginians should not carry the war beyond the river Iberus. There was also an article in it, by which the people of Saguntum were excepted, as allies of the Romans, from the number of those States the Carthaginians were allowed to attack.

The prosperity which Asdrubal enjoyed, had not Liv. xxi. 3. made him forget the obligations he was under to his father-in law. He wrote to Carthage, whither Hannibal had returned after Amilcar's death, to demand, that he should be sent to the army. Hannibal was

then about * three and twenty. The affair met with some difficulty. The Senate was divided into two powerful factions, that followed quite opposite views in the conduct of the public affairs. The one had Hanno at its head, to whom his birth, merit, and zeal for the good of the State, gave great authority in the public councils; and this party was upon all occasions for preferring a safe peace, that might preserve all the conquests in Spain, to the uncertain events of an hazardous war, which, they foresaw, would one day terminate in the ruin of their country.. The other faction, which was called the Barcinian faction, from supporting the interest of Amilcar, surnamed Barcas, and those of his family, openly declared for the war. When the Senate therefore was to deliberate upon Asdrubal's demand in respect to young Hannibal, the Barcinian faction, who desired to see him fill the place of Amilcar his father, supported the design of Asdrubal with their whole credit. On the other side Hanno, chief of the opposite faction, used his utmost endeavours to keep him at Carthage. "Asdrubal's demand," said he on this occasion, "seems just; however, I am not of opinion that we should grant it." So odd a beginning having roused the attention of the whole assembly; "Asdrubal," continued he, "believing himself indebted for his whole fortune to Amilcar, seems to have reason to be solicitous for the rise of his son, in order to testify his gratitude: but it would be inconsistent for us, to prefer private views to the interests of the public. Are we afraid, that a son of Amilcar should not imitate his father's tyrannical ambition soon enough? Are we afraid, that we shall be the slaves of the son too late, who have seen the son-in-law, after the father's death, usurp the command of our armies as an hereditary office, that belonged to him

* Livy is mistaken here in making Hannibal but fourteen years old: *vixdum puberem*. He was nine, when he was carried to Spain, where Amilcar his father passed nine years. To these eighteen must be added the first five of Asdrubal's command, which makes twenty-three years.

“ in right of succession? My advice is to keep this
 “ young man in the city, in order that he may have
 “ time to learn the submission and obedience, which he
 “ owes to the laws and the magistrates; lest this
 “ small spark should one day light up some great con-
 “ flagration.” The wisest and best of the Senate were
 of Hanno’s opinion; but the greater number, as is
 usual, carried the point against the more salutary re-
 solution.

Hannibal in consequence was sent to Spain: and Liv. xxi. 4.
 on this occasion * Livy draws his picture in the fol-
 lowing colours. As soon as he appeared in the army,
 he drew upon him the eyes and favour of the troops.
 The old soldiers in particular believed they saw their
 old General Amilcar revive in him. They observed
 the same lineaments, the same martial vigour, the same
 vivacity in his looks. But this resemblance of his
 father soon became the least attraction that gained him
 their hearts. And indeed never was there a genius
 more happily formed than his for two things, as con-
 trary as they seem; to obey and to command. In

* Missus Annibal in Hispaniam, primo statim adventu omnem ex-
 ercitus in se convertit. Amilcarem viventem redditum sibi veteres
 milites credere: eundem vigorem in ultu, vimque in oculis, habitum
 oris, lineamentaue intueri. Deinde brevi effecit, ut pater in se mi-
 nimum momentum ad favorem conciliandum esset. Nunquam ingen-
 ium idem ad res diversissimas, parendum atque imperandum, habilis
 fuit. Itaque haud facillè discerneres, utrum imperatori an exercitui
 carior esset. Neque Asdrubal alium quemquam præficere malle, ubi
 quid strenuè ac fortiter agendum esset: neque milites alio duce plus
 confidere, aut audere. Plurimum audaciæ ad pericula capeSSenda,
 plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat. Nullo labore aut corpus
 fatigari, aut animus vinci, poterat. Caloris ac frigoris patientia par:
 cibi potionisque, desiderio naturali, non voluptate, modus finitus:
 vigiliarum somnique, nec die nec nocte discriminata tempora; id quod
 gerendis rebus superesset, quieti datum. Ea neque molli strato, neque
 silentio arcessita: multi sæpe militari sagulo opertum humi jacentem
 inter custodias stationesque militum conspexerunt, Vestitus nihil inter
 æquales excellens: arma atque equi conspiciebantur. Equitum pedi-
 tumque idem longè primus erat. Princeps in prælium ibat: ultimus
 conferto prælio excedebat. Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia
 æquabant: inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plusquam Punica; nihil
 veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla
 religio. Cum hoc indole virtutum atque vitiorum, triennio sub Af-
 drubale imperatore meruit: nullâ re, quæ agenda videndaque magno
 futuro duci esset, prætermisâ. Liv. xxi. 4.

consequence it had been difficult to determine, which loved him most, the General or the soldiers. If any enterprize was to be executed, that required vigour and valour, Asdrubal made choice of him for it in preference to all others; and the troops were never more confident of success, than when he was at their head. None had more bravery than him, when it was necessary to expose himself to danger; nor any one more presence of mind in the midst of it. No fatigue could either weary his body, or depress his courage. He bore cold and heat with equal indifference. Pleasure had no share in his meals; pure necessity and the wants of nature, were his rules in eating and drinking. He knew no distinction of night and day for his hours of labour or rest: what remained of time after his affairs were finished, he gave to repose. And he sought neither a soft bed, nor silence, to invite sleep. He was often seen in a soldier's cassock lying upon the ground amongst the centinels, and at the places where guards were posted. He did not distinguish himself from others by the magnificence of his dress, but by the goodness of his horses and arms. He was at the same time the best foot-soldier and horseman in the army. He always advanced first to battle, and returned last from it. These great qualities were, however, united with as great vices: inhuman cruelty; more than Carthaginian perfidy; no respect for truth; none for what is most sacred amongst men; no fear of the Gods, no regard for the sanctity of oaths, no sense of religion. With this mixture of great virtues and great vices, he served three years under Asdrubal: during which he applied himself with infinite attention both to see and to do every thing that could form a great Captain. We shall examine, in the sequel, whether all the vicious strokes, with which Livy has compounded his picture of Hannibal, really suited him.

After the death of Asdrubal, the soldiers immediately carried Hannibal into the General's tent, and elected

elected him unanimously, young as he was, to command them: he might then be about six and twenty; and the People, at Carthage, made no difficulty of approving their choice. Hannibal perceived aright, that the faction opposite to him, which was in great credit at Carthage, would sooner or later bring it about to supplant him, if he did not make them incapable of hurting him. He therefore judged, that the most certain means to support himself, was to engage the Republic in an important war, wherein she would have occasion for his service, and he become necessary to the State. This is the usual policy of the Ambitious; who, little affected with the public interests, regard only their own advancement; and Princes, as well as States, are often blind enough not to discover the secret springs which actuate their Ministers and Generals, and to take that for zeal, which is only the effect either of vile self-interest, or frantic ambition.

From the moment he had been nominated General, as if he had already received orders to carry the war into Italy, he secretly turned all his views that way, and did not lose time, that he might not be prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. He took many towns of strength in Spain, and subjected several States: and on an important occasion, though the army of the enemy, consisting of more than an hundred thousand men, was much superior to his own in number, he knew so well how to chuse his time and posts, that he entirely defeated it. After this victory, nothing opposed him. However, he did not meddle yet with Saguntum; carefully avoiding to give the Romans any occasion for declaring war against him, before he had taken all the measures he judged necessary for the success of so great a design; and therein he followed the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to conciliate the affection of his citizens and allies, and to acquire their confidence, by giving them a liberal share of the plunder which he took from the enemy,

Liv. xxi.
3.
App. de
Bell. An.
P. 314.

Polyb. iii.
168, 169.

enemy, and paying them exactly all the arrears that were due to them: a wise precaution, which never fails of producing its effect in time.

Appian.
315.

Hannibal fearing to take upon him an enterprize so hazardous in itself, as that of besieging Saguntum, prepared people for it at a distance. He caused many complaints to be made at Carthage against the inhabitants by his creatures and emissaries. He wrote several times himself to the Senate; that the Romans were labouring underhand to debauch their allies from them, and to make Spain take arms against them. He carried on his intrigues with so much address, that full powers were given him to act in respect to Saguntum whatever he should judge most advantageous for the State. In this manner wars have their rise! For the rest, we see in this instance that Hannibal was no less an able politician than an artful Captain.

The people of Saguntum, on their side, rightly perceiving the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress made by Hannibal in his conquests. This passed in the beginning of the Consulship of Livius and Æmilius, of whom we have spoke in the preceding book, or at the end of the preceding year. The Romans appointed Deputies to go and inform themselves on the spot in the present state of affairs, with orders to lay their complaints before Hannibal, in case they should think it expedient: and if he should not give them satisfaction, to go to Carthage for the same purpose.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C. 218.
Polyb. iii.
170—173.
Liv. xxi.
6—15.

Saguntum was situated on the side of the Iberus next Carthage, about a thousand paces from the sea, in the country where the Carthaginians were permitted to carry their arms. But the inhabitants having put themselves under the protection of the Romans some years before, were excepted not only by the treaty with Asdrubal, in which there was an express article to that effect, but even by that of Lutatius, whereby the two people engaged not to attack the allies of each other.

other. For the rest, an happy situation, which procured them all the advantages of sea and land, a considerable multitude of inhabitants, exact discipline in the government of their little State, joined with principles of honour and probity, of which they gave shining proofs in their attachment and fidelity to the Romans: all this in a short time had acquired them immense riches, and enabled them to make head against all the neighbouring people.

Hannibal perceived of what importance it was to make himself master of this place. He conceived, that he should thereby deprive the Romans of all hopes of making war in Spain: that this new conquest would secure all those he had made already: that by leaving no enemy behind him, his march would be the more quiet and safe: that he should acquire money for the execution of his designs: that the plunder which his soldiers should take in it, would render them more ardent to follow him: and lastly, that the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would conciliate the people, and dispose them to favour him in the great enterprize which he meditated.

He had long been contriving a pretext, by propagating quarrels and sowing matters of division between the Saguntini and the Turdetani their neighbours. At length he openly espoused the latter; and, under pretence of doing them justice, entered the territory of Saguntum, and ravaged the whole country, whilst the Romans were losing time in deliberating and appointing embassies. Having divided his army into three bodies, he attacked the city in as many places at once. One angle of the wall ran into a valley of greater extent, and more level than the rest of the ground round the place. It was here he made his galleries approach, in order to be in a condition to bring his battering rams to work under cover. They advanced at first with sufficient facility: but in proportion as they approached the wall, they found the difficulties increase upon them. Besides, being a direct mark for the darts, which were poured upon them from

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

from a very high tower, this side of the wall being more exposed than the rest, was better fortified; and a great number of chosen troops defended the part of the city, where the enemy made most efforts to take it, with the utmost vigour and valour. The Saguntines at first kept a continual discharge of darts and arrows upon Hannibal's workmen, who never shewed themselves uncovered with impunity: and soon after, not contenting themselves with fighting from the tops of their walls and tower, they were so bold as to make sallies upon them, in order to destroy their works; and in all these actions, the loss of the Carthaginians was as great as that of the Saguntines. But when Hannibal himself, in approaching the wall with little precaution, had been dangerously wounded with a javelin in the thigh, his troops were so much terrified with the danger he had ran, that they were very near abandoning their works entirely.

The attacks were suspended for some days, till Hannibal was cured of his wound: but all that time was employed in working upon new batteries. For which reason he was no sooner in a condition to act, than the city was attacked again with more vigour than before, and on different sides at the same time. The mantles were pushed farther on, and the ram prepared to batter. Hannibal, whose army was believed to amount to an hundred and fifty thousand men, had sufficient numbers for every occasion. But the besieged found it very difficult to resist so many troops, and repulse such repeated assaults, which left them no time to breathe. The ram had already made several openings in the wall, through which the city was uncovered. Three towers fell down afterwards with all their walls. So considerable a breach made the Carthaginians imagine they were upon the point of taking Saguntum. The wall was no sooner fallen, than both sides ran with equal ardor, the one to force, and the other to defend, the city. This action had not the aspect of those tumultuous battles, that are fought during sieges, on the occasion of an assault or a sally.

a fally. It was a battle in form, sustained by two armies, drawn up as in the open field between the ruins of the walls and the narrow space between them and the houses of the city. On one side hope, on the other despair, animated the combatants: the Carthaginians assuring themselves, that with some few efforts they should carry the place; and the Saguntines opposing their bodies to the besiegers in the room of their ruined fortifications. None gave ground, for fear of seeing the post they abandoned occupied by the enemy. In consequence as they fought with abundance of ardor and animosity, and were confined within a very narrow compass, all blows took place.

The Saguntines made use of a kind of javelin, which they discharged with the hand, and called *falarica*. The wooden part towards the handle was round every where, except towards the end tipped with iron, which was square. Round this part they wrapt hemp dipt in pitch, and set it on fire. The iron was three feet long, and capable of penetrating both the arms and bodies of those at whom it was thrown. But, if it continued fixed in the shield only without piercing the body, it however occasioned great terror and perplexity. For, as it was discharged flaming, and the motion made it burn the fiercer, the soldier whom it hit, let fall his arms, and remained exposed without defence to the following discharges.

The victory was a long time in suspense between the two parties. But a resistance beyond hope having augmented the courage and force of the Saguntines, and the Carthaginians considering themselves as defeated, for the sole reason that they were not victorious, the former on a sudden raised great cries, and repulsed the besiegers into the breaches: then seeing them wavering and uncertain, they drove them even from thence, and at length obliged them to fly outright into their camp.

At this instant Hannibal was informed, that the Roman Ambassadors were just upon the point of arriving in his army. As he was resolved not to comply with

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with their demands, he chose not to hear them. He sent persons to meet them at the sea-side, and to tell them, that it was not safe for them to come to him in the midst of an army composed of so many barbarous nations with arms in their hands ; and that as for himself, the important enterprize he was employed in, did not leave him time to give audience to Ambassadors. He rightly judged, that upon his refusal to hear them, they would not fail to go directly to Carthage. For which reason he wrote instantly to the heads of the Barcinian faction to keep upon their guard, and to use their utmost endeavours to frustrate those made by the opposite party in favour of the Romans.

These Ambassadors succeeded no better at Carthage than they had at Saguntum. All the difference was, that the Senate was very willing to give them audience. None but Hanno took upon them the defence of the treaty. He was heard without interruption ; but the silence afforded to his discourse, was rather an effect of the authority which his rank gave him in the assembly, than a sign of its consent and approbation. “ This is not the first time, said he, that I have apprized you of what you had to fear from the family of Amilcar ; and that I have conjured you by the Gods, who are arbiters and witnesses of treaties, not to confide the command of your troops to any of that odious race. The manes of Amilcar cannot remain in quiet ; and whilst a single person of the blood and name of Barcas continues at Carthage, you must not depend upon the observance of treaties and alliances. Notwithstanding my advice, you have sent to your army an ambitious boy, who, burning with desire to reign, sees no other means for attaining his ends, than to live surrounded with troops, and to excite new wars continually. Herein you have lighted the fire, that consumes you, instead of putting it out. Your troops are now besieging Saguntum, contrary to the faith of a recent treaty : but the Roman armies will soon besiege Carthage under the guidance of the same Gods,

“ who avenged the infraction of antient treaties in the
 “ first war. What can be the motive for your confi-
 “ dence? Do you not know the enemy? Do you not
 “ know yourselves; or are you ignorant of the for-
 “ tune of the two nations? The Romans, before
 “ they declare themselves, send you Ambassadors,
 “ like allies, and for allies; and your important Ge-
 “ neral does not vouchsafe to admit them into his
 “ camp, and contrary to the law of nations, refuses
 “ them an audience, that ought to be granted even
 “ to enemies at war. Treated in this manner, they
 “ come hither to make their complaints to you, and
 “ to demand satisfaction. They are willing to sup-
 “ pose, that the public council of Carthage has no
 “ share in the insult; and in that case they demand,
 “ that Hannibal be delivered up to them, as the only
 “ person culpable. But the more patience and mo-
 “ deration they show at first, the more inexorable I
 “ am afraid they will be, when they have once taken
 “ arms to avenge themselves. Remember mount
 “ Eryx; remember the Ægates. Set before your
 “ eyes the calamities you have suffered, and the
 “ losses you have sustained by sea and land during
 “ twenty-four years. And you had not at your head
 “ a rash young man, like Hannibal, but his father,
 “ Amilcar himself, that other Mars, as his partizans
 “ call him. How then came you to be overcome?
 “ It was because the Gods thought fit to avenge the
 “ injury the Romans had received from us in Italy,
 “ when contrary to the faith of treaties we aided Ta-
 “ rentum: as they will avenge that which we have
 “ now committed in Spain by besieging Saguntum.
 “ * Yes, it was the Gods that punished you, and,
 “ tho’ words might have made it doubtful in the be-
 “ ginning, which side had broke the treaty, it was their
 “ will, that the event, like an equitable judge, should
 “ decide the question, in giving the victory to those,

* Vicerunt ergo dii hominesque: & id de quo verbis ambigebatur, uter populus fœdus rupisset, eventus belli, velut æquus judex, unde jus stabat, & victoriam dedit.

A. R. 534. " who had justice on their side. It is against the walls
 Ant. C. " of Carthage, that Hannibal is now advancing his
 218. " mantles and towers : It is the walls of Carthage that
 " he is now battering with his rams. I wish my pre-
 " diction may prove false : but I foresee, that the
 " ruins of Saguntum will fall heavy upon our heads,
 " and that we shall be reduced to sustain against the
 " Romans the war which we have undertaken against
 " the people of that city. You are then, says some-
 " body, for having Hannibal delivered up to the
 " Romans. I well know, that the enmity which
 " always subsisted between his father and me, may
 " render me suspected of partiality, and deprive my
 " opinion of part of the weight it ought to have with
 " the Senate. But I will not pretend, that I was not
 " glad of Amilcar's death ; because had he lived, we
 " should already have been at blows with the Romans.
 " As to his son, I hate and detest him, as the fury,
 " the firebrand of this war : and I am not only of
 " opinion for delivering him up to the Romans, as
 " they demand, to expiate the infraction of the treaty ;
 " but though they should not have required it, I
 " should advise you to banish him to the utmost ex-
 " tremities of the earth and sea ; to such a distance,
 " that his name might never more be heard amongst
 " us, nor his presence disturb the tranquility of our
 " Republic. My advice therefore is, that you decree
 " three embassies. The first to go immediately to
 " Rome to make satisfaction. The second, to de-
 " clare in your name to Hannibal, that he must with-
 " draw his troops from before Saguntum, and to de-
 " liver himself into the hands of the Romans. You
 " will direct the third to reimburse the Saguntines for
 " the losses they have sustained during the siege of
 " their city."

Almost all the Senators were so much in Hannibal's interest, that there was no occasion for any long speeches in answer to Hanno. Far from approving his advice, they reproached him with having spoken against Amilcar's son with more violence and animosity

sity than Valerius himself, the principal of the Roman Ambassadors. Accordingly, all the answer they gave him was, that it was not Hannibal, but the people of Saguntum, who had given occasion for the war; and that the Romans would be much in the wrong to prefer the Saguntines to the Carthaginians, their antient allies.

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Ant. C.
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Whilst the Romans lost time in sending Ambassadors, Hannibal pushed the siege of Saguntum with vigour. As he saw, that his soldiers were fatigued by working and fighting without any relaxation, he gave them some days rest, having however taken the precaution to post some troops for the preservation of his mantles and other works. During this time he animated them by representing the insupportable pride of the enemy, and promising them great rewards. But when he had publicly declared, that he would give them all the plunder in the city after they had taken it, the hopes of it inflamed their courage to such a degree, that if the signal had been immediately given, nothing seemed capable of resisting them. The Saguntines, on the contrary, did not employ the time that the Carthaginians suspended their attacks in idleness. But, without making any sallies, they passed day and night in building a new wall where the old one had been thrown down, and the city was exposed.

The enemies soon returned to the charge, and attacked the city with more vigour than ever; so that the besieged, confounded by the cries, which resounded on all sides, knew not which way to turn to defend it. Hannibal in person encouraged his troops both with words and actions, at the place where he caused a moving tower higher than the fortifications of the place to be brought forwards. And by the means of the balistas and catapultas, which he had disposed in the stories of that tower, having either killed or driven away all that defended the wall with discharges of stones and darts, he believed the time was come for carrying the place. For this reason he sent five hundred Africans with tools for sapping the wall at

A.R. 534. the bottom. They found no great difficulty to succeed; for the stones were not fastened together with lime and cement, but only plaistered over with a mortar of earth, according to the antient custom. Every stroke of the pickax made a much larger breach than the place where it was struck into, and whole companies entered the city through these openings.

Ant. C. 218. It was on this occasion they seized an eminence, whether they caused their machines to be carried; this place they surrounded with a wall, in order to have a kind of fort in the city, that might command it even within itself. The Saguntines, on their side, built a new wall in the part within the city, not yet taken by the enemy. Both sides applied to fortifying themselves with a kind of emulation, and were often obliged to come to blows whilst so employed. But the besieged, by losing ground, and intrenching still behind what they lost, saw their city diminish every day. They even began to want provisions, the length of the siege having exhausted their stores; and they could rely upon no relief from without; the Romans, their sole hope, being too remote, and the whole country round about in the possession of the enemy.

Reduced to this extremity, Hannibal gave them a little time to breathe, being obliged to march against the Carpetani and Oretani, who had lately taken up arms again. Those two people, exasperated by the rigour with which levies were made in their country, had rose, and even seized Hannibal's officers. But surprized at that General's diligence, they immediately returned to their duty.

The vigour of the besiegers did not relax during this expedition. Maharbal the son of Imilco, whom Hannibal had left to command in his absence, worked with so much ardor, that hardly either side perceived his absence. That officer had the advantage in all the actions that passed against the Saguntines, and battered their walls with three rams at once with so much fury, that Hannibal at his return had the pleasure to see them entirely demolished. He therefore made

made his army advance against the citadel itself. The besieged defended it with great valour; but could not prevent the enemy from taking great part of it.

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218.

Saguntum was in this condition, when Alcon, of that city, and a Spaniard named Alorcus, took upon them to attempt some means for an accommodation. The first, without consulting his countrymen, went in the night into the camp of the besiegers, not despairing of being able to move Hannibal with his prayers and tears. But when he found the incensed victor deaf to every thing, and that he proposed none but extremely hard conditions, he became a deserter from a negociator, which he had pretended himself, and remained in the camp of the Carthaginians; protesting, that it would cost any person whatsoever their life, who should dare to propose such an accommodation to the Saguntines. Now Hannibal insisted, that they should make the Turdetani satisfaction in respect to all their grievances; that they should deliver up all their gold and silver to him; and that they should quit the place without arms, and go and settle in whatever country he should assign them.

These were the conditions, to which Alcon affirmed the Saguntines would never submit. However Alorcus, who served at that time in Hannibal's army, but was the guest and friend of the Saguntines, was not of his opinion. Convinced on the contrary, that when people have lost all, they also lose courage, he took the negotiation upon himself. Going over therefore to the besieged, he delivered his arms to the sentinels, and demanded to be carried to the Prætor of Saguntum. He was followed to him by a crowd of all kinds of people, who were made to remove in order to his having audience in the Senate; where he spoke in the following terms.

“ If Alcon your fellow-citizen, after having taken
“ upon himself to demand conditions of peace of
“ Hannibal, had not wanted courage to bring back
“ such as he dictated, my undertaking this applica-
“ tion to you had been useless, which I now make

A. R. 534. " neither as a deserter, nor as a deputy from Hanni-
 Ant. C. 218. " bal. But as he has remained amongst the enemy,
 " either through his fault, if he has falsely pretended
 " to fear you ; or yours, if you cannot be told the
 " truth without danger : I thought fit as your antient
 " friend and guest to come hither, in order that you
 " might not be ignorant of the means which still re-
 " main for obtaining peace, and preserving yourselves.
 " And what ought to make you conclude, that I act
 " in this manner only out of consideration for you, is
 " my not having made any proposal to you, as long
 " as you were in a condition to defend yourselves, or
 " had any hopes of aid from the Romans. Now you
 " no longer expect any assistance from them, and nei-
 " ther your walls nor your arms can defend, or af-
 " ford you security, I come to offer you a peace,
 " more your necessity than in your favour, and which
 " cannot take place, if you do not hear the conditions
 " as a conquered people, which Hannibal proposes
 " as victor ; and if you do not consider all left you
 " as gain, rather than all taken from you as loss ; be-
 " cause, strictly speaking, all belongs to the con-
 " queror. He insists, that you abandon a city,
 " which is half in ruins, and of which he is almost
 " entirely master : but he restores you your lands,
 " and leaves you at liberty to build another wherever
 " you shall think fit. He orders you to bring to him
 " all your gold and silver, either belonging to the
 " public or particulars : but he gives life and liberty
 " to yourselves, your wives and children, provided
 " you quit Saguntum without arms. These are the
 " laws a victorious enemy dictates, and which the
 " condition you are in reduces you to accept, as hard
 " as they are. If you abandon yourselves without
 " reserve to his clemency, I do not despair of his mi-
 " tigating the rigour of these conditions, and remit-
 " ting a part of them. But, should he insist upon
 " them all without exception, would it not be better for
 " you to submit to them, than to suffer your own
 " throats to be cut, and to expose your wives and
 " chil-

“ children to all the indignities unavoidable in a place
“ taken by storm ?”

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When Alorcus had done speaking, the principal Senators retired from the people, who had ran in crouds to hear him ; and without giving him any answer, they caused all the money in the public treasury and their own houses to be thrown into a fire, which they had ordered to be kindled in the Forum, and most of them flung themselves also into the midst of the flames.

So desperate a resolution had already spread consternation throughout the whole city, when a great noise was heard on the side of the citadel, which caused no less terror. It was occasioned by the fall of a tower, that the enemy had battered a great while. A Carthaginian cohort having immediately entered through the opening made by the fall of that tower, sent to acquaint Hannibal, that the city had no defence left on that side. The General, without losing a moment's time, attacked it with all his forces, and ordered his soldiers to kill all that were of age to bear arms. This order was cruel : but the event shewed it was necessary. For what had it signified to spare a frantic and furious people, who shut themselves up in their houses, and either burnt themselves there with their wives and children, or desperately defended themselves sword in hand, to the last moment of their lives.

In this manner, after eight months care and fatigue, Hannibal took the city by storm. Though the inhabitants had purposely spoiled and destroyed all that they had of fine and magnificent, and the incensed victor had put the conquered to the sword without regard to sex or age, a prodigious quantity of money and moveables, and a great number of prisoners, were taken. Hannibal set the money apart, to be employed in his designs ; distributed the prisoners amongst the soldiers according to their several merits ; and sent all that was valuable in stuffs and moveables to Carthage. The success answered all he

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

had projected. The soldiery became more bold in exposing themselves: the Carthaginians came in with pleasure to all he demanded of them: and with the money he had abundantly supplied himself, he saw himself in a condition to execute the great designs he had formed. Hannibal, after the taking of Saguntum, retired to Carthage, to pass the winter there.

Liv. xxi.
16.

The ambassadors, who had been sent to Carthage, were scarce returned to Rome, than advice came of the taking and destroying of Saguntum. It is hard to express the grief and consternation, which that sad news occasioned at Rome. Compassion for that unfortunate city, shame of having failed to aid such faithful allies, just indignation for the Carthaginians, the authors of so many evils; all excited such trouble and confusion, that it was not possible in the first moments to form any resolution, nor to do any thing except to vent grief and shed tears for the ruin of a city, which had been the unhappy victim of its inviolable attachment to the Romans, and of the imprudent delays with which the latter had acted in regard to it.

To these first sentiments soon succeeded the most lively apprehensions for their own condition and danger, believing they saw Hannibal already at their gates. They considered, "that they never had to do with so warlike and formidable an enemy, and that the Romans had never been so little enured to arms as they then were. That what had passed between them and the people of Sardinia, Corsica, Istria, and Illyricum, might be considered rather as an exercise for their troops, than as a war in form. That Hannibal was at the head of an army of veteran soldiers, accustomed for twenty-three years to battles and victory, amongst the most warlike nations of Spain, under the bravest and most enterprising of Generals. That after having rendered them more ardent and bold by taking the most opulent city of all Spain, he was upon the point of passing the Iberus, with the most warlike nations of the country at his heels, who had come in voluntarily to follow his standards. That the

the Gauls, always fond of war, would augment his army in his march through their country. That they should see themselves reduced to fight against all the nations of the universe under the walls of Rome, and for the preservation of Rome itself.”

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

When they had recovered themselves a little, an assembly of the People was called, in which the war with the Carthaginians was determined. The Consuls drew lots for their provinces. Spain fell to Scipio, and Africa with Sicily to Sempronius. The Senate fixed the number of troops that were to serve this year at six legions. Each Roman legion consisted at that time of four thousand foot, and three hundred horse: the number of the allies to be added to them was left to the discretion of the Consuls. But they were ordered to spare nothing that was necessary for having a powerful and well manned fleet.

Dio. xxi.
17.

Two Roman legions were given to Sempronius: sixteen thousand foot and eighteen hundred horse of the allies, and an hundred and sixty galleys of five benches of oars with twelve galliots. Sempronius was sent into Sicily with these land and sea forces; and with orders to go to Africa, in case his colleague was in a condition with the troops that remained to prevent Hannibal from entering Italy.

As the latter advanced by land, Scipio had only sixty galleys left him, with two Roman legions; and fourteen thousand foot and sixteen hundred horse of the troops of the allies.

The Prætor L. Manlius with two Roman legions, ten thousand foot and a thousand horse, was sent into Gallia Cisalpina, even before the Carthaginians were expected on that side.

Public enterprizes, whether great or small, always began at Rome by acts of religion, without which they did not believe they could hope good success. Processions through the city were therefore decreed, and public prayers in the temples, for obtaining the protection of the Gods during the war, for which the Roman People were preparing.

A.R. 534.

Ant. C.

218.

Liv. xxi.

18.

Polyb. iii.

187.

After all these measures had been taken at Rome, the Senate, that they might have nothing to impute to themselves, thought it proper, before hostilities were commenced, to send Ambassadors into Africa, who were chosen out of the principal persons of that august body. They were to demand of the Senate of Carthage, whether it was by their order, that Hannibal had besieged Saguntum; and if they answered in the affirmative, as it was probable they would, to declare war against the people of Carthage in the name of the Roman people. As soon as they arrived at Carthage, and had obtained audience, Fabius, who was at the head of the embassy, without any preliminary discourse, declared the commission he was charged with. Upon which one of the principal Senators of Carthage spoke as follows: "Your first Ambassadors in demanding, that Hannibal should be delivered up to you, under pretence that he had besieged Saguntum on his own authority, perfectly shewed us, to what an height you carry your pride. This second embassy is more moderate in appearance; but more unjust and violent at bottom than the first. At first you confined yourselves to the person of Hannibal only: now you attack all the Carthaginians, from whom you are for extorting a confession of their pretended fault, in order to assume a right from that confession, to demand reparation for it from them. As for me, the question between you and us seems not to be, whether Hannibal, in besieging Saguntum, has acted of his own head, or by our command; but whether the enterprize were just or unjust in itself. The first question concerns only us. It belongs only to us to judge our citizen, and to examine, whether he has undertaken the war of his own head, or by our orders. All that you can discuss on this point with us, is confined to knowing, whether the siege of Saguntum be an actual contravention of the treaty. Now, as yourselves supply us with a distinction between enterprizes under-

“ undertaken by a General upon his own authority, A. R. 534.
 “ and those which he executes by that of the public ; Ant. C.
 “ I confess, that the Consul Lutatius made a treaty 218.
 “ with us, wherein there is a clause, by which the
 “ allies of both States are exempted from all insults.
 “ But there is not one word in it of the Saguntines,
 “ who at that time were not your allies. You will
 “ answer, no doubt, that in the treaty which you
 “ made some time after with Asdrubal, the Sagun-
 “ tines are expressly mentioned. I allow it : but to
 “ this objection I shall answer only what you have
 “ taught us yourselves. You have pretended, that
 “ you were not held to execute the first treaty made
 “ by Lutatius, because it had not been confirmed by
 “ the Senate and People of Rome ; and for this rea-
 “ son a second was made, which was ratified by both
 “ orders. We admit this principle. If then the
 “ treaties made by your Generals do not oblige you,
 “ unless you have previously approved them ; that
 “ which Asdrubal made with you without consulting
 “ us, can neither oblige us. Cease therefore to talk
 “ of Saguntum and the Iberus, and at length de-
 “ clare the design which you have so long concealed
 “ at heart.”

Fabius then holding up a piece of his robe that was doubled together : “ I have here,” said he in a lofty tone, “ peace and war ; and you are to chuse one or the other.” Upon being answered, that he might make that choice himself : “ I give you war then,” said he, letting fall his robe. “ We accept it willingly, and shall make it so,” replied the Carthaginians with the same loftiness.

This simple and open manner of interrogating the Carthaginians, and afterwards upon their answer, of declaring war against them, seemed to the Romans Polyb. iii.
175, 176.
Liv. xxi.
19. more consistent with the dignity of their character, than if they had amused themselves in subtilizing upon the construction of the treaties, especially after the taking and demolition of Saguntum had left no hope of peace. For, if the question had been to enter into disputes,

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Ant. C.
218.

disputes, it had been easy to have replied to the Carthaginian Senator, that he was in the wrong to compare the first treaty of Lutatius, which was changed, with that made with Asdrubal; because it was expressly stipulated in that of Lutatius, "that it should be only so far in force as it should be approved by the Roman People:" whereas there was no such exception in that of Asdrubal; and the latter had been confirmed by a silence of so many years, during the life of Asdrubal himself, and after his death. After all, had they adhered to the treaty of Lutatius in question, the Saguntines are sufficiently comprehended in the general terms of "the allies of the two States;" that clause neither declaring those that were so at that time, nor excepting such as might become so in the sequel. Now both States having reserved to themselves entire liberty in that respect for the time to come, was it just either that they should admit no nation into their alliance, whatever services they might receive from it, or that they should not protect such as they did admit into it? All that the Romans and Carthaginians could mutually require, was, that they should not endeavour to debauch each other's allies; and, if there were any people who should be for going over from the one to the other, that they should not be received.

Polybius, from whom Livy has extracted this whole reasoning, adds a reflexion, which the latter ought not to have omitted. It would, said he, be a gross mistake, to consider the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal, as the principal and real cause of the second Punic war. It was the beginning, but not the cause of it. The regret of the Carthaginians for having given up Sicily too easily by the treaty with Lutatius, which terminated the first Punic war; the injustice and violence of the Romans, who took the advantage of the troubles in Africa, to make the Sardinians also take arms against the Carthaginians, and to impose a new tribute upon them; and lastly, the great success and conquests of the latter in Spain, which alarm-
ed

ed the one, and inspired the other with courage and presumption: these were the real causes of the rupture. If only the taking of Saguntum were to be considered, the Carthaginians would be wholly in the wrong, who could not, with any reasonable pretext, besiege a city, undoubtedly included, as the ally of Rome, in the treaty of Lutatius. The Saguntines indeed were not in alliance at the time that treaty was concluded: but it is evident, that the two States did not divest themselves by that treaty of the liberty of making new alliances. To take things only in this view, the Carthaginians would have been absolutely inexcusable. But if we go farther back to the times when Sardinia was taken by force from the Carthaginians, and without any reason a new tribute imposed upon them, it must be confessed, (says Polybius, who still speaks) that the conduct of the Romans, in respect to these two points, can by no means be excused, being solely founded upon injustice and violence. This is certainly a blot in their glory, which their greatest actions cannot remove. I only ask, whether the notorious injustice of the Romans previously committed, did not justify the Carthaginians in no longer observing a treaty concluded in all the forms, and whether it was not a legitimate reason for entering into a war with them? In this kind of discussions of treaties, people very seldom act with a due regard to faith, or think it incumbent upon them to make justice their sole guide and interpreter.

The Roman Ambassadors, according to the order they had received at setting out, went from Carthage into Spain, to endeavour to engage the States of that nation in the amity of the Romans, or at least to dissuade them from entering into that of the Carthaginians. The Bargusians *, whom they visited, not being satisfied with the Carthaginians, whose yoke was become insupportable to them, received them with abundance of favour; and their example made most

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

Liv. xxi.
19, 20.

* People between Catalonia and Arragon.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

of the nations beyond the Iberus desire to change sides. The Roman Ambassadors applied next to the Volscians; but the answer they received from them spreading throughout Spain, made other States lose all the inclination they might have had to ally themselves with Rome. "Are you not ashamed," said the oldest person in the assembly, where they had audience, "to ask us to prefer your alliance to that of the Carthaginians, after what it has lately cost the Saguntines, whom you their allies treated with greater cruelty in abandoning them, than Hannibal their enemy in destroying their city. I advise you to go in quest of allies into other countries, where the fate of Saguntum is not known. The ruins of that unfortunate city are a sad indeed, but salutary, lesson for all the States of Spain, that ought to teach them to place no confidence in the Romans." After this discourse, they were ordered to quit the territory of the Volscians directly. They were no better treated by the rest of the Spanish nations, to whom they applied; so that, after having ran over all Spain ineffectually, they entered Gaul, and went at first to * Ruscino.

It was then the custom of the Gauls to come to the assemblies compleatly armed: which, at their first appearance, presented an object terrible enough to the eyes of the Romans. It was still worse, when after having extolled the glory and valour of the Romans, and the greatness of their dominions, they demanded of the Gauls of this canton, to refuse the Carthaginians, who were going to invade Italy, passage over their lands, and through their cities. For there arose so great a murmur, attended with fits of laughter, in the assembly, that the magistrates and old persons could not quiet the impetuosity of the youth without great difficulty; so void of reason and even shame did it seem to ask the Gauls, that in order to spare Italy, they should take a dangerous war upon

* City in the neighbourhood of Perpignan.

themselves, and expose their own lands to being plundered and destroyed for the sake of preserving those of others. The tumult being at length appeased, the oldest person made the Ambassadors this reply :
 “ That the Gauls had never received either any service from the Romans, or any injury from the Carthaginians, that ought to induce them to take arms for the one against the other. That on the contrary they were informed, their countrymen settled in Italy had been very ill treated by the Romans ; who had driven them out of the lands they had conquered, laden them with tributes, and greatly injured them in every respect.”

A. R. 534.
 Ant. C.
 218.

They were not treated more favourably in any other part of Gaul. The Massilienses were the only people that received them like friends. These equally faithful and vigilant allies apprized the Romans of every thing it was for their interest to know, after having taken great care to be informed of it themselves. They gave them to understand, that Hannibal had been beforehand with them, in order to secure the amity of the Gauls : but that this nation, savage and greedy of money, would continue no longer in his interest, than he took care to engage their Chiefs by presents.

Having ran over the different regions of Spain and Gaul in this manner, they arrived at Rome, immediately after the Consuls had set out for their provinces, and found all the citizens full of the war, which they were going to have upon their hands ; nobody doubting but that Hannibal had already passed the Iberus.

That General, after taking Saguntum, went into winter-quarters at Carthagera. Here he received advice of all that had passed in respect to him both at Carthage and Rome. In consequence, considering himself not only as the Chief, but as the author and cause of the war, he either distributed, or sold, what remained of the spoils ; and persuaded that he had no time to lose, he assembled the Spanish soldiers,

Polyb. iii.
 187, 188.
 Liv. xxi.
 21, 22.

A. R. 534.
Ant C.
218.

and said to them: "I believe, friends, that you rightly perceive, now we have established peace throughout Spain, that the only choice we have to make, if we desire not to quit our arms, and disband our armies, is to carry the war elsewhere. For we can only procure these nations the advantages of peace and victory, by marching against a people, whose defeat may acquire us glory and riches. But, as we are going to undertake a remote war, and it may happen, that we shall not return so soon as we could wish; if any of you are desirous to see your countries and families, I give you my permission. You will return to your countries very early in the spring, in order that with the protection of the Gods, we may go and begin a war, that will crown us with glory, and load us with riches."

This permission, which he granted them of himself, gave them abundance of pleasure, because almost all of them desired extremely to see their countries again, from which they foresaw they should be absent a great while. The rest they enjoyed during the whole winter, between the labours they had already passed, and those they were still to experience, restored all the vigour of body, and ardor of courage they had occasion for in the new enterprizes they were to execute. They came to the rendezvous at the beginning of the spring.

Liv. xxi.
21.

Hannibal having reviewed the different nations, of which his army was composed, returned to Gades, a Phœnician colony, as well as Carthage, in order to perform the vows he had made to Hercules; and he made new ones to that God for the good success of his designs. But as he was no less intent upon the defence of his country, than upon attacking that of the enemy, he resolved to leave forces considerable enough in Africa to cover it against the attempts of the Romans, in case they should think fit to make descents in it, whilst he was on his march through Spain and Gaul to enter Italy by land. For this purpose

Polyb. iii.
178.

pose he caused levies to be made in Africa and Spain, especially of slingers, and those that discharged darts and arrows : but he made the Africans serve in Spain, and the Spaniards in Africa ; being persuaded, that they would behave better in a strange country than in their own, especially as they had contracted by that exchange, a reciprocal obligation to defend themselves well. He sent thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot armed with light bucklers, and eight hundred and seventy slingers of the islands Baleares, with twelve hundred horse of different countries, into Africa. He garrisoned Carthage with part of these troops, and distributed the rest in the country about it. At the same time he ordered four thousand chosen youth to be raised in the different cities of the provinces, whom he sent to Carthage, as well to serve for hostages there, as for the defence of the city.

He did not think it proper to neglect Spain, especially as he had been informed that the Roman Ambassadors had used their utmost endeavours to engage the several States in their interests. He charged his brother, a bold and active man, with the defence of it ; and for that service gave him the following forces, most of them raised in Africa : eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty African foot, three hundred Ligurians, and five hundred Balearian slingers. To this body of infantry, he added four hundred and fifty Liby-phœnician horse, eighteen hundred Numidians and Mauritians, and two hundred Ilergetes, a Spanish nation. And in order that nothing wherein the force of a land-army consisted might be wanting, he added one and twenty elephants. And lastly, as he did not doubt but the Romans would act by sea, where they had gained a famous victory, which had terminated the first war between them and the Carthaginians ; for the defence of the coasts, he left him fifty galleys of five benches of oars, two of four, and five of three. He gave his brother wise advice concerning the manner in which he was to act both in respect to the Spaniards and the Romans, in case they should attack him.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

Liv. xxi.
22.
Polyb. iii.
189.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

We see here from the beginning of this war, in the person of Hannibal, the model of an excellent General, whose wise foresight nothing escapes; who gives his orders on all sides where necessary; who takes all the measures early, that can conduce to the success of his designs; that always pursues those he has taken; and who never forms any, that are not great; who shews so perfect a knowledge of war, that, if he had not been so young, it might have passed for the effect of consummate experience.

S E C T. II.

Hannibal secures the good-will of the Gauls. He signifies the day for beginning the march of the troops. Dream or vision of Hannibal. He marches towards the Pyreneans. Way Hannibal had to march from Carthage to Italy. The Gauls favour the passage of Hannibal through their lands. Revolt of the Boii against the Romans. Defeat of the Prætor Manlius. The Consuls set out for their respective provinces. P. Scipio arrives at Marseilles by sea. He is informed, that Hannibal is upon the point of passing the Rhone. Passage of the Rhone by Hannibal. Skirmish between the detachments sent out by both parties. Deputation of the Boii to Hannibal. He harangues the troops before he enters the Alps. P. Scipio finds Hannibal set out. The latter continues his route to the Alps. He is chosen arbiter between two brothers, and places the oldest upon the throne. Famous passage of the Alps by Hannibal. Greatness and wisdom of that General's enterprize.

Polyb. iii.
188.

HANNIBAL having provided for the safety of Africa and Spain, waited only for the arrival of the couriers, which the Gauls were to send, and the informations which he expected from them, concerning the fertility of the country at the foot of the Alps and along the Po; the number of the inhabitants; whether they were a warlike people; whether they retained

retained any animosity against the Romans in effect of the war with them sometime before. He had great expectations from that nation. It was for this reason, that he had taken care to send deputies to all the petty kings of Gaul, as well on this side of the Alps, as those who inhabited those mountains, resolving to fight the Romans only in Italy, and rightly judging, that he should stand in need of the help of the Gauls, for overcoming the obstacles which he should meet with on his way. He therefore took care to gain their chiefs by presents, of which he knew they were very greedy, and thereby to assure himself of the affection and fidelity of a part of that nation. At length the couriers arrived, and informed him of the disposition of the Gauls, who expected him with impatience; of the extraordinary height of the Alps, and the difficulties he must expect to find in passing them, though it was not absolutely impracticable.

Early in the spring, Hannibal made his troops quit their winter-quarters. The news he received from Carthage of what had been done there in his favour, had extremely encouraged him. Assured of the goodwill of his citizens, he began then to speak freely of the war with the Romans to his soldiers. He represented to them "in what manner the Romans had demanded, that himself, and all the officers of the army, should be delivered up to them. He spoke with advantage of the fertility of the country they were going to enter, of the disposition of the Gauls in his favour, and the alliance they were to make together." The troops having told him, that they were ready to follow him wherever he thought fit, he praised their courage, declared the day when he would set out, and dismissed the assembly.

Upon the day fixed, Hannibal began his march at the head of ninety thousand foot, and about twelve thousand horse. He passed near * Etovissa, and advanced towards the Iberus, without quitting the sea-

* The exact situation of this city is not known.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

coast. He is said to have had a dream here, in which he saw a young man of a form and stature more than human, who said, he was sent by Jupiter to conduct Hannibal into Italy. It is added, that he bade him follow him and keep him in view, without looking off upon any other object. That accordingly he did so at first with respect mingled with dread, without turning his eyes any other way. But that at length, not being able to resist a curiosity so natural to mankind, especially in things forbidden, he turned his head to see the object he was forbade to look upon. That he then perceived a serpent of enormous magnitude, that rolled itself along amongst the shrubs, which it beat down on the right and left with a great noise. That at the same time it began to thunder with a dreadful storm. And lastly, that having asked, what this prodigy signified? he was answered, that it presaged the desolation of Italy: but that he continued his march, without enquiring farther concerning an event, which the fates were for keeping a secret.

Polyb. iii.
189, 190.

Be this dream as it will, for Polybius says nothing of it, Hannibal passed the Iberus, attacked the several* nations that inhabited the country upon his route from the Iberus to the Pyrenean mountains, fought several bloody battles, in which himself lost a considerable number of men. He however subjected that country, of which he gave Hanno the government, in order to be master of the defiles, which separate Spain from Gaul. To guard these passes, and awe the inhabitants of the country, he left him ten thousand foot, and a thousand horse, and the keeping of the baggage of those who were to follow him into Italy.

Hannibal here was informed, that three thousand of the Carpetani, terrified by the length of the way, and the height of the Alps, which they represented to themselves as unfurmountable, had taken their route back to their own country. He saw plainly that he should get nothing by endeavouring to retain them,

* The Ilorgetes, Bargusians, Erenesians, and Andosians.

by kind treatment, and at the same time was afraid of irritating the savage disposition of others, if he employed force. He therefore used address and policy; and, besides that number, dismissed seven thousand soldiers more, who, he perceived, were no longer pleased with this war, pretending, that it was also by his order, that the Carpetani had retired. By this wise conduct he prevented the bad effects which the desertion of the Carpetani might have occasioned in the army, had it been known; and he gave the troops hopes of being discharged, whenever they pleased; a powerful motive to induce them to follow him cheerfully, and not to be tired of the service.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

The army not being incumbered then with their baggage, and composed of fifty thousand foot, nine thousand horse, and thirty-seven elephants, Hannibal made it march through the Pyreneans, in order to go on and pass the Rhone. This army was formidable, more by the valour than number of the troops, who had served many years in Spain under the most able Generals Carthage had ever produced.

Polybius gives us a very clear idea of the length of way which Hannibal had to march, in order to arrive in Italy. From Carthagenæ, from whence he set out, to the Iberus, is two thousand two hundred stadia: (110 * leagues.) From the Iberus to Emporium, a little maritime town, that separates Spain from Gaul according to Strabo, sixteen hundred stadia: (80 leagues.) From Emporium to the passage of the Rhone, the same space of 1600 stadia: (80 leagues.) From the passage of the Rhone to the Alps fourteen hundred stadia: (70 leagues.) From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred stadia: (60 leagues.) Thus from Carthagenæ to Italy, the way is eight thousand stadia, that is to say, four hundred leagues. These measures must be right; for Polybius tells us, that the Romans had carefully divided this route by spaces of eight stadia, that is to say by Roman miles.

* The estimate here is twenty stadia to a league.

A.R. 534.

Ant. C.

218.

Polyb. iii.

195.

Liv. xxi.

24.

Hannibal having passed the Pyreneans, incamped near the city of * Illiberis. The Gauls well knew, that his design was against Italy, and had at first expressed sufficient good-will for the deputies he had sent to them. But having been apprized, that he had subjected by force several states of Spain beyond the Pyreneans, and that he had left strong garrisons in their countries to keep them in awe, the fear of being enslaved like them made them take arms, and assemble in sufficiently great numbers near † Ruscino. Hannibal being apprized of this, apprehended the delay they might occasion of his march, much more than the force of their arms. This obliged him to send deputies to the petty Kings of the country, to demand an interview of them. “ He gave them their choice either to come to him at Illiberis, where he was incamped, or to suffer that he should approach Ruscino; in order that the proximity of place might facilitate their conversations. That as for him, he would receive them with joy in his camp, or would immediately attend them in theirs, if they chose that. That the Gauls ought to treat him as a friend, and not as an enemy; and that unless they forced him to it, he would not draw his sword till he arrived in Italy. This he gave them to understand by his deputies. But their Princes coming themselves immediately to him at Illiberis, they were so charmed with the good reception he gave them, and the presents he made them, that they left his army at entire liberty to pass through the country, taking their route by Ruscino.

In the mean time the Romans were informed by deputies from ‡ Massilia, that Hannibal had passed the Iberus. This was a new motive to make them hasten the execution of their project of sending an army into Spain under the command of P. Cornelius, and another into Africa under that of Tiberius Sem-

* Now called Colioure in Roussillon.

† Near Perpignan. Hod. Ruscinon.

‡ Marseilles.

pronius. But whatever diligence they used, they could not prevent that of their enemy.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C. 218.

Whilst the two Consuls were levying troops, and making other preparations, all possible expedition was used to conclude every thing relating to the colonies, before intended to be sent into Cisalpine Gaul. The cities were inclosed with walls, and those who were to inhabit them, were ordered to repair thither in thirty days. Each of these colonies consisted of six thousand men. One was settled on this side the Po, and called Placentia; and the other on the other side of that river, to which the name of Cremona was given.

Polyb. iii. 193—194
Liv. xxi. 25—26.

These colonies were no sooner settled, than the Boii, being apprized of the approach of the Carthaginians, and promising themselves much from their aid, revolted from the Romans, without regard to the hostages they had given them at the end of the last war. They drew over the Insubrians, whom an antient grudge against the Romans before inclined to take arms, and both together ravaged the country, which the Romans had distributed. Those who fled were pursued as far as Mutina, another colony of the Romans: (Modena.) Mutina itself was besieged. They shut up three Romans of great distinction in that place, who had been sent thither to distribute the lands: these were C. Lutatius, a person of Consular dignity, and two old Prætors. They demanded an interview, which was granted them by the Boii: but contrary to their engagement, they seized their persons, with the view of recovering their hostages by their means.

Upon this news, L. Manlius the Prætor, who, as we have said, commanded an army in the country, made his troops march towards that city, without having taken any precaution, or so much as acquainted himself with the country. The Boii had laid ambuscades in a forest. As soon as the Romans entered it, they fell upon them from all sides: Manlius lost a great part of his army, and with much difficulty escaped with the rest, whom not without great pains

A. R. 534. and danger, he made enter Tanetum, a small town
 Ant. C. on the banks of the Po, where they intrenched them-
 218. selves, and where they were afterwards besieged by
 the enemy.

When it was known at Rome, that they were to have the revolt of the Gauls upon their hands, at the same time with the impending war of the Carthaginians, the Senate sent the Prætor C. Atilius to the aid of Manlius with a Roman legion, and five thousand of the allies, whom the Consul P. Scipio had lately raised. The enemy retired on the rumour of this march. Publius however raised a new legion to supply the place of that, which had been sent with the Prætor.

Polyb. iii. In the beginning of the same spring that Hannibal
 194. passed the Iberus and the Pyrenees, the Consuls, having made all the necessary dispositions for the execution of their designs, set sail, Publius with sixty ships for Spain, and Tiberius Sempronius with an hundred and sixty of five benches of oars for Africa.

The latter acted at first with so much impetuosity, made such formidable preparations at Lilybæum, and assembled such great bodies of troops from all sides, that it might have been thought, his design was, when he landed in Africa, to besiege Carthage.

Polyb. iii. Publius keeping along the coasts of Hetruria, Li-
 195. guria, and the mountains of the Salians, arrived the
 Liv. xxi. fifth day in the neighbourhood of Marseilles, landed his
 26. troops, and incamped near the first of the mouths, by which the Rhone empties itself into the sea, with design to give Hannibal battle in Gaul, before he arrived at the Alps. He was far from believing, that he had passed the Pyrenees already. But being informed, that he was even upon the point of passing the Rhone, he was sometime uncertain whether he should march in order to meet him. Seeing that his troops had not perfectly recovered the fatigues of their voyage, he gave them some days rest, contenting himself with sending out three hundred of his bravest horse, as scouts, with some Gauls then in the pay of the people
 of

of Massilia, with orders to approach the enemy as near as they could without exposing themselves, and to observe well their march, number, and aspect. This delay was highly salutary for Hannibal. For had the Consul hastened his march, and joined the Gauls in order to dispute the passage of the river with him, he might have put a stop to his progress, and frustrated all his designs.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

Hannibal having either awed or brought over all the other nations of Gaul, whose country he had passed through, was arrived at about the distance of four days march from the mouth of the Rhone in the country of the Volcæ, a powerful people. They inhabited on the banks of the Rhone on both sides of that river: But despairing of being able to defend the side, on which the Carthaginians were entering their country, they removed with all their effects to the other, and prepared to dispute the passage of those strangers with force of arms. All the other States that inhabited along the Rhone, and especially those on whose lands Hannibal incamped, ardently desired to see him on the other side of that river, in order to be delivered from so great a multitude of soldiers, that starved them. In consequence he easily engaged them by presents to assemble all the barks they had; and even to build new ones. He also caused an extraordinary number of boats, skiffs, and floats to be made; in which work he passed two days.

Polyb. iii.
195—200.
Liv. xxi.
26—28.

The Gauls were posted on the other side, in a good disposition for disputing the passage with him. It was not possible to attack them in front. He therefore commanded a considerable detachment of his troops under the command of * Hanno son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up, and in order to conceal their march and his design from the knowledge of the enemy, he made them set out the beginning of the third night. He ordered him to go up the river towards its source, and to pass it with the troops as secretly as

* Not the Hanno left to command in Spain.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

possible at the first place where it was fordable, and afterwards to take a large compass in approaching the enemy, in order to fall on them in the rear at the proper time. This succeeded as he intended. The Gauls, whom Hannibal had given them for guides, made them march about five and twenty miles; at the end of which, they shewed Hanno a little island, formed by the river in dividing itself, which occasions its being not so deep, and more easy to pass, in this place. They * passed the river the next day without any resistance, or being perceived by the enemy. They halted the rest of the day, and during the night (which was the fifth) they advanced with little noise towards the enemy.

Hannibal in the mean time prepared to attempt the passage. The heavy armed troops were to go on board the greater barks, and the light armed infantry in the small. The greater were placed above in a long file and upon the same line, and the less below, in order that the former sustaining the violence of the stream, the latter might have less to suffer from it. It was conceived proper to make the horses follow swimming; and in order to that, a man in the stern of each boat held three or four on each side by the reins. Parts of the horses were made to enter the water entirely equipped, in order that their riders might immediately charge the enemy on landing. By this means a sufficiently great number of troops were thrown upon the other side at the first passage.

Hannibal had not began to pass the river with his army, till after he had seen a smoke rise on the other side; which was the signal the troops, that had passed the river with Hanno, was to make. Every thing was immediately disposed, and spoke the prelude of a great battle. In the barks some mutually encouraged each other with great cries; whilst others, to use the expression, strove with the violence of the stream; and the Carthaginians, who remained upon the shore, ani-

* This is believed to have been between Roquemaure and Pont St. Esprit.

mated their companions with their voices and gesture. The Barbarians, on the other side, according to custom, raised dreadful cries and howlings, clashing their shields together, and already assuring themselves of victory. At that instant, they heard a great noise behind them, saw all their tents on fire, and themselves vigorously attacked in the rear. Hannibal animated by this success, drew up his troops in battle as they landed, exhorted them to behave with bravery, and led them on against the enemy. The latter, terrified, and already in disorder by so unforeseen an event, were instantly broke, and put to flight.

Hannibal, master of the passage, and at the same time victor over the Gauls, immediately took care to make the rest of his troops pass the river, and incamped that night upon its banks. The next morning, on the report that the Roman fleet was arrived at the mouth of the Rhone, he detached five hundred Numidian horse to discover where the enemy lay, their number, and what they were doing.

It remained now to make the elephants pass the Rhone, which occasioned abundance of perplexity; but that was removed in the following manner. A raft of two hundred feet in length and fifty in breadth, was brought to the side of the river, and made fast by large cables to beams planted along the shore. This float was covered all over with earth: so that those animals on going upon it, imagined that they went as usual upon the land. From this first float, which was fixed, they passed on to a second, of the same form, but only an hundred feet in length, and made fast to the other by cords easily untied. The females were made to go foremost. The other elephants followed them; and when they had passed on to the second float, it was let loose from the first, and towed to the other side by small boats. After which it returned to fetch the rest. Some fell into the water, but got to shore to the rest, so that not one of them was drowned.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.
Polyb. iii.
198.
Liv. xxi.
29.

In the mean time the two parties sent out to view the armies of each other, happening to meet, an action, much more furious and bloody than could be expected from so small a number, ensued. Almost all the men were wounded. The number of the slain was pretty equal on both sides: and it was not till after a very obstinate resistance, that the Numidians fled, and abandoned the victory to the Romans, who began to be extremely fatigued on their side. The victors lost an hundred and sixty men, Romans and Gauls; and of the Numidians more than two hundred remained upon the spot. This action, which was at once, says Livy, the beginning of this war, and the presage of its success, made people judge, that if the Romans had the advantage in the end, they would at least buy their victory dear. After it was over, the Romans in pursuing the enemy approached the intrenchments of the Carthaginians, examined every thing with their own eyes, and immediately flew to give the Consul an account of what they had seen.

Polyb. iii.
197.
Liv. xxi.
29.

Hannibal was in doubt, whether he should go to Italy without fighting, or come to blows with the first enemy he should meet on his way. Magalus, Prince of the Boii, and chief of the embassy sent to him by that people, removed that uncertainty. He told him, “ that the Boii and the other Gauls called him in to their aid, and promised to join him in the war against the Romans. He took it upon himself to conduct his army into Italy by ways, where it would want nothing, and by which his march would be short and safe. He described the fertility of the country it was to enter in magnificent terms, and dwelt particularly upon the disposition of the several states to take arms in his favour against their common enemy. He concluded with advising him to reserve all his forces for Italy, and not to give battle, till it arrived there.”

Hannibal being determined to pursue his route to Italy, assembled his soldiers, and as he had perceived some coldness, especially in respect to the length of
the

the way and passing the Alps, of which they had a terrible idea from report, he made use both of reproaches and praises, to reanimate their courage. He represented to them, "that having to that day confronted the greatest dangers with them, he could scarce comprehend from whence the terror that seized them could arise. That during the many years they had served under his father, under Asdrubal, and himself, they had always been victorious. That they had passed the Iberus with design to deliver the Universe from the tyranny of the Romans, and to extirpate the very name of that haughty people. That then none of them thought the way too long, though it were to be from the extremity of the West to that of the East. That now, when they had marched the greatest part of it; had passed the Pyrenees in the midst of the most savage nations; had passed the Rhone, and stemmed the impetuous waves of so rapid a river in the view of so many thousand Gauls, who had disputed the passage with them in vain: now when they found themselves close to the Alps, of which the opposite side to that before them was part of Italy, they wanted spirit and resolution. What image then did they form of the Alps! Did they believe them any thing but high mountains? That though they were higher than the Pyrenees, there certainly was no land that touched the sky, or was not to be passed by mankind. That it was certain the Alps were inhabited; that they were cultivated; that they subsisted men and other animals, to whom they had given birth. That the Ambassadors themselves from the Gauls, whom they saw before their eyes, had no wings, when they passed them to come thither. That the ancestors of the same Gauls, before they settled in Italy, where they were strangers, had often passed them with an innumerable multitude of women and children, who went with them in quest of new habitations. He concluded with repeating all the aids, with which the Ambassadors of the Gauls had engaged to supply them."

A.R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.
Liv. xxi.
30.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

The foldiers would scarce give Hannibal time to conclude, but raised their hands up all together, and declared they were ready to follow wherever he would lead them. He fixed their departure for the next day; and after having made vows and supplications to the Gods for the safety of the whole army, he dismissed them, recommending it to them, to refresh and rest themselves. Accordingly he set out the next day.

Polyb. iii.
202.
Liv. xxi.
31.

Whatever diligence P. Scipio made, with design to give Hannibal battle, he did not arrive at the place where the Carthaginians had passed the Rhone till three days after they were marched. Having no hopes of coming up with them, he returned to his fleet, and embarked again, with the resolution to go and wait for them at the bottom of the Alps. But in order not to leave Spain without defence, he sent his brother Cneus thither, with the greatest part of his troops, to make head against Asdrubal, and set out for Geneva, intending to act with the army in Cisalpine Gaul near the Po against Hannibal.

Id. Ibid.

Hannibal set out the next day as he had declared, and continued his march through Gaul along the river towards the north: not because that way was the most direct and shortest, but that by removing from the sea, he removed from Scipio, and favoured his design of entering Italy with all his forces, and without weakening them by any battle.

Ibid. 103.
Liv. xxi.
31.

After a march of four days he arrived at a kind of island, as it was called, formed by the confluence of the * Isara and the Rhone, which unite in this place.

* The text of Polybius, as we have it, and that of Livy, place this island between the Saone and the Rhone, that is to say, where Lyons has been since built. This is pretended to be an error. In the Greek it was wrote Σκάρπυς, to which the word Ἀραῶν has been substituted. Jac. Gronovius says he saw it wrote Bisarat in a manuscript of Livy: which shews, that "Isara Rhodanusque amnes" must be read instead of "Arar Rhodanusque;" and that the island in question is formed by the confluence of the Isara and Rhone. The situation of the Allobroges, mentioned here, is an evident proof of this. I do not enter into this kind of disputes. I thought it necessary to follow the correction.

Here

Here he was chosen arbiter between two brothers, who disputed the crown with each other. He adjudged it to the eldest, conformably to the intention of the Senate and principal persons. The Prince in gratitude for that service, supplied him abundantly with provisions and cloathing, of which his army was in extreme want, for covering themselves against the insupportable cold they were to feel on the Alps.

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The greatest service which Hannibal received from the prince which he had just placed upon the throne, was his posting his troops in the rear of the Carthaginians, who were in some distrust and fear of the Allobroges, and his escorting them to the place where they were to enter the Alps.

After marching about eight hundred stadia (forty leagues) in ten days, they arrived at the foot of the Alps. The sight of those mountains, which seemed to touch the sky, and were covered all over with snow, where nothing was to be seen but a few wretched cottages, dispersed here and there, and situated upon the tops of inaccessible rocks, but lean cattle starved with cold, men with long uncouth hair and beards, and of a fierce and savage aspect; these objects revived the thoughts they had conceived of them before, and struck the soldiers with dread.

As long as Hannibal had continued in the flat country, the Allobroges had not disturbed him in his march, whether because they feared the Carthaginian cavalry, or that the troops of the King of the Gauls kept them in awe. But when that escort retired, and Hannibal began to enter into the defiles of the mountains, the Allobroges ran in great numbers to seize the eminences, that commanded the places through which his army must necessarily pass. The troops were extremely alarmed, when they perceived those mountaineers perched upon the ridges of their rocks. Had they known how to improve their advantage, and keep their posts, which was very easy to have done, all had been over with the whole army, which might have been entirely destroyed in those

moun-

Polyb. iii.
203—209.
Liv. xxi.
32—37.

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218.

mountains. Hannibal stopped, made his troops halt, and as there was no other passage that way, he incamped as well as he could in the midst of a thousand precipices, and sent some of his Gaulish guides to view the disposition of the enemy. By their means he learnt, that the defile where he was stopped, was guarded only in the day-time by the inhabitants, who at night retired to their several cottages. This information saved the army.

Hannibal, early in the morning, advanced towards those summits, making a feint as if he intended to go over them in the day, and in the view of the Barbarians. But the soldiers, overwhelmed with an hail of flints and great stones, stopped short, as they had received orders. Hannibal, after having passed the whole day in fruitless attempts, but which he designedly repeated to deceive the enemy, incamped in the same place, and intrenched himself. As soon as he was certain that the mountaineers had abandoned that eminence, he caused a great number of fires to be kindled, as if he intended to stay where he was with his whole army. But leaving his baggage, with the cavalry and the greatest part of his infantry there, he set out at the head of his bravest troops, passed the defile with them, and seized the same summits, which the Barbarians had just quitted. At the break of day the gross of the Carthaginian army decamped, and prepared to advance. The enemy, at the usual signal, had already quitted their forts in order to resume their posts upon the rocks, when they perceived part of the Carthaginians over their heads, whilst the rest were upon their march: but they did not lose courage. Accustomed to run over those rocks, they came down upon the Carthaginians on their march, and harrassed them on all sides. The Carthaginians had the enemy to fight, and the difficulty of the places where they could scarce keep on their legs, to contend with at the same time. But the greatest disorder was occasioned by the horses and beasts that carried the baggage, that, terrified by the cries and howl-

howlings of the Gauls, which the mountains re-echoed in an horrible manner, fell back on the soldiers, and beat them down along with them into the precipices on the side of the way.

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Hannibal had hitherto been only a spectator of what passed, for fear of augmenting the confusion, by endeavouring to remedy it. But now seeing himself in danger of losing his baggage, which would be attended with the ruin of the whole army, he came down from the eminence, and put the enemy to flight: after which, quiet and order being reinstated amongst the Carthaginians, he continued his march without trouble and danger, and arrived at a fort, which was the most important place of the country. He made himself master of it, as well as of all the neighbouring towns, in which he found great quantities of corn and abundance of cattle, that served to subsist his army during three days.

After a march quiet enough, he had a new danger to experience. The Gauls pretending to have been taught by the example of their neighbours, who had suffered for having undertaken to oppose the march of the army, came to compliment Hannibal, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides, and left hostages with him for their fidelity. Hannibal, without relying much upon their promises, would not disgust them however, lest they should declare themselves openly against him. He gave them an obliging answer, and having accepted of their hostages and the provisions, which themselves had caused to be brought into the way, he followed their guides, not confiding however entirely in them, but always upon his guard, and with abundance of circumspection and secret diffidence. When they came into a much narrower way, commanded on one side by an high mountain, the Barbarians quitted an ambuscade on a sudden, attacked the Carthaginians in front and rear; pouring a shower of darts upon them both near and from some distance, and rolling down stones of enormous magnitude upon them from the eminences. The rear was charged

A. R. 534. charged with greater vigour than the rest, and by a
 Ant. C. greater number of the enemy. This valley had un-
 218. doubtedly been the tomb of the whole army, if the
 Carthaginian General had not taken care from the
 beginning, by way of precaution against treachery,
 to post the baggage with the cavalry in the front,
 and the heavy-armed foot in the rear. That infantry
 sustained the enemy's charge, without which the loss
 had been much greater; as Hannibal, notwithstanding
 all his precautions, was upon the point of being
 entirely defeated. For whilst he was in suspense, whe-
 ther he should make his army advance in these nar-
 row ways, because he had left his infantry no rein-
 forcement to cover their rear, as himself did that of
 the cavalry; the Barbarians took the advantage of
 that moment of uncertainty, to charge the Carthagi-
 nians in flank; and having separated the rear from
 the front of the army, they seized the space between
 both, so that Hannibal passed the night separately
 from his horse and baggage.

The next day the mountaineers renewed the charge;
 but with much less vigour than the day before; so
 that the Carthaginians joined again, and passed this
 defile, where they lost more of their carriage beasts
 than soldiers. From thenceforth the Barbarians ap-
 peared only in small bodies, more like robbers than
 real enemies, sometimes on the rear, sometimes in the
 front, according as the place favoured them, or the
 Carthaginians themselves gave them opportunities of
 surprizing them, by advancing too far in the front,
 or keeping too much behind the rear, of the army.
 The elephants which were placed in the advanced
 guard, crossed these rugged and steep mountains very
 slowly. But on the other side, wherever they ap-
 peared, they covered the army from the insults of the
 Barbarians, that did not dare to approach those
 animals, whose figure and magnitude were new to
 them.

After a march of nine days, Hannibal arrived at last
 upon the top of the mountains. He continued there

two days, as well to rest those who had got thither happily, as to give others time to join the main body. During this halt, the troops were agreeably surprized to see most of the horses and carriage-beasts appear which had tired upon the route, and had followed the track of the army.

It was then about the end of October, and abundance of snow had newly fallen, which covered all the ways, and very much troubled and discouraged the troops. Hannibal perceived it; and stopping upon an eminence, from whence all Italy might be seen, he shewed them the fertile * countries watered by the Po, where they were almost arrived, adding, "that they had now only a slight effort to make. He represented to them, that a battle or two was now upon the point of putting a glorious period to their labours, and of enriching them for ever, by making them masters of the capital of the Roman dominions." This discourse, full of such grateful hopes, and sustained by the sight of Italy, restored joy and vigour to the dejected army. They continued their march in this disposition. But the way was not the more easy in effect of it: on the contrary, as it was down-hill, the difficulty and danger increased; and the more, because on the side next Italy the declivity of the Alps is much greater and more steepy. Accordingly they scarce found any but broken, direct, slippery ways; so that the soldiers could not keep their feet in walking, nor stop themselves when they made a wrong step, but fell against and threw down one another.

They arrived at a place more difficult than any they had yet passed. The soldiers, though without arms or baggage, had a great deal of trouble to get down by feeling for, and laying hold of, the bushes and brambles that grew there, with their feet and hands. The place was extremely steep of itself, but was become more so by a late falling in of the earth, in ef-

* Of Piedmont.

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Ant. C.
218.

fect of which there was an abyss opposite to them of above a thousand feet in depth. The cavalry stopt short here. Hannibal surprized at that stand, ran thither, and saw that it was actually impossible to go on. He had thoughts of taking a long compass; but that was found to be equally impracticable. As some days before new snow of no great depth had fallen upon the old, the feet entering it supported themselves with ease. But when this new snow was melted by the passing of the first troops and carriage beasts, the rest marched only upon ice, where every thing was slippery; where there was no hold for the feet; and where in case of the least false step, in which the hands and knees might be necessary for recovering the legs, there was no longer either branches or roots to lay hold of. Besides this inconvenience, the horses striking the ice hard in order to keep footing upon it, plunged their feet into it in such a manner, that they could not draw them out, and continued there as if caught in a gin. It was therefore proper to have recourse to some other expedient.

Hannibal chose to make his army incamp, and rest itself for some time upon the summit of this hill, which was broad enough, after the ground was cleared, and all the snow, both new and old, that covered it, removed, which cost infinite pains. A way was afterwards cut by his order through the solid rock, and that work carried on with amazing ardour and constancy. To open and enlarge this way, all the trees round about were cut down; and as fast as that was done, the wood was disposed round the rock, after which it was set on fire. Happily the wind was very high, which soon kindled a vast flame, so that the rock itself became as red as the fire around it. Hannibal then, if we may believe Livy, (for Polybius does not say a word of this circumstance) caused * vinegar to be poured upon it, which insinuating

* Many reject this fact as supposed and impossible. Pliny however observes upon the force of vinegar in breaking stones and rocks, "Saxa rumpit infusum, quæ non ruperit ignis antecedens," l. xxiii. c. 1. For which reason he calls vinegar; "Succus rerum domitor," l. xxxiii.

itself into the clefts of the rock, split by the force of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner taking a compass so as to abridge the declivity, a way was cut along the rock that afforded an easy passage for the troops, baggage, and even elephants. Four days were employed in this work. The carriage-beasts died of hunger; for there was nothing to subsist them on mountains entirely covered with snow. They at length arrived at cultivated, fertile places, which supplied the horses abundantly with forage, and the men with all kinds of nourishment.

In this manner Hannibal arrived in Italy, after having employed fifteen days in passing the Alps, and five months in this whole march from Carthagera, till the army quitted these mountains. It was then much inferior in number to what it was when he set out from Spain, where we have seen that it amounted to near sixty thousand men. It had already sustained great losses upon the march, either in the battles it had been obliged to fight, or in passing rivers. On its quitting the banks of the Rhone it was still thirty thousand foot, and eight thousand horse. The passing of the Alps diminished it almost one half. Hannibal had only twenty thousand foot left, (of which twelve thousand were Africans, and eight thousand Spaniards) and six thousand horse. Himself had caused this to be engraven upon a column near the Lacinian promontory.

Those who are ever so little accustomed to read history with reflexion, cannot but admire so great, so noble, and so bold a design, as this of Hannibal, who undertakes to cross four hundred leagues of country, to pass the Pyreneans, the Rhone, and the Alps, in order to attack the Romans in the very centre of their empire, without being stopped by the innumerable difficulties with which such a design must inevitably be

l. xxxiii. c. 2. Dio, speaking of the siege of Eleuthera, says, that its walls were made to fall down by the force of vinegar, l. xxxvi. p. 8. The difficulty of finding a sufficient quantity of vinegar on these mountains for such an operation, is probably what makes it doubtful.

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218.

attended. But when we consider all the dangers to which he exposed himself and his army, especially in passing the Alps, where he lost more than half of it, one might be tempted to tax his conduct with imprudence and even temerity ; especially if we suppose, that he engaged in so hazardous an enterprize as this, without having foreseen all its consequences, and without being informed of the disposition of the nations, and the nature of the places, through which he was to pass. He would no doubt be inexcusable, had he acted in this manner : but in this respect he has a good apologist, in the person of Polybius. Hannibal, says that Historian, conducted this great affair with abundance of prudence. He had informed himself exactly in the nature and situation of the places, to which he proposed to go. He knew, that the nations, through which he was to pass, waited only an occasion to revolt against the Romans. And lastly, by way of precaution against the difficulty of the ways, he took the people of the country for his guides, who offered themselves the more willingly for that service, and might be confided in with the greater security, as they had the same hopes and interests. Besides which, the ways over the Alps were not so impracticable, as they might be imagined. Before Hannibal approached them, the Gauls bordering upon the Rhone had passed those mountains more than once ; as they had very recently to join the Gauls in the neighbourhood of the Po against the Romans. And farther, the Alps themselves are inhabited by a very numerous people, where an army, in consequence, may find provisions and forage. I can speak with certainty of all these things, says Polybius at the end of this reflexion, because I have informed myself concerning them by the testimony of cotemporaries ; and as to what regards places, I know them of myself, having visited the Alps, and considered them attentively, in order to have an exact knowledge of them.

Polyb. iii.
201.

S E C T. III.

Hannibal takes Taurinum (Turin.) Battle of the cavalry near the Ticinus, in which P. Scipio is defeated. The Gauls come in crowds to join Hannibal. Scipio retires, passes the Trebia, and intrenches himself near that river. Actions that pass in Sicily. Naval battle, in which the Carthaginians are defeated. Sempronius is recalled from Sicily into Italy, to aid his colleague. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of P. Scipio, he fights a battle near Trebia, and is defeated. Successful expeditions of Cn. Scipio in Spain. Hannibal attempts to pass the Appennines. Second battle between Sempronius and Hannibal. The Consul Servilius sets out for Rimini. The feast of the Saturnalia revived. Hannibal dismisses the prisoners taken from the allies of Rome without ransom. His stratagem to prevent attempts upon his life. He passes the marsh of Clusium, where he loses an eye. He advances towards the enemy, and ravages the whole country to draw the Consul to a battle. Flaminius, contrary to the advice of the council of war, and bad omens, engages. Famous battle of the lake of Trasymenus. Contrast between Flaminius and Hannibal. Bad choice of the People the occasion of the defeat. General affliction which it causes at Rome.

HANNIBAL's first care, on quitting the Alps, was to give his troops some rest, of which they were in extreme need. When he saw them in a good condition, the people of the territory of Turin (Taurini) having refused to make an alliance with him, he incamped before their principal city, which he took in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition occasioned so great a consternation amongst the Barbarians, that they all came of themselves to submit to the victor. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, as they were

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.
Polyb. iii.
212.
Liv. xxi.
39.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218. highly disposed by inclination, and as they had caused Hannibal to be assured, if the fear of the Roman army, which approached, had not restrained them. Hannibal judged then, that he had no time to lose, that it was necessary to advance into the country, and to venture some exploit, that might establish a confidence in him amongst the people, who were desirous to declare for him.

Polyb. iii.
214—218.
Liv. xxi.
39—47.
App. 316. The Romans, in the beginning of the campaign, had expected nothing less than to be obliged to sustain the war in Italy. The extraordinary rapidity of their enemy, the success of so hazardous an enterprize as that of marching through so many countries, and of passing the Alps with an army, the diligence and vivacity of his motions immediately after his arrival; all this astonished Rome, and occasioned great alarm there. Sempronius, one of the Consuls, received orders to quit Sicily, and come to the aid of his country. P. Scipio, the other Consul, had no sooner landed at Pisa, and received from the Prætors Manlius and Atilius the troops under their command, than he advanced by long marches towards the enemy, passed the Po, and incamped near the * Ticinus.

Here the two armies were in view of each other. The two Generals knew little of, but had already conceived an esteem, and even admiration, for each other. On the one side the name of Hannibal had been very famous from before the taking of Saguntum; and on the other, the Carthaginian judged the merit of Scipio, from the choice which had been made of his person to command the Romans against him. What still mutually increased this high opinion, was, that Scipio had renounced the command of the army in Spain, and quitted Gaul to oppose Hannibal in Italy; and that Hannibal had been so bold as to form the design of passing the Alps, and so fortunate as to put it in execution.

* A little river in Lombardy.

The Generals on both sides thought it proper to harangue their soldiers, before they came to blows.

A. R. 534.
Ant C.
218.

“ Scipio, after having represented to his troops the glory of their country, and the great actions of their forefathers, told them, that victory was in their own hands, as they had to deal with Carthaginians, so often defeated, reduced to be their tributaries, and almost their slaves long ago. That Hannibal, in passing the Alps, had lost the best part of his army: That the rest were exhausted by hunger, cold, fatigues and misery: That it would suffice only to shew themselves, in order to put troops to flight, that resembled ghosts more than men.” “ All that I fear,” continued he, “ is that Hannibal will seem to have been conquered “ by the Alps, before you come to blows with him. “ But it is but just that the Gods, who have been “ first insulted, should also begin the war first with a “ people and a leader guilty of perjury and the viola- “ tion of treaties. They have only left to us, us “ who have been injured but in the second place, the “ glory of giving them the last blow. Let us try, “ added he, whether, after twenty years, the earth “ on a sudden has brought forth a new race of Car- “ thaginians, or whether they are the same we defeated “ at the islands Ægates, and in so many other places. “ We might have made our victorious fleet sail for “ Africa, and, without much pains, have destroyed “ Carthage their capital. We granted them peace, “ and took them under our protection, when they “ were highly distressed by the revolt of all Africa. “ For these great services they are come to attack our “ country under the leading of a young madman, “ who has sworn our destruction. For now it is not “ Sicily and Sardinia, but Italy, that is in question. “ It is here that we are to make our utmost efforts, “ as if we fought under the walls of Rome themselves. “ Let each of you imagine, that he is not only de- “ fending his own person, but his wife and children. “ And let not your families only engross your “ thoughts; remember that the Roman Senate and

A. R. 534. " People have their eyes fixed upon your arms ; and
 Ant. C. " that the fortune of Rome, and her whole empire,
 218. " depends solely upon your vigorous behaviour and
 " valour."

Hannibal, in order to be the better understood by soldiers of a gross apprehension, spoke to their eyes, before he addressed himself to their ears, and did not think of persuading them by reasons, till after he had prepared them by objects. He gave arms to many of the mountaineers he had taken, made them fight two and two in the sight of his army ; promising liberty and a compleat suit of armour, with a war-horse, to such of them as came off victorious. " The joy with which those Barbarians ran to fight on such motives, gave Hannibal occasion, from what had just passed before their eyes, to give his troops a more lively image of their present situation, which leaving them no means of going back, laid them under the absolute necessity of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the infinite miseries prepared for those, who should be abject enough to give way before the Romans. He set before their eyes the greatness of rewards, the conquest of all Italy, the plunder of Rome, that rich and opulent city, illustrious victory, immortal glory. He depreciated the Roman power, of which the vain glare ought not to dazzle warriors like them, come from the pillars of Hercules into the very heart of Italy, through the most fierce and savage nations. As to what regarded him personally, he would not descend to compare himself with a General of six months standing ; (so he defined Scipio) him, who was almost born, at least nurtured and brought up in the tent of his father Amilcar ; him, who was the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still much more, of the Alps themselves. He excited their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had presumed to demand, that himself and the soldiers who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them ; and he animated their jealousy against the insupportable

able pride of those imperious masters, who believed that every thing was to obey them, and that they had a right to impose laws upon the whole earth."

After these discourses both sides prepared for a battle. Scipio having laid a bridge over the Ticinus, passed that river with his troops. Two bad omens had spread trouble and alarm throughout his army. To avert their effects, he made the usual sacrifices. The Carthaginians were full of ardour. Hannibal made them new promises, and crushing the head of a lamb he was sacrificing to pieces, he prayed Jupiter to crush his own in the same manner, if he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had just promised them.

There is reason to say, that in war every thing depends upon the beginnings, and that it is a good omen for a General to open the campaign with a victory. Hannibal had great occasion to begin well, in order to obviate the opinion people might conceive of his having undertaken things above his ability. He relied much upon the valour of his cavalry, and the vigour of his horses, which were all Spanish.

The two Generals set out with all their horse, and with the same design of taking a view of each other, and met in a great plain on this side of the Ticinus. Scipio drew up his troops in one line, with the Roman cavalry on the wings, and the Gallick allies in the centre, which were strengthened by light-armed troops. Hannibal regulated himself by this disposition. The Numidian horse were excellent. His cavalry bridled and equipped, were equal in front to that of the Romans. As to the * Numidian horse, he threw them into the wings, and marched in that order against the enemy.

The Generals and the cavalry desiring only to engage, the charge began. At first Scipio's light-armed soldiers had no sooner discharged their first darts, than terrified by the Carthaginian cavalry, which came on upon them, and fearing to be trod under foot by the

* The Numidian horse used neither bridle nor saddle.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

horses, they gave way, and fled through the intervals between the squadrons. The battle was sustained a great while with equal vigour. Many soldiers dismounted on both sides, so that the action became of foot as well as of horse. During this time the Numidians, that extended beyond the Roman cavalry in front, wheeled about upon the wings; and whilst part of them charged in flank, the rest cut to pieces what remained of the light-armed troops, that had retired behind the wings, and afterwards attacked the horse in the rear. The Romans being surrounded on both sides, the disorder became general. Scipio was wounded in this battle, and rendered incapable of action. He was brought off from the enemy by the valour of his son, who was then but seventeen years of age, and was making his first campaign. That young Hero distinguished himself gloriously here by an action of valour, and at the same time of filial piety, in saving his father's life. This was the great Scipio, who afterwards acquired the name of Africanus, by terminating this war successfully.

The Consul, dangerously wounded, retired in good order, and was carried into his camp by a large body of the horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the troops followed him thither. He quitted it soon after, having ordered his soldiers to pack up their baggage secretly, decamped from the Ticinus, moved on expeditiously to the banks of the Po, and made his troops pass that river with abundance of tranquillity. They arrived at Placentia, before Hannibal knew that they were decamped from near the Ticinus. He immediately set out to pursue them, but found the bridge broke down. He took only six hundred men prisoners, who were still on this side of the river, and had not made haste enough to pass over to the other. These had been left to guard the fort built at the head of the bridge.

Such was the first battle between the Romans and Carthaginians, which, properly speaking, was only a rencounter of the cavalry, and not a battle in form.

The

The superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry was manifest in it; and from thenceforth the principal force of their army was judged to consist in it; for which reason the Romans ought to have avoided large and open plains, such as are those between the Alps and the Po.

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Ant. C.
218.

Immediately after the battle of Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls, in emulation of each other, came in and surrendered themselves to Hannibal, as they had concerted at first, supplied him with munitions, and entered themselves to serve in his troops. And this, as Polybius has already observed, was the principal reason that induced that wise and able General, notwithstanding the small number and fatigue of his troops, to hazard an action, which was become his absolute necessity, as it was not in his power to return back, had it been ever so much in his will: because only a victory could make the Gauls declare in his favour, whose aid was the sole resource he had in the present conjuncture.

Polyb. iii.
220.
Liv. xxi.
48.

Hannibal having passed the Po upon a bridge of boats, incamped near the enemy. The following night, about two thousand foot and two hundred horse of the Gauls, who served amongst the Romans as auxiliary troops, after having killed the guards of the gates of the camp, went over to that of Hannibal. That General received them with many professions of amity, and having promised them great rewards, he sent them to their respective homes, recommending it to them to engage their countrymen in his interests.

Scipio considered this desertion of the Gauls as the signal of a general revolt, and did not doubt, that they would fly to arms like madmen, after having proceeded to such an excess of perfidy. For this reason, notwithstanding the pain which his wound gave him, he set out secretly towards the end of the following night, and having advanced towards the Trebia, a little river near Placentia, he incamped upon the eminences, where it was not easy for the horse to approach. His retreat was not so secret as from the Ticinus.

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Ant. C.
218.

Ticinus. Hannibal having sent after him first the Numidians, and afterwards all his cavalry, would have infallibly cut off his rear-guard, if the Numidians, through their avidity of plunder, had not thrown themselves into the camp, which the Romans had just abandoned. Whilst they were searching every where without finding any thing to make them amends for the time they lost, the enemy escaped out of their hands. And accordingly they immediately perceived the Romans employed in intrenching themselves on the other side of the river, which they had time enough to pass; and all their advantage was confined to killing a small number of stragglers, whom they found still on the same side with them.

Scipio not being able to support the pain which the agitation of the march gave him, and believing it necessary to wait for his colleague, whom he knew had been recalled from Sicily, chose the ground by the side of the river where he thought he might continue with most safety, and intrenched himself. Hannibal was incamped not far from thence. But, if his victory over the Roman cavalry gave him joy, the scarcity of provisions, which augmented every day in an army obliged to march through an enemy's country, without any preparation for it on its route, gave him no less disquiet. This reduced him to send a party to * Clastidium, where the Romans had laid up a great quantity of corn. The person whom he had charged with this expedition, tried at first to make himself master of that place by force. But Dasius of Brundisium, who commanded in it, having offered to deliver it up for money, he accepted that traitor's proposal; in consequence of which it cost Hannibal only four hundred pieces of gold for what subsisted his troops during the whole time that he continued in the neighbourhood of Trebia. He treated the garrison, which had been put into his hands with the place, favourably, in order to acquire the reputation of a general of great clemency in the beginning.

* A small city between the Po and the Alps.

Whilst Hannibal was carrying on the war in Italy by land, the Carthaginians acted by sea in the neighbourhood of Sicily, and the other islands near Italy. Of twenty galleys of five benches of oars, which the Carthaginians had put to sea to ravage the coasts of Italy, nine got to the island of Lipara, and eight to the Vulcaniæ. The three others were carried into the strait by a contrary wind. King Hiero, who was by accident then at Messana, where he expected the Consul, having perceived them, sent out twelve galleys, which took them without difficulty, and brought them into the port of that city. The prisoners taken in those ships informed him, that besides the fleet of twenty galleys, of which they were part, there were thirty-five ships more of the same kind, which were coming to Sicily, in order to solicit the antient allies of the Carthaginians. That they believed this second fleet was principally designed to take the city of Lilybæum: but that it had been driven to the islands Ægates by the same storm as had dispersed them.

The King wrote immediately to M. Æmilius, Prætor of Sicily, to give him this advice, and to apprize him of the arrival of the enemy. The Prætor immediately sent Lieutenants and Tribunes to Lilybæum, and the neighbouring cities, with orders to keep the soldiers in readiness, and especially to take care of Lilybæum, in which the provisions and machines necessary for war were laid up. At the same time he published a decree, by which the mariners and soldiers, who were to serve by sea, were required to prepare provisions for ten days, to carry them on board their ships, and to imbark the moment the signal should be given for that purpose. He also recommended it to those, who guarded the coasts, to redouble their vigilance, and to give notice of the arrival of the enemy's fleet as soon as they perceived it at sea. In consequence, though the Carthaginians had regulated their course so as to arrive at Lilybæum in the night, they were however descried at a considerable distance, because the moon shone bright, and they came with their sails flying. The sentinels

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.
Liv. xxi.
49. 50.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

sentinels gave their signal that instant ; the city took arms, and the ships were manned immediately. The soldiers were divided, so that some fought on board the galleys, whilst the rest defended the walls and gates of the city.

The Carthaginians, on their side, seeing that the enemy were upon their guard, would not enter the port before day. They passed the rest of the night in furling their sails, and preparing their ships for battle. As soon as day appeared they stood out to sea, in order to have room enough to act themselves, and to give the enemy liberty to come out of the port. The Romans did not refuse battle, encouraged by the advantage they remembered they had gained over the Carthaginians almost in the same place, and relying upon the number and valour of their soldiers.

When the two fleets were out at sea, the Romans, full of ardor and confidence, prepared to measure their force with that of the Carthaginians. The latter, on the contrary, endeavoured to avoid fighting man to man, substituting stratagem to force, because their hope was founded solely on the lightness and agility of their vessels, and not on their own courage. And indeed they had abundance more people to work them, than to fight ; and on boarding them there appeared far more mariners than soldiers. This difference of troops having lessened their boldness, and augmented that of the Romans, they immediately fled, leaving seven of their ships at the mercy of the enemy, with seventeen hundred men, as well mariners as soldiers, amongst whom were three Carthaginians of the principal nobility. The Roman fleet retired without having suffered any thing, except one galley, which had received damage ; but however regained the port with the rest.

The news of this battle had not yet been carried to Messana, when the Consul Sempronius arrived there. In entering the port he found King Hiero, who was come to meet him with a fleet well equipped. That Prince having quitted his own ship to go on board that

that of the Consul, expressed his joy for his happy arrival with his fleet and army, wished him all possible success in Sicily, and afterwards acquainted him with the condition of the island, and the enterprize of the Carthaginians. He concluded with assuring him, that he would serve the Romans in his advanced age with the same zeal and courage, as he had given them proofs of in his youth. He told him, that he would supply him gratis with provisions and cloaths for the legions, and the soldiers and mariners that served on board the fleet: That the enemy intended to attack Lilybæum, and the other maritime cities; and that there was reason to fear that the love of novelty would induce a great number of Sicilians to second them. The Consul, upon this advice, believing he had no time to lose, set out for Lilybæum, accompanied by Hiero and his fleet.* They had not been long at sea, when they were informed of the battle, which had been fought near that city, and the defeat of the Carthaginians.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

When they arrived at Lilybæum, Hiero took leave of the Consul, and retired with his fleet. Sempronius having recommended the care of the coast to the Prætor, whom he left at Lilybæum, set sail for Malta, where the Carthaginians had a garrison. As soon as he appeared, Amilcar, the son of Gisgo, who commanded in the island with about two thousand men under him, were delivered up to him. Some days after he returned to Lilybæum, and himself and the Prætor sold all the prisoners they had taken, except the persons of distinction. The Consul, seeing that Sicily had nothing farther to fear on that side, went to the * islands Vulcaniæ, where it was reported, that the Carthaginian fleet lay in the road. But he did not find any of the enemy: they were set out from thence in order to plunder the coasts of Italy.

The Consul, at his return to Sicily, received advice of the descent and ravages of the enemy's fleet,

Polyb. iii.
220.
Liv. xxi.
52.

* North of Sicily.

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218. and at the same time letters from the Senate, which informed him of Hannibal's arrival, and ordered him to return directly to the aid of his colleague. Divided by so many different cares, his first was to embark his army, which he ordered to repair to Ariminum by the Upper, or Adriatic sea. He sent Sextus Pomponius his Lieutenant with twenty-seven galleys to cover Calabria, and all the maritime coast of Italy. He left the Prætor M. Æmilius a complete fleet of fifty galleys. As for himself, after having put Sicily into a condition of defence, he coasted Italy with ten ships, and landed at Ariminum, where he found his army, and marched with it to join his colleague near Trebia.

In consequence the Consuls were joined with all the troops of the Commonwealth; and it was expected, that the two armies would soon come to a battle. Hannibal had approached the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by the little river. The proximity of the armies occasioned frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of cavalry, gained an inconsiderable advantage over a party of the Carthaginians; but one that much augmented the good opinion that General had already conceived of his own merit.

Polyb. iii.
221—227.
Liv. xxi.
52—57.
App. 317. This slight success seemed a complete victory to him. He boasted with much self-complacency of having beat the enemy in the first encounter, in a kind of fight wherein his colleague had been defeated, and of having thereby revived the languid courage of the Romans. Determined to come to a decisive action as soon as possible, he thought it necessary, for the sake of decency, to consult Scipio, whom he found of an entirely different opinion. "That Consul represented, that if time was given the new levies to exercise themselves during the winter, they would be much more capable of service the next campaign; that the natural levity and inconstancy of the Gauls would by degrees divide them from Hannibal; that himself was not entirely well of his wound; and that

when

when he should be in a condition to act, his presence might be of some use in a general affair : and he concluded with earnestly desiring him to go no farther.”

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Ant. C.
218.

How solid soever these reasons were, Sempronius could not relish them, or at least he had no regard to them. He saw sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies under his command, without including the cavalry : a compleat army consisted then of that number of troops, when the two Consuls were in the field together. The enemy's army, though augmented by the Gauls, was not so numerous. The conjuncture seemed to him entirely favourable. He said openly, “ that both officers and soldiers desired a battle, except his colleague, whose courage being more weakened by his wound than his body, could not bear to hear of coming to blows. . . But was it just, that every body should grow languid with him ? What more did he expect ? Had he any hopes, that a third Consul and a new army were to come to his aid ? What a grief, said he, would it be to our ancestors, if they saw two Consuls at the head of two great armies, tremble before the same Carthaginians, whom they in times past attacked within the very walls of Carthage ?”

He talked in the same manner both amongst the soldiers, and even in the tent of Scipio. A personal view made him think and speak in this manner. The time for the election of new Consuls which approached, made him fear, that a successor would be sent him, before he could come to blows with Hannibal ; and he thought it necessary to take the advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure all the glory of the victory to himself. As he did not consult the proper time for the service, says Polybius, but for himself, he could not fail of taking bad measures. Accordingly he ordered the troops to hold themselves in readiness for a battle.

This was all Hannibal desired ; who held it for a maxim, that a general who has advanced into an enemy's or a foreign country, and has formed an ex-

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

traordinary enterprize, has no other resource, than continually to keep up the hopes of his allies by some new exploit. Knowing that he had to do only with new raised troops of no experience, he was desirous to take the advantage of the ardor of the Gauls, who demanded to fight, and of Scipio's absence, whom his wound would not permit to be present in the battle. And lastly, he saw that the post he occupied was the most advantageous that could be chosen for his numerous cavalry and elephants, in which the principal force of his army consisted, to act in. Animated by all these motives, his only thought was to lay an ambuscade, from which the rashness of Sempronius promised him good success.

Between the two armies there was a spot, which Hannibal judged proper for this design. It was an open plain wherein there was a rivulet. Its banks of sufficient height, were besides covered with bushes and brambles, and near it were hollows of depth enough to hide even cavalry. He knew, that an ambuscade was often more sure in a flat and level country, but bushy as this was, than in woods, because less suspected. He ordered Mago his brother to post himself here with two thousand horse and foot. He made his Numidian cavalry pass the Trebia, with orders to advance at day-break to the very gates of the enemy's camp, in order to draw them on to a battle; and to repass the river in retiring, to induce the Romans also to pass it; and to enter the plain. What he foresaw did not fail to happen. The hot-headed Sempronius first sent all his cavalry against the Numidians, then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians gave way with design. The Romans pursued them with ardor.

That day there was a very cold fog, and abundance of snow fell. As the Consul had made the men and horses quit the camp with precipitation, and without either having taken any nourishment, or given them any other preservative against the inconveniences of the

the place and season, they were benumbed with cold, which became still more intense in proportion as they approached the river. But when in pursuing the Numidians, who had fled expressly to draw them on, the foot had entered the water up to their breasts, which the rain had swelled extremely the night before, their limbs were chilled and penetrated with cold to such a degree, that they could scarce support their arms; besides what they suffered by hunger, not having ate the whole day, which was now much advanced.

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Ant. C.
218.

This was not the case with Hannibal's soldiers. By his order they had kindled fires before their tents, and rubbed all their limbs with oil, which was distributed by companies, in order to render them the more supple: they had also refreshed themselves entirely at their ease. We see here the advantage of having a General of attention and foresight, whose vigilance nothing escapes.

As soon as the Romans had quitted the river, Hannibal, who waited that moment, made his troops advance. The Consul, seeing that the enemy, in facing about, treated his horse roughly, had caused a retreat to be sounded and recalled them. Both sides then prepared for battle. The two Generals drew up their armies in the following manner.

Hannibal posted the slingers and light-armed troops in the front line, who amounted to about eight thousand men. Behind them he drew up his infantry in one line, to the number of twenty thousand men, Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans. He divided his cavalry on the two wings, which, including the Gauls, amounted to above ten thousand men; and strengthened those two wings with his elephants, part of which he placed before the right, and part before the left.

Sempronius drew up his foot, consisting of six and thirty thousand men, in three lines, according to the custom of the Romans. His cavalry, which consisted of four thousand men, was divided on the two wings. The light-armed troops were posted along the whole

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Ant. C.
218.

front. According to this disposition, the Roman army must have been much exceeded in front by that of the Carthaginians.

When they advanced, the light-armed troops on both sides began the action, which at first was no less favourable to the Carthaginians than disadvantageous to the Romans. On the side of the latter were soldiers who had suffered hunger and cold from early in the morning, most of whose darts had been discharged in attacking the Numidians; and those that remained were so heavy with having been soaked in the water, that they could be of no use. The horse and the whole army were in no better condition to act. There was nothing of this kind on the side of the Carthaginians. Fresh, vigorous, and full of ardor, nothing prevented them from doing their duty.

Accordingly, as soon as the light-armed troops were retired into the intervals of the lines, and the heavy-armed infantry were engaged, the Carthaginian horse, which far exceeded the Roman cavalry in number and vigour, fell upon the latter with such force and impetuosity, that they broke and put it to flight in a moment. The flank of the Roman foot being then uncovered, the light-armed troops of the Carthaginians, and the Numidian horse, returned to the charge, fell upon the flanks of the Romans, put them into disorder, and made them incapable of defending themselves against those who attacked them in front. The battle was hottest on both sides in the centre of the heavy-armed infantry. The Romans defended themselves there with a courage, or rather a fury, that nothing could overcome. At this instant the Numidians quitted their ambuscade, charged the legions who fought in the centre, and put them into extreme confusion. The two wings, that is to say, the troops on the right and left of the centre, attacked in front by the elephants, and in flank by the light-armed troops, were driven headlong into the river. As to the centre, those who were in the rear, could not keep their ground against the Numidians, who had charged them

them behind, and were entirely put to flight: the rest, who were in the front and on the first line, forced by an happy necessity to fight in despair, after having defeated the Gauls, and part of the Africans, opened themselves a way through the Carthaginians. Then seeing that they could neither aid their wings, which had been entirely put to the rout, nor return to their camp, which the Numidian cavalry, the river, and the rain opposed, they drew up in close order, and took the route of Placentia, to which they retreated without danger, to the number of at least ten thousand men.

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Ant. C.
218.

Most of the rest who staid behind perished upon the banks of the river, either crushed to pieces by the elephants, or put to the sword by the horse. Those who could escape, as well foot as horse, joined the gros of the infantry of whom we have just spoke, and followed it to Placentia. The Carthaginians pursued the enemy to the river, where the rigour of the weather stopped them, and made them return to their intrenchments. The victory was compleat, and the loss inconsiderable. Only a very small number of Spaniards and Africans remained upon the place. The Gauls suffered most, and the whole army exceedingly by the rain and snow. Abundance of men and horses perished with cold, and only a small number of the elephants could be saved.

The night following, the Romans who had staid behind to guard the camp, passed the Trebia without being perceived by the enemy, in effect of a violent rain, which fell with a great noise. And perhaps exhausted with the fatigue of the day, and having abundance of wounded, they only feigned not to perceive them, and gave them time to retire to Placentia.

The loss of the battle was only to be imputed to the rashness and blind presumption of the Consul, who, notwithstanding the wise remonstrances of his colleague, hurried on to a battle in a conjuncture, when every thing was against him. The bad success was a just punishment of his vanity, but not the remedy

A. R. 534. of it. To conceal his shame and defeat, he sent cour-
 Ant. C. riers to Rome, who said no more than that a battle
 218. had been fought, in which the Roman army would
 have been victorious, if it had not been for the bad
 weather. At first nobody suspected the truth of this
 news. But the whole particulars of the action arrived
 soon after: that the Carthaginians had defeated the
 Consul's army, and taken his camp; that part of the
 legions had retired and taken refuge in the neighbour-
 ing colonies; that all the Gauls had made an alliance
 with Hannibal; and that the army had no munitions,
 but what came from the sea by the Po.

Polyb. iii. This news occasioned so much terror in the city,
 227. that the people every moment expected to see the vic-
 Liv. xxi. torious army arrive before their walls, without having
 57. any means for defending themselves. They said, that
 after the defeat of Scipio at the Ticinus, they had re-
 called Sempronius from Sicily, and ordered him to go
 to the aid of his colleague. But after the defeat of
 two Consuls, and two Consulary armies, what other
 leaders, what other legions, could they oppose to the
 victorious enemy!

These sad reflections did not long engross the Ro-
 mans. They considered how to prevent the conse-
 quences of so unfortunate an event. Great prepara-
 tions were made for the following campaign: garri-
 sons were put into the towns, and troops were sent into
 Sardinia and Sicily, as also to Tarentum, and all the
 important posts. Sixty galleys were fitted out of five
 benches of oars, and deputies dispatched to Hiero to
 demand aid. That King sent them five hundred
 Cretans, and a thousand heavy-armed foot. To con-
 clude, no measures were omitted, that the conjuncture
 made necessary. For, adds Polybius, such are the
 Romans in general and particular; the more reason
 they have to fear, the more formidable they become.
 The first thing they did, was to make the Consul
 Sempronius return from the army to preside in the
 assembly, for the election of Consuls. Cn. Servilius
 and C. Flaminius were chosen. We shall soon see of
 what

what character the latter was, after we have seen what passed the same year in Spain.

A. R. 5.
Ant. 218.
Polyb. 2.
228.
Liv. 28.
60, 61.

Cn. Cornelius Scipio, to whom Publius his brother had left the command of the naval army, having set out from the mouths of the Rhone with all his fleet, arrived at * Emporiæ. He besieged all the cities upon that coast as far as the Iberus that refused to surrender, and treated those who submitted voluntarily with abundance of lenity. He took great care, that the latter should suffer no hurt, and put good garrisons into the new conquests he had made. Then penetrating into the country at the head of his army, that had already been augmented by a great number of the Spanish people, who became his allies in proportion as he advanced into the country, he sometimes received cities into his alliance, and sometimes took them by force, as they lay on his route.

Hannibal had given the government of that province on this side of the Iberus to Hanno, and ordered him to keep it in the interests of the Carthaginians. To put a stop to the progress of the Romans, before the whole country should have declared for them, he incamped in their view, and offered them battle. Scipio accepted it with joy, because not being able to avoid having both Asdrubal and Hanno to deal with, he chose rather to fight them separately, than to have them both upon his hands at the same time. The victory cost them little. He killed six thousand of the enemy, took the General himself with some of his principal officers, and two thousand prisoners, with those who had been left to guard the camp, of which he made himself master, as well as of † Scissis, a neighbouring city, which he took by storm. The plunder of it was very considerable, because those who had gone with Hannibal to Italy, had left their equipages in it.

Before the news of this defeat had spread, Asdrubal had passed the Iberus with eight thousand foot and a

* Now called Empurius in Catalonia.

† There is no trace of this city in the ancient geographers.

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Ant. C.
218.

thousand horse, in order to meet Scipio, imagining that he was only just arrived in Spain. But when he was apprized of Hanno's loss of the battle and his camp near Scissis, he turned towards the sea. Not far from † Taraco he found the mariners and soldiers of Scipio's fleet, negligently dispersed about the country, in effect of the security with which the good success of their land-army had inspired them; and having detached his horse against them, a great number of them were put to the sword, and the rest driven to their ships. He afterwards retired, and repassing the Iberus with his army, took up his winter-quarters in New Carthage, where he applied himself wholly in making new preparations, and in guarding the country on that side of the river.

Cn. Scipio, on returning to his fleet, punished those who had neglected their duty; and having united both armies, that of the sea with the land-forces, he took up his winter-quarters at Taraco. There dividing the spoils amongst the soldiers with a strict regard to justice, he gained their affection, and made them ardently desire the continuance of a war, from which they derived such great advantages. And this was the state of affairs in Spain.

Liv. xxi.
58.

Hannibal, after the battle of Trebia, went upon some other expeditions, but of no great importance. The rigour of the season obliged him to give his troops some rest after so many labours. As soon as the least sign of spring appeared, he drew them out of their winter-quarters to make them march into Hetruria, with design either to bring over the inhabitants of that country by gentle methods, or to subject them by force, as he had the Gauls and Ligurians.

For this purpose it was necessary for him to pass the Apennine mountains, where he was surprized by so dreadful a storm, that what he had suffered in passing the Alps, seemed less terrible in the comparison. A prodigious high wind, mingled with rain, drove di-

* City of Catalonia. Hod. Tarragona.

rectly

rectly into their faces with such violence, that they were reduced either to abandon their arms, or to be beat down if they attempted to oppose the impetuosity of the hurricane. But, when the wind took away their breath, they turned their backs, and stood still for some time in that condition. The thunder and lightning with which its dreadful claps were attended, deprived them at once of the use of their eyes and ears, so that they were struck with terror, and remained in a manner immoveable. The rain at length ceased: but, as is the usual consequence, the wind rising still higher, they were obliged to incamp in the same place where the storm surprized them. This was a new and as arduous a fatigue to them as the first. For they could neither speed nor pitch the tents, the wind either tearing them out of their hands, or driving them out of their places. And at the same time the water, which the wind had raised, having condensed and froze on the tops of the mountains, so great a quantity of snow and hail fell, that abandoning an ineffectual labour, they all threw themselves on the ground, overwhelmed under the weight of their tents and habits, rather than covered by them. The cold which ensued was so sharp and penetrating, that the horses as well as the men endeavoured in vain to rise, during a great while, their nerves being become so stiff, that it was impossible for them to bend or make use of their members. When they had recovered a little strength and courage, in effect of the pains and agitation they gave themselves, they began to kindle fires from space to space, which was a great relief to them, and seemed to restore them to life. Hannibal remained two days in this place as if besieged, and did not quit it till after having lost a great number of men and horses, with seven of the elephants, which had survived the battle of Trebia.

On his descent from the Apennines, he incamped ten miles from Placentia. The next day he marched in quest of the enemy with twelve thousand foot and five thousand horse. Sempronius, who was already returned from

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

from Rome, did not decline the battle. The two armies were then but a league distant from each other. The next day they marched with equal ardor to a battle which was long disputed, and in which both sides had alternately the advantage. In the first charge, the Romans were so much superior to the Carthaginians, that after having put them to flight, they pursued them as far as their camp, and even endeavoured to force it. But Hannibal having posted a small body of troops at the gates, sufficient however to defend the entrance, ordered the rest to keep in close order in the middle of the camp, till he gave them the signal to sally, and attack the enemy. It was now about three in the afternoon, when Sempronius, having fatigued his troops ineffectually, ordered a retreat to be sounded. As soon as Hannibal perceived the Romans retiring, he made his cavalry march out on the right and left. The action had been most bloody, if the day had permitted it to be of any continuance. Night separated the combatants, dreadfully furious against each other. The number of the dead in consequence did not answer the animosity with which they fought. The loss on both sides did not amount to six hundred foot, and three hundred horse: but that of the Romans was considerable more by the rank than number of their dead; because many Knights, five legionary Tribunes, and three Generals of the allies, were left upon the place.

Præfectos.

After this battle, Hannibal retired into Liguria, where the inhabitants, as a proof of their fidelity, upon his arrival delivered up to him C. Fulvius and C. Lucretius two Quæstors, two legionary Tribunes, and five Knights, almost all of them Senators. Sempronius retired towards Lucca.

Liv. xxi.
62.

During * this winter, several prodigies happened at Rome, and in the neighbourhood: or “ to speak more justly, a great number were reported, to which

* Romæ aut circa urbem multa, eâ hieme, prodigia facta: aut (quod evenire solet motis semel in religionem animis) multa nunciata, & temerè credita sunt. Liv.

people gave credit lightly enough, as it happens, when once superstition has taken possession of their minds." These words of Livy are remarkable, and shew, that he was neither so credulous nor so superstitious as many have imagined him. All the ceremonies prescribed in the like cases were very scrupulously performed, and the minds of the people much quieted, after sacrifices were offered, and vows made to the Gods according to the direction of the Sibyl's books.

Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius were Consuls elect. A. R. 534.
Ant. C. 218.
The latter had made himself known long before for Liv. xxi. 63. his turbulent and seditious disposition, incapable either of taking his measures with wisdom, or of giving them up after having once resolved upon them. We have seen him engaged in violent contests with the Senate during his Tribuneship; and again in his first Consulship, first concerning the Consulship itself, which they were for having him abdicate, and then on account of his triumph, of which they undertook to deprive him. He had also rendered himself odious to them, upon the occasion of a new law, which Q. Claudius had carried against their order, Flaminius having been the only person of the Senators that had supported him in that enterprize. By this law it was prohibited for any Senator to have a bark of more than three hundred *amphoræ* in burden, which was about 15625 pounds, or about eight tons, sea-computation. Q. Claudius conceived a vessel of these dimensions sufficient for bringing the growth of the Senators lands to Rome, and that it was unworthy of their rank to make use of ships of burthen to carry the grain and fruits of others for hire. The hatred of the Senate served only to acquire him the favour of the People, who, out of a blind affection for him, raised him a second time to the Consulship.

He was convinced, that the Senate, to be revenged of him, would keep him at Rome, either by alledging bad omens, obliging him to celebrate the *Feriæ Latinæ*, or having recourse to some of the usual pretexts for

A. R. 534.
Ant. C.
218.

for retarding the departure of the Consuls. Resolved to cut short all those difficulties, he pretended business in the country; and having left Rome, he set out secretly for his province, whilst he was still in a private capacity. This evasion, when made public, exasperated the Senators the more, who were already much incensed against him. They talked publicly, "That Flaminius had declared war, not only against the Senate, but the Gods themselves. That having been made Consul the first time contrary to the auspices, which opposed his election, he had derided both the Gods and men, who united in forbidding him to give battle. That now, actuated by the reproaches which his conscience made him of his impiety, he had avoided appearing in the Capitol, and performing there the august ceremony of entering into the Consulship, that he might not be obliged to invoke great Jupiter on so solemn an occasion; that he might neither see nor consult the Senate, whom he was the only one that hated of all the Romans, and by whom he knew he deserved to be hated; that he might withdraw himself from the most august and most indispensable ceremonies; that he might avoid making the usual vows in the Capitol for the prosperity of the Commonwealth and himself; and afterwards set out for his province with the honourable marks of his dignity. That he had quitted Rome by stealth like the meanest servant in his army, without being preceded by the Lictors, without having the Fasces carried before him, almost as if he left his country in order to go into banishment. Did he believe it more honourable and decent for himself and the Roman Commonwealth to perform so sacred and so splendid a ceremony at Ariminum than at Rome, and in the house of a stranger, than in the presence of his household Gods?"

The complaints of the whole Senate, and the Deputies sent to him to oblige him to return, had no effect upon him. He entered upon office at Ariminum; and having received two legions from Sempronius,

one

one of the last year's Consuls, and two from the Prætor C. Atilius, he passed the Apennines, in order to enter Hetruria.

CN. SERVILIUS.

C. FLAMINIUS II.

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

Servilius entered upon office at Rome on the Ides, Liv. xxii. that is to say, the 15th of March, the day fixed then for that ceremony; and assembled the Senate, in order to consult them concerning the operations of the campaign which he was going to open. This deliberation gave room for renewing their reproaches against Flaminius. They complained, that they had created two Consuls and had but one. That Flaminius could not be deemed as such, having set out from Rome without either authority or auspices. That it was at the Capitol that the Consuls received those two qualifications, in the presence of the Gods and of the Roman citizens, after having celebrated the Latine games, and offered the customary sacrifices upon the Alban mountain, and to the most high Jupiter; and not in his province, and a strange country, whether he went only in quality of a private person. Servilius, after having received their instructions, repaired with his troops to Ariminum, in order to shut up the passes on that side against the enemy.

He left Rome in great perplexity. The fears of the public were increased by the prodigies related from all parts. Sacrifices, processions, and prayers were ordered to be made in all the temples. Amongst many other acts of religion, a public feast was given, and the * feast of Saturn, which continued a day and a night, was proclaimed. This ceremony was made an annual festival, which the People were ordered to celebrate for ever. I shall relate the circumstances of it at the end of this section.

* This festival was instituted almost three hundred years before, Liv. ii. 21. It was only revived now.

A. R. 535. Hannibal wintered in Gallia Cisalpina, where he
 Ant. C. treated the prisoners of war in a different manner, ac-
 217. cording to their being Romans or allies. He kept
 Polyb. iii. the Romans in prisons, and scarce allowed them the
 229. necessaries of life : whereas he acted with all possible lenity in respect to their allies. He assembled them one day, and told them, “ that he had not come thither with intent to make war upon them, but to take their defence upon him against the Romans : that therefore if they understood their own interests, they ought to espouse his party, as he had passed the Alps with no other view than to reinstate the Italians in their liberty, and to assist them in recovering the cities and countries out of which they had been driven by the Romans.” After this discourse, he sent them home to their own countries without ransom. This was a stratagem, to separate the people of Italy from the Romans, to induce them to join him, and to make all those, whose cities or ports had been subjected by the Romans, take arms in his favour.

Ibid. It was in the same winter-quarters that he conceived
 Liv. xxii. a truly Carthaginian stratagem. He was surrounded
 I. by a fickle and inconstant people, and the tie con-
 App. 316. tracted with them was still entirely recent. He had reason to apprehend, that on a change of disposition in respect to him, they might form designs against him, and attempt upon his life. For his security therefore he caused perukes and habits to be made for all different ages ; and sometimes wore one kind and sometimes another, and disguised himself so often, that not only those who saw him go backwards and forwards, but even his friends, could hardly know him.

Polyb. iii. The Gauls in the mean time suffered the war to be
 230. made in their country with great impatience. The
 Liv. xxii. hopes of booty had been their sole inducement to fol-
 2. low Hannibal. They saw, that instead of enriching themselves at the expence of others, their country, become the theatre of the war, was equally harrassed by the winter-quarters of both armies. Hannibal had every

every thing to fear from this discontent, which already broke out in murmurs, and complaints sufficiently public. To prevent their effects, as soon as winter was over he made haste to decamp. He knew, that Flaminius was arrived at Arretium in Etruria, and directed his march that way. He began by consulting those who knew the country best, in order to judge what route he should take for approaching the enemy. Many were pointed out to him, which did not please him, because too long, and because they exposed him to being traversed by the enemy. There was one which lay through certain marshes. This was most to his liking, because it agreed best with the ardent desire he had of coming to blows with the Consul, before his colleague could have joined him; and he gave it the preference. On its being rumoured in the army, every body was terrified. There was not a man that did not tremble at the thoughts of the fatigues and dangers they should undergo in passing those marshes, which the Anio besides had overflowed for some days.

Hannibal, having been well informed, that the bottom was good, decamped, and composed his advanced guard of Africans, Spaniards, and all his best troops. With these he mixed the baggage, in order, if they were obliged to stop, that they should be in want of nothing. The main body was composed of Gauls; and the cavalry formed the rear-guard. He had given the command of it to Mago, with orders to make the Gauls advance either by fair means or force, in case they should take disgust through terror, and be for going back.

The Spaniards and Africans got over with no great difficulty, because as nobody had passed the marsh before them, it was tolerably firm under foot. Besides which they were soldiers enured to fatigues, and accustomed to this kind of toils. It was not the same when the Gauls passed. The marsh had been poached by those who had gone over it before. They could not advance without extreme difficulty; and, as they

were

A.R. 535. were little used to such laborious marches, they did
 Ant. C. not support this without the utmost impatience.
 217. However, it was impossible for them to go back : the
 horse pressing them forwards continually. It must be
 owned, that the whole army had abundance to suffer.
 During four days and three nights they never had
 their feet out of water. But the Gauls suffered more
 than all the rest, most of the carriage-beasts perished
 in the mud, and even then did not cease to be of some
 use. Upon their packs out of the water the soldiers
 slept at least some part of the night. A great number
 of horses lost their hoofs. Hannibal himself, upon
 the only elephant that remained, had all the difficulty
 in the world to get out of it. A defluxion, that fell
 upon his eyes, occasioned as well by the alternate
 heats and colds usual enough in the beginning of
 the spring, as by being continually awake, and the
 gross vapours of the marsh, tormented him excessively.
 And as the conjuncture would not suffer him to stop,
 in order to his being cured, this accident cost him an
 eye.

Polyb. iii. When he had with great difficulty got over these
 234. wet and marshy lands, he incamped in the first dry
 Liv. xxiii. place he found, in order to give his troops some re-
 5. freshment. Having been informed by his scouts, that
 the army of the enemy was still in the neighbourhood
 of Arretium, he applied himself with infinite attention
 to know, on the one side, the designs and character
 of the Consul, and on the other, the situation of the
 country, the means he was to use for having provi-
 sions, the ways by which they could be brought to
 his camp ; and all the things in general that could be
 of advantage to him in the present conjuncture : cares
 highly worthy of a great Captain, and of one that
 does not act by chance. He knew in consequence,
 that the country between * Fesulæ and Arretium was
 the most fertile of Italy ; that it had cattle, corn,
 and all the fruits which the earth produces for the

* Cities of Tuscany. Hod. Fiesole & Arrizzo.

nourishment of man, in abundance. As to Flaminius, that he was a man of an happy turn for insinuating himself into the favour of the populace; but who, without any talents either for government or war, had an high opinion of his own capacity for both, and for that reason neither consulted any body, nor hearkened to any advice: for the rest, that he was hot, fiery, and bold even to rashness. Hannibal concluded from hence, that if he ruined the country before his eyes, he should infallibly draw him on to a battle.

He neglected nothing that could provoke the fiery temper of his adversary, and assuredly hurry him into the vices natural to him. Accordingly leaving the Roman army on the left, he moved on the right towards Fesulæ; and putting all to fire and sword in the finest country of Hetruria, displayed to the eyes of the Consul as much ravage and desolation as was possible. Flaminius was not of a disposition to remain quiet in his camp, even though Hannibal had lain still in his. But when he saw the lands of the allies ravaged before his face, and that the pillage of them was carried off with impunity, and the smoke on all sides denounced the entire ruin of the country, he believed it a disgrace to him, that Hannibal should march triumphantly through the middle of Italy, ready to advance to the very gates of Rome, without any resistance. It was to no purpose, that those who formed the council of war endeavoured to persuade him “to prefer the safest choice to that which seemed the most glorious; to wait for his colleague, in order to act in concert with all the forces of the Commonwealth; and to content himself in the mean time with detaching the cavalry and light-armed foot, to prevent the enemy from ravaging the country with so much licence and impunity.” Flaminius could not hear this wise discourse without indignation. He quitted the council abruptly, and at the same time gave the signal for the march and battle. “Yes, no doubt,” said he, “let us stay here with our arms across before the walls of Ar-

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

Polyb. iii.
233.
Liv. xxii.
3.
App. 319.

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

retium. For this is our country; our household Gods are here. Let us suffer Hannibal, escaped out of our hands, to ruin Italy with impunity, and putting all to fire and sword before him, to arrive at the gates of Rome. And as for us, let us take great care not to stir from hence, till a decree of the Senate comes to fetch Flaminius from Arretium, as of old Camillus from Veii, to the aid of his country."

Cic. de
Divin.
l. 77.

On saying these words, he leaped upon his horse. But the beast fell down, and threw him head foremost to the ground. All who were present were frightened by this accident, as a bad omen. As for him, he took no notice of it. The officer, who presided at the auspices having informed him, that the chickens would not eat, and that it was necessary to put off the battle to another day: "And suppose they should take a fancy not to eat then," says Flaminius, "what must one do, pray?" "Keep still," replied the officer. "O wonderful auspices," cried Flaminius! "If the chickens are hungry, one may give battle; but if they won't eat because they have had their fill, one must by all means take care not to fight." He then gave orders to pull up the colours, and follow him. At that instant one came to tell him, that a standard-bearer with all his force could not pull his ensign out of the ground, where it had been fixed in the usual manner. Flaminius, without expressing the least surprize, turning towards the person who brought him this news: "Don't you also bring me letters from the Senate," said he, "to prevent me from giving battle. Begone; and tell the standard-bearer, if fear has froze his hands, to dig round the staff of his ensign, and he'll get it out, I warrant him."

The army then began to march. Whilst the General's presumption inspired the soldiers with a kind of joy, who were struck with his air of confidence, without being capable of weighing his motives for it; the principal officers, who had been of a contrary

trary opinion in the council, were the most terrified by the two prodigies, of which they had just been witnesses.

A. R. 535°
Ant. C.
217.

Hannibal, in the mean time, advanced continually towards Rome, with Cortona on his left, and the lake of Thrasymenus on his right. When he saw that the Consul approached, he studied his ground, in order to give battle to his advantage. On his march he came to a very level and spacious valley, skirted on each side with two ridges of mountains, and closed at the end with a steep hill of difficult access. At the entrance lay the lake, between which and the foot of the mountains there was a narrow defile, which led into the valley. Through this pass he filed off, gained the hill at the bottom, and posted himself there with the Spaniards and Africans. On the right behind the eminences, he posted his Balearians and other troops, armed with missile weapons. As to the cavalry and the Gauls, he placed them behind the eminences on the left, and extended them in such a manner, that at the extremity they reached almost to the defile at the entrance of the valley. He passed an whole night in laying his ambuscades; after which he waited quietly till he should be attacked.

Polyb. iii.
234—236.
Liv. xxii.
4—5.
Plut. in 1
Fab. 175.

The Consul marched behind with an extreme desire of coming up with the enemy. The first day, as he arrived late, he incamped near the lake. It required no great experience in war to perceive, that engaging himself in such a defile, was to court his own destruction. However, the next morning before day-break, without taking the precaution to have the places viewed, and without staying till it was light enough to discern objects, he made his troops enter it. He even carried his senseless confidence to such an height, as to make a troop of the servants of the army follow him with chains, with which he intended to load the Africans, already conquered in his imagination. A very thick fog had arose that morning. When the Consul had made his troops enter the plain, he believed he had only the Cartha-

Polybius.

A. R. 335.
Ant. C.
217.

ginians he saw in his front to deal with, at the head of whom was Hannibal. He never imagined that there might be other bodies of troops in ambuscade on each side behind the mountains. Hannibal having suffered him to advance above half the length of the valley, gave the signal of battle, and sent orders to those who were in ambuscade to attack the enemy at the same time on all sides. One may judge the confusion of the Romans.

They were not yet drawn up in battle, and had not prepared their arms, when they saw themselves charged on all sides, in the front, flanks, and rear. Flaminius, though void of all the other qualities necessary to a General, had courage. He was the only intrepid person in so universal a consternation, animated his soldiers with his hand and voice, and exhorted them to open themselves a way with their swords through the enemy. But the tumult that prevailed on all sides, the dreadful cries of the combatants, and the fog, which had rose, prevented him from being either heard or seen. However, when they perceived, that they were inclosed on all sides, either by the enemy, the lake, or the mountains, the impossibility of escaping by flight reanimated them, and they began to fight on all sides with astonishing fury. The animosity of the two armies was so great, that nobody perceived an earthquake, which at that instant threw down almost whole cities in many countries of Italy, and produced amazing effects.

The action continued three hours. Flaminius having been killed by an Insubrian Gaul, the Romans began to give way, and afterwards fled outright. A great number, in order to escape, threw themselves into the lake. Others having taken the way of the mountains, came into the midst of the enemy they were endeavouring to shun. Only six thousand opened themselves a passage through the victors, and retired to a place of safety: but they were stopped, and made prisoners the next day by Maherbal, who besieged and reduced them to so great an extremity,
that

that they laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves upon a promise, which was made them, that they should have liberty to retire.

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Ant. C.
217.

Such was the famous battle of Thrasymenus, which the Romans reckoned in the number of their greatest misfortunes; and such the fruit of the rashness of Flaminius. It cost him his own life, and Rome the loss of so many brave soldiers, who had been invincible under another General. The Romans lost fifteen thousand men in the battle itself. About ten thousand got to Rome by different ways; and only fifteen hundred were killed on the side of the Carthaginians; but a great number of their men died of their wounds. Hannibal treated the Roman prisoners very cruelly, and even those who had surrendered to Maherbal; pretending that officer had no right to treat with them without having first consulted him. As to the Latine allies of the Romans, he dismissed them without ransom. He caused the body of Flaminius to be sought for in vain, in order to give it honourable interment. He paid the last duties to the officers and soldiers of his army, that had fallen in the battle; after which he put his troops into quarters of refreshment.

It is not necessary, that I should collect here all the faults of Flaminius into one point of view. They are evident, gross, and cannot escape the least discerning eye. We see in him the effects of a blind esteem for one's self, and a senseless presumption, which is diffident of nothing, which would believe it a disgrace either to ask or follow counsel, which always flatters itself with good success, without having taken any measures to make it sure, and which sees no danger, till it is impossible to avoid it.

What a contrast is there in Hannibal, who shews in the action we are speaking of, all the qualities of a great Captain: vigilance, activity, foresight, profound knowledge of all the rules of the art-military, and of all the stratagems of war, indefatigable attention to inform himself in every thing; and lastly, a

A. R. 535. wonderful address in improving occasions of times,
 Ant. C. places, and persons; and in making them all subser-
 217. vient to his views.

I cannot pardon the Roman People for having, through prejudice for a factious person that knew how to flatter them, opposed so formidable an enemy with so contemptible a General as Flaminius. Such choices, and they are not uncommon, often bring a State to the very brink of destruction.

Polyb. iii.¹ As soon as the news of the defeat of the army near
 236. the lake of Thrasymenus was brought to Rome, the
 Liv. xxii. whole people went to the Forum with abundance of
 7. terror and consternation. The ladies running to and fro about the streets, asked all they met, what was the bad news, which had just happened, and in what condition the army of the Commonwealth was. The multitude assembled round the tribunal of harangues; and the Senate and Magistrates were desired to repair thither, in order to inform them of what had passed. At length, towards the evening, the Prætor M. Pomponius appeared in public. He sought no evasions to soften such mournful news: the misfortune was too great to admit of palliatives. "We have lost a great battle," said he. Though he did not enter into any particulars, some persons from confused rumours, related however different circumstances; "That the Consul had been killed; that the greatest part of the troops had fallen in the battle; that only a small number of soldiers, dispersed by flight into Hetruria, or made prisoners by the victor, had escaped with life."

Those, whose relations had served under the Consul Flaminius, were divided in thought by as many various anxieties, as there are different misfortunes, to which conquered troops are exposed; and nobody yet knew what they were either to hope or fear. The next and the following days, a multitude of citizens were seen at the gates, but far more women than men, who waited there the return of their relations, or of such as might give some account of them. And, if any one of their acquaintance arrived, they immediately

diately furrounded him, and did not quit him, till they had learnt all the particulars they desired to know from him. They afterwards returned to their homes with grief or joy in their looks, according to the news they had heard, accompanied by others who either congratulated, or condoled with, them.

The women distinguished their grief or joy still more than the men. One is said to have died at the gates of the city on the unexpected appearance of her son, that returned from the army: and another, who had been falsely informed of the death of her's, to have expired the very moment she saw him enter her house, where she had given herself up to grief. For several days, the Prætors kept the Senate assembled from morning till evening, to deliberate upon the measures it was necessary to take, and to determine with what General, and what troops, they should be able to oppose the victorious Carthaginians.

Before they had fixed upon any measure, the news of a new misfortune was brought them. Hannibal had defeated four thousand horse, whom the Consul Cn. Servilius had sent to the aid of his colleague, but who had stopt short in Umbria, as soon as they had been apprized of what had passed near the lake of Thrasymenus. This loss made different impressions upon the people. Some considered it as slight in comparison with that sustained before, which wholly engrossed them. * Others did not judge of this event from the loss in itself: but as the slightest accident suffices to depress a body already weakened by a dangerous illness, whilst one in perfect health can resist a much ruder shock; so they believed, that the defeat of this cavalry was not to be considered in itself, but according to the relation it had to the exhausted strength of the Commonwealth; which made it inca-

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

Liv. xxii.
8.

* Pars, non id quod acciderat, per se æstimare: sed, ut in affecto corpore quamvis levis causa magis, quàm valido gravior, sentiretur; ita tum ægræ & affectæ civitati quodcumque adversi inciderit, non rerum magnitudine, sed viribus extenuatis, quæ nihil quod aggravaret pati possent, æstimandum esse. Liv.

A. R. 335. pable of sustaining the most inconsiderable blow. In
 Ant. C. 217. so sad a conjuncture they had recourse to a remedy,
 which had not been employed a great while, and re-
 solved to create a Dictator. We shall soon see upon
 whom the choice fell.

DIGRESSION upon the SATURNALIA.

THE SATURNALIA were a feast instituted in ho-
 nour of Saturn. Fable, which has made a god
 of him, conceals the truth of his history under differ-
 ent fictions. Saturn is believed to have been a very
 powerful King. After various events, being con-
 quered by his son Jupiter, who possessed himself of
 his throne, he retired to the court of Janus, King of
 the Aborigines in Italy, who gave him a good recep-
 tion. * In conjunction with him, he governed that
 people, who were almost savage, civilized their man-
 ners, gave them laws, taught them to cultivate the
 earth, and invented the sickle, which was afterwards
 his symbol. The peace and plenty which they enjoyed
 during his reign, occasioned those happy times to be
 called “ the Golden Age;” and it was to perpetuate
 the remembrance of it, that the feast of the Saturnalia
 was instituted.

The particular intent of this feast was to represent
 the equality, which prevailed in the time of Saturn
 amongst men, who lived according to the laws of
 nature, without diversity of conditions; slavery being
 introduced into the world only by violence and ty-
 ranny.

This feast began, as is believed, in the time of Ja-
 nus, who survived Saturn, and placed him in the

* *Italiæ cultores primi Aborigines fuere: quorum rex Saturnus tantæ justitiæ fuisse traditur, ut neque servierit sub illo quisquam, neque quicquam privatæ rei habuerit; sed omnia communia, & indivisa omnibus fuerint, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset. Ob cuius exempli memoriam cautum est, ut Saturnalibus exequato omnium jure passim in conviviiis servi cum dominis recumbant.* JUS-
 TIN. xliii. 1.

number of the Gods. It was originally only a popular solemnity. Tullus Hostilius gave this custom in Rome the sanction of the public authority, and raised it to the rank of a festival established by law: at least he made such a vow. It appears, that this vow was not performed till the Consulship of A. Sempronius and M. Minucius, in whose time a temple was dedicated to Saturn, which became the public treasury of the Roman People, (*ærarium*) where the public money and acts were kept. At the same time the feast of the Saturnalia was instituted in all the forms. The celebration of them was probably discontinued afterwards, and re-established *in perpetuum*, in the second Punic war, and the Consulship of Servilius and Flamininus, as we have said before.

Dion. Hal.
iii. 175.
Liv. ii. 21.
1.

Liv. xxii.
1.

They * were days of rejoicing, which were passed in feasting. The Romans then laid aside the Toga, and appeared in public in the Tunica, or dress used at table. They sent each other presents, in the manner of new-year's gifts, which were called *Apophoreta*, and gave their name to the last book of Martial's epigrams. Games of chance, prohibited at other times, were then allowed. The Senate adjourned: the affairs of the bar were suspended; and the schools were shut. It was thought a bad omen to begin a war, and to punish criminals, during a time sacred to pleasure.

The children proclaimed the feast, by running through the streets the day before, and crying out, *Io Saturnalia*. There are medals still in being with those words upon them. The severe raillery, which the famous Narcissus, Claudius's freedman, suffered, is founded on those words. When that Emperor sent him into the Gauls to appease a sedition, which had arose amongst the troops, upon his ascending the tribunal in order to harangue the army, the soldiers cried out *Io Saturnalia*, by way of implying, that it

Dio lx.
677-

* *Hilara sanè Saturnalia*; Cic. Epist. ad Attic. v. 20,

was the feast of the Saturnalia when the slaves acted as masters.

This festival continued only one day at first : but in process of time it lasted three, then five, and at length seven, including the two days of a contiguous festival in it. It was celebrated in the month of December xiv. * Kal. Jan.

The most singular and remarkable of the customs observed during the Saturnalia, is that which relates to the slaves ; and it is for that reason I have reserved it for the end of this head. I have already observed, that this feast had been principally instituted to preserve the remembrance of the primitive and natural equality, which subsisted between all mankind. It † was for this reason, that the power of the masters over the slaves was suspended at that time. They made it a diversion to change condition and dress with them. They gave them authority over the whole house, which obeyed them like a little Republic. They ordered them to be treated with the same respect and duty as themselves. They not only admitted them to their tables, but, according to Athenæus, served them there. To conclude, they gave them the liberty to say and do all they thought fit. This is the privilege, which Horace permitted his slave Davus to use, who desired to tell him abundance of things, but was afraid of offending him. “ Use,” says his master to him, “ the liberty which the month “ of December gives thee.”

Athen.
xiv, 639.

Sat. vii.
l. 2.

Age : libertate Decembri

(Quando ita majores voluerunt) utere : narra.

The supreme power, which masters had over their slaves, might easily degenerate into cruelty and ty-

* The xiv. Kal. Jan. in the year of Numa, when the month of December had only 29 days, was the 17th of December. After the reformation of the calendar by Cæsar, which gave 31 days to that month, it was the nineteenth.

† Instituerunt diem festum, quo non solum cum servis domini vescerentur, sed quo utique honores illis in domo gerere, jus dicere permiserunt,

ranny. The custom, of which we are speaking, had been wisely established to make them remember, that * slaves were men as well as themselves, and consequently ought to be treated with humanity, and considered by their masters as a kind of companions and friends of an inferior class. † It was for the same reason, that at Rome in the solemnity most capable of inspiring sentiments of vanity and haughtiness, I mean the triumph, wherein the victor seated in his pompous chariot, exhibited himself as a spectacle to the whole people, care was taken to place a slave behind him, who put him in mind from time to time, to remember that he was a man.

Every body knows how cruelly the Lacedæmonians treated the Helots, who were their slaves. This was not the practice at Rome; and Plutarch gives a very natural and sensible reason for it. “At that time,” speaking of the infancy of the Commonwealth, “slaves were used with abundance of humanity, their masters considering them rather as their companions than their bondmen; because they worked, and lived with them in the country. For that reason they behaved with a great deal of goodness to them, and afforded them a kind of freedom and familiarity, that very much softened their condition.” Plut. in Coriolan. p. 225.

Not to mention views of religion, masters only gain by a mild and humane treatment of their servants. ‡ Love serves with a quite different zeal and fidelity from fear. Seneca congratulates one of his friends upon his kind and gentle usage of his slaves; and exhorts

miserunt, & domum pusillam rempublicam esse judicaverunt. SENECA. Epist. 47.

* *Servi sunt? imò homines. Servi sunt? imò contubernales. Servi sunt? imò humiles amici. SENECA. Ep. 47.*

† *Hominem se esse etiam triumphans in sublimissimo illo curru admonetur. Suggestur enim à tergo: RESPICE POST TE. HOMINEM MEMENTO TE ETIAM. TERTULL. Apolog. cap. 33.*

Et sibi Consul

Ne placeat, servus curru portatur eodem. JUV. Sat. X.

‡ *Fidelius & gratius semper obsequium est, quod ab amore, quam quod à metu proficiscitur. HIERON. ad Celantiam.*

him

him strongly not to regard the * frivolous and unjust reproaches of those, who dislike his familiarizing himself with his servants, and his not making them sensible of his superiority by the pride and insolence of his behaviour.

Besides this there were slaves at Rome of extraordinary merit, both for natural parts and the sciences, for virtue and fidelity. † Slavery extends no farther than the body; the soul is not within its power. The body may be bought and sold: but the soul is free and independant. This is so true, says Seneca, that we have neither a right to exact obedience from them, nor are they obliged to obey us, in all things. They are not to execute orders against the State, nor to perpetuate any crime at our bidding.

Part of what I have said upon the Saturnalia is extracted from a brief memoir on the same subject, which is treated at large in Macrobius, and in the Dialogue of Lipsius upon that festival.

REFLECTION upon the Vows made by the ROMANS.

IT was not without reason, that the Roman People were extremely enraged, and alarmed, by the impious refusal of the Consul Flaminius to observe the religious ceremonies, enjoined the Consuls, before they set out from Rome for the war. One of the most common of them was to make vows, and offer sacrifices in the Capitol, in order to draw down the divine protection upon their arms. The Consuls ne-

* Non est quod fastidiosi te deterrent, quo minùs servis tuis hilarem te præstes, & non superbè superiorem. *SENEC. Epist. 47.*

† Errat, si quis existimat servitutem in totum hominem descendere: pars melior ejus excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt, & ascripta dominis: mens quidem sui juris. Corpus itaque est, quod domino fortuna tradidit: hoc emit, hoc vendit. Interior illa pars mancipio dari non potest. Ab hac quicquid venit, liberum est. Non enim aut nos omnia jubere possumus, aut in omnia parere coguntur. Contra rempublicam imperata non facient; nulli sceleri manus commodabunt. *SENEC. de Benef. iii. 20.*

ver took the field, till they had, previously to all things, discharged that duty; and no war was undertaken till that was first done. In the very war of which we have been speaking, the * Prætor made vows, in the name and by the order of the Roman People, "in case the Commonwealth should continue during ten years in the state wherein it then actually was." When the Roman People made war against Antiochus, they promised to cause the great Roman games in honour of Jupiter to be celebrated during ten days successively, if that war was successful. † The Generals often, in the very heat of battle, made vows when the army was in danger. For the time to ‡ address vows to the Divinity is when there is no resource to be had from man. The Roman history abounds with facts of this kind.

Liv. xxxvi.

2.

But the custom of making vows was not peculiar to the Roman People. It is of all times and all nations, and consequently is derived from revelation. For an universal custom is a manifest proof of a general tradition come down from the first family, from which all mankind are descended. And not only States and Republics, but private persons, have in all times made it a practice to make vows to God, in order to obtain from him even their temporal wants.

To consult only the light of human reason, one might perhaps believe, that it is not treating the Divinity with sufficient respect, to make him descend to such inconsiderable particularities, as the care of supplying us with the things necessary to life; or of stipulating with him, that, if he will vouchsafe to take that care upon him, we on our side will discharge certain duties, to which we oblige ourselves only on that condition. But those who judge in this manner of vows, are in an error.

* Prætor vota suspicere jussus, si in decem annos Respublica eodem stetitset statu. Liv. xxi. 62.

† Bellona, si hodie nobis victoriam duis, ast ego tibi templum voveo. Liv.

‡ Tum præcipue votorum locus erat, cum spei nullus esset. Plin. viii. 16.

God, by this means, has thought fit to preserve in the minds of all the people of the earth, a clear idea of his Providence; of the care which he takes of all men in particular; of the supreme authority which he reserves to himself over all the events of their lives; of his entire liberty to substitute nature and all things to his will; and of his attention to those who call upon him, and have recourse to him in their need.

Senec. de
Benef. iv.
4.

The Pagans have acknowledged this truth. Seneca, in refuting Epicurus, who pretended, that the Divinity did not interfere in any kind of human affairs, employs the common opinion and universal custom of mankind in this point, as an invincible argument against him. † To think as Epicurus does, says he, one must be ignorant that in all places, in all times, amongst all nations, men have lifted up their suppliant hands, and made vows to heaven, for the attainment of its graces. Would they act in this manner, would they all be so stupid and extravagant to address their prayers and vows to a Divinity, whom they believed deaf and impotent? And is not this general concurrence a certain proof of their internal conviction, that God both hears and grants their requests?

DIGRESSION upon the PUBLICANS.

AS the Publicans will be spoken of hereafter, I think myself obliged to give the reader some slight idea of them. I shall reduce what I have to say upon this head to two articles. In the first, I shall treat of the revenues of the Roman People; in the second, of the Publicans, who were the farmers or receivers of those revenues.

* Hoc qui dicit, non exaudit precantium voces, & undique sublati in cœlum manibus vota facientium privata ac publica. Quod profectò non fieret, nec in hunc furorem omnes mortales consentirent, alloquendi furda numina & inefficaces deos; nisi nossent illorum beneficia nunc ultro oblata, nunc orantibus data.

ARTICLE I.

Of the revenues of the Roman People.

THE revenues of the Roman People consisted principally in two kinds of imposts, which were raised either upon the citizens, or the allies of the empire: *Tributum* and *Vestigal*. I shall call them Taxes and Tributes, though perhaps those words do not exactly render the Latin terms. We shall see their difference in the sequel.

S E C T. I.

Of the Taxes.

THE tax, *Tributum*, was a personal contribution, which Princes or Commonwealths raised upon their subjects to support the expences of the State.

The tax at first was paid Rome equally and by the head, without distinction either of estate or condition. Servius Tullius, the sixth King of the Romans, abolished this custom, and regulated the contributions by the estates of every particular; as we have shewn in speaking of the institution of the Census. They were not considerable at first. But when Rome began to give the soldiers pay, who till then had served at their own expence, the contributions perpetually augmented with the occasions of the State. They were of two kinds: the one ordinary and fixed; the other extraordinary, which were raised only in the emergencies of the Commonwealth; as happened the 538th year of Rome in the Consulship of Q. Fabius Maximus and M. Claudius Marcellus, when particulars Liv. xxiv. 11. were taxed a certain sum according to their estates, for equipping a fleet, and supplying it with mariners.

These taxes continued to be raised upon private persons, till the 586th year of Rome. Paulus Æmi-

Cic. de
Offic. ii. 76.

lius at that time caused such considerable sums of gold and silver to be carried into the public treasury, of the spoils taken from Perseus, the last King of Macedonia, that the Commonwealth was in a condition entirely to take off all taxes from the citizens; and they enjoyed that exemption, till the year after the death of Julius Cæsar.

I cannot forbear inserting in this place a circumstance, which Cicero adds to what I have just been saying of Paulus Æmilius, and which is highly for his honour. After having related that he caused immense sums to be carried into the public treasury, "As to himself, says he, he carried nothing into his own house, except immortal glory." *At hic nihil domum suam præter memoriam nominis immortalem detulit.* How noble and extraordinary was such disinterestedness!

S E C T. II.

Of the Tributes or Imposts.

SO I call what the Romans termed *Vestigalia*. These revenues in the early times of the Commonwealth were of three sorts, and were raised either upon lands; pasturages belonging to the Commonwealth; or customs for the importation or exportation of merchandize: these were called *Decumæ*, *Scriptura*, *Portorium*.

DECUMÆ, or *Decimæ*. When the Romans had conquered a people, either in or out of Italy, they deprived them of part of their territory, part of which they distributed amongst citizens who settled there as a colony, and reserved the property of the rest to the State, which they farmed to particulars, upon condition of paying a tenth of the profits of such lands to the Roman People.

The tenths were not raised in the same manner in all the provinces. From some a certain quantity of grain, or fixed sum of money, was exacted, as in Spain, and Africa; and this impost was called *Vestigal certum*;

certum; because it was always the same, whether the year were good or bad, or the lands produced much or little. Other provinces, as Asia, were treated more favourably, and paid only the tenth precisely; so that the Roman People shared in the misfortune of barren years. Sicily was treated in the same manner, and with still greater favour.

Corn was brought from Sicily (as also from the other provinces) under three denominations; which corn, according to those three differences, was called either *decumanum*, *emptum*, or *æstimatum*.

Frumentum Decumanum was the tenth of the corn produced by each husbandman's lands, with which he was obliged to supply the Roman People *gratis*.

Emptum was the corn which the Roman People bought for the occasions of the State, on which they set the price themselves.

Æstimatum was the corn consumed in the Prætor's house, with which the province was obliged to supply him. He sometimes received it in money, and fixed the value on it himself.

The tenths of wine, oil, and the lower species of grain were also paid. Cic. 5. in Verr.

SCRIPTURA. This was the revenue, which the Roman People raised upon the pasture-lands, of which the property was in the Commonwealth, and which was farmed to particulars. It was so called, because the number of cattle, which particulars were to put into those pasturages, were registered; and it was by that number the yearly sums they engaged to pay were regulated.

PORTORIUM. The duties laid upon merchandise brought through the gates of cities, and into sea-ports, or carried out of them, were so called.

There was also another impost distinct from the foregoing, which was called *viceſima manumissorum*: this was the twentieth of the value at which each slave made free was estimated, and which was carried into the public treasury. It was established by the Consul Cn. Manlius in the camp; a thing unprecedented. Liv. vii. 16.

DIGRESSION upon the PUBLICANS.

The Senate, however, passed that law, because that impost brought in a great revenue to the Commonwealth. * Cicero observes, that it still subsisted in his time, even after all Italy was exempt from taxes and duties. The Emperor Caligula doubled that duty one half.

Dio in
Exc. lxxii.

The Romans had also a revenue from the making and sale of salt. This tax is what the French now call *la Gabelle*. The King Ancus Marcius was the first who established salt-works. Those who farmed them selling the salt too dear, the duty was taken out of their hands; and to ease the people, they were afterwards used in the name of the public by commissioners, who rendered an account of their administration. This was in the year of Rome 246.

Liv. i. 33.

Liv. ii. 9.

This change was made for the advantage of the people; and salt, during more than three hundred years, continued exempt from all duties. In the 548th year of Rome, a tax was laid upon it for the first time in the Censorship of M. Livius and C. Claudius. The price of salt had been till then at Rome and throughout Italy, the sixth part of the As, which is not quite so much as the sixth of our penny: *Sextante salis & Romæ, & per totam Italiam erat*. Livy does not explain what quantity of salt was signified by the word *sal*: it is to be understood of his own times. Livius is believed to have been the author of this impost, and to have instituted it by way of revenge upon the people for the unjust judgment they had formerly passed against him; and for that reason he was surnamed *Salinator*. We do not find in any author to what this duty amounted.

Liv. xxix.

Strab. iii.
247.

The mines of iron, silver and gold, were in process of time a very great revenue to the Romans. Polybius, as cited by Strabo, tells us, that in his time there were forty thousand men employed in the mines in the neighbourhood of Carthage; and that they

* *Portorii Italix sublati*—quod vestigial superest domesticum, præter vicesimam. Ep. ad Att. ii. 16.

every day produced the Roman People five and twenty thousand drachmas, that is, about six hundred pounds.

The public treasury of Rome was considerably enriched by the spoils brought into it by the Generals at their return from their victories, especially when they were as disinterested as Paulus Æmilius, of whom we have spoken before.

It is a misfortune, that antient authors have left us no particular detail either of the amount of the several taxes and tributes paid to the Romans, or of the gross of the revenues of the State. They were undoubtedly very moderate in the beginning: but towards the end of the Commonwealth, they had augmented in proportion to its conquests and dominions. Appian, in an express work, treated all that related to the forces, revenues, and expences of the Empire: but that book is lost, with the greatest part of his history.

Plutarch tells us, that Pompey, in his triumph Plut. in Pomp. over Mithridates, caused inscriptions in great characters to be carried, wherein was read, that till then the public revenues had amounted annually to only five thousand myriads, or fifty millions of Attic drachmas, that is to say, to about one million two hundred thousand pounds; and that from his conquests the Romans had augmented their revenue eight thousand five hundred myriads, or fourscore and five millions of drachmas, that is to say, about two millions one hundred thousand pounds sterling. These two sums added together, made about three millions three hundred thousand pounds sterling. Asia only is here in question. The conquest of the Gauls, and that of Egypt, farther augmented the revenues of the Roman People. The tribute imposed by Cæsar upon the Gauls, according to Suetonius and Eutropius, amounted to ten millions of drachmas, or about two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. Suet. in Cæs. xxv. Eutrop. l. 6. And, according to Velleius Paterculus, Egypt paid almost as Vell Pat. ii. 39. much as Gaul.

DIGRESSION upon the PUBLICANS.

After having spoken of the revenues of the Roman People, it is necessary to add something in respect to those who were appointed to collect them.

ARTICLE II.

Of the PUBLICANS.

THOSE, who collected the public revenues, were so called, and were much the same as the *Fermiers Generaux*, Receivers-general, in France. The Roman Knights usually exercised this function. The order of Knights were in great consideration at Rome, and a kind of middle rank between the Senators and the People. Their institution was as early as Romulus. They did not attain the great offices, nor enter the Senate, as long as they continued in the order of Knights: which made them the more capable of employing themselves in collecting the revenues of the Roman People.

They consisted of several different societies, into which three sorts of persons were admitted: *Mancipes*, or *Redemptores*, who took the farms in their names; *Prædes*, those who were security for them; *Socii*, Associates, who entered into a kind of partnership with the rest, and divided the losses and gains with them.

The farms of the public revenues, whether of Italy or the provinces, could be assigned only at Rome, and in the presence of the People: and this was done by the Censors.

When any difficulty arose, either in respect to the diminution or cancelling a lease, or any thing of the like nature, the affair was referred to the Senate, who decided supremely in such case. For these farmers ran great risks. Cicero, in his fine discourse to the People, to induce them to give Pompey the command of the war against Mithridates, represents in a very lively manner the extreme danger, to which that war exposed those, who collected the public revenues in

Asia,

Asia. * That province excelled all the rest of the empire, as well for the fertility of the countries, and variety of their productions, as the extent of its pastures, and multiplicity of merchandizes exported from thence to other places. Now the rumour only of war, and the neighbourhood of an enemy's troops, ruins an whole country, even before they have made any irruption into it; because at that time the care of breeding cattle, and the cultivation of lands, are abandoned; and commerce by sea entirely interrupted. Thus all the sources, from which the product of the farms is derived, being stopt and dried up, the farmers are incapable of performing their engagements, and of paying the sums agreed on for their leases.

Cicero insists much upon this inconvenience, and speaks of the farmers-general in a manner that shews the exceeding consideration he had for them. "If † we have always believed, says he, that the revenues arising from taxes and imposts, are the nerves of the Commonwealth, we ought to consider the Order, that takes upon itself the care of raising them, as the support of all the other bodies of the State." Cicero uses the same language every where in his discourses. And indeed they did the Commonwealth great service, and were often its resource in calamitous times, and on pressing occasions. Livy relates, (as we shall after him) that after the battle of Cannæ, the Prætor Fulvius, having represented the incapacity of Rome either to send the provisions and cloathing, that were absolutely necessary, to Spain, ‡ exhorted the people

* Asia tam optima est & fertilis, ut & ubertate agrorum, & varietate fructuum, & magnitudine pastionum, & multitudine earum rerum quæ exportantur, facile omnibus terris antecellat.—Pecora relinquuntur, agricultura deseritur, mercatorum navigatio conquiescit. Ita neque ex portu, neque ex decumis, neque ex scriptura vestigal conservari potest. Quare sæpe totius anni fructus uno rumore periculi, atque uno belli terrore, amittitur. Pro Leg. MANIL. 14, 15.

† Si vestigalia nervos esse Reip. semper duximus, eum certè ordinem qui exercet illa, firmamentum ceterorum ordinum rectè esse dicemus. Ibid.

‡ Cohortandos, qui redempturis auxissent patrimonia, ut reipublicæ, ex qua crevissent, tempus commodarent. LIV. xxxiii. 48.

DIGRESSION upon the PUBLICANS.

of business, who had augmented their fortunes by the farms, to assist the Commonwealth which had enriched them, by making advances for its service, that should be punctually reimbursed. And this they did with a readiness and joy, that argued their zeal for the public good.

It was not deemed criminal in them to have acquired riches by collecting the public revenues. Nothing is more just and legal than such gains when moderate; and they seem to have been thought so in respect to the persons, of whom we are now speaking; as they are only said to have augmented their patrimony, *qui redempturis auxissent patrimonia*. The profession therefore of business, far from being reproachable in itself, ought to be considered as absolutely necessary to a State. Princes, to support the charges of it; to defend it against enemies abroad, and to maintain tranquility at home, are obliged to lay taxes and imposts upon their subjects. A Roman Emperor seemed to design to abolish them entirely, and to make so glorious a present to mankind; *Idque pulcherrimum donum generi mortalium faceret*. The Senate, in praising so generous a thought, represented to him, that putting it in execution, would be to ruin the empire. It is against their will, that Princes find themselves reduced to this sad necessity, with which not being able to dispense, their intention is, that, both in the imposing and levying of taxes, their subjects should be treated with all possible humanity; and they readily agree in their sentiments with a King of Persia, who answered a Governor of a province, that thought to make his court to him by augmenting the imposts, "that he was for shearing, and not for slaying, his sheep."

The misfortune is, that the intention of Princes is not always followed; and that those to whom they confide their authority, sometimes abuse it in a strange manner. And this often rendered the name of Publican odious. Cicero, who declares so much in their favour, confesses "that Italy and the provinces re-

founded

founded with complaints against them ; * and that it was less upon the account of the imposts, than their cruel and unjust manner of exacting them." It is in his fine letter to his brother Quintius, who had then the government of Asia, that he explains himself thus ; a letter, which is a master-piece, and which all governors and ministers ought always to have before their eyes. " He tells his brother, that he will find the publicans a great obstacle to the protection he designs to afford, and the good he desires to do, the people of his province. He exhorts him to act with all possible reserve in respect to an order of persons, to whom his brother and himself have very great obligations ; but so however, that the public good may not suffer by it". " For," adds he, † " if you have " a blind complacency for them in all things, that " will be the means to ruin inevitably those whom " the Roman People have confided to your care, that " you might not only be vigilant for their safety and " the preservation of their lives, but for the interests " of them all, and that you might procure them all " the advantages that depend on you. To judge " rightly of things, this is the only difficulty you will " find in the government of your province."

The wise advice which Cicero gives his brother in a letter, wherein he opens his heart freely to him, shews, what his real thoughts were of the publicans, and detracts very much from the praises he gives them in the public discourses, wherein he talks as an orator.

Accordingly we shall be obliged, in the sequel of this history, to relate several facts not much for their honour : and some of the greatest men of the Commonwealth have recommended themselves by nothing more, than their resolution and vigilance in redressing

* Non tam de portorio, quàm de nonnullis portitorum injuriis querebantur.

† Sin autem omnibus in rebus obsequemur, funditus, eos perire patiemur, quorum non modò salutem, sed etiam commodis consulere debemus. Hæc est una (si verè cogitare volumus) in toto imperio tuo difficultas.

Diod. in
Excerpt.
Vales.
p. 394.

the grievances, which the publicans made the subjects of the empire suffer. Amongst others, Q. Mutius Scævola had been charged with the government of Asia in the quality of Prætor. When he arrived in his province, nothing was heard but the cry of the whole people against the unjust exactions and inhuman cruelty of the publicans. He found, upon a serious examination into them, that these complaints were only too well founded; and that his predecessors, either to curry favour with the order of Knights, which was very powerful then at Rome, or to enrich themselves, had entirely given the reins to the insatiable avidity of the men of business. He believed such notorious rapine could only be put a stop to, by an example of severity capable of spreading terror amongst them, and hanged one of the principal commissioners, that presided in collecting the public revenues. Is a robber upon the highway more criminal than a man, who abuses the authority confided to him, to plunder and ruin nations?

Often indeed it was not the publicans themselves, who committed these rapines, and had the advantages of these thefts, but their substitutes: but this excuse, admitting it to be true, did not justify them. They might be told with Cicero, † “Your confederates
“ were your hands; your deputies, officers, clerks,
“ kindred, friends, dependants, all were your hands.
“ You are responsible for their conduct to the citizens,
“ allies, and the Commonwealth. Their crimes are
“ yours. If we would be deemed innocent, we must
“ not only abstain from crimes ourselves, but restrain
“ all in office under us from committing them.”

This is the rule. But where is it observed?

* Comites illi tui dilecti, manus erant tuæ: præfecti, scribæ, accensi, præcones, manus erant tuæ: ut quisque te maximè cognatione, affinitate, necessitudine aliqua attingebat, ita maximè manus tua putabatur—Si enim innocentes existimari volumus, non solum nos abstinentes, sed etiam nostros comites præstare debemus. VER. lli. n. 27, 28.

Circumspiciendum est diligenter, ut in hac custodia provinciæ non te unum, sed omnes ministros imperii tui sociis, & civibus, & reipublicæ præstare videre. Cic. Epist. 1. ad Quint. Frat.

DIGRESSION upon the Habits of the ROMANS.

BEFORE I speak of the habits of the Romans, I ought to observe, that there is hardly any subject either more confused, or upon which authors less agree, than this. I shall not take upon me either to refute, or reconcile them. The end I propose is to relate, as briefly as possible, what shall appear most probable to myself, and most useful to my readers.

HABITS OF THE MEN.

The **TOGA** was, properly speaking, the habit of the Romans.

Romanos rerum Dominos, gentemque togatam. Virg.

It was so peculiarly an habit of peace, that peace was expressed by the word *Toga*.

Cedant arma togæ.

The *Toga* was a kind of very ample cloak, and according to the most received opinion, quite open before. It was usually made fast upon the left shoulder, so that the right shoulder and arm of the same side were entirely at liberty. As it was of an extraordinary breadth, to prevent it from trailing upon the ground, it was wrapt round the body, folded several ways, and the ends gathered in broad plaits, and carried upon the arm. Quintilian (Book IX. Chap. 3.) explains with great extent in what manner the orator should hold his robe in pleading. * *Hortensius*, that famous orator, who was curious to excess in respect

* *Hortensius*—in præcinctu ponens omnem decorem, fuit vestitu ad mundiciem curioso, & ut bene amictus iret, faciem in speculo ponebat, ubi se intuens, togam corpori sic applicabat, ut, &c. *MACROB.* ii. 9.

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to the elegance and gracefulness of his dress, looked in a glass, to examine whether the whole was well disposed, and took no less care in adjusting the folds of his Toga, than in turning the periods of his discourse. How often is there something of little, even in the greatest men ! *Quantum est in rebus inane.*

In antient marbles and monuments this habit seems to have much grandeur and dignity, but it could not have been very commodious. The Toga was of a very light stuff, white, and usually of wool. They quitted it when in mourning, and in times of public calamity, to wear black.

The measure of the Toga was not fixed, but according to the fortune or pride of the wearer. Horace represents a rich man recommending seriously to one of a very small income, not to pretend to vye with him in the magnitude of his Toga.

————— *Meæ, contendere noli*
Stultitiam patiuntur opes : tibi parvula res est.
Aræta decet, sanum comitem toga.

In another place he describes the public indignation for a rich man of no birth, who, proud of his great estate and credit, swept the streets of Rome with a Toga six ells wide.

Vides ne Sacram metiente te viam
Cum bis ter ulnarum toga,
Ut ora vertat huc & huc euntium
Liberrima indignatio.

Seest thou, when with six ells of gown
 You sweep the Mall, how many frown;
 How each that views thee, screws his face,
 And justly scorns thee for an ass. CREECH.

The TUNICA was common to the Greeks and Romans : but amongst the Greeks, it had pretty close sleeves ; and amongst the Romans wide ones extremely short, which did not reach to the elbow. It came
 down

down to the knees, or something lower. The Tunica had no opening before. As it was wide enough, it was kept close with a girdle or sash. It was a disgrace amongst the Romans to appear in public loose and without a girdle, *discinctus ut nepos*; or with a * tunic, Horat. that reached down to the heels, *cum tunica talari*; and Cic. in one that had sleeves which reached to the hands, *Et* Virg. *tunicæ manicas & habent redimicula mitræ*. Cæsar wore Suet. in Cæsar, c. 45. a *Latus-clavus*, that had sleeves to the wrists with fringes to them, and with a sash only over his *Latus-clavus*, leaving it loose and ill fastened on. † This gave occasion for Sylla's saying, which he often repeated to the favourers of aristocracy: "Beware of the boy with the loose girdle." Sylla's thought was, that under that outside of softness and effeminacy lay hid unbounded ambition, and a genius formed for cabal and faction.

The Tunica was worn immediately under the Toga. Only the common people appeared abroad in Rome in the tunic; from whence Horace calls them *tunicatus*. In the country and the municipal cities, persons of the greatest condition wore only this habit.

Besides this external tunic many wore another next the skin. This was called *intercula*, *subucula*, or *indusium*; for those three words signify almost the same thing. This internal tunic was made of wool: flax was not yet applied to that use; and that made bathing absolutely necessary to the cleanliness and health of the body.

We see here then three things commonly and almost generally worn by the Romans: The Shirt, so I call *indusium*; the Tunic, and the Toga. They had other habits, according to the difference of age, rank, and condition.

PRÆTEXTA. This was a kind of Toga given to the young Romans of quality, when they were turned

* Talares ac manicatas tunicas habere, olim apud Romanos flagitium. S. Aug. de Doctr. Christ.

† Unde emanavit Sullæ dictum, optimates sæpius admonentis, ut malè precinctum puerum caverent. "Sylla then very old, treated Cæsar as a child."

of fourteen. It was so called, from being edged, and in a manner striped with purple. They quitted it for the *Toga virilis*, or robe of manhood, at sixteen or seventeen years; for opinions differ.

Macrob.
i. 6.

Every body knows the history of young Papirius Prætextatus. He had been present, as the son of a Senator, according to the custom of those times, at a deliberation of the Senate, which had continued a great while. His mother earnestly pressed him to tell her the subject of it. But the son's refusal served only to increase the mother's curiosity. At length, as if overcome by her instances, he told her that the Senate had deliberated, whether it would be most advantageous to give two wives to one husband, or two husbands to one wife; and that the affair would not be determined, till the next day. He concluded with desiring her in the strongest terms to keep it a secret. The whole city had it immediately. The next day the ladies in a great alarm came in a body to the Senate; who only laughed at the ingenious fiction of the young man, and for the future prohibited the admittance of young persons to their deliberations, except Papirius, to whom that distinction was granted, to reward his fidelity in keeping a secret at an age whilst he still wore the Prætexta; and that gave him the surname of Prætextatus.

The BULLA may be placed here, though it was not an habit. The *Bullæ* were ornaments antiently given to children of quality: but the use of them became more common in process of time. They were usually of gold, most frequently in the form of an heart, or round; they hung at the breast, and were hollow, in order, says Macrobius, that preservatives against envy might be put in them.

The *Prætexta* was also the robe of the magistrates, as well at Rome as in the colonies and municipal cities.

THE ROBE OF MANHOOD, *TOGA VIRILIS*. This is that prescribed first. It was also called *Toga pura*, because it had no purple in it. *Ego meo Ciceroni Arpini*
—*puram*

—*puram togam dedi.* To put on this robe gave the youth great joy, because they then began to be men for themselves, to enter into affairs, to shew themselves at the bar if they thought fit; for as long as they wore the *Prætecta*, they were not permitted to appear there.

The *LATUS-CLAVUS*. This was the ornament of an habit, which gave its name to the habit itself. It is agreed it consisted of pieces of purple inserted into the tunic: but some affirm, that they were of a round form, like the head of a nail; and others, that they were long pieces in the form of a nail itself. However that were, the tunic, in which these pieces were largest, were peculiar to the Senators: in that of the Knights they were less, for which reason it was called *Angustus-clavus*.

TRABEA. It was also a robe of honour, used at first by the Kings, and afterwards by the Consuls. The Augurs also wore it. It was a kind of Toga, or at least served instead of it. This habit was of purple. Aldus Manutius says, that it was a military habit, worn by the Consuls during war. The Knights also used it at their general review on the 15th of July.

The *CHLAMYS*, and *PALUDAMENTUM*, are often enough confounded by authors. It was a military habit, open, worn over the tunic, fastened with a clasp, and usually upon the left shoulder to leave the right arm at liberty. The Consul and Generals, before they set out for the field, went to the Capitol dressed in this robe, in order to pray and make vows to the Gods, and quitted it at his return, when he entered the city back in the Toga.

The *SAGUM* was a cassock worn in the army by officers as well as private men: but the Sagum of the former was of a finer kind of stuff than that of the latter. It was originally an habit from the Gauls, from whom the Romans had learnt the use of it.

We often find in Livy the *Togæ* and *Tunicæ* mentioned amongst the cloathing sent to the army.

The

DIGRESSION upon the Habits of the ROMANS.

The latter were used there in all times, and by all in the service: but the Togæ were only for the officers; and they used them only within the camp, at a time of rest, and not in action.

The CINCTUS GABINUS is only a certain manner of wearing the Toga, a part of which was brought under the right arm to form a kind of girt or binding round the body.

The Romans usually went bare-headed: statues and marbles almost always represent them so. When either the ceremony of a sacrifice, the sun, rain, or cold weather obliged them to cover their heads, they made themselves a kind of cap of the corner of their Toga: as we see in some marbles. They had however several kinds of hats, to defend them from the injuries of the weather, of which they made little use.

The CUCULLUS, was a kind of cowl like that of the monks. It was usually fastened to the Lacerna, a kind of furtout or riding-coat, used by the soldiers, and inhabitants of the country.

The PILEUS, the form of which was not unlike our night-caps. It was given to slaves, when they were made free, by their masters.

The PETASUS. It was used by travellers. The Petasus usually had brims, but narrower than those of our hats. It must be owned, that ours are infinitely more commodious for keeping off the sun and rain. The Turks however, and all the nations of the East, still retain their turbans.

The dress of the leg is one of the most obscure things relating to their habits; and upon which authors give us least light, as Father Montfaucon owns, who has been of great use to me in this digression.

This dress of the legs may be divided into two kinds. Those which covered the foot entirely, like our shoes; *calceus*, &c. and those which were formed of one or more soles under the foot, and strings or ribands, which bound the naked foot in such a manner at top, that part of it remained uncovered; this is
not

not much unlike what we call sandals : *caliga solea, crepida, sandalium*. The difference between these several kinds of sandals is little known. Some of them went no farther than the ankle : others higher, and sometimes as far as the middle of the leg. The *Caliga* was a kind of boot worn by the soldiery.

The *O.ræ* were also a kind of little boots, which covered part of the legs.

HABITS OF THE WOMEN.

The women, as well as the men, had three garments, one over the other.

The *INDUSIUM* was next the skin, and served as a shift.

The *STOLA* was the same thing as the *Tunica* of the men, except in being longer, and reaching down to the heels. It had sleeves to the elbow, whereas those of the *Tunica* were very short.

The *PALLA*, *pallium*, *amiculum* or *peplum*, was the outward habit of the women, which answered to the *Toga* of the men. It is difficult to distinguish the different signification of those names.

It is not expected from me that I should enumerate in this place the different ornaments used by the women in their dress, in which they have been very curious in all ages and nations, as St. Jerom has thought proper to observe, in giving the sex the epithet φιλόκοσμοι, *lovers of ornaments*. Neither shall I expatiate upon their head-dresses, which in all times have been subject to abundance of variations : for in those times the Mode changed at least as often as in these. And indeed, how should I be able to describe the head-dresses which are extant upon marbles, wherein the hair rises before, like a top-knot, in five or six rows of curls, and the whole is reared like different stories, to the height of half a foot above the forehead ; and wherein the hair, on the back of the head, is made into tresses, or braided in large braids, interwove

wove with each other, and disposed with amazing artifice.

*Tot premit ordinibus, tot jam compagibus altum
Ædificat caput.*

JUVENAL.

With curls on curls they build her head before,
And mount it in a formidable tow'r. DRYDEN.

One can hardly believe, says Father Montfaucon, that one woman's hair could form so many braids behind, and so many curls before: perhaps false hair was used in this kind of head-dress.

T H E

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK THE FOURTEENTH.

THIS book contains the greatest events in the space of two years only; the Dictatorship of Fabius Maximus, to whom Minutius is General of the horse; and the famous battle of Cannæ under the Consuls Paulus Æmilius and Varro.

S E C T. I.

Fabius Maximus is nominated Prodictator, and Minucius his General of the horse. Hannibal ravages the Country, and besieges Spoletum ineffectually. On the Consul's return, Fabius is again nominated Dictator. He begins by acts of religion. The Dictator's departure. Authority of the Dictatorship. Servilius is appointed to guard the coasts with a fleet. Fabius determines not to hazard a battle, in which design he perseveres inflexibly, notwithstanding the endeavours of Hannibal, and the raillery of his own people. Character of Minucius. Hannibal misled through the mistake of his guide. Admirable fidelity of the allies of the Roman People. Seditious discourse of Minucius against the Dictator. Rash skirmish and defeat of Mancinus. Skirmishes between the two armies. Hannibal extricates himself in a very dangerous post by a stratagem entirely new. Fabius is obliged to go to Rome. Successful expeditions

E e

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peditions of Cn. Scipio in Spain. P. Scipio goes thither to join his brother. Spanish hostages delivered up to the Romans by the contrivance of Abellon. The wife delays of Fabius discredit him. Two other reasons render him suspected. Slight advantage of Minucius over Hannibal. The People give Minucius equal authority with the Dictator. Insolent behaviour of Minucius. Battle between Hannibal and Minucius. The latter is beaten. Fabius preserves him. Minucius acknowledges his fault, and returns to his obedience to the Dictator. Extraordinary qualities of Fabius. Wisdom of his conduct in respect to Hannibal. Digression upon the changes made in the Roman coin.

NO Dictator* had been created during thirty three years at Rome for the command of armies, when Fabius was invested with that dignity. We must remember, that the Dictator was a kind of King; but for six months only. All other authority, during his government, either ceased, or was subordinate to him, except only that of the Tribunes of the People, who exercised the functions of their office independently of him. The Consuls were only his Lieutenants, and appeared in his presence as private persons. As a mark of this fulness of power, he had four and twenty Lictors; whereas each of the Consuls had but twelve. He presided in the Senate, when he was in the city, and caused its resolutions to be put in execution. The command of the armies belonged to him. The General of the horse, whom he appointed, did not share in authority with him, and was only a principal officer, that received the Dictator's orders, and supplied his place in his absence. For the rest, the Dictatorship, as is plain from the facts of which we are now speaking, was not an office that always subsisted in the Commonwealth. Recourse was had

* Dictators were sometimes appointed for civil functions, after which they abdicated. In the thirty-three years here mentioned there had been some Dictators of this kind, and Fabius himself amongst the rest.

to it, when the occasions of the State made it necessary.

If ever the Commonwealth stood in need of this extraordinary resource, it was undoubtedly in the present conjuncture, after the famous battle of Thrasymenus, which was the third defeat of the Romans, in less than a year after Hannibal had entered Italy. The Romans were then in a great consternation, and apprehended for the city itself. But because the Consul, to whom alone it appertained to nominate a Dictator, was absent, and it was not easy to send a courier, or convey letters to him, the Carthaginians being in possession of all the passes; and besides, as there was no example of a Dictator's having been created by the People, Q. Fabius Maximus was elected Prodictator. He was allowed to be the only person, whose greatness of soul, and gravity of manners, answered the dignity and majesty of that office; and the more, as he was still of an age, in which the mind is of sufficient vigour to execute the designs it has formed; and in which resolution and boldness are tempered with prudence. He chose Q. Minucius Rufus for his master of the horse, a man of courage, who had been Consul, but too bold, and incapable of a principal command. Fabius demanded permission of the People to ride in the army; for by an antient law, the Dictator was expressly forbade to do so; whether the greatest strength of the Romans was supposed to consist in their infantry, and for that reason it was believed necessary for the Dictator to continue always at the head of the battalions without ever quitting them; or because, that office being of sovereign authority in all things, it was thought proper, that the Dictator should appear to depend on the People, at least in that particular.

The first care of the Dictator, for so I shall call him from henceforth, was to fortify Rome, to post bodies of troops for defending the avenues to it, and to break down the bridges over the rivers. The Romans be-

A. R. 535.

Ant. C.

217.

Liv. xxii.

Plut. in

Fab. p.

175.

A. R. 535. lieved themselves reduced to provide for the safety of
 Ant. C. the city, as they could not defend Italy against Han-
 217. nibal.

Polyb. iii. Though Hannibal had room to conceive the greatest
 237. hopes, however, he did not think it proper to approach
 Liv. xxii. Rome yet. He contented himself with keeping the
 9. field, and ravaging the country as he advanced towards
 * Adria. He crossed † Umbria, and marched directly
 to ‡ Spoletum, which he endeavoured to carry by
 storm; but without effect, for he was repulsed with
 loss. He judged from the little success he had in at-
 tacking a single colony, how much it would cost
 him, to make himself master of Rome itself. From
 thence he marched towards Picenum§, where his
 greedy and rapacious troops found in the fertility and
 riches of the country, wherewithal to refresh them
 after their fatigues, and to enrich them at the same
 time.

Polyb. iii. It was about this time, that Hannibal dispatched
 238. couriers to Carthage, with advice of the good success
 of his enterprizes in Italy. For till then he had not
 approached the Sea. This news gave the Carthagi-
 nians extreme pleasure: they applied themselves more
 than ever to the affairs of Spain and Italy, and omit-
 ted nothing that might promote and hasten their
 success.

Hannibal from time to time changed quarters,
 without removing from the Adriatick Sea. He caused
 the horses to be washed with old wine, which he
 found there in abundance, and thereby reinstated them
 for service. He also caused the wounded men to be
 cured, and gave others time and means to recruit
 their strength; and when he saw them all well and vi-
 gorous, he began his march, and crossed the terri-
 tory of the || Prætutii and of Adria, those of the

* Now Atri, a city of the kingdom of Naples.

† Duchy of Urbino.

‡ A city in the ecclesiastical state.

§ Marché D'Ancona & de Fermo.

|| Most of these countries form a part of Abruzzo Citeriori, and
 of the kingdom of Naples.

Marrucini and Frentani, and all the country adjoining to Luceria and Arpi. Wherever he passed, he plundered, massacred, and burnt all before him.

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

During this time, the Consul Cn. Servilius had put the Gauls to flight in several engagements, in which he had gained some slight advantages, and had taken one inconsiderable town from them. But he had no sooner received advice of his colleague's defeat, than he advanced by great marches towards Rome, in order not to be wanting to his country on occasion. It may be believed, that his presence gave room to supply what had been wanting in the first nomination of Fabius, and that he was created Dictator a second time in all the forms.

Liv. xxii.
9.

He no sooner entered upon office, than he assembled the Senate. Believing it incumbent upon him to begin his administration by acts of religion, he gave the Senators to understand, that Flaminius had erred much less through temerity and ignorance of the art of war, than through his contempt for the Auspices, and the worship of the Gods. A great number of ceremonies were decreed, and vows of several kinds made; amongst others that of the *ver sacrum*. By this vow the Roman People were engaged to sacrifice to Jupiter at the time fixed, all that should be brought forth during the spring by the flocks and herds of sheep, goats, and kine. For the same end it was decreed, that the sum of three hundred thousand three hundred and thirty-three Asses and one third, should be employed in the celebration of the great games. This sum shews, that a trine number was considered, even amongst the Pagans, as religious and sacred. All the different vows having been made with the usual ceremonies, the day for the public procession was declared, at which an infinite number of People as well of the country as city were present. By all these acts, says Plutarch, he endeavoured not to fill their minds with superstition, but to animate their courage by piety, and to dispel their fears by a firm confidence in the protection of heaven.

Ibid.
Plut. in
Fab. 176.

A. R. 535. From affairs of religion, the Dictator proceeded to
 Ant. C. those of war. Having levied two Legions, to join
 217. those which he was to receive from the Consul Ser-
 Liv. xxii. vilius, he fixed the day for their rendezvous at Ti-
 11. bur. At the same time he published a decree, by
 Tivoli, which all who inhabited cities or forts badly fortified,
 were ordered to retire into places of safety; as also
 those of the country, that lived upon the route Han-
 nibal was to take. And to deprive him of the means
 of subsisting, he caused the houses to be burnt, and
 the corn to be destroyed upon the places that were
 abandoned.

Liv. Plut. After having given all these orders, Fabius set out
 by the Via Flaminia to meet the Consul and his army.
 When he was near Oriculum, he perceived the Con-
 sul advancing with some officers on horseback to meet
 him. He immediately ordered him to be told
 to alight, and to come to him without liCTOR or train.
 The Consul's ready obedience, and the respect with
 which he accosted Fabius, gave the citizens and allies
 that high idea of the Dictatorship, which time had
 almost effaced. Was it pride in the Dictator to exact
 this mark of submission and respect from a Consul?
 Undoubtedly no: it was discipline, duty and justice.
 The Divine Providence, which does every thing with
 weight and measure, in communicating part of its
 power to Kings, Princes, and those that are at the
 head of any state whatsoever, in order to render their
 authority more awful, and at the same time more
 useful to inferiors, has thought fit, that it should be
 attended with pomp and splendor to strike the eye;
 that LiCTors with rods and axes, or armed guards,
 should walk before them, to inspire terror; and that
 in approaching their thrones and persons certain ex-
 ternal homages should be paid them, to express the
 submission and obedience that become subjects. Men
 are not penetrating enough to discern and honour, in
 men like themselves, the authority of God, if they
 were to see it in a condition that had nothing great
 and splendid, nothing but low and contemptible in it.

Whilst

Whilst the Dictator and Consul were still in dis-
course, the Dictator received letters from Rome, by
which he was informed, that the vessels, which had
set sail from the port of Ostia, laden with provisions
for the army in Spain, had been taken by the Cartha-
ginian fleet near the port of * Cossa. It was for this
reason Servilius had orders to repair as soon as possi-
ble to Ostia, to take all the ships he could find in
that port or near Rome, to fill them with soldiers and
seamen, to pursue the enemy's fleet, and to defend
the coasts of Italy.

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.
Liv. Ibid.

The Dictator having received the army from Ful-
vius Flaccus, one of the Consul's Lieutenants, re-
paired to Tibur on the day appointed for the general
rendezvous. From thence he advanced to Præneste,
and crossed the country into the Latine Way. After
having caused the places to be viewed with abundance
of care, he marched in quest of the enemy, with the
design he had then formed, and from which he never
after departed, not to hazard a battle, till he should
be obliged to it by necessity. He applied himself to
observing Hannibal's motions, straitening his quarters,
cutting off his provisions, avoiding the plains on ac-
count of the Numidian cavalry, following the enemy
when they decamped, harrassing them in their marches,
and lastly, in keeping at such a distance, as left him at
liberty not to come to blows, except when he should
see an evident advantage.

Polyb. iii.
239, 240.
Liv. xxii.
12.
Plut. in
Fab. 176.

Hannibal was then at a small distance from the city
of Arpi in Apulia; and from the first day that he saw
the enemy near him, did not fail to offer him battle.
But when he saw that every thing continued still and
quiet in the Dictator's camp, and that all his endea-
vours did not occasion the least motion there, he re-
tired into his own, blaming in appearance the cow-
ardice of the Romans, whom he reproached with being
insensible to glory, with having lost that martial ardor
so natural to their forefathers, and with openly yielding

* Cossa, a city and promontory of Hetruria,

A. R. 535. him an easy victory. But he was inwardly vexed to
 Ant. C. see, that he had to do with a General so different from
 217. Flaminius and Sempronius; and that the Romans, taught by their misfortunes, had at last chosen a General capable of making head against Hannibal.

From that moment, he saw that he should not have warm and bold attacks to apprehend from the Dictator, but a prudent and circumspect conduct, that might involve him in great difficulties. It remained to know, whether the new General, whose constancy he had not yet experienced, had firmness enough unalterably to pursue the plan which he seemed to have laid down to himself. He therefore tried to vary his resolution by the different motions he made; by ravaging lands, plundering cities, and burning towns and villages. Sometimes he decamped with precipitation; sometimes he halted suddenly in some valley out of the way; in order to see whether he could not surprize him in the open country. But Fabius kept his troops upon eminences, without losing sight of Hannibal; never approaching him near enough to come to blows, but not keeping so distant, as to put it in his power to escape him. He kept the soldiers strictly in the camp; not suffering them to quit it, except to forage; and that not without very strong convoys. He engaged only in slight skirmishes, and with so much precaution, that his troops had always the advantage. By that means, he insensibly revived the confidence of the Soldiery, of which the loss of three battles had deprived them, and made them capable of relying as before upon their valour and good fortune.

Liv. xxii.
 12.

* Fabius found a no less obstacle to his wise designs in Minucius, his General of the horse, than

* Sed non Annibalem magis infestum tam sanis consiliis habebat, quam magistrum equitum, qui nihil aliud, quam quòd parebat imperio, moræ ad præcipitandam remp. habebat: ferox rapidusque in consiliis, ac lingua immodicus, primò inter paucos, dein propalam in vulgus, pro cunctatore segnem, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat: premendorumque superiorum arte, (quæ pessima ars nimis prosperis multorum successibus crevit) se se extollebat,

in Hannibal. He was one, whom nothing hindered from ruining the Commonwealth, but the state of subordination and dependance, in which he was: he was hot and hasty in council, and arrogant and presumptuous in discourse. He attacked Fabius without any reserve, at first before a small number of persons, but soon after publickly. He treated him as pusillanimous and cowardly, instead of prudent and circumspect, as he was; giving his virtues the names of the vices that bordered nearest upon them. Thus by a mean and black cunning, which succeeds but too often, and consists in decrying those above us in office and merit, he established his own reputation upon the ruin of that of his General.

The Carthaginians, after having plundered * Daunia, and passed the Appennines, advanced as far as Samnium, a fertile country, which had long enjoyed a profound peace, where they found so great an abundance of provisions, that notwithstanding the consumption and waste which they made of them, they could not exhaust them. From thence they made incursions into the territory of Beneventum, a colony of the Romans, and took Telesia, a well fortified city, where they made a prodigious booty. Hannibal was determined to go to Capua, in effect of the hopes that had been given him that that city was inclined to embrace his party. The Romans continued to follow him at a day or two's march distance, without intending to come up with, or to fight him. The Carthaginian General commanded his guide to conduct him into the territory of Casinum, having been informed by those who knew the country, that if he seized the defile which was in those parts, the Romans would have no passage to come to the aid of their allies. But the barbarous manner in which he pronounced that name, made the guide mistake Casilinum for Casinum. So that taking a quite different route, he crossed the territories of Allifa, Calatia and Calenum, and came

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

Liv. xxii.
13.

* Hod. Capitanata, a province of the kingdom of Naples in Apulia.

A. R. 535. to the plains of Stella, contrary to his intention. He
 Ant. C. at length discovered his error, and that Casinum was
 217. a great way from thence. To intimidate the other
 guides by the punishment of this, and to prevent
 himself from falling into the like inconvenience for
 the future, after having caused him to be whipt with
 rods, he ordered him to be crucified. Was this
 guide criminal for having been mistaken in such a
 manner?

Polyb. iii. Hannibal, to take advantage of this mistake, began
 241. to ravage the plains of Capua, and especially the fine
 Liv. xxii. and rich country of Falernum, supposing, that the
 13. cities in their territory would renounce the alliance of
 the Romans. For till then, though they had been de-
 feated in three battles, no city of Italy had gone over
 to the Carthaginians. They had all continued faithful,
 even to those who had suffered most: so much respect
 and veneration had the allies for the Roman Common-
 wealth. Nothing does more honour to the Roman
 People, nor makes their character better known, than
 what Polybius says in this place. And it must be
 judged of from such strokes. Livy renders them the
 same testimony, and seems even to rise upon the
 Greek historian. * Whilst all, says he, was in a flame
 in Italy, the horrible ravages committed by Hannibal
 were not capable of shaking the fidelity of the allies.
 It was, adds he, and what follows cannot be too well
 observed; it was, because, finding themselves under
 a government full of equity and moderation, they
 submitted without pain to a People in whom they dis-
 cerned a superiority of merit, that rendered them
 most worthy of commanding; which is the firmest
 tie and most assured pledge of the fidelity of those
 that obey.

Liv. xxii. The murmurs and seditious discourse of the Gene-
 14. ral of the horse had ceased for some days, because
 Plut. in Fabius, who followed Hannibal, having marched his
 Fab. 177.

* Nec tamen is terror, cum omnia bello flagrant, fide socios di-
 movit: videlicet quia iusto & moderato regebantur imperio, nec ab-
 nuebant, quod unicum vinculum fidei est, melioribus parere. Liv.

army faster than usually, Minucius, and his party, believed that he was hastening to the aid of Campania. But when they were incamped near the Vulturnus, and from thence saw the finest country of Italy a prey to the enemy; especially when they saw from the top of mount Massicus the whole country of Falernum and Sinuessâ ravaged, and all the houses burnt by the Carthaginians, whilst Fabius persisted in keeping the eminences, and said not a word of coming to a battle: the sedition broke out again with more violence than ever. “Are we then come hither,” said Minucius, still more furious than before, “to see, as a grateful sight, the dreadful ravages suffered by our allies? “If the motives of glory and interest cannot excite our courage, have we no compassion for our fellow-citizens, sent by our fathers as a colony to Sinuessâ? “What! do we remain insensible, whilst we see the same coasts in the power of Numidians and Moors, along which our ancestors would have thought it a dishonour, that the Carthaginians should navigate with impunity. It is but some few months since, that on being informed of the siege and danger of Saguntum, we were transported with indignation: and we now see with tranquility Hannibal just upon the point of storming a city, inhabited by a Roman colony. If that great General, who was deservedly called the second founder of Rome, had acted as does now this new Camillus, who has been deemed solely worthy of the Dictatorship in so unhappy a conjuncture; Rome had been still in the hands of the Gauls. Let us not then deceive ourselves in this respect. It is a folly to believe, that victory can be attained with folded arms, or vows addressed to heaven. The troops must be made to take arms, be led into the plain, and try their swords with the enemy. It is by action, by courting danger, that the Roman power attained its height, and not by this timorous conduct, to which cowards give the name of prudence and circumspection.”

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

Plut. in
Fab. p 177.

These discourses spread in the army, and there was not a single man in it, that did not rank Minucius much above the Dictator. Even the friends of Fabius, and those who seemed most in his interest, advised him to put an end to all these rumours, which were injurious to his reputation, by shewing some condescension for the officers and soldiers, who all in general demanded ardently to be led on against the enemy. But the Dictator, without emotion, told them: "I should shew myself really much more timorous than they accuse me of being, if the fear of their jests and reproaches made me change a resolution that I did not take, till after I had maturely weighed all the consequences, and had discovered the absolute necessity of it. When we fear for our country, we fear without shame: but to fear the discourse of men, and suffer one's self to be frightened by their railing, is to shew one's self unworthy of command, and to make one's self the slave of those, of whom one ought to be master, and to check and correct when they think amiss." Fabius therefore, always on his guard as well against his own soldiers as the enemy, and even considering the Romans as the principal adversaries in respect to whom he ought to shew himself invincible, persisted in observing the same conduct during all the rest of the campaign, notwithstanding the injurious reports which he knew had been carried from the camp to the city against his pretended timidity, and want of vigour. Hannibal, despairing of drawing him on to a battle, thought of retiring into some place, where he might pass the winter commodiously. He was not willing to consume the provisions he had amassed, but to lay them up in some place of safety. For it was not sufficient, that his army had no wants at present; he took pains that they might always have abundance.

Fabius was apprized by his scouts of Hannibal's design; and as he was assured, that he would necessarily quit Campania by the route he had entered it, he detached a part of his troops to seize the mountain

Callicula and the fort of Casilinum. As for himself, ^{A. R. 535.} he led back his army over the same hills, and sent out ^{Ant. C.} L. Mancinus for intelligence with four hundred horse. ^{217.} That young officer had orders to observe the enemy's ^{Liv. xxii.} motions without shewing himself, if possible, at least ^{15.} without exposing himself, and to return with an account of what passed. But being of the number of those whom the seditious and extravagant discourses of Minucius had misled, he no sooner saw some of the Numidian cavalry dispersed in the villages, than he ran headlong upon them, and even killed some of them. Nothing more was wanting to make him entirely forget his commission. His ardor for fighting prevailed over the obedience which he owed the Dictator. The Numidians, divided in several parties, came on to attack him one after another; and then flying with design before him, drew him on insensibly near their camp, very much fatigued, as well as all his people and their horses. Carthalon, who commanded all the cavalry, immediately came out, and having put them to flight, even before he came up with them, he pursued them almost two leagues without any intermission. Mancinus seeing he could not escape the enemy, that persisted in the pursuit, exhorted his troops to defend themselves to the utmost of their power, and faced about against the Numidians, to whom he was much inferior, as well in number, as force and confidence. In consequence himself with the bravest of his followers were killed. The rest fled full gallop to Calenum, and from thence by by-ways to the camp of the Dictator.

By accident Minucius was come up that day to re- ^{Liv. 16.} join Fabius, who some days before had been detached to seize a very narrow pass upon the top of Tarracina, that commands the sea; in order to prevent Hannibal from advancing towards Rome, as he might have done, if the Appian Way had been left open to him. The Dictator and the General of the horse having united their troops, encamped upon the way Hannibal was to pass, about two miles from the enemy. The next day, the Carthaginians occupied all the ground between

A. R. 535. between the two camps. The Romans posted themselves
 Ant. C. under their intrenchments, where they certainly had
 217. the advantage of place : the enemy however continued
 to advance, with their cavalry in front ; which occa-
 sioned several skirmishes between the two armies. But
 the Romans, by Fabius's order, did not quit their
 Polyb. iii. posts ; so that the action passed conformably to the
 243—245. Dictator's plan, rather than to the intentions of Han-
 Liv. xxii. nibal. Eight hundred Carthaginians were left upon
 15—18. the place, and the Romans lost only two hundred
 Plut. in men.
 Fab. 177.
 App. 322.

Hannibal was in great perplexity. It was absolutely necessary for him to return the way he came, which was a very narrow one, and in which it was very easy to incommode him. Fabius was resolved to take the advantage of the enemy's perplexity, and sent four thousand men before to seize the pass itself, after having exhorted them to do their duty well, and make the most of the happy situation of the post they were going to seize. He followed afterwards with the greatest part of his army, to post himself upon the hill that commanded the defiles. The Carthaginians arrived, and incamped in the plain at the foot of the mountains. Hannibal found himself shut up on all sides, and under the sad necessity of passing the winter between the rocks of Formiæ on one side, and on the other in the frightful sands and marshes of Linternum : whereas the Romans had Capua and Samnium behind them, and a great number of rich allies, who could send them provisions in abundance.

The Romans believed it impossible for Hannibal to extricate himself out of the post wherein he had engaged, and flattered themselves with the grateful hope of taking all the rich plunder the Carthaginians carried with them, and of soon terminating a war, which had already cost them so much blood, and given them such just alarms for the future. Fabius himself thought in the same manner, and applied himself solely in viewing what posts he should seize, how and where he should begin the attack ; and these designs were to be executed the next day.

Hannibal rightly judging what the enemy could do on this occasion, did not give them time. He well perceived, that his usual stratagems and arts were turned upon himself: but he had not exhausted them entirely. It is in such conjunctures, that a General has occasion for uncommon presence of mind and constancy of soul, to confront danger in all its extent without fear, and to find sure and ready resources without deliberating. He therefore * conceived an entirely new stratagem, which had never before been employed, and which was less capable of hurting in effect, than of confounding and terrifying by the sight of it. He got about two thousand oxen together, as well wild as tame, which were part of the plunder he had taken in the enemy's country. He ordered vine-branches and other small dry wood to be brought in from the country, of which little bundles were made, and dexterously affixed to the horns of those animals. He commanded Asdrubal to cause them to be set on fire about the middle of the night, and to drive the oxen towards the eminences, especially towards the defiles, which the Romans had occupied.

Having taken his measures thus, he began to march in silence, and advanced towards the defiles, with his heavy-armed infantry in front, his cavalry followed by the plunder in the centre, and the Spaniards and Gauls in the rear. The oxen were a great way before the advanced guard of his army. At first the fear only of the flames, that blazed upon their heads, and still more, the pain they felt, when the fire had reached to the quick, made those animals mad; so that they dispersed themselves on all sides upon the hills, and into the forests. Their efforts to rid themselves of the fire by violent motions and tossing their heads, only increased and spread the flames, which set fire to all the shrubs round about. The Romans were terrified, and imagined at first, that they were men, who ran

* *Ludibrium oculorum, specie terribile, ad frustrandum hostem commentus.* Liv.

A. R. 535. on all sides with torches in their hands. Those who
 Ant. C. had been posted at the entrance itself of the defile in
 217. order to keep it, fled as soon as they perceived the fires
 over their heads, and made to the top of the mountain,
 as the safest place, because they saw fewest fires there.
 They however found some oxen there, which had se-
 parated from the rest. And at first taking them for
 animals that breathed fire out of their mouths, they
 stopped in surprize at the sight. But having discovered
 what they were by approaching nearer, and seeing
 what they had taken for a prodigy was an artifice en-
 tirely human, instead of taking courage they were only
 the more terrified: they believed, that they should be
 surrounded by the enemy, and fled in still greater dis-
 order than before. They happened to fall in with
 Hannibal's light-armed troops. But both sides being
 equally afraid to engage during the darkness of the
 night, expected day without beginning the battle:
 Mean while Hannibal had time to make all his troops
 pass the defile.

Fabius fully perceived this motion. But not doubt-
 ing that it was a stratagem of Hannibal's, he kept
 his soldiers in their intrenchments, not being inclined
 to hazard a battle during the night. At break of
 day, there was a battle on the top of the hill, in
 which the Romans, being superior in number, would
 easily have defeated Hannibal's light-armed troops,
 that were separated from the rest of the army, if he
 had not sustained them with a body of the Spaniards,
 which he sent to their aid. The soldiers of that na-
 tion being accustomed to climb, and to run lightly
 through forests and over the steepest rocks, easily
 eluded, by the agility of their bodies and their manner
 of attacking and defending, the efforts of an enemy
 heavy-armed, and accustomed to fight on the plain
 without quitting their posts. Both retired into their
 camps, after the Romans had lost some of their men
 in this action, whereas few or none of the Spaniards
 fell in it.

Hannibal,

Hannibal, having extricated himself with as much glory as good fortune out of a very great danger, went to incamp in the territory of Allifæ, whither Fabius followed him. The latter, according to the plan he had laid down, marched his troops continually on the eminences, keeping between Hannibal's army and the city of Rome, without losing sight of the enemy, and without laying himself open to be forced to a battle. Hannibal, after some motions, returned a second time into Apulia, and advanced as far as Geraunium, the inhabitants of which were retired, because the place was not tenable. Fabius approached, and incamped in the territory of Larinum in an advantageous post.

Being obliged some time after to set out for Rome, whither affairs of religion had recalled him, he employed not only authority and counsel, but almost entreaties, to prevail upon the General of the horse, "that during his absence he would not tempt fortune: that he would rely more upon prudence, than chance; and that he would rather imitate his conduct, than that of Sempronius and Flaminius. That he would not imagine it a small advantage to have stopped the progress of Hannibal, and eluded his artifices during the whole campaign. That, according to the maxim of the most skilful and wisest physicians, rest often did the sick more good, than violent remedies. That to have ceased to be overcome by an enemy always victorious till then, and to have at length had time to breathe, after so many successive defeats, was no small gain." The sequel will shew how fruitless these counsels were. In the mean time Fabius set out for Rome.

Italy was not the only theatre of the war. It was made in Spain by sea and land with no less vigour. Asdrubal having fitted out thirty ships, which his brother had left him, and having added ten more to them, made forty sail, of which he had given the command to Amilcar, set out from New Carthage, or Carthage. He then made the land-forces quit their winter-quarters,

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

Polyb. iii.
245.
Liv. xxii.
18.
Plut. 179.

Polyb. iii.
245.
Liv. xxii.
19.

A.R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

quarters, put himself at their head, and making the ships keep along the coast, followed them on the shore, with design to join the two armies, when they should be near the Iberus. Cn. Scipio, being apprized of this design of the Carthaginians, at first intended to march by land to meet them: but, when he knew how numerous the enemy's army was, and what preparations they had made, he embarked his chosen troops on board his ships; and then having set sail with a fleet of thirty-five galleys, after two days sail from Tarragona, he landed near the mouth of the Iberus. When he was about ten miles from the enemy, he detached two frigates of Marseilles to scout. For the people of Marseilles were always the first to expose themselves, and their intrepidity was of great service to them. None were more firmly attached to the interests of the Romans than this people, who in the sequel gave them frequent proofs of their affection, but signalized themselves especially in the war with Hannibal. These two frigates brought back advice, that the enemy's fleet was at the mouth of the Iberus. Cneus immediately made all the sail he could to surprize it. But Asdrubal, being informed long before by sentinels, that the Romans approached, drew up his troops in battle upon the coast, and gave orders that the crews should go on board the ships. When the Romans were near, the charge was sounded, and the battle began immediately. The Carthaginians sustained the attack with vigour during some time, but they soon gave way. After having seen two of their ships taken by the Romans, and four sunk, they retired towards the land: but being pursued warmly by the Romans, they approached the shore as much as they could: and then, quitting their ships, they fled for refuge towards their land-army. The Romans pursued them so vigorously, that they took all the galleys, that had not bulged upon the coast, or ran ashore, and carried them off, fastened to the poops of their ships, to the number of twenty-five. This victory, which cost the Romans little, made them masters of all that sea, and
the

the neighbouring coasts. They advanced as far as the gates of Carthage, set fire to the houses next the walls, and laid waste the whole country round about. The fleet laden with spoils steered from thence as far as * Longuntica, where Asdrubal had made a great provision of (*Spartum*) a kind of broom, which was used for making cables. They set fire to it, after having taken away as much of it as they had occasion for.

The fleet returned by the same course to the countries of Spain on this side of the Iberus. It was here Scipio found the Deputies of all the nations, that inhabit along the river, and even of many of those which are at the extremities of the province. More than sixscore States submitted sincerely and faithfully to the power of the Romans, and gave them hostages.

The † Celtiberians, who formed part of the States of which we have just spoke, took arms by order of the Roman General, and entered into the province of the Carthaginians, where they carried three cities by storm. They afterwards defeated Asdrubal himself in two different battles, in which they killed him fifteen thousand men, took four thousand prisoners, and a great number of ensigns.

When the news of these defeats was received at Carthage, seventy sail of ships were fitted out: for it was believed impossible to undertake any thing without being masters of the sea. This fleet sailed at first to Sardinia, and from Sardinia to the coast of Pisa in Italy, where the commanders were in hopes of conferring with Hannibal. The Romans advanced with an hundred and twenty ships of war, *quinqueremes*. The Carthaginians, being informed, that they were at sea, returned the same way to Carthage. Servilius, the Roman Admiral, pursued them during some time, but could not come up with them.

Whilst this passed P. Scipio arrived in Spain with a new reinforcement of ships and soldiers. The Senate,

Polyb. iii.

247.
Liv. xxii.

* A city situated upon the coast of the kingdom of Valencia.

22.

† The Celtiberians inhabited a part of Arragon.

A. R. 535. Ant. C. 217. persuaded that the affairs of Spain deserved peculiar attention, and that it was not only useful but necessary to push the Carthaginians to the utmost in that country, and to carry on the war more vigorously there in order to a powerful diversion, fitted out twenty ships, or, according to Livy, thirty, with eight thousand land-forces, and all kinds of munitions. This reinforcement was commanded by P. Scipio, who was sent into Spain, according to the scheme formed from the beginning of the campaign, with orders to join his brother Cneus as soon as possible, in order to act in concert with him. It was apprehended at Rome, that the Carthaginians, by being masters in those countries, and by amassing munitions and money there in abundance, might make themselves masters of the sea; and by supplying Hannibal with troops and money, might assist him in subjecting Italy. P. Scipio being arrived in Spain, and having joined his brother, rendered the Commonwealth very great services. Till then the Romans had not ventured to pass the Iberus. They believed, they had done enough in acquiring the amity of the States on this side, and having engaged them in their party by alliances: but the two brothers being joined, passed that river, and advanced as far as Saguntum.

Polyb. iii. 248—250. Liv. xxii. 22. They knew that the hostages, which Hannibal had taken from all the States of Spain to secure their fidelity, were kept in the citadel of this place with no great number of troops. The fear of expiating their revolt by the blood of their children, was the sole tie, that continued the Spaniards in the party of the Carthaginians, which they were very desirous of quitting for that of the Romans. This tie, which awed a great part of the province, was broke by a Spaniard, who shewed more address and art, than fidelity on the occasion. He was called Abelox, a person of quality, and much considered in the country. He had till then been very much attached to the Carthaginians: but through an inconstancy usual enough amongst those Barbarians, he had changed sides, at least in his will, with

with fortune, For the rest, being fully persuaded, that people only despise a deserter and a traitor, that brings over with him only his own person into the party he embraces, he conceived thoughts of obtaining some great advantage for the Romans, in order to render himself considerable amongst them. He believed, that the greatest service he could render them in the present conjuncture, was to deliver up to them the hostages, which Hannibal had caused to be kept in Saguntum. The question was to bring in, or rather to deceive Bostar, to whom the keeping of them had been confided. “ He went to him, and having made the conversation turn upon the hostages, he gave him to understand, that fear had kept the Spaniards within their duty, as long as the Romans were at a distance: but that since they arrived in the province, their camp was become the asylum of all those who affected change. That therefore it was necessary to engage people, whom authority could no longer keep within bounds, by favour and advantages. That the most certain means to assure the fidelity of the States was to give them up their hostages. * That it was natural for every one to be pleased with being trusted, and that to render men faithful, it often suffices to place confidence in them.” He then offered to carry back the several hostages into their own country. Bostar was far from being so cunning as the Carthaginians commonly were; and judging of others by himself, he was far from suspecting a man of quality of so black a perfidy. He suffered himself to be persuaded, and in the night caused all the hostages to be put into the hands of Abelo, who immediately delivered them up to the Scipios, as he had before agreed with them. The Roman Generals, without losing time, caused them to be carried to their parents. It is easy to conceive, what surprize, and at the same time what joy, such an act of clemency and generosity occasioned in the country. All the Spaniards, with common con-

* Vult sibi quisque credi, & habita fides ipsam plerumque obligat fidem. Liv.

A. R. 535. sent, declared for the Romans, and would have taken
 Ant. C. arms immediately against the Carthaginians, if winter,
 217. which then came on, had not obliged both sides to retire into their quarters.

Liv. xxii. And this is what passed in Spain the second year of
 23. the war with Hannibal, whilst the salutary delay of Fabius in Italy had given the Romans time to breathe after so many losses. What is surprizing here is, that at the same time, that so wise a conduct gave Hannibal the utmost anxiety, who saw the Romans had at length chosen a General, that made war by principle and not by chance; it was mistaken by the very people, who reaped the benefit of it, by the Romans both of the city and army, especially after a slight advantage, of which we shall soon speak.

Ibid. Two things also contributed to render this General
 Plut. in odious to the Romans. First, the stratagem of Hannibal, who having been shewn an estate belonging to the Dictator by deserters; forbade any ravages to be committed upon it, whilst he put all around it to fire and sword, in order to render him suspected of some intelligence with the Carthaginians. The second thing which also contributed to alienate the People against him, was his having made a treaty with Hannibal, without consulting the Senate, in respect to the Cartel for the exchange of prisoners; by which it was agreed, as had been done in the first war, that man should be restored for man; and that for the ransom of those, who remained after the exchange, a thousand sesterces per head should be paid, that is, about six pounds sterling. The number of the prisoners, that the Romans had to ransom, amounted to a sum of more than fifteen hundred pounds. This article of the ransom having been proposed in the Senate, and the Senate always deferring to order the money to be paid, because Fabius had made this treaty without their participation, he at length thought proper to send his son to Rome, with instructions to sell the lands which the enemy had spared, and ransomed the prisoners with his own money. Most of them were desirous to reimburse

imburse him afterwards ; but he could not be prevailed upon to consent to it. A.R. 535.
Ant. C.

We have already said, that Hannibal had seized Geraunium in Apulia, and intended to form his magazines in that place, and to settle his winter-quarters there. He was actually incamped before the walls of that city, from whence he sent two-thirds of his army to forage, with orders to each man to bring in a certain measure of corn to those who were appointed to lay it up : the third part of his troops served to guard his camp, and to sustain the foragers in case they should be attacked. ^{217.} Polyb. iii.
^{251.} Liv. xxii.
34.

Minucius had approached Hannibal, and incamped in the territory of Larinum, with the army which he commanded alone, after the Dictator went to Rome. Seeing himself at liberty to act through his superior's absence, he meditated projects, that suited his genius, sometimes of falling upon Hannibal's foragers whilst dispersed in the country, and sometimes of attacking his camp, where only the third part of his army remained. Hannibal soon perceived, that the method of making war had changed with the General in the enemies camp. As to him, seeing that the Romans approached, he contented himself with sending the third part of his soldiers to forage, and kept the rest in his camp. He was always attentive to his first design ; which was not to consume his plunder, and to lay up great quantities of provisions, in order that during the winter-quarters the men, carriage-beasts, and especially the horses, might want for nothing : for it was upon his cavalry that he principally relied.

Hannibal had sent during the night some Numidians, who seized an eminence near the Romans, and which commanded their camp. The latter, despising the small number of those Numidians, dislodged them the next day, and incamped there themselves. By this means, there remained only a very small space between the two camps. Minucius, one day perceiving that the greatest part of the Carthaginian army was dispersed in the country, detached his cavalry and

A. R. 535. light-armed infantry against the foragers, and went
 Ant. C. himself with the Legions to attack the camp of the
 217. Carthaginians. All that Hannibal could do, was to
 defend himself. The slaughter of his foragers was
 great. This success inspired Minucius with excessive
 pride and arrogance, and flushed him with a boldness
 and temerity, that was sensible of no danger, and suf-
 fered him to see nothing but certain victory in the
 most hazardous enterprizes.

Polyb. iii. Fame, which always magnifies things, published
 253. this small advantage, which Minucius had gained, as
 Liv. xxii. a great victory. The letters wrote by the General of
 25, 26. the horse still rose upon rumour. Nothing was talked
 Plut. page of in the assemblies of the Senate and People for se-
 129. veral days but this affair: their joy was not to be ex-
 pressed. As there had been almost no hopes hitherto
 of this war, it was believed, that affairs were upon the
 point of changing face. Besides which, this advantage
 made people think that if the troops had done no-
 thing hitherto, it was not through want of courage;
 but that it was to be ascribed to the timorous circum-
 spection and excessive prudence of the Dictator, in re-
 spect to whom no reproaches were spared.

Fabius alone, in the midst of the public universal
 joy, believed neither rumour, nor Minucius's letters;
 and though every thing had been exactly true, he was
 not afraid to say, that he apprehended more from
 Minucius's good success, than if he had met with a
 little adversity. No-body gave ear to him, and the
 Senate itself was averse to hear him cry up the enemy's
 forces, and repeat the defeats, which the temerity and
 ignorance of former Generals had occasioned. He
 however declared, "that if he continued to command,
 he would call Minucius to an account for having
 fought contrary to his orders. That he would soon
 make the Romans confess, that a good General con-
 sidered fortune as nothing, and set no value upon any
 thing but prudence and reason. That he thought, he
 had deserved more glory, in the present conjuncture,
 for having preserved his troops from any shame and
 disgrace,

disgrace, than if, at other times, he had slain many thousands of the enemy.”

A. R. 535.

Ant. C.

217.

All these discourses had no effect. One of the Tribunes had the insolence to exclaim against Fabius without any bounds. He said, “ That it was no longer possible to bear his ill humour. That not satisfied with having prevented in person and upon the spot, the advantages which might have been gained over the enemy, he destroyed, as far as in him lay, those which had actually been gained in his absence. That he only protracted the war for the sake of continuing longer in command, and to be sole master both in Rome and the army. That in order to prevent Minucius from looking the enemy in the face, and undertaking some military expedition, he had in a manner tied up his hands, and had kept the soldiers confined within their intrenchments as in a prison. That lastly, as soon as the Dictator’s departure had set them at liberty, they had marched against the enemy, had defeated, and put them to flight. That for all these reasons, he should boldly have proposed to divest Fabius of the Dictatorship, if the Romans had the courage of their forefathers. But as the run and taste of the times was incapable of an action of vigour, he would content himself with a very moderate demand, which was, that the authority should be equally divided between the Dictator and the General of the horse, without suffering Q. Fabius, however, to return to the army, before he nominated a new Consul in the room of Flaminius.”

The Dictator did not deign to justify himself against the Tribune’s accusation ; but raising his voice, said : “ He thought it proper that without loss of time they should compleat the sacrifices and religious ceremonies, for which he had been made to come to Rome, in order that he might return soon to the army, to chastise the temerity of Minucius, who, contrary to his orders, had attacked the enemy.” He created M. Atilius Regulus Consul, and the evening before the people were to give their suffrages upon the proposal of

A. R. 535. of the Tribune, that he might not be witness of the
 Ant. C. 217. blow they were going to give his authority in respect
 to the General of the horse, he set out in the night
 in order to rejoin the army. The next day the People
 assembled early, and the Tribune made the proposal.
 But it was necessary, according to custom, that some-body
 should speak upon the subject, and explain it at large to
 the multitude, before they proceeded to vote. Of all the
 Romans, Varro alone, took upon him the odious commission
 to support the Tribune's enterprize: we shall soon see what
 this Varro was. The proposal passed, and Fabius received
 the news of it upon the road. Every body, as well in the city
 as at the army, friends and enemies, considered this decree
 as the grossest affront, and the most ignominious treatment,
 that could be offered the Dictator. He alone judged quite
 differently of it. And as the Sage of old answered one, who
 told him, "these people laugh at you;" "And for my part,"
 says the Philosopher, "I don't think they laugh at me;"
 judging very rightly that those are only derided who deserve
 derision, and who are moved and concerned at it: Fabius
 in like manner remained insensible to this supposed insult.
 He bore the injustice of the people with the same constancy
 of soul, with which he had suffered the invectives of his
 enemies; and, well assured, that in dividing the command
 between Minucius and him, they had not divided ability in
 the art of commanding; he returned into his camp, no less
 victorious over the insults of his citizens, than the artifices
 of the enemy.

Liv. xxii. Minucius thought very differently. He was before
 27. insupportable through the pride, with which his suc-
 Plut. in cess, and the favour of the multitude, had inspired
 Fab. p. 179. him: but now, observing no mean, he boasted, that
 he was no less the conqueror of Fabius, than of Hannibal.
 He said with great self-satisfaction, "That this famous
 General, the sole resource in the disgraces of the public,
 this Dictator judged solely capable of making head
 against Hannibal, had seen his inferior, his

his General of the horse, become his equal by a decree, of which there was no example in the whole series of the history of the Roman People; and that in the same city, where the Generals of the horse had been accustomed to tremble at the sight of the Dictator's rods and axes; with so much lustre had his merit and personal good fortune appeared! That he would therefore pursue his good fortune, if the Dictator obstinately persisted in a slow and timorous conduct, condemned by the Gods and men."

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

The actions of Minucius were agreeable to his discourse. From the first day that he saw Fabius, he told him, that it was necessary to determine in what manner they should use the authority, which had lately been divided between them: and, without waiting the Dictator's answer, he gave his own opinion first, and declared, that in his judgment, the best they could do, was to agree, that each of them should command the whole army in chief alternately during one day, or for a longer space of time, if that was thought expedient. Fabius was not of this opinion. He believed, "that all which should be abandoned to the temerity of his Colleague, would at the same time be given up to the mercy of fortune. He chose to divide the troops into two bodies. He owned, that he was obliged to give him a share in the command, but not to give it up entirely to him: protesting, that he never would voluntarily, and of his own accord, renounce governing the public affairs with prudence, at least according to the part of the authority he was permitted to retain; and that as he was prevented from preserving the whole, he would at least preserve what he could." As soon as the partition of the troops was made, Minucius resolved to incamp separately, and posted himself in the plain.

The * two great qualities that form a great Captain, are valour and prudence: but they all border

* Ac sanè, quod difficillimum est, & prælio strenuus erat, & bonus consilio: quorum alterum ex providentia timorem, alterum ex audacia temeritatem plerumque asserre solet. SALLUST. in bell. Jugurt.

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Ant. C.
217.

upon two great failings, which may have terrible consequences. For, usually, prudence through too great precaution degenerates into fear ; and valour, through too much audacity, into rashness. We shall soon see Minucius fall into this latter fault : but Fabius always knew how to observe a wise moderation, a mean, which is very rare and difficult, being equally brave in action, and circumspect in enterprizes, as Sallust says of Jugurtha.

Polyb. iii.
254.
Plut. in
Fab. 180.

Hannibal, who knew all that passed amongst the enemy by the means of deserters and his spies, felt a double joy in effect of the change that had happened. For the rashness of Minucius being now unlimited, was an assured prey for him ; and the prudence of Fabius had lost half its strength. Between the camps of Minucius and Hannibal there was an eminence so situated, that whoever seized it first, must have a great advantage over his enemy. Hannibal knew all the importance of this post ; but was not in haste to seize it ; because he expected to make a better use of it, by leaving it to become an occasion of a battle. The plain round about, viewed at a distance, seemed entirely level and open, and at first sight was judged incapable of ambuscades. But Hannibal had observed hollows, cuts, and cavities in it, each deep enough to contain and conceal about two hundred men. He threw five hundred horse and five thousand foot into them in the night. And lest that ambuscade should be discovered in the morning by the enemy's foragers, at sun-rise the next day he caused the hill to be seized by his light-armed troops.

Minucius believed the occasion happy, and sent out his light-armed infantry, with orders to dispute this post vigorously. He made his cavalry follow them, and then marched out himself with his legions. Hannibal, on his side, continually sent new troops thither, which he followed immediately with the horse, and the rest of his army ; so that the action insensibly became general. The light-armed Romans who advanced up hill, were beat down first upon the cavalry,
that

that followed them. The latter was soon broke by the Carthaginian horse, which were much superior in number, and retired towards the main body of the legions. The infantry, though surrounded with terrified troops, remained alone intrepid; and if it had fought in a less disadvantageous post; and stratagem, on the side of the enemy, had not been united with force, the success of the preceding days had so much animated them, that they were in a disposition to dispute the victory well. But, at that moment, Hannibal gave the signal for the troops in ambuscade to move, who suddenly attacking the legions in flank and rear, occasioned so much disorder and consternation amongst them, that none of them had either courage enough to fight, or any hopes of saving themselves by flying.

A. R. 535
Ant. C.
217.

Fabius, whom his zeal for the good of the State rendered attentive to all his Colleague's motions, saw from his camp the danger to which the army of Minucius was exposed. "I rightly foresaw (said he) that rashness would soon meet the misfortune it pursues. But let us refer our reproaches to another time; and now fly to their aid. Let us go and force the victory out of the enemy's hands, and from the mouths of our own people the confession of their fault." Those that fled, at the sight of the aid, which they received in a manner as if it had come from heaven, resumed courage, and joined the army of Fabius, which advanced in good order. The defeated troops, and those which were still quite fresh, forming now but one body, were in full march to charge the Carthaginians, when Hannibal caused the retreat to be sounded, not disowning, that if he had defeated Minucius, Fabius in his turn had defeated him; an highly glorious testimony from such an enemy! He added, by way of pleasantry, * "that at length the cloud which used to shew itself upon the hills, was fallen with much noise and a great storm."

* Tandem eam nubem, quæ sedere in jugis montium solita sit, cum procella imbrem dedisse. Liv.

After

A. R. 535.
Ant. C.
217.

After the battle Fabius having taken the spoils of the enemy who had been left upon the spot returned to his camp, without letting a single offensive, or angry word against his Colleague escape him.

Liv. xxii.
29, 30.
Plut. 181.

Something would have been wanting to the glory of the Dictator, if Minucius himself had not paid homage to it. He did so, and in the most solemn manner possible. As soon as he entered his camp after the battle, he assembled his soldiers, and made the following discourse to them. " I have often heard
" that the first and highest degree of merit is to know
" how to act aright of one self, without having occasion for the counsel of others : the second, to be
" capable of following and executing good advice :
" but that he who neither knows how to command
" nor obey, ought to be considered as the weakest
" of men. As nature does not admit us to aspire at
" the first kind of glory, let us at least endeavour to
" deserve the second ; and till we have learnt how to
" command, let us submit to obey one wiser than ourselves. Let us go and rejoin Fabius, and carry our
" ensigns to his tent. The only occasion in which I
" will command you from henceforth, is to go and
" submit to his orders ; and to pay at the same time
" the respect and obedience which we owe to him.
" When I have saluted him by the name of Father, a
" title he merits both by his rank, and the great service we have just received from him, do you also,
" fellow-soldiers, salute those, by whose arms and valour you have just been preserved, your patrons and
" preservers ; and if we have acquired nothing else
" this day, it shall at least give us the glory of being
" grateful."

He immediately put himself at their head, and marched directly to the camp of the Dictator. Fabius, and all that were with him, were very much surprized, when they saw him arrive. Every thing was done conformably to the design Minucius had laid down. After he had caused his ensigns to be planted before Fabius's tribunal, he began the first by saluting him
with

with the name of Father, and all his soldiers saluted the Dictator's with that of patrons and preservers. He then spoke * as follows. "Great Dictator, I have
 "just equalled you with my father, by giving you the
 "same name; but I am more indebted to you than to
 "him. To him I only owe my life; to you I owe
 "not only that, but the lives of all these soldiers that
 "surround me. I myself therefore cancel and annul
 "the decree of the People, which was rather a bur-
 "then than an honour to me. I return with joy to
 "my obedience to your authority and under your au-
 "spices, and that for the greater advantage, as I
 "hope and desire, as well of yourself and me, as of
 "your two armies, of which the one is indebted for
 "its preservation to the other. I only entreat you to
 "forget all that is passed, and to permit me to retain
 "under your command the office of General of the
 "horse, and these the rank they hold in the troops."

After this discourse, the officers and soldiers of the two armies embraced. Fabius's troops received those of Minucius, known or not, into their tents, with the most sensible mark of kindness and affection. All became friends that moment; and that day, which had begun so unhappily, concluded with universal joy.

As soon as the news of this reconciliation was carried to Rome, and confirmed by letters from the Generals and soldiers, there was not one who did not extol the Dictator's generosity and wisdom to the skies. They saw how much superior the true knowledge of commanding, and an always judicious and firm con-

* I cannot help inserting here the speech Plutarch puts into the mouth of Minucius, which is very shining and abounds with wit, whereas that of Livy is more simple. "You have this day, Dictator, gained two very signal victories: by your valour, you have overcome the enemy: and by your wisdom and generosity, your Colleague. By the one of these victories you have preserved, and by the other you have instructed, us; and the advantage you have gained over me is no less salutary and glorious for me, than my defeat by Hannibal was shameful and unhappy. I therefore call you Father, having no name more venerable, that I can give you; though the obligation I have to you is much greater than to him who gave me life. For I not only owe my own life to you, but the preservation of all these valiant men."

A. R. 535. duct, was to rash bravery, and a frantic itch for
 Ant. C. signalizing oneself. Hannibal and the Carthaginians
 217. had an higher opinion of Fabius than before, and then
 first began to perceive, that they made war in Italy,
 and against the Romans. For, always before, they
 had conceived such a contempt for those, who com-
 manded the troops of the Commonwealth, as well as
 for the troops themselves, that they could scarce ima-
 gine they were at war with the same nation, of whom
 their fathers had left them so terrible an idea.

We see here excellent qualities in Fabius, and the
 more admirable as they are more uncommon. In battle,
 to confront the greatest dangers, and even death, is a
 great effort of virtue ; it is, however, common. But
 patiently to suffer the most injurious and unmerited
 reproaches ; to see his reputation torn in pieces by a
 subordinate and dependant officer ; to expose himself
 to universal censure and disgrace, for observing the
 only conduct capable of preserving the State ; and to
 see the most important services repaid with the most
 cruel ingratitude by an whole people, and not to de-
 part either from his plan or his duty in the midst of
 so many and so sensible subjects of discontent ; this
 must be confessed to be the effect of a force, con-
 stancy and nobleness of sentiments much above the
 common. The love of virtue is, in most men, so
 languid and weak, that it can scarce support itself with-
 out the help of the approbation and esteem of men.
 * How glorious did this generous contempt of glory
 become for Fabius, and with what interest did it not
 repay him what he seemed to have lost and sacrificed
 for the public good !

This † love of the public good was the soul of his
 actions, and continually inspired him with that in-
 flexible firmness and constancy for the service of his

* Adeo spreta in tempore gloria cum scenore redit ! Liv.

† [Est] illa pietatis constantia admirabilis, quam Q. Fabius Maximus
 infatigabilem patriæ præstitit.—Compluribus injuriis laceffit, in
 eodem animi habitu permansit, nec unquam sibi reip. permisit irasci,
 tam perseverans in amore civium fuit. VAL. MAX. iii. 8.

country, against which he never deviated into the least A. R. 535.
resentment, whatever injury he received from it. Ant. C.

217.

To these excellent qualities, Fabius added another, not less estimable, nor rare, which is to resist the grateful and powerful attractions of revenge, become so natural to man since his corruption. Not only not a word of indignation and insult escapes him against an enemy, who had so cruelly injured him; but, soon after, when it was in his power to have let him perish in an action, in which his own rashness had engaged him, he flies to his aid, extricates him out of danger, accepts his submission, and restores him to his friendship, without making him sensible of the injury received, and his injustice, by the slightest reproach.

Fabius's conduct here in respect to Hannibal, which was only designed insensibly to revive the confidence of the Roman armies, discouraged by preceding defeats; to abate the impetuous ardour of the young victor he had to oppose by affected delays; to undermine and consume his strength by degrees, by incessantly harrassing his troops; to make him incapable either of ravaging the countries of the allies, or of forcing him to a decisive action: this conduct, I say, has always been considered as the effect of consummate prudence, and a perfect knowledge of the rules of the art-military. * It acquired Fabius the glorious title of Wise Delayer, who by protraction had saved the State; a title which did him more honour than all the victories he could have gained. And indeed, what courage, what greatness of soul, did it not require, to set himself above the rumours and reproaches of an whole army, and of almost the whole people; and to have no view but the safety of his

* Quintus Maximus & bella gerebat ut adolescens, cum planè esset grandis; & Annibalem juveniliter exultantem patientia sua mollebat, de quo preclarè familiaris noster Ennius. (It is Cato the elder that speaks.)

Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.

Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.

Ergo magisque magisque viri nunc gloria clares.

Cic. de senect. n. 10.

A.R. 535. country? This is what Ennius, an almost cotemporary poet, has so well expressed in verses known by every body.
Ant. C. 217.

As it was in Fabius's Dictatorship, which will soon end, that a considerable change happened in the coin, I thought it necessary to treat that subject here in few words.

DIGRESSION upon the Changes made in the ROMAN Coin.

Plin.
xxxiii. 3.

ROME at first, as we have observed elsewhere, used only bits of brass, of more or less weight, for money, which were of no determinate form, and had no just impression. King Servius Tullius made Asses of a pound in weight; and this was called *æs grave*, so often mentioned in authors. These asses were weighed and not counted. He caused them to be marked with the figure of some animal, (*pecudum*) as of an ox, a sheep, an hog, which occasioned their being called *pecunia*. These asses were divided into several pieces of less weight: *Semisses*, the half; *trientes*, the third; *quadrantes*, the fourth. Only brass-money was used till the Consulship of C. Fabius and Q. Ogulnius, that is, till the 483d year of Rome, five years before the first Punic war.

Rome at that time, become more powerful, and mistress of almost all Italy, by the defeat of Pyrrhus and the Tarentini, began to coin silver-money; viz. *denarii*, *quinarii*, that were afterwards called *victoriati* and *sestertii*. The *denarii* were worth ten asses, or ten pounds of brass; the *quinarii* five; the *sestertii* two and an half. Hence we see how scarce silver was, and how much it was worth in those early times. According to Budæus and Gronovius, an hundred *denarii* were very near the pound of silver. The *denarius* was worth ten asses, or ten pounds of brass. Consequently every pound of silver was worth a thousand asses, or a thousand pounds of brass.

Soon

Soon after, that is during the first Punic war, the necessities of the Commonwealth occasioned the asses to be reduced from the weight of one pound or twelve ounces, to that of two ounces, *sextantarium pondus*, always retaining the same value. This new brass-money had also a new stamp, viz. a Janus with two faces on one side, and the prow of a ship on the other. Plin. ibid.

In the second Punic war, during the Dictatorship of Fabius, in the 535th year of Rome, the weight of the As was again lowered to one half, and reduced to one ounce. Its proportion with silver was then changed, and the *denarius* was worth sixteen asses. * Pliny observes, that the *denarius* was reckoned in the pay of the soldiery only as ten asses : that is, by continuing to use the name of *denarius* to express the pay of the soldiers, they had however only † ten asses and not sixteen. Accordingly the seditious troops demanded the *denarius* for their pay.

Lastly, the weight of the As was again lowered one half, and reduced to half an ounce. The law which decreed this change, and which Pliny calls *Lex Papiria*, gives us the name of its author ; but it is not exactly known in what time he lived. Though the weight of the As was then less by one half than in the time of the second Punic war, it however always retained the same proportion with silver.

* In militari tamen stipendio semper denarius pro decem assibus datus. PLIN. ibid.

† Denis in diem assibus animam & corpus æstimari. TACIT. Annal. l. 17.

S E C T. II.

The Consul Servilius, after a short expedition into Africa, returns into Italy, to take upon him the command of the land-forces. The two Consuls follow the plan of Fabius. The deputies of Naples offer a present to the Romans. A spy, and slaves punished. Ambassadors sent to different places. Preparations made for the election of Consuls. Birth and character of Varro. Speech of a Tribune in his favour. He is elected Consul, and has Paulus Æmilius for his Colleague. Prætors nominated. Number of troops. Ambassadors from King Hiero arrive at Rome with presents. Presumptuous speeches of the Consul Varro. Wise speech of Paulus Æmilius. The Senate exhort him to come to a decisive battle. Fine discourse of Fabius to Paulus Æmilius. The latter's answer. Speech of Paulus Æmilius to the troops. Hannibal's stratagem discovered. Extreme difficulties, to which the want of provisions reduce him. Alarm of Rome concerning the battle upon the point of being fought. Division and dispute between the two Consuls. Varro is determined to give battle contrary to his colleague's opinion. Hannibal's speech to his troops. Famous battle of Cannæ. Defeat of the Romans. Death of Paulus Æmilius. Reflection upon Hannibal's refusing to march directly to attack Rome. The Carthaginians take the spoils of the dead upon the field of battle. Hannibal makes himself master of the two camps. Generosity of a lady of Canusium in respect to the Romans. Scipio the younger suppresses a dangerous conspiracy. Four thousand Romans retire to Venusia. The Consul Varro repairs thither.

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Ant. C.
217.
Liv. xxii.
31.

WHILST the things which we have just related passed in Italy, the Consul Cn. Servilius, after having cruized along the coasts of Sardinia and Corsica with a fleet of an hundred and twenty galleys, and received hostages from both, went to Africa, where

where he at first gained some advantages. But a blow which followed soon after, obliged him to return to Sicily. When he arrived at Lilybæum, he left his fleet with the Prætor T. Otacilius, who appointed his Lieutenant P. Sura to carry it back to Rome. As to himself, he crossed all Sicily by land, and afterwards went to Italy over the strait of Messina. He received letters there from Fabius, by which, after having been almost six months in the Dictatorship, he recalled him, to take upon him the command of the troops in conjunction with his Collegue M. Atilius.

The two Consuls being placed at the head, the one of the army of Fabius, and the other of that of Minucius, fortified themselves early in the quarters, where they were to pass the winter, (for it was then towards the close of the autumn) and afterwards carried on the war in concert, and with great unity, entirely according to the plan of Fabius. When Hannibal came out in quest of provisions and forage, they always attacked him at advantage, falling upon the stragglers of the enemy, but carefully avoiding general actions, which Hannibal ardently pursued. By this conduct the Carthaginian General was reduced to such straits for provisions, that if he had not feared being reproached with flying, he would immediately have removed into Gaul, having absolutely lost all hope of subsisting his troops, in the country where he was, if the Consuls of the next year observed the same conduct as these.

Winter having put a stop to hostilities on both sides, the two armies continued quiet in the neighbourhood of Geraunium in Apulia, when the deputies of Naples arrived at Rome. Having permission to enter the Senate they carried thither forty gold cups of a considerable weight. The chief of the embassy said: "That it was easy to conceive, that the treasures of the Commonwealth might be exhausted by the expences attending the war. That the Neapolitans were not ignorant, that the Roman People fought for the

A.R. 535. preservation of the cities and countries of Italy, as
 Ant. C. well as for Rome its capital. That for that reason
 217. they had believed it just and reasonable to aid them
 with the treasures which their ancestors had left them,
 to be the ornament of their temples in prosperity, and
 a resource for themselves in bad fortune. That they
 were entirely disposed to afford them all the other aids,
 of which they could be supposed capable. That the
 greatest pleasure which the Roman People could do
 them, was to consider all that belonged to the Neapo-
 litans as their own, and to honour them so far as to
 vouchsafe to accept a present, much less considerable
 in its own value, than the good will of those who of-
 fered it." The Ambassadors were thanked for their
 generosity and regard: but the Senate contented
 themselves with accepting only the lightest of the
 forty cups.

Liv. xxii. At this time a Carthaginian spy was discovered at
 33. Rome, who had continued there almost two years.
 He was dismissed, after having his hands cut off.
 Twenty-five slaves were also hanged, who had formed
 a conspiracy in the field of Mars. The discoverer had
 his liberty given him, and a sum of copper-money
 amounting to about fifty pounds sterling.

Ibid. Ambassadors were sent to Philip, King of Mace-
 donia, to demand, that he would deliver up to the
 Roman People Demetrius of Pharos, who had taken
 refuge in his dominions, after having been conquered.
 Another embassy was sent to the Ligurians, to com-
 plain of their having supplied the Carthaginians with
 provisions and troops: and at the same time to take
 a nearer view of what passed amongst the Boii and In-
 subrians. A third was also sent to Pinæus, King of
 Illyricum, to demand the payment of the tribute he
 owed, or hostages, if he was not in a condition to pay
 it as it became due. All these particular cares shew
 how attentive the Senate was in respect to every thing
 that concerned the interests of the Commonwealth,
 even in the most remote countries, notwithstanding
 the

the enemy, that pressed them so vigorously in the very heart of the State. A. R. 535.
Ant. C.

The point of importance was to chuse Consuls capable of making head against Hannibal. We have seen that the wise delay of Fabius had given the Romans time to breathe, and to recover themselves a little after so many disgraces that had happened upon the neck of each other. The effect of it was so sensible, that Hannibal, at the end of the second year of the war, all victorious as he was, having however neither town, post, nor country in alliance with him, was extremely at a loss. Nothing was wanting, but to continue the war upon the same plan, entirely to reduce him to despair, and even to destroy him. The thing was manifest, and could not escape even the least penetrating. But when it pleases God to blind a people, they no longer make use of their reason and prudence. To render the Romans entirely wise, it was necessary they should receive a greater blow than any they had experienced before. 217.
Polyb. iii.
253.
Liv. xxii.
34.

The principal instrument of this total disgrace was C. Terentius Varro, who, by reducing them to extremities, obliged them to observe a more prudent conduct. This man, of entirely mean birth, being the son of a butcher, and who had done the vilest offices of that business under his father, being possessed of a considerable fortune, presumed to aspire at an higher condition. He was constantly at the bar, and in the assemblies of the People, and by dint of taking the part, and pleading the causes, of the meanest of the citizens against the principal persons of the Commonwealth, whose fortunes and reputation he attacked at the same time, he made himself known, and paved himself a way to the offices of the Commonwealth. He successively obtained the Quæstorship, the two Ædileships, and the Prætorship. The Consulship was still behind. A favourable occasion arose for a man like him to smooch his way to it. This was, when the question was to make Minucius General of the horse equal to Fabius his Dictator. We have seen Liv. xxii.
26.

SERVILIUS, REGULUS, Consuls.

Ant. C.
217.

that only Varro had the impudence to support so unjust and pernicious a proposal. By that means he knew how dexterously to take advantage of the hatred for the Dictator for gaining the favour of the people, with whom he had all the merit of the decree which then passed. He did not fail the year following, which is that of which we are speaking, to demand the Consulship as the just reward of so great a service.

It is the sign of a weak government, and the most usual cause of the misfortunes that happen in a State, when * in the choice of Generals and Commanders, no difference is made between good and bad men, and favour and faction carry the rewards that are due to merit. This truth will appear in this place in all its light on the occasion of Varro.

Liv. xxii.
34—35.

The People favoured him highly. The Senators opposed his demand with their whole power, being unwilling that it should be a custom for the dregs of the people to become their equals, by declaring themselves their enemies. Varro had a relation amongst the Tribunes of the People, who to render the person of his candidate the more agreeable, laboured, by his seditious discourses, to render the whole Nobility odious to the People. He said, “that it was the Nobility, who by desiring war for many years, had occasioned Hannibal to come into Italy: and, not contented with that, they had expressly and by fraud protracted it, though it had been easy to terminate it at once. That it was a plot formed by them all, and that there would be no end to the war, till a Consul truly Plebeian was created, that is to say, a † new man. For, added he, the Plebeians that have become noble, are initiated into the same mysteries, and as soon as they have ceased to be despised by the Patricians, have begun to despise the People.”

* Inter bonos & malos discrimen nullum: omnia virtutis præmia ambitio possidet. SALLUST. in bell. Catil.

† He was called a New Man, whose ancestors had never borne any Curule offices, which with the Romans constituted Nobility, that was divided into Patrician and Plebeian.

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Discourses of this kind made so great an impression, that though Varro had five competitors, of which three were Patricians, and two of Plebeian families, but long become illustrious by having borne the great offices, he was created Consul alone, in order that he might preside in the assemblies, in which a Collegue was to be given him.

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The Nobility then cast their eyes upon Paulus Æmilius, who had been Consul with M. Livius the year before the second Punic war. We have already related, that on the expiration of their Consulship, they had been accused before the People, as having appropriated part of the spoils taken in the war to themselves. Livius had been found guilty, and fined: and Paulus Æmilius had escaped not without great difficulty. Besides being still extremely exasperated against the People, whom he could not forgive so great an affront, he had a great repugnance to entering again into offices. He was however forced to get the better of it, and all the other candidates having declined, he was given rather for an Antagonist, than a Collegue, to Varro.

C. TERENTIUS VARRO.

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216.

L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS II.

The Consuls being chosen, four Prætors according to the custom of those times were appointed, Manius Pomponius Matho, P. Furius Philus, M. Claudius Marcellus, and L. Postumius Albinus; the two first remained in the city to administer justice. Marcellus had Sicily for his province, and Postumius Gaul. It is remarkable, that these four Prætors had already borne that office, and the two last had even been Consuls. Of all the magistrates of this year, Varro was the only one, that exercised an office with which he was invested for the first time. Care had been taken to send a fresh supply of provisions to the fleet, that wintered at Lilybæum; and all the necessary munitions for the armies under the command of the two Scipios

Liv. xxii.
35.
Polyb. iii.
256.

A. R. 536. Scipios were embarked for Spain : And preparations
 Ant. C. for the approaching campaign were made with the ut-
 216. most diligence.

Polyb. iii. The armies were much more numerous than ever
 257. they had been. The Romans usually raised no more
 Liv. xxii. than four legions, each consisting of four thousand
 36. foot and three hundred horse. The Latines supplied
 a like number of infantry, and twice as many cavalry.
 Half of these troops of the allies, and two legions,
 were given to each Consul. They usually made war
 separately. Eight Roman legions were now raised,
 each composed of five thousand foot, and three hun-
 dred horse, with the like number of foot and twice
 as many horse of the allies ; which in all amounted
 to fourscore and seven thousand two hundred men.

Ambassadors arrived from Pæstum, who brought
 many gold cups to Rome. The Senate acted in the
 same manner with them as it had with the Neapolitans.
 They were thanked for their good will, but their
 present was not accepted.

Liv. xxii. About the same time a fleet laden with provisions
 37. sent by King Hiero to the Romans his allies, entered
 the port of Ostia. When the Ambassadors of that
 Prince were introduced, they assured the Senate,
 “ that the King their master could not have been
 more afflicted for any loss of his own, than he had
 been for the death of the Consul Flaminius, and the
 defeat of his army. That accordingly, though he was
 sensible, that the greatness of soul of the Roman Peo-
 ple was still more admirable in bad fortune than in
 good, he thought it incumbent upon him to send them
 all the aids, which good and faithful allies usually
 supply during war ; and which he desired the Senate
 to accept. That first he presented the Commonwealth,
 as an happy omen of the future, a Victory of gold,
 weighing three hundred and twenty pounds, which
 he begged them to accept, and desired that they might
 keep it for ever. That they had brought in their gal-
 lies an hundred thousand bushels of wheat, and two
 hundred thousand of barley, in order that the Romans
 might

might not want provisions; and that their master would transport what farther quantity they should think fit, and wheresoever they should appoint. That Hiero knew, that the Commonwealth employed no soldiers in their armies, but Romans and allies of the Latine name. But that as he had seen in their camps foreign auxiliary light-armed troops, he had sent them a thousand such troops, as well archers as slingers, which the Romans might oppose to the Balearians, Moors, and other nations, that used arrows. To these presents they added a salutary piece of advice, which was to order the Prætor of Sicily to sail to Africa with his fleet, in order that the enemy having also the war in their country, might be less in a condition to send Hannibal reinforcements.”

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216.

The Senate replied to these Ambassadors, “ That King Hiero was considered at Rome as a good and faithful ally. That ever since he had been in alliance with the Romans, he had upon all occasions given them proofs of a sincere amity and a generosity truly royal, to which they were as sensible as they ought. That the Roman People had refused the gold offered them by some States, and had contented themselves with their good will. That they accepted the Victory sent by Hiero as a good omen; that they intended to place it in the Capitol, that is, in the temple of Jupiter, and hoped that it would remain there for ever, to be favourable to them in all their undertakings.” The provisions arrived from Sicily, with the archers and slingers, which came at the same time, were given to the Consuls. Twenty-five galleys were added to the fleet that T. Otacilius commanded in Sicily, and he was permitted to sail to Africa, if he judged that the good of the Commonwealth required it.

The Consuls after having made the levies, of which L'v. xxii. we have been speaking, continued some days in the 38. city, till the aid for the Latines arrived. In that interval, Varro held several assemblies of the People, in which he always spoke in the same spirit of rashness and arrogance, “ accusing the Patricians of having drawn

A. R. 536. drawn the war into Italy, and affirming, that it would
 Ant. C. continue there as long as Generals of the temper and
 216. character of Fabius should have the command. That
 as for him, he would terminate it the very first day
 he saw the enemy." Paulus Æmilius his Collegue har-
 rangued the People but once, which was the evening
 before his departure, and was not heard favourably,
 because he chose rather to tell them the truth, than to
 flatter them. He spoke of Varro with abundance of
 caution and reserve, except in declaring, "That he
 could not easily conceive how a General, before he
 knew his own troops, or those of the enemy, the situa-
 tion of places, and the nature of a country, whilst still
 in the midst of Rome, could know at such a distance
 how it would be proper to act when he should be at
 the head of his army, and even tell the day beforehand
 when he should give battle. * That as to himself he
 knew, that it was for the circumstances of times and
 places to determine the resolutions of men, and not
 for men to pretend by their resolutions to dispose those
 circumstances, which did not depend on them. That
 therefore he should be in no haste to take immature
 measures. That he wished, that undertakings con-
 ducted and resolved with prudence, might have good
 success. That temerity, besides its not suiting reason-
 able persons, had hitherto been unfortunate."

The Senate observed to Paulus Æmilius, of what
 importance the good or bad success of this campaign
 would be to the Commonwealth. They exhorted him
 to make a good choice of his time for a decisive action,
 and to behave with the valour and prudence so justly
 admired in him; in a word, in a manner worthy of
 the Roman name. This discourse of the Senate, and
 still more the extraordinary preparations, which had
 been made for this campaign, shew clearly, that
 the Senate itself desired an end might be put to the
 war. They did not set fourscore thousand men and

* Se, quæ consilia magis res dent hominibus, quàm homines rebus,
 ea ante tempus immatura non præcepturum. Liv.

upwards on foot to protract it, and to continue without action.

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Liv. xxii.

39.
Plut. in
Fab. 182.

It was easy to judge that Paulus Æmilius was disposed of himself to prefer the safest, to the most specious, conduct. However, Fabius, full of zeal for the safety of his country, and perhaps discontented with the too express ardor of the Senate for coming to a battle, was desirous to have a particular conference with Paulus Æmilius, in order to confirm him further in his good resolutions; and he spoke to him in these terms, when he was upon the point of setting out. “ If you had a
“ Colleague like yourself, which were most to be desired, or if yourself were like your Colleague, it
“ would be to no manner of purpose for me to speak
“ to you. For two good Consuls would not want my
“ advice, in order to their taking the most advantageous measures for the Commonwealth; and two
“ bad Generals, far from following my counsels, would
“ not so much as hear them. But knowing the difference between you and Varro, I address myself to
“ you only; and I am even much afraid, that as good
“ a citizen, and as able a captain, as you are, you
“ will endeavour in vain to support the Commonwealth, whilst it is so ill sustained on the other side.
“ The good and bad measures which shall be taken, will have the support of consular authority. For
“ do not deceive yourself, Paulus Æmilius, you must expect to find a no less obstacle in the person of
“ Varro, than in that of Hannibal your enemy: and
“ I do not know, whether the first will not be more formidable to you than the second. You will have
“ to do with the one only in the field of battle; but
“ with the other at all times and in all places. Against
“ Hannibal, you will find support in your legions: Varro will attack you with your own soldiers. We
“ know what the imprudence of Flaminius has cost the Commonwealth. If Varro puts his plan in
“ execution, and gives battle, as soon as he sees the
“ enemy, either I am entirely ignorant of the art of
“ war, and know neither Hannibal nor the Cartha-
“ ginians,

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216.

ginians, or there will soon be a place in Italy more famous for our defeat than the lake of Thrasymenus. I can affirm, without fearing to give room for suspecting me of vain-glory, that the only means for succeeding against Hannibal, is to pursue the method I observed in making war with him. * Nor is this to be judged by the event, (which is the instructor of fools) but by reason, which has been, and always will and must be the same, as long as the same things continue. We are making war in the midst of Italy, in the very bosom of our country. We are surrounded on all sides by our citizens and allies. They aid us with men and horses, with arms and provisions; and they will certainly continue to do so: we have too many proofs of their zeal and fidelity to be capable of doubting that. We every day become more strong, more prudent, more determinate, and more experienced. Hannibal on the contrary is in a foreign, and an enemy's country, separated from his own by a great tract of lands and seas. He is at war with all around him; remote from home, and is at peace neither by land nor sea. He has not a city that receives him within its walls, nor any fund upon which he can rely. He lives from day to day upon what he plunders in the country. He has scarce preserved the third part of the troops, with which he passed the Iberus. Famine has destroyed more of them than the sword; and he knows not how to subsist the few that remain. Can it then be doubted, but that by protraction we must ruin an enemy that grows weaker every day, and to whom neither troops, provisions, nor money are sent. How long has he kept dancing round the walls of Geraunium, and defending that miserable fortress of Apulia, as if it was the walls of Carthage. But not to propose only my own ex-

* Nec eventus modò hoc docet, (stultorum iste magister est) sed eadem ratio quæ fuit, futuraque, donec eadem res manebunt, immutabilis est. Liv.

“ ample to you, you know in what manner the last
 “ Consuls Atilius and Servilius eluded all his efforts
 “ by keeping upon the defensive. This, Paulus
 “ Æmilius, is the sole means you have for saving the
 “ Commonwealth. But unhappily, you will find
 “ greater difficulties to put it in execution from your
 “ own people, than from the enemy. The Romans
 “ desire the same thing as the Carthaginians, and Varro
 “ is of the same opinion with Hannibal. You † have
 “ therefore two Generals to resist alone, which you
 “ will do effectually, if you know how to despise the
 “ discourses and opinions of men; and if you nei-
 “ ther suffer yourself to be dazzled by the vain-glory
 “ of your Collegue, nor terrified by the false infamy
 “ with which they will endeavour to blacken you.
 “ It is commonly said, that truth may suffer some
 “ eclipse, and that too often, but that it is never to-
 “ tally extinguished. To know how to contemn
 “ glory when proper, is the means of acquiring the
 “ most solid. Suffer with patience your prudence to
 “ be called timidity, your wise circumspection flow-
 “ nefs and inactivity, your ability in the art of war,
 “ incapacity and cowardice. I had rather a wise ene-
 “ my should fear you, than foolish citizens praise
 “ you. Hannibal will despise you, if he sees you
 “ dare all things, and fear you, if you act nothing
 “ rashly. Upon the whole, I am not for your re-
 “ maining entirely without action, but that all your
 “ enterprizes be guided by reason and not abandoned
 “ to chance. Be always master of events. Be al-
 “ ways armed and upon your guard. Never be want-
 “ ing to any favourable occasion; but never give the
 “ enemy one for surprizing you. If you go on with-

† Duobus Ducibus unus resistes oportet. Resistes autem, adversus
 famam rumoresque hominum si satis firmus steteris; si te neque Col-
 legæ vana gloria, neque falsa tua infamia moverit. Veritatem labo-
 rare nimis sæpe, aiunt, extingui nunquam. Gloriam qui spreverit,
 veram habebit. Sine timidum pro cauto, tardum pro considerato,
 imbellem pro perito belli vocent. Malo te sapiens hostis metuat,
 quam stulti cives laudent. Omnia audentem contemnet Annibal:
 nil temere agentem metuet.

A. R. 536. "out precipitation, you will see clear, and all your
 Ant. C. "steps will be safe. Haste and heat blind and con-
 216. "found us."

Liv. xxii.
 40.

The Consul replied with a dejected air, "that this advice seemed very wise and salutary, but that it was not easy to put it in execution." As he had always in mind the injustice, which had been done him on the expiration of his first Consulship, he added, "that he hoped the event of the campaign would be happy; but that if any misfortune should happen, he had rather perish by the swords of the enemy, than by the voices of his citizens."

After this conversation, Paulus Æmilius set out for the army, attended to the gates of the city by the principal Senators; whilst a train more remarkable from its great number than its dignity, followed its idol the Plebeian Consul.

When they were both arrived at the camp, they assembled the troops, to declare to them the intentions of the Senate, and to animate them in respect to their duty. Paulus Æmilius spoke, and judging it necessary to encourage the troops after the blows they had received, and to dispel the dread they had conceived in consequence, he represented to them, "That if they had been worsted in the preceding battles, they had many reasons to prove, that it was not their fault; but that if it were now judged proper to give battle, nothing could prevent the victory. That before the same army had not been commanded by the two Consuls, and that no troops had been used but new-raised men, without exercise or experience, and who had come to blows with the enemy, almost without having either seen or known him." "But now," added he, "you see all things in a very different situation. Both Consuls are at your head, and share all dangers with you. You know the arms of the enemy, their manner of forming themselves, and their number. Scarce a day has passed for above a year, but you have measured your swords with them. Different circumstances must produce different

“ferent effects. After having fought on particular
 “occasions with equal forces, and been frequently
 “victorious, it would be very strange, if you were
 “defeated when more than one half superior in num-
 “ber. Romans, nothing is wanting to give you vic-
 “tory, but the will to conquer; and I should injure
 “you, to exhort you not to want that. Remember
 “only, that your anxious and trembling country has
 “its eyes fixed upon you. Its cares, its strength,
 “its hopes, are all united in your army. The fate
 “of Rome, of your fathers, wives, children, is in
 “your hands: Do you act in such a manner that
 “the event may answer their expectation.” After
 this discourse Paulus Æmilius dismissed the assembly.
 Though Hannibal saw the Roman troops augmented
 to double their number, he was however extremely
 rejoiced on the arrival of the two Consuls, because he
 desired only an occasion to come to a battle.

A. R. 536.
 Ant. C.
 216.

The Romans had at first a slight advantage over
 Hannibal's foragers in a tumultuary engagement,
 wherein the Carthaginians left seventeen hundred men
 upon the spot, and the Romans but one hundred at
 most, as well citizens as allies. Hannibal was not
 sorry for this slight success of the enemy. He con-
 sidered it as a proper bait for drawing them into his toils,
 and conceived thoughts of making the best of it im-
 mediately. As if this blow had intimidated him, he
 decamped during the night, leaving almost all his
 baggage behind him. He had caused a great number
 of fires to be kindled in his camp, in order to make
 them believe, that it was his intention to disguise his
 flight. As for himself he lay concealed with his troops
 behind the mountains. As soon as day appeared, the
 soldiers perceived, that Hannibal's camp was aban-
 doned, and demanded with great cries, that the signal
 should be given for pursuing the enemy, and plun-
 dering their camp. Varro strongly supported their
 demand. Paulus Æmilius did not omit to repeat,
 that it was necessary to keep upon their guard, and
 to distrust the stratagems of Hannibal. Seeing that

Liv. xxii.
 41—43.

A.R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

no regard was had to him, he caused his Collegue to be informed, that the Auspices were not favourable. Varro durst proceed no farther : but the army refused to obey. Happily two slaves, who had been made prisoners the year before by the Carthaginians, having found means to escape, arrived at this moment in the Roman camp, and being carried immediately to the Consuls, gave them to understand, that Hannibal's army was posted in ambush behind the mountains. * This information came in very good time for giving the Consuls occasion to make their authority respected, which the ill-judged softness and complacency of Varro had taught the troops to despise.

Liv. xxii.
43.

Hannibal, finding his stratagem discovered, returned into his camp. The perplexity in which he then was, well proves the wisdom of the conduct, which Fabius had first observed, and which Paulus Æmilius followed after his example. He was in want both of provisions and money. His troops began to murmur already, and to complain openly, of not having their pay, and of being made to perish by hunger. The Spanish soldiers had already conceived thoughts of going over to the Romans. And lastly, it was said, that Hannibal himself had deliberated more than once, whether he should not fly into Gaul with his cavalry, and leave all his infantry behind him, which he could subsist no longer. Famine obliged him to decamp, and to remove into a part of Apulia, where the heats were greater, and where, for that reason, the grain ripened sooner. He posted himself near Cannæ, a little town, which soon after became very famous from the battle fought there. It was situated upon the river Aufidus, now called Ofanto. It was an open country, which Hannibal had purposely chosen, in order to use his cavalry, in which his principal strength and confidence lay. The Romans followed him close, and incamped near him.

* Horum opportunus adventus Consules imperii potentes fecit, cum ambitio alterius suam primum apud eos pravâ indulgentiâ majestatem solvisset.

When the rumour spread at Rome, that the two armies were in view of each other, and were preparing for a battle, though it was expected, and even desired, however, in that critical moment, which was to determine the fate of the Commonwealth, every body was seized with anxiety and dread. The past defeats made them tremble for the future ; and as the imagination is apt to dwell particularly upon the evil it fears, they represented to themselves in the strongest light all the misfortunes, to which they should be exposed in case of being overcome. In all the temples, prayers and sacrifices were made to avert the effect of the dreadful prodigies, with which the whole city resounded. For, says Polybius, in urgent dangers, the Romans took extreme care to appease the wrath of the Gods and men ; and of all the ceremonies prescribed for these occasions, there is not any that they do not observe, without fear of disgracing themselves, whatever seeming meanness they may include.

The Consuls had divided their troops into two camps. The least was on the other side of the Aufidus upon the eastern shore : the great camp, which contained the best part of the army, was on this side of that river, as was the camp of the Carthaginians. These two camps of the Romans had a communication by a bridge. This nearness occasioned frequent skirmishes. Hannibal incessantly harrassed the enemy, sending out parties of Numidians, that fatigued them extremely, and fell suddenly sometimes upon one part of their camp, and sometimes on another.

Every thing was in confusion in the Roman army. The councils of war passed rather in disputes, than deliberations. As the camps were in a very level and open plain, and Hannibal's cavalry was superior in all things to that of the Romans, Paulus Æmilius did not judge it proper to give battle in that place, but was desirous to draw the enemy on to a ground, where the infantry might have the greatest share in the action. His Collegue, a General without experience, but full of presumption and esteem for himself, was of a quite

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.
Polyb. iii.
262.

Liv. xxii.
44.
Plut. in
Fab. 182.

A. R. 536. contrary opinion. This is the great inconvenience
 Ant. C. that frequently attends a command divided between
 216. two Generals, between whom jealousy, contrariety of
 humour, and diversity of views seldom fails to excite
 division. Paulus Æmilius objected to Varro the ex-
 ample of the rashness of Sempronius and Flaminius.
 Varro reproached him in his turn, that the conduct
 of Fabius, which he was for imitating, was a very
 commodious pretext for covering real cowardice un-
 der the specious name of prudence. He called the
 Gods and men to witness, that it was not his fault, if
 Hannibal, by a long and quiet possession, attained a
 kind of right over Italy. That he was in a manner
 chained up by his Colleague, and that their arms were
 taken out of the hands of the soldiers, who were full
 of ardor, and desired only to fight.

Varro at last, exasperated by a new insult of the
 Numidians, who had pursued a body of Romans almost
 to the gates of the camp, was finally resolved to give
 battle the next day, when he was to command: for
 the Consuls commanded each their day alternately.
 Accordingly, early in the morning the next day, he
 made his troops advance to give battle, without con-
 sulting his Colleague. Paulus Æmilius followed, be-
 ing incapable of resolving not to second him, though
 he by no means approved his conduct.

Polyb. iii. Hannibal, after having made his troops sensible,
 261. that had they been given their choice of a ground for
 fighting, they could not, superior as they were in ca-
 valry, have chosen one more for their advantage:
 “Return the Gods thanks, therefore,” said he, “for
 “having brought the enemy hither, that you may
 “triumph over them; and think well of me also for
 “having reduced the Romans to the necessity of
 “fighting. After three great successive victories,
 “what more is wanting to inspire you with confidence,
 “than the remembrance of your own exploits? The
 “former battles have made you masters of the flat
 “country: by this, you will become so of all the ci-
 “ties, riches and power of the Romans. But the
 “question

“ question is not to speak ; we must act. I hope
 “ from the protection of the Gods, that you will soon
 “ see the effect of my promises.”

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 216.

The two armies were very unequal in number. There was in that of the Romans, including the allies, four-score thousand foot, and something more than six thousand horse ; and in that of the Carthaginians, forty thousand foot, all well disciplined and inured to war, and ten thousand horse. Varro, at day-break, having made the troops of the great camp pass the Aufidus, drew them up immediately in battle, after having joined them with those of the little camp. The whole infantry were upon one line, closer and of greater depth than usual. The cavalry was upon the two wings ; that of the Romans on the right, supported by the Aufidus ; and that of the allies on the left wing. The light-armed troops were advanced in the front of the battle to some distance. Paulus Æmilius commanded the right of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius Geminus, the Consul of the preceding year, was in the centre.

Polyb. iii.
 262—267.
 Liv. xxii.
 45—50.
 Plut. in
 Fab. 182,
 183.
 Appian. de
 Bell. Ann.
 323—328.

Hannibal immediately drew up his army in one line. He posted his Spanish and Gaulish cavalry on the left, sustained by the Aufidus, to oppose the Roman horse, and upon the same line half his heavy-armed African infantry ; then the Spanish and Gaulish infantry, which properly formed the centre ; on their right the other half of the African infantry ; and lastly, the Numidian horse, which composed the right wing. The light-armed troops were in the front, facing those of the Romans. Asdrubal had the left, Hanno the right ; Hannibal, having his brother with him, reserved the command of the centre to himself.

The African troops might have been taken for a body of Romans, so much did they resemble them by the arms, which they had gained in the battles of Trebia and Thrasymenus, and which they then employed against those who had suffered them to be taken from them. The Spaniards and Gauls had shields of the same form : but their swords were very

A. R. 536. different. Those of the former were equally proper
 Ant. C. for cutting and thrusting, whereas those of the Gauls
 216. cut only with the edge, and to a certain distance.
 The soldiers of those two nations, especially the Gauls,
 had a dreadful aspect, in effect of the extraordinary
 bigness of their bodies. The latter were naked from
 their belts upwards. The Spaniards wore linnen
 habits, the extreme whiteness of which, exalted by a
 border of a purple colour, made a surprizingly splendid
 appearance.

Liv. xxii.

43.
 Plut. in
 Fab. p.
 183.


Hannibal, who knew how to take his advantages as
 a great Captain, forgot nothing that could conduce
 to the victory. A wind peculiar to that region, called
 in the country the Vulturnus, blew always at a certain
 period. He took care to draw up in such a manner,
 that his army, facing the north, had it in their backs,
 and the enemy, fronting the south, had it in their
 faces; so that he was not in the least incommoded
 with it; whereas the Romans, whose eyes it filled
 with dust, scarce saw before them. From hence we
 may judge how far Hannibal carried his attention,
 which nothing seems to escape.

The two armies marched against each other, and
 began the charge. After that of the light-armed sol-
 diers on both sides, which was only a kind of pre-
 lude, the action began by the two wings of the cavalry,
 on the side of the Aufidus. Hannibal's left wing,
 which was an old corps, to whose valour he was prin-
 cipally indebted for his successes, attacked that of the
 Romans with so much force and violence, that they
 had never experienced the like. This charge was not
 made in the usual manner of attacks of cavalry, by
 sometimes falling back, and sometimes returning to
 the assault; but in fighting man to man and very near,
 because they had not room enough to extend them-
 selves, being pent up on one side by the river, and
 on the other by the infantry: The shock was furious,
 and equally sustained on both sides; and whilst it was
 still doubtful, to which side the victory would incline,
 the Roman horse, according to a custom usual enough
 in

in their corps, and which was sometimes successful, but was now very ill applied, dismounted and fought on foot. When Hannibal was informed of this, he cried out : “ I am as well pleased with them in that posture, as I should be to have them all delivered up to me bound hand and foot.” Accordingly, after having defended themselves with the utmost valour, most of them fell upon the spot. Asdrubal pursued those that fled, and made a great slaughter of them.

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Ant. C.
216.

Plut. in
Fab. 183.

Whilst the horse were thus engaged, the infantry of both armies advanced also against each other. The battle began at first in the centre. As soon as Hannibal perceived, that the Romans began to give way, he made the Gauls and Spaniards move that were in the main body, and whom he commanded in person. In proportion as they advanced towards the enemy, he made the right and left form a semicircle like a  placed thus. At first the opposite centre of the Romans charged them. After some resistance the Spaniards and Gauls began to give way, and to lose ground. The rest of the Roman infantry also moved on in order to take them in flank. They fell back according to the orders they had received, continuing to fight, and regained the ground, where they had at first been drawn up in battle. The Romans, seeing that the Spaniards and Gauls continued to retreat, continued also to pursue them. Hannibal then, well pleased to see every thing succeed according to his design, and perceiving the moment was come for acting with all his forces, he gave orders, that his Africans should wheel to the right and left upon the Romans. These two bodies, which were fresh, well-armed, and in good order, having wheeled about suddenly towards the space, or hollow, into which the Romans had thrown themselves in disorder and confusion, charged them on both sides with vigour, without giving them time to look about them, or leaving them ground to form themselves.

A. R. 536. In the mean time, the Numidian cavalry of the
 Ant. C. right wing was engaged also with the enemy opposite
 216. to them, that is, the cavalry of the allies of the Romans. Though they did not distinguish themselves in this battle, and the advantage was equal on both sides, they were, however, very useful on this occasion. For they found the enemies they had in their front sufficient employment, to prevent them from having time to assist their own people. But when the left wing, where Asdrubal commanded, had routed, as we have said, the whole horse of the right wing of the Romans, and had joined the Numidians, the cavalry of the Romans did not expect to be attacked by them, and fled.

It is said, that Asdrubal then did a thing, which shews his prudence no less than it contributed to the success of the battle. As the Numidians were very numerous, and never did their duty better than when an enemy fled, he ordered them to pursue the Romans to prevent their rallying, and led on the Spanish and Gaulish horse to the charge, to support the African infantry. Accordingly he fell upon the Roman foot in the rear; which being attacked at the same time both in the flanks and rear, and surrounded on all sides, was entirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodigies of valour.

Liv. xxii. Paulus Æmilius had been considerably wounded
 49. from the beginning of the battle: however, he continued to discharge all the duties of a great Captain; till victory having at length entirely declared for the Carthaginians, those who had fought around him, abandoned him, and fled. A legionary tribune, called Cn. Lentulus, came by on horseback near the place where the Consul was sitting upon a stone, covered all over with his blood. When he saw him in that sad condition, he pressed him earnestly to get upon his horse, and make off, whilst he had some strength remaining. The Consul, to use the expression of Horace, prodigal of his great soul, refused that offer. "I have taken my resolution," said he. "I will
 Animæq; magnæ prodigum Paulum, superante Pæno. " expire

“ expire upon these heaps of my dead soldiers. But
 “ do you take care not to lose the little time you
 “ have for escaping from the enemy, through an
 “ useless compassion. Go, and tell the Senate from
 “ me to fortify Rome, and to make troops enter it
 “ for its defence, before the Victor arrives to attack
 “ it. Tell Fabius in particular, that I lived and died
 “ highly sensible and fully convinced of the wisdom
 “ of his counsels.” At that moment, a body of the
 flying troops arrived, and soon after them another of
 the enemy in pursuit of them, who killed the Consul
 without knowing him. The horse of Lentulus saved
 him, through the favour of the tumult. The Consul
 Varro retired to Venusia, attended only by seventy
 horse. About four thousand men escaped the slaughter,
 and took refuge in the neighbouring cities.

Many of the Romans had remained during the battle in the two camps to guard them, or had retired to them after it. Those of the great camp sent to the others, who were to the number of seven or eight thousand men, to come and join them, in order to their retiring in one body to Canusium, whilst the enemy, fatigued with the battle, and full of wine, were buried in sleep. This proposal was very ill received; and notwithstanding the warm remonstrances of Sempronius, one of the Tribunes of the army, most of them rejected it. Only some of them, filled with courage, followed the Tribune, notwithstanding the opposition of their companions, and having passed thro' the enemy, arrived in the great camp to the number of six hundred. From thence having joined a greater number, they all retired without danger to Canusium.

Besides the Consul Paulus Æmilius, two Quæstors, and one and twenty legionary Tribunes, there perished in this battle many illustrious persons, who had been either Consuls or Prætors. Of this number were Servilius, Consul the year before; Minucius, who had been Consul and General of the horse under Fabius; fourscore Senators, who had served voluntarily out of zeal for their country; and so amazing a number of
 Knights,

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A. R. 536. Knights, that Hannibal sent three bushels of the rings, Ant. C. 216. that distinguished the Knights from the rest of the People, to Carthage. The general loss amounted to at least fifty thousand men, and according to Polybius, to more than seventy thousand. The Carthaginians were so furious against the enemy, that they did not cease killing, till Hannibal, in the greatest heat of the slaughter, cried out several times: "Hold, soldiers, spare the conquered."

On the side of Hannibal, the victory was complete, and he was indebted for it principally, as well as for the preceding ones, to the superiority of his cavalry. He lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horses.

Liv. xxii.

51.

Plut. in

Fab. 184.

Whilst all the officers were congratulating Hannibal upon his victory; and considering the war as terminated, were advising him to give himself and his soldiers some days rest; Maharbal, General of his horse, who was well convinced, that there was not a moment to be lost, said to him: "Take great care of that: for that you may know of what consequence the gaining of this battle is to you, in five days you shall dine in the Capitol. Only follow me with the foot: I shall go before at the head of my horse, that they may see me arrive, before they can know I have began my march." * The idea of so great a success dazzled Hannibal, and he could not immediately come into it. He therefore answered Maharbal, "that he applauded his zeal, but that it required time to consider his proposal." "I see," replied Maharbal, "the Gods have not given all talents to the same man. You know how to conquer, Hannibal; but not how to use your victory." It is generally enough believed, that the inactivity of this

* Annibali nimis læta res est visa, majorque quam ut eam statim capere animo posset. "Itaque voluntatem se laudare Maharbalis," ait: "Ad consilium pensandum, temporis opus esse." Tum Maharbal, "Non omnia nimirum eidem dii dedere. VINCERE SCIS, ANNIBAL, VICTORIA UTI NESCIS." Mora ejus diei fati creditur saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio.

day on Hannibal's side, saved Rome and her dominions.

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Many, and Livy amongst the rest, condemn Hannibal for this delay, as a capital error. Some are more reserved, and cannot, without very convincing proofs, censure so great a Captain; who in all other things does not seem to have ever been wanting either in prudence to make the right choice, or in vivacity and promptitude, to put it in execution. They are besides restrained by the authority, or at least silence of Polybius, who, in speaking of the great consequences of this memorable day, agrees, that the Carthaginians conceived great hopes of carrying Rome on the first assault: but as to him, he does not explain himself concerning what it was necessary to have done in respect to a city very populous, extremely warlike, well fortified, and defended by a garrison of two legions; and he does not drop a word, that implies such a project practicable; or that Hannibal was in the wrong for not having attempted it.

Polyb. iii.
298.

And accordingly, on examining things nearer, we do not find, that the common rules of war admitted him to undertake it. It is certain, that Hannibal's whole infantry before the battle amounted only to forty thousand men; that being diminished six thousand, who had been killed in the action, and a much greater number undoubtedly, who had been wounded, and obliged to quit the field, he had no more than twenty-six, or twenty-seven thousand foot in a condition to act; and that that number could neither suffice for forming the circumvallation of a city of such extent as Rome, with a river running through it, nor for attacking it in form, without either machines, munitions, or any of the things necessary in a siege. For the same reason Hannibal, after his success at Thrasymenus, all victorious as he was, had attacked Spoletum ineffectually; and a little after the battle of Cannæ, he was obliged to raise the siege of a small city of no name or strength. And it cannot be denied, that if, on the occasion in question, he had mis-

Liv. xxii.
9.
Ibid. xxiii.
18.

carried,

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216. carried, as he had reason to expect, he would irretrievably have ruined all his affairs. But to judge properly of this fact, it were necessary to be of the military profession, and perhaps cotemporary with the action. This is an antient matter of dispute, upon which it becomes only the skilful to pass judgment. As for me, after having advanced my doubts, I shall not omit to use Livy's words upon this subject.

Liv. xxii.
51. The day after the battle, as soon as it was light, the Carthaginians began to gather the spoils. How much soever they hated the Romans, they could not consider the slaughter they had made without horror. The field of battle, and all the places adjacent, were covered with dead bodies, according as they had been killed during the battle or in flight. But what attracted their attention most, was a Numidian still alive lying upon a dead Roman. The first had his ears and nose torn and bleeding. For the Roman, not being able to use his hands, in order to hold and handle his arms, because they were entirely disabled with wounds, had rose from anger to fury, and had died tearing his enemy with his teeth.

Ibid. 52. After they had passed part of the day in stripping the dead of the spoils, Hannibal led his troops on to attack the little camp. His first care was to post a body of troops upon the banks of the Aufidus, to prevent the enemy from having water. But as they were all weary with labour and watching, and most of them covered with wounds, they surrendered sooner than he expected. The capitulation was, that they should deliver up their arms and horses to the victor, retaining only a single habit. That when the prisoners should be ransomed, about seven pounds ten shillings should be paid for each Roman citizen, five pounds for each ally, and fifty for every slave. The Carthaginians took possession of their persons, and kept them under a good guard, after having separated the citizens from the allies.

Whilst Hannibal lost a great deal of time on this side, those of the great camp, who had sufficient strength

strength or courage, to the number of four thousand A. R. 536.
 foot and two hundred horse, retired to Canusium, Ant. C.
 some in bodies, and others dispersed over the country, 216.
 which was not the most unsafe way. Only the
 cowardly and the wounded remained, who surrendered
 themselves to the victor upon the same conditions
 as those of the little camp.

Hannibal made a very considerable booty. But
 except men, horses, and a little silver, which was
 principally upon the furniture of the horses, (for the
 Romans carried very little plate into the field) he a-
 bandoned all the rest to the soldiers.

He afterwards caused the bodies of his own people
 to be placed in an heap, in order to burn and pay
 them the last duties. Some authors write, that he
 caused the Consul's body to be sought, and that having
 found it, he gave it very honourable interment.

As to those who had retired to Canusium, the in- Liv. ibid.
 habitants giving them nothing but quarters, a lady
 of Apulia, of considerable birth and riches, called
 Buba, supplied them with cloaths, provisions, and even
 money. After the war, the Senate did not fail to ex-
 press their gratitude to her for so great a generosity,
 and to confer extraordinary honours upon her.

For the rest, as there were four legionary Tribunes
 amongst these troops, the question was, which of them
 should command till farther orders. By the consent
 of them all, that honour was conferred upon P. Scipio,
 then very young, and upon Appius Claudius.

Whilst they were deliberating amongst themselves Liv. xxii.
 upon what was necessary to be done in the present con- 53.
 juncture, P. Furius Philus, the son of a person of
 Consular dignity, came to tell them, that they enter-
 tained false hopes, and that the Commonwealth was
 entirely ruined. That a considerable number of the
 better sort of the youth, with L. Cæcilius Metellus at
 their head, were endeavouring to get ships, with de-
 sign to quit Italy, and to embark, in order to retire
 to some king in alliance with the Romans. Of all the
 misfortunes that had fallen upon the Commonwealth,
 there

A.R. 536. there had been no example of so desperate and fatal a
 Ant. C. resolution. All that were in the Council, were struck
 216. with amazement on this news. Most of them kept a
 mournful silence. Some proposed deliberating upon
 the affair; when young Scipio, for whom the glory of
 terminating this war successfully was reserved, affirmed,
 "that there was no time to be lost in an affair of
 that nature. That the question was to act, and not to
 deliberate. That those who loved the Commonwealth
 had only to follow him. That there could not be
 greater enemies of the State, than men capable of forming
 such a design." After these words, he went
 directly to the house where Metellus lodged, followed
 by a great number of the most zealous. And having
 found the young persons assembled, of whom he had
 been informed, he drew his sword, and presenting the
 point to them, he said: "I swear first, that I will not
 "abandon the Commonwealth, and that I will not
 "suffer any one else to abandon it. Great Jupiter,
 "I call upon you to witness my oath; and I consent,
 "if I fail to keep it, that you will cause me and my
 "family to perish by the most cruel of deaths. Cæci-
 "lius, do you take the same oath, and all that are
 "here assembled. Whoever refuses to comply, shall
 "die this moment." They all swore, being as much
 terrified as if they had seen and heard the Victor Han-
 nibal; and permitted Scipio to have them guarded
 in sight.

Liv. xxii.
 54.

At the time this passed at Canusium, about four
 thousand men, horse and foot, who had been dispersed
 in the flight about the country, repaired to Venusia
 to the Consul. The inhabitants of that city received
 them into their houses, where they took great care of
 them. They supplied all those that wanted them,
 with arms and cloaths, and gave each horseman about
 twelve shillings, and each of the foot about eight
 shillings. In a word, both in public and private,
 they treated them with all possible marks of extreme
 good-will. They were unwilling it should be said,
 that the People of their city had been less generous
 than

than a single woman of Canusium: such force has good example. A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

But Busa, notwithstanding her great fortune and good heart, was overwhelmed by the great number of those, who had occasion for her aid. Already more than ten thousand men had repaired into that city. Appius and Scipio having been informed, that one of the Consuls had outlived the loss of the battle, sent him a courier, to let him know what troops they had with them, and to ask whether it was his will, that they should march them to him at Venusia, or should expect him at Canusium. Varro chose rather to go and join them, where they were. When he arrived there, he saw himself at the head of a body of troops, that might pass for a Consular army; and with these forces, if he was not yet in a condition to keep the field, he was at least capable of stopping the enemy, by opposing them with the walls of Canusium. Liv. ibid.

S E C T. III.

Consternation, which the confused rumour of the loss of the army occasions at Rome. The Senate assembles. Wise counsel of Fabius to make the necessary dispositions in the city. The Senate receives letters from Varro, which inform them of the present state of affairs. News concerning Sicily. M. Marcellus is appointed to command the troops in the room of Varro. Crime of two Vestals. Q. Fabius Piccor is sent to Delphi. Human victims sacrificed to the Gods. Marcellus takes upon him the command of the troops. M. Junius is created Dictator. Slaves listed. Hannibal permits the prisoners to send deputies to Rome, to treat about their ransom. Caribalon, a Carthaginian officer, ordered to quit the territory of the Commonwealth. Speech of one of the Deputies in favour of the prisoners. Speech of Manlius Torquatus against the same prisoners. The Senate refuses to ransom them. Reflections upon that refusal. Mean fraud of one of the Deputies. Many allies quit the party of the Romans. Varro returns to Rome, where he is very well received. Reflexion upon this conduct of the Roman People.

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

Liv. xxii.
54.

NO certain and exact news of what had passed at the battle of Cannæ, had yet been received at Rome; and it even was not known, that there was still in being the sad remains of which we have just been speaking. The entire defeat of both armies, and the death of the two Consuls, was rumoured. Never had Rome, since the taking of the city by the Gauls, been under such alarm, and in so great and universal a consternation. It was talked, that the Romans had now neither camp, Generals, nor soldiers. That Hannibal was master of Apulia, and Samnium, as he would soon be of all Italy. Nothing was heard, but cries and groans in the streets; the women in tears, tearing their hair, and beating their breasts, in the dreadful despair to which they were reduced; the men, sad and dejected, and inwardly abandoned to a grief they were desirous to conceal, expressed it in spite of themselves by their silence.

What other nation would not have sunk under the weight of so many calamities? If we compare the battle of Cannæ with that which the Carthaginians lost at the islands Ægates, and which reduced them to give up Sicily and Sardinia to the Victor, and afterwards to pay him tribute; or that which Hannibal himself lost afterwards at the gates of Carthage; they are in nothing to be compared with it; except that the loss of them was sustained with less constancy and courage.

Ibid. 55.
Plut. in
Fab. 184.

Affairs were in this condition, when the Prætors, P. Furius Philus, and M. Pomponius, assembled the Senate, in order to take measures for the preservation of Rome. For they did not doubt, but Hannibal, after having defeated their armies, would immediately set out to attack the Capitol, the taking of which would terminate the war, and compleat the ruin of the Commonwealth. But as the women, who flocked around the Senate-house, made the air resound with their cries, and that even before it was known, who was alive and who dead, all families were equally in the greatest affliction: Q. Fabius Maximus was of opinion,

opinion, "that couriers should be immediately dispatched upon the Appian and Latine Ways, with orders to interrogate those, who had escaped by flight, and whom they should meet on their route, to know from them the fate of the Consuls and army; where the remains of the troops were, admitting there were any; which way Hannibal had directed his march after the battle; what he was actually doing; and what might be conjectured in respect to his future designs. He also represented, that for want of the magistrates, whose number was too small in the city, the Senators should take care to calm the trouble and dread that prevailed in it; and he added a very long detail of all it was necessary for them to do in order to succeed in this respect. That when the tumult should be appeased, and the minds of the people more calm, the Senate should re-assemble to deliberate more coolly upon measures for preserving the Commonwealth."

A.R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

Every body came into this opinion, and it was immediately put in execution. The first thing that was done, was to forbid the women to appear in public, because their despair and clamour served only to deject the people, already too much affected. In the second place, the Senators went from house to house to encourage the heads of families, and to represent to them, that the State did not want resources against the present evils. Fabius himself, instead of appearing timorous, and without hope, as he did when there seemed nothing to fear; now, when every body was in extreme consternation and horrible anguish, walked about with a grave pace, and a countenance full of assurance and tranquility; which, with his serious and consoling discourses, revived the courage, and calmed the grief, of the whole city. And lastly, lest fear should prevail over all other sentiments, and the citizens, by retiring elsewhere, should leave the city without defence, guards were posted at the gates, in order that no-body might go out without permission. When the Senators had dispersed the multitude, that had gathered

Liv. xxii.
56.

A. R. 536. thered round the Senate-house and in the Forum, and
 Ant. C. 216. appeased the tumult in all parts of the city, letters
 arrived from Varro, by which " he informed the Senate of the death of the Consul Paulus Æmilius, and the defeat of the army : That as for him, he was actually at Canusium, where he was drawing together the remains of this defeat : That he had with him about ten thousand in a condition bad enough : That * Hannibal was still at Cannæ; where he amused himself with gathering the spoils upon the field of battle, and setting a rate for the ransom of the prisoners in a manner becoming neither a great General, nor a Victor." Soon after all the citizens were informed of their particular losses. And as there was not a family, which was not obliged to wear mourning, it was limited by a decree of the Senate to thirty days, in order that the festivals and other ceremonies of religion, whether public or private, should not be interrupted too long.

Liv. xxii. 56. The Senate had scarce re-entered their house, than they received other letters from Sicily, by which the Prætor T. Otacilius informed them, that the Carthaginian fleet ravaged King Hiero's dominions. That he had made preparations for sailing to attack it; but that he had received advice at the same time, that they had another fleet near the islands Ægates, which was preparing to sail to Lilybæum, and to ravage the province of the Roman People, when he should have set out to cover the coasts of Syracuse. That it was therefore necessary to send a new fleet, if they designed to defend Hiero, and the Province of Sicily.

Ibid. 57. The Senators were of opinion, that M. Claudius Marcellus, who commanded the fleet at Ostia, should be sent to Canusium, and that the Consul should be wrote to, to leave the command of the army to that Prætor, and to come himself to Rome, as soon as he could, and as the good of the Commonwealth would admit.

* Pœnum sedere ad Cannas, in captivorum pretiis prædaque alia, nec victoris animo, nec magni Ducis more, nundinantem.

The fear which so much bad news gave the Romans, was still augmented by a great number of prodigies, of which the most terrifying, was the crime of the Vestals Opimia and Floronia, who both, this same year, suffered themselves to be corrupted. The one, according to custom, was buried alive near the gate Collina; the other killed herself to avoid that punishment. The Decemviri were ordered to consult the books of the Sibyl; and Q. Fabius Pictor was sent to Delphi, to know from the oracle, by what prayers and sacrifices the wrath of the Gods might be appeased. This was the Fabius Pictor, who wrote the Roman History from Romulus down to his own times. The work of a Senator, employed in the public affairs, should, I conceive, be of great authority. But Polybius imputes to him a blind passion for his country, which often made him depart from the truth; and Livy himself does not seem to have set any great value upon him.

During the absence of Fabius Pictor, some extraordinary sacrifices were made, as prescribed in the books that contained the destiny of the Romans. Amongst the rest a male and female Gaul, and a Grecian man and woman were sacrificed, by being buried alive in a cave in the beast-market, which had been lined with stone. This place had before been bathed with human blood, according to a rite that the Romans had borrowed from foreign nations. What blindness was this! What idea had these nations of their Gods, to believe that human blood was capable of appeasing their wrath? But how could a people, who valued themselves upon their great humanity, and politeness of manners, as the Romans did, give into so cruel and barbarous a superstition? This was the worship, which the devil, "who was a murderer from the beginning," and had usurped the place of the true God, required from men, and which we should still pay him, if the all-powerful grace of the Redeemer had not delivered us from slavery to him.

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.
Liv. xxii.
27. In the mean time M. Marcellus sent fifteen hundred men, whom he had raised for the sea-service, to Rome, to guard the city. As to himself, after having sent the third legion to Teanum in Campania with the legionary Tribunes, he left the fleet, with as many soldiers as could be spared, and under the command of P. Furius Philus; and some days after repaired to Canusium by great marches.

Liv. *ibid.* M. Junius, having afterwards been created Dictator by the authority of the Senate, appointed Ti. Sempronius General of the horse, and, amongst the new troops, he listed all the young men, who had attained the age of seventeen (which was the time when the Romans first entered to serve in the army) and he even listed some who had not quitted the robe * *prætexta*, and who, consequently, were under that age. Of these he composed four legions and a body of a thousand horse. At the same time he sent to demand of the allies of the Latine name the contingent they were to furnish in virtue of the treaty. He also caused arms of all kinds to be prepared, without including those which had formerly been taken from the enemy, and which were removed from the temples and porticos to arm the new soldiers.

Liv. *ibid.* Besides these, the Romans made levies of a new kind. For the Commonwealth not being capable of supplying a sufficient number of free citizens, listed eight thousand of the most robust slaves, first asking them, whether they took arms with their own entire consent and good-will: a very remarkable circumstance. They did not believe, that soldiers raised by force were to be relied upon. They preferred soldiers of this kind to those, who were Hannibal's prisoners, and whom that General offered to restore for a less ransom than the price paid for these slaves.

Ibid. 58. Hannibal, after the victory at Cannæ, acting rather like a Conqueror than a General, that remembered he

* They did not quit the *Prætexta* till seventeen years of age. I have spoke of it, and of the other Roman habits, in a former part of this volume.

had still enemies to overcome, caused a state of all the prisoners to be laid before him. He separated the allies from the Romans; spoke to the first with the same professions of good-will and amity, as he had before after the battle of Thrasymenus; and dismissed them all without ransom. Then having ordered the Romans to be brought before him, which he had not hitherto done, he spoke to them with lenity enough. He told them, "That it was not his intention to destroy their nation; that he fought against them only for glory and empire. That as his forefathers had given way to the valour of the Romans, he would use his utmost endeavours to reduce the Romans to give way in their turn to his good fortune and courage. That therefore he would permit the prisoners to ransom themselves. That he demanded for each horseman about twelve pounds, for each of the foot about seven, and about two pounds ten shillings for every slave."

Though Hannibal had considerably increased the ransom before agreed upon, the prisoners however accepted with joy the conditions, though unjust, upon which they were permitted to withdraw out of the hands of the enemy. They therefore chose ten of the most considerable amongst them, whom they sent to Rome to the Senate. Hannibal desired no other security for their faith, than the oath which they took to return. He sent Carthalon, a Carthaginian of the greatest distinction, along with them, to propose conditions to the Romans, in case he found them disposed to make peace. When these deputies had quitted the camp of the Carthaginians, one of them, pretending to have forgot something, returned thither, and rejoined his companions before night.

When it was known at Rome, that they were upon the point of arriving in the city, the Dictator sent one of his Lictors to Carthalon, to order him in his name to quit the territory of the Commonwealth before night. Is this then the Chief of a People conquered and reduced to extremities, who assumes such a tone of haughtiness and empire to his conquerors?

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Ant. C.

216.

Liv. xxii.

59.

As to the deputies of the prisoners, he admitted them to an audience of the Senate, when M. Junius, the principal person amongst them, spoke thus in the name of them all. "There is nobody, fathers, that does not know, no people have less regard for the prisoners of their country than the Romans: But, without having too good an opinion of our cause, we may affirm, that no prisoners ever deserved your indifference or contempt less than we. For it was neither in the field of battle, nor through fear, that we delivered up our arms to the enemy: but after having fought till night, on heaps of dead bodies, we at last retired into our camp. During the remains of day, and the whole night following, notwithstanding the fatigues we had undergone, notwithstanding the wounds with which we were covered, we defended our intrenchments. The next day, seeing ourselves invested by a victorious army, and having our communication with the water cut off, without any hopes of opening ourselves a way through an innumerable multitude of enemies; and convinced besides, that it was no crime to save some small remains of an army, that had left fifty thousand men upon the field of battle; we at length treated concerning our ransom, and delivered up to the enemy the arms that could no longer be of any use to us. NOV II

"We knew, that our ancestors had given the Gauls gold to ransom themselves; and that our fathers, though so severe in respect to the conditions of peace, had however sent Ambassadors to Tarentum, to treat about the ransom of prisoners. And notwithstanding that, the battle, which we lost at Allia against the Gauls, and that which Pyrrhus gained against us at Heraclea, were less pernicious to the Commonwealth by the slaughter of our soldiers, than by their fear and flight. Whereas the fields of Cannæ are covered with the dead bodies of the Romans; and if we escaped the enemy's fury, it was because their arms were blunted, and their strength exhausted by slaughtering us.

"There

“ There are even some of us who cannot be re-
 “ proached with having quitted the field of battle ;
 “ but who having been appointed to guard the camp,
 “ fell with the camp itself into the hands of the enemy.

“ I do not envy the fate or condition of any of my
 “ countrymen and fellow-soldiers, nor desire to justify
 “ myself at their expence. But, unless there be merit
 “ in running better, and flying faster and more suc-
 “ cessfully than others, I do not think those to be pre-
 “ ferred to us, most of whom quitted the field of
 “ battle without arms, and did not stop till they had
 “ reached Venusia or Canusium ; nor that they can
 “ boast of being able to do the Commonwealth better
 “ service than we. You will find good and valiant
 “ soldiers in them ; but the remembrance that we are
 “ indebted to your goodness for having been ransom-
 “ ed, and reinstated in our country, will induce us to
 “ exceed them, if possible, by our valour and zeal.

“ You are raising soldiers of all ages and condi-
 “ tions. I am informed, that you are arming eight
 “ thousand slaves. We are very near the same num-
 “ ber of citizens, and our ransom will not exceed what
 “ it will cost you to purchase them. For I should
 “ injure the Roman name, if I compared them with
 “ us in any other manner.

“ If you make any difficulty to chuse the side of
 “ favour and humanity in respect to us, a treatment
 “ for which we do not believe we have given room ;
 “ consider to what enemy you are going to abandon
 “ us. Is it to a Pyrrhus, who treated our prisoners
 “ like his friends and guests ; or to a Barbarian, to
 “ a Carthaginian, equally avaricious and cruel ? If
 “ you saw the chains, with which your citizens are
 “ laden ; if you were witnesses of the misery in which
 “ they are made to languish, you would undoubtedly
 “ be no less moved with their condition, than if you
 “ were to turn your eyes upon the fields of Cannæ,
 “ covered with heaps of the dead bodies of your
 “ soldiers.

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

“ You hear the groans, and may see the tears of
“ our relations, who expect your answer in the most
“ cruel anxiety. What do you believe must be the
“ alarm of our absent companions concerning the de-
“ cree you are going to pronounce, which will deter-
“ mine in respect to their lives and liberty ?

“ Though Hannibal, contrary to his disposition,
“ should incline to treat us with lenity and goodness,
“ could we endure life, after you should have judged
“ us unworthy of being ransomed ? The prisoners,
“ whom Pyrrhus dismissed in former times without
“ ransom, returned to Rome along with the princi-
“ pal persons of the city, who had been sent to him
“ to treat of their ransom. For me, I should return
“ into my country, a citizen of less value than a small
“ sum of money. Every one has his maxims, and
“ manner of thinking. I know, that I am exposed
“ to lose my life : but I fear much less to die, than to
“ live without honour ; and I should think myself
“ eternally dishonoured, if it should appear, that you
“ had condemned us as wretches unworthy of your
“ compassion. For it will never be imagined, that it
“ was on account of the money you were desirous to
“ save.”

As soon as he had done speaking, the croud of their relations, who were not far from the assembly, began to raise mournful cries. They stretched out their hands towards the Senators, and implored them to restore them their children, brothers, fathers, and husbands : for the occasion had also induced the women to come into the Forum, to join their prayers with those of the men. After the people were made to remove, they began to collect the voices. Opinions were very much divided. The most compassionate were for ransoming them with the public money ; Others maintained, that the Commonwealth was not in a condition to be at that expence : that it sufficed to suffer them to ransom themselves with their own money : they added, that the State might aid such as had not ready money, on condition, that they should engage

engage their lands or houses for the payment of the money that should be lent them.

T. Manlius Torquatus then, one of the most illustrious Senators, who had been twice Consul, but who was still more distinguished by the ancient severity, which in the opinion of many he carried even into cruelty; when it came to his turn to speak, explained himself in the following terms. “ If the deputies had been contented with asking, that the prisoners should be ransomed, without attacking the reputation of others, I should have given my opinion in one word. I should only have exhorted you to follow the example set you by your fathers, and from which we cannot depart without ruining military discipline. But as they have almost made it for their glory to have surrendered themselves to the enemy, and have made no difficulty to prefer themselves, not only to those who were taken in the field of battle, but even to those who retired to Venusia and Canusium, and to the Consul Varro himself, I think it incumbent on me to let you know all that passed after the battle of Cannæ. I wish I had now for my auditors the soldiers of Canusium, the irreproachable witnesses of every one’s valour and cowardice; or at least P. Sempronius, whose council and example had they regarded, they would now be soldiers in our camp, and not prisoners in the hands of the enemy. But what was their conduct? From the time that the greatest part of the enemy had re-entered their camp, either to rest themselves after the fatigues of the battle, or to give themselves up to the joy that always succeeds victory, an whole night passed, in which they might have forced their way through the few Carthaginians, that were left to oppose a retreat, which seven thousand men were capable of opening sword in hand, even in the midst of an whole army. But they had neither hearts to undertake it themselves, nor docility enough to follow him, who set them the example, and exhorted them to imitate him. During the greatest part of

“ the

A. R. 536.

Ant. C.

216.

Liv. xxii.

60.

A. R. 536. " the night, Sempronius never ceased advising and
 Ant. C. " pressing them to follow him, whilst the enemy were
 216. " still but in small numbers around their camp, whilst
 " all was in profound silence, and the night would
 " cover their retreat. It was in vain for him to re-
 " monstrate to them, that before day appeared, they
 " would arrive in the cities of the allies, where they
 " would have nothing farther to fear; and to ani-
 " mate them, he mentioned several examples of the
 " like nature. Nothing was capable of moving you.
 " He shewed you a way, that led to safety with glory;
 " and your courage failed you, even when the ques-
 " tion was to save your lives. You had before your
 " eyes fifty thousand of your citizens and allies, that
 " lay dead upon the field of battle: and so many ex-
 " amples of courage could not inspire you with any.
 " And you were not only contented with being abject
 " and cowardly; you not only refused to follow him
 " that gave you good counsel, but you endeavoured
 " to keep him with you, to stop himself, if at the
 " head of a body of soldiers more valiant than you,
 " he had not opened his way through cowards and
 " traitors sword in hand. Sempronius was obliged to
 " force a passage through his own citizens, before he
 " forced one through the enemy. And should Rome
 " regret the loss of such soldiers? Of seven thousand
 " men, only six hundred had the valour to return free,
 " and with their arms in their hands, into their coun-
 " try, whilst forty thousand of the enemy could nei-
 " ther deter, nor keep them back. With how much
 " more ease would two whole legions have executed
 " the same enterprize? To conclude, I shall reduce
 " my opinion to these few words. I believe you
 " ought no more to ransom these men, than to give
 " up those to Hannibal, who opened themselves a
 " way through the enemy with the greatest valour, and
 " gloriously restored themselves to their country."

This speech made a great impression. The Sena-
 tors, moved with Manlius's discourse, had less regard
 to the ties of blood, in which they stood with most
 of

of the prisoners, than to the fatal consequences, that an indulgence, so little conformable to the severity of their ancestors, might have. Besides which, they did not believe it proper to be at an expence, that would at the same time exhaust the treasury of the Commonwealth, and furnish Hannibal with a supply, of which it was well known he was in extreme want. It was therefore resolved not to ransom the prisoners. This sad answer, and the loss of so many citizens, added to those who had been killed in the battle, excited new sorrow in every heart; and the whole multitude, that had remained at the entrance of the Senate-house, followed the deputies to the gates of the city with tears in their eyes, and making lamentable moan.

One can scarce refrain from taxing the inflexible rigour, with which the Senate rejected the request of seven thousand prisoners, whose case seemed to plead much in their favour, with excessive and inhuman cruelty. If the maxim of conquering or dying, and never to give up their arms to the enemy, had been a maxim inviolably observed by the Romans, we should be less surprized. But that was not the case; we have seen, on more than one occasion, the prisoners of war ransomed by the Romans. Indeed it might be that reason itself that induced them now to shew themselves so firm and inexorable, in order to give new vigour, by a signal example, to that maxim, which they considered with reason as the strongest support of the State, and which could alone render them invincible, by rendering them formidable and superior to all their enemies. Accordingly Polybius observes, and his remark well confirms what we say here, that one of the reasons which had induced Hannibal to propose the ransom of the prisoners, was to deprive them, if possible, of that ardour of courage, that made them so terrible, and that determinate resolution of dying rather than to give up their arms; by shewing them in this ransom an assured resource, even though they should surrender to the enemy. And he adds, that it was the knowledge the Senators had of this design of Hannibal, which rendered them inexorable.

A.R. 536.
 Ant. C.
 216.
 Liv. xxii.
 61.

One of the deputies returned to his house, believing he had acquitted himself of his oath by going back fraudulently into Hannibal's camp, under the pretence of having forgot something. But so mean a fraud, that dishonoured the Roman name, was no sooner known, than it was told in full Senate. It was the opinion of every body, that he should be seized, put under a guard, and carried back to Hannibal's camp.

Ibid.

After the battle of Cannæ ensued the revolt of Italy. The allies of the Romans, whose fidelity had been unalterable till that day, began to stagger, without any other reason than the fear of seeing the Commonwealth destroyed. The names of the States that quitted the party of the Romans, but at different time, some sooner, some later, were as follows. The Campanians, Atellani, Calatini, Hirpini, part of Apulia, all the Samnites except the Pentri, the Bruttii, and Lucanians; to whom may be added the Sallentini, all the coast inhabited by the Greeks, the Metapontini, the Tarentines, the Crotonienses, the Locri, and all the Cisalpine Gauls.

Plut. in
 Fab. 184.

We have here the effect of an injudicious ill-timed battle, and what Fabius had foreseen: Whereas before it Hannibal had neither city, magazine, nor port in Italy in his possession, and could not subsist his troops without great difficulties; and that only from day to day, by what he could plunder and carry off, having no safe convoys, nor any provisions for this war, and running here and there with his army, one might almost say, like a great body of robbers: instead of this unhappy condition, he saw himself on a sudden master of a great part of Italy, with provisions and forage in vast abundance. The value of a wise and experienced General was then known. What before the battle was called slowness and timidity in Fabius, soon after seemed, not the effect of human reason, but, says Plutarch, of a divine genius, that had foreseen at such a distance things that were to happen, and which seemed scarce credible to those who made so fatal an experience of them.

But

But what is astonishing here, is, that so many disgraces and losses, which happened one upon another, could not oblige the Romans to hear the least word of peace. And lastly, what exceeds every thing that can be imagined of this kind, is the glorious reception, which they made Varro at his return, after a defeat of which himself had been the principal and almost sole cause. When it was known, that he was upon the point of entering Rome, all the orders of the State went out to meet him, and return him thanks for not having despaired of the Commonwealth; and that, in so great a misfortune, he had not abandoned it; but was come to resume the helm, and to put himself at the head of the laws, and of his citizens, as not judging them yet without resource. There is no punishment, of which a General, who had sustained a like loss, or even a much less, would not have been thought worthy at Carthage.

This singular stroke gives us great room for admiring the wisdom of the Roman Senate. What a difference there is between Rome and Carthage in respect to the spirit and principles of government! Is it really good policy to make Generals accountable for their success? May they not happen to be unfortunate without any fault of theirs? But, though it should be through their fault, that a battle, a war, should have been unsuccessful, does that fault (I except treason) deserve to be punished with death? If it is ignorance in the art of war, or even cowardice, ought not the State or Prince that chose them, to impute that thought to themselves? Besides which, are there not punishments more conformable to humanity, and at the same time more useful to the State? Amongst the Romans a fine, a slight disgrace, a kind of voluntary exile, seemed sufficient punishments for their Generals; and even those were used but very rarely. They chose rather to give them time and occasion to amend their faults by noble exploits, which entirely obliterated the shame and remembrance of them, and preserved Generals for the Commonwealth, that might become capable

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Ant. C.

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Plut. in

Fab. 184.

Liv. xxii.

61.

Paulum

puduit,

Varro non

desperavit.

Flor.

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capable of rendering it service. The barbarous custom, still actually observed amongst the Turks, with whom we see, in a very short space of time, three or four Grand Vizirs leave their heads upon the scaffold, or perish by the fatal bow-string; is that custom, I say, a proper means for inspiring those with courage and zeal, who are appointed to command? But, to return to the Romans, and the conduct they observed in respect to Varro, if they had condemned him to die, as he seemed to deserve, after having occasioned more than fifty thousand citizens to perish, how capable would such a decree have been of augmenting the consternation and despair of the publick, which rose but too high already: whereas the favourable reception which they gave the Consul, intimated to the people, that the evil was not without remedy, and made them believe, that the Senate had certain and present resources.

The conduct of the Senate in respect to Varro was always equally sustained. He was continued in command several years; but with the precaution of only giving him commissions of little importance: so that his person was always honoured, but without exposing the State to the consequences of his incapacity.

VARIANT EMILIUS, Consul.

capable of rendering it service. The barbarous custom, that usually prevailed among the Turks, with whom we met, in a very short space of time, three or four great Vases, large as a head, upon the shield, or breast of the fatal bow-bowling, is that custom, I say, a single person for inspiring those with courage and zeal, who are appointed to command. But to return to the Romans, and the conduct they observed in respect to him, if they had condemned him to die, so he seemed to deserve, after having occasioned more than five thousand deaths to his people, how capable would such a death have been of augmenting the confidence and respect of the people, which alone but too highly merits, where the rewards of reputation which they give for military services to the people, that the city was not without remedy, and made their riches, that the Senate and certain and

the conduct of the Senate in respect to him was always approved. He was punished in some manner, and the punishment of only giving him a commission of twelve months, to that his person was always honored, and without exposing the State to the consequences of his insubordination.



J. H. Gravelot inv. del. et Sculp.

HANNIBAL after the Battle of CANNÆ.

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T H E

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK THE FIFTEENTH.

S E C T. I.

Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ, marches into Campania. He goes towards Capua, a city abandoned to luxury and voluptuousness. Pacuvius Calavius subjects the Senate of that city to the People, and thereby to himself. Causes of the luxury and debauchery of the Campanians. They send Ambassadors to Varro, who discovers to them too much in respect to the loss sustained at Cannæ. The same Ambassadors are sent to Hannibal. Conditions of the alliance of the Campanians with Hannibal. He is received into Capua. Perolla proposes to his father to kill Hannibal. Calavius dissuades him from so horrid a design. Hannibal's magnificent promises to the Campanians. He demands Decius Magius to be delivered up to him : which is complied with immediately. Magius reproaches the Campanians with their cowardice. He is driven by a storm into Egypt. Fabius Pictor brings back the answer of the oracle of Delphi to Rome.

HAnnibal, after having conquered the Romans at Cannæ, and taken and plundered their camp, marched immediately from Apulia into Samnium, and entered the country of the Hirpini, where the city of

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216.
Liv. xxiii.
1.
Compsa

A. R. 536. * Compsa was delivered up to him. After having left
 Ant. C. all his plunder and baggage there, he divided his army
 216. into two bodies. Mago, with the one, had orders to receive such of the cities, as surrendered of themselves, into the alliance of the Carthaginians, or to reduce those which should make resistance. Hannibal with the other, crossed all Campania, advanced towards the † lower sea, with design to make himself master of Naples (*Neapolis*) in order to have a maritime city at his disposal, which would put him in a condition to receive the aids Carthage should send him. But having considered more narrowly the height and solidity of the walls of that city, he saw, that he should get nothing by attacking it, and desisted from that enterprize.

Liv. xxiii. From thence he turned his march towards Capua.
 2. The inhabitants of that city were plunged in luxury and voluptuousness. These were the fruits of a long peace, and continual prosperity, during a great number of years. But, in this general corruption, the greatest evil of Capua was the abuse, which the People made of their liberty. Pacuvius Calavius had found the secret of making the Senate dependant on the People, and thereby of subjecting it to himself. This popular citizen, though noble, had by bad methods acquired infinite credit at Capua. The year that the Romans were defeated at Thrasymenus, he
 Ibid. 2—4. was principal magistrate of that city. He was persuaded, that the People, who had long hated the Senate, and who are always fond of innovations, would take occasion from this defeat to proceed to great extremities; as to assassinate the Senate, and give up Capua to Hannibal, in case that General approached with his victorious army. Pacuvius was a bad man; but not of the number of those abandoned wretches of the first class, to whom the most enormous crimes are easy. He was very well pleased to lord it in his coun-

* Now Conza in the Ulterior Principality.

† Mare Inferum, that washes the coasts of Campania.

try, but he did not desire, that it should be utterly ruined; and he knew, that a State is absolutely undone, when a public council subsists no longer in it. He therefore conceived a stratagem, from which he was in hopes of deriving two advantages at once, viz. to save the Senate, and to subject it entirely to the People and himself.

In order to this, he assembled the Senators, and represented to them, “that they were threatened with extreme danger. That the populace did not intend to revolt in order to destroy the Senate afterwards, but that their design was to rid themselves of the Senate, by killing all, of whom it was composed, in order to give themselves afterwards to Hannibal. That he knew a means to preserve them from that danger: but that it was previously necessary, that forgetting all differences, which had happened concerning the government of the State, they should abandon themselves entirely to his faith and honour.” And as soon as all the Senators, in their terror, had assured him, that they would implicitly follow his counsels: “I shall shut you up in the Senate-house, said he to them, and pretending to approve a design, which it would be in vain for me to oppose, and to enter myself into the conspiracy, I shall assuredly find means to save your lives. You may rely upon my word. I am ready to give all the security for this that you shall demand.” When they seemed to confide in his promises, he caused the hall, where they were assembled, to be shut, and placed guards in the porch to prevent any body from coming in or going out.

Then having assembled the People: “You have long desired,” said he, “to punish the crimes of the wicked and detestable Senators. You may now satiate your revenge. I have them shut up in the Senate-house; and am going to give them up to your daggers, single and unarmed. Follow therefore the impulses of a just indignation. But remember however, that you ought to prefer your own interests to the pleasure of gratifying your re-
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“ sentiment. For in a word, if I am not mistaken, it
“ is only against these Senators you are incensed ; and
“ your design is not, that Capua should absolutely
“ remain without any public council. You must
“ either give yourselves a King, which you have in
“ horror ; or you must have a Senate, which is the
“ only council of a free State. In order to this you
“ must, by the same act, do two things equally im-
“ portant : which is, to destroy the old Senate, and
“ chuse a new one. The Senators are going to ap-
“ pear before you one after another. I shall ask you
“ what you resolve in respect to each of them. The
“ sentence you pronounce, shall be followed with the
“ execution. But, before each criminal is punished,
“ you will take care to nominate an honest man and a
“ good citizen to supply his place.”

After this discourse, he sat down, caused all the names of the Senators to be thrown into an urn, and ordered, that the person whose name was first drawn should be brought out of the Senate. As soon as his name was heard, all cried out, that he was a vile wretch, and merited nothing but the gibbet. “ I see
“ plainly,” said Pacuvius, “ that you condemn this
“ man. Before you punish him, substitute another
“ in his room who is a man of probity, and capable
“ of being a good Senator.” All the citizens continued silent at first, for want of knowing a man of worth. At length, one of the most impudent of the multitude, having ventured to name one, they set up a cry on all sides ; some saying, they did not know him, others reproaching him with the meanness of his birth, the low trade he followed, or the irregularity of his manners. Still greater difficulties were found in respect to the second and third, that they thought fit to propose ; so that the impossibility of finding a better man than him they had at first condemned, obliged all the citizens to return to their houses, declaring of all evils the most supportable to be That, to which People are accustomed ; and they left the Senators in peace.

Pacu-

Pacuvius having thus saved the lives of the Senators, he subjected them, by this pretended service, to his power, much more than to that of the People. From thenceforth he exercised an absolute sway in the city, without being obliged to use violence, every body voluntarily submitting to him. The Senators, forgetting their rank, and even their liberty, flattered the people, and paid an abject court to them. They invited the meanest of the citizens to their tables, and when any cause was to be tried, in order to gain the favour of the multitude, they declared highly for him, who had them on his side. In a word, in all the deliberations of the Senate the decision was just as the People approved.

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The inhabitants of Capua were in all times much addicted to luxury and voluptuousness. This disposition, which was in a manner natural to them, was kept up and confirmed by the fertility of their country, and the neighbourhood of the sea; two sources which supplied them not only with what was necessary to life, but also with all that could gratify the senses, and render them effeminate and cowardly. But since this last event, the abject complacency of the Great, and the excessive licentiousness of the multitude, occasioned, that nobody set any bounds to their expences, or gave any check to their passions. The Laws, Magistrates, and Senate, were derided with impunity. And to crown all their evils, after the battle of Cannæ, the respect they had for the Roman people, which had alone been capable of keeping them within some bounds of moderation, was changed into contempt. The sole consideration, that prevented them from quitting their ancient allies directly, in order to go over to the Carthaginians, was, that many of the most powerful families of Capua had allied themselves by marriage to those of Rome; and the Romans had chosen out of the troops, supplied them by the Campanians for the war, three hundred horse of the principal families of Capua, and had sent them

Liv. xxiii.

A. R. 536. to Sicily, and distributed them in the garrisons of that
 Ant. C. province.
 216.

It was not without abundance of difficulty, that the fathers and nearest relations of those horse prevailed, that Ambassadors should be sent to the Roman Consul upon the subject of the defeat at Cannæ. They found him still at Venusia with a small number of soldiers half-armed, in a condition highly capable of exciting compassion in good and faithful allies, but which could only inspire contempt in a people so proud, and so little sensible to faith and honour, as those of Capua. The Consul's discourse served only to increase that disposition. For, after the deputies had declared, that the People of Capua shared as much as possible in the misfortune that had happened to the Romans, and had offered him in the name of their State all the aids they might have occasion for; Varro, as if he expressly designed to make the Roman people contemptible to allies, whose character he ought to have known, "talked to the deputies of the battle of Cannæ * as of a blow, that left Rome neither strength, resource, hope, or any means of rising up of herself from so deplorable a state. That legions and cavalry, arms and ensigns, men and horses, money and provisions, were all wanting. That if the Campanians desired to shew themselves good and faithful allies, they ought to think, not of aiding the Romans in the war, but of almost entirely sustaining it in their stead. That as for the rest, it was as much for their interest as that of the Romans, not to suffer Hannibal to prevail over them, unless they would make a people equally perfidious and cruel their masters, become the conquest of the Numidians and Moors, and receive laws from Africa and Carthage."

* Nihil, ne quod suppleremus quidem, nobis reliquit fortuna. Legiones equitatus, arma, signa, equi virique, pecunia, commeatus, aut in acie, aut binis postero die amissis castris, ponerunt. Itaque non juvetis nos in bello oportet, sed penè bellum pro nobis suscipiatis.
 Liv.

The deputies, after this discourse, withdrew, expressing some outward concern, but inwardly transported to see Rome reduced to so deplorable a condition. Vibius Virius, one of them, said to his colleague on their return, "That the time was come, when the Campanians could not only recover the lands unjustly taken from them by the Romans, but also acquire the empire of all Italy. That they could make an alliance with Hannibal upon whatever conditions they pleased; and that after that General had terminated the war, and should return victorious into Africa with his army, it was not to be doubted, but he would leave them masters of Italy." They were all of Virius's opinion. When they returned to Capua, and had given an account of their embassy, there was nobody, that did not consider the Roman Commonwealth as absolutely ruined. The People, and the greatest part of the Senators, would have immediately abandoned the Romans, if the seniors, by the authority they still retained, had not deferred that change for some days. But at length numbers prevailed over the sounder part, and it was concluded, that the same deputies should be sent to Hannibal.

The Ambassadors made an alliance with him upon the following conditions. "That neither the generals nor magistrates of Carthage should have any right over the citizens of Capua. That they should not be obliged to bear arms against their will, to hold any office, or pay any tribute. That Capua should be governed according to its own laws, and by its own magistrates as before the treaty. That Hannibal should put into the hands of the Campanians three hundred prisoners, to be chosen by themselves, whom they should exchange for the three hundred Campanians in the Roman service in Sicily." Besides these conditions, which were expressed in the treaty, the people of Capua proceeded to a cruelty against the Romans, which Hannibal had not required. They seized all the Roman officers, and other citizens, who were in their power, either at Capua for the affairs of

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Liv. xxiii.
7.

A. R. 536. the war, or for what concerned themselves in their
 Ant. C. private capacities; and having shut them up in baths
 216, under pretence of securing their persons, they put
 them to death with unheard-of cruelty, by stifling
 them with the steam of these places, which deprived
 them of respiration.

Liv. xxiii. Decius Magius had opposed this act of inhumanity;
 7. 9. as well as the sending of the embassy to Hannibal to
 the utmost: * He was a man, that wanted nothing to
 be considered in the highest degree by his country,
 but to have to do with a people in their senses. When
 he saw, that Hannibal sent a garrison into Capua, he
 represented to them in the most lively colours, the
 deplorable condition, to which the Tarentines were
 formerly reduced, and the miseries they suffered, in
 consequence of having given themselves an imperious
 and violent master in the person of Pyrrhus, and of
 having received a garrison he sent into their city. That
 of Hannibal having been admitted notwithstanding
 his remonstrances, he however did not desist. He
 exhorted them in the strongest terms, either to drive
 it out of their city, or if they desired, by a glorious
 and memorable action to expiate the crime they had
 committed, in betraying their antient allies in so
 shameful a manner, to put Hannibal's soldiers to the
 sword, and at that price to retrieve the amity of the
 Roman People. As Magius talked publicly in this
 manner, Hannibal was soon informed of it. He im-
 mediately sent him orders to come to him. Magius
 replied haughtily, that he would not; and that Han-
 nibal had no authority over the inhabitants of Capua.
 That General then in a rage ordered, that he should
 be laid in chains, and dragged by force to his camp.
 But, after some moments reflexion, apprehending,
 that so violent a treatment might irritate the Campa-
 nians, and excite some tumult in the city, he sent a
 courier to Marius Blaius Prætor of the Campanians,

* Vir, cui ad summam auctoritatem nihil præter sanam civium men-
 tem desuit.

to inform him, that he would come himself to Capua the next day; and accordingly he set out, as he had said, with a small number of soldiers.

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The Prætor having assembled the citizens, ordered them to go in a body with their wives and children to meet Hannibal. All the world complied in consequence, not only out of obedience, but curiosity and desire to see a General, who had made himself famous by so many victories. Magius did not quit the city: But, that it might not be said, that fear prevented him from appearing, as having something to reproach himself with, he did not keep within doors. He walked in the public place with his son and a small number of his friends; whilst all the city was in motion to receive Hannibal, and to have the pleasure of considering the person of so great a man.

Who would have expected in a city abandoned to luxury and debauch, and given up to slavery, to have found a citizen of so generous a zeal for the safety and liberty of his country, and of a courage so intrepid and so much superior to all fear. Perhaps he carried it too far. This cool behaviour and tranquillity of a man, threatened with certain danger; who affects to walk in the public place with his friends, favours much of bravado and insult. Magius, through an immoderate desire of glory, seemed to provoke death. *Famam Fatumque provocabat.*

Tacit.

Hannibal had no sooner entered the city, than he demanded that the Senate should be assembled.

He was desired not to enter upon any serious affair then, and to permit, that the first day he honoured them with his presence, and which the city of Capua considered as a festival, might be passed in rejoicing. Notwithstanding his natural ardor, he did himself violence; and not to refuse the Campanians the first favour they asked of him, he passed the greatest part of the day in visiting what there was of curious and remarkable in the city.

He lodged in the house of Stenius and Pacuvius, two brothers of the greatest distinction in Capua for

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their birth and riches. Pacuvius Calavius, the head of the faction that had engaged Capua in Hannibal's interests, carried his son Perolla thither, after having forced him with difficulty out of the company of Decius Magius, in conjunction with whom he had always strongly supported the party of the Romans against the Carthaginians; neither the example of the greatest part of his countrymen, nor paternal authority, being able to make him change his opinion. Hannibal was informed of the conduct and inclinations of this young man; nor did his father endeavour to justify him; but by his prayers he obtained pardon for him. Hannibal granted it with so good a grace, that he even invited him and his father to an entertainment given him by Minius, to which none else were admitted except Jubellius Taurea, a man famous for his bravery in war.

They * sat down to table before † the usual time; and, which then seemed to be a kind of debauch, they began to eat a great while before night. This feast was magnificent, and spoke neither the manners and frugality of Carthage, nor the austerity of military discipline. The entertainment was such an one, as we may suppose it, in the most opulent and voluptuous house of a city devoted to luxury and pleasure. All the guests appeared in the greatest gaiety. Only Perolla continued to wear a countenance sad enough; whilst neither the invitations of the masters of the house, nor of Hannibal himself, could induce him to have any share in the common joy. He excused himself on account of his health; and his father added, that it was no wonder he appeared disordered and in confusion in the presence of Hannibal.

Towards the evening, his father having quitted the room of the feast, he followed him into a garden be-

* Cœperunt epulari de die: & convivium non ex more Punico, aut militari disciplina esse, sed, ut in civitate atque etiam domo luxuriosa, omnibus voluptatum illecebris instructum. Liv.

† I shall relate the custom of the ancients in respect to meals in the sequel.

hind the house. And there taking him aside: "Fa-
 " ther," said he, " I am going to inform you of a
 " design, which will not only obtain us pardon from
 " the Romans for our revolt, but will place us in
 " higher credit and consideration with them than ever."
 Pacuvius, in great surprize, asked him what it was?
 Upon which the young man opening his robe, shewed
 him a dagger which hung at his sash. " I am going,"
 " said he, " to seal our alliance with the Romans in
 " the blood of Hannibal. I thought proper to apprise
 " you of it first, that, if you did not think fit to be a
 " witness of the action, you might withdraw." Ca-
 lavius, in as much terror, as if he had seen the blood
 of Hannibal shed, said: * " Son, I beg and conjure
 " you by all the most sacred rights of nature and blood
 " that bind fathers to sons, not to commit the most enor-
 " mous of all crimes in my sight, and not expose your-
 " self to the most dreadful of all punishments. It is
 " but few moments, since we engaged ourselves by the
 " most solemn oaths, that we gave Hannibal the most
 " sacred marks of an inviolable amity, calling all the
 " Gods to witness to our faith: and shall we, who
 " have but this instant quitted his conversation, arm
 " the same hands against him, which we gave him as
 " pledges of our fidelity. That table, where the Gods,
 " that avenge the violated rights of hospitality, pre-

* Per ego te, inquit, fili, quæcumque jura liberos jungunt paren-
 tibus; precor quæsoque, ne ante oculos patris facere & pati omnia ne-
 ganda velis. Pauca horæ sunt, intra quas jurantes per quicquid deo-
 rum est, dextræ dextras jungentes, fidem obstrinximus, ut sacratas
 fido manus, digressi ab colloquio, extemplo in eum armaremus? Sur-
 gis ab hospitali mensa, ad quam tertius Campanorum adhibitus ab
 Annibale es, ut eam ipsam mensam cruentares hospitis sanguine? An-
 nibalem pater filio meo potui placare, filium Annibali non possum?
 Sed sit nihil sancti, non fides, non religio, non pietas: audeantur in-
 ganda, si non perniciem nobis cum scelere afferunt. Unus aggressu-
 rus es Annibalem. Quid illa turba tot liberorum servorumque? quid
 in unum intenti omnium oculi? quid tot dextræ? torpescent — ne in
 amentia illa? Vultum ipsius Annibalis, quem armati exercitus sustinere
 nequeunt, quem horret populus Romanus, tu sustinebis? Et, alia auxi-
 lia desint, me ipsum ferire, corpus meum opponentem pro corpore
 Annibalis, sustinebis? Atqui per meum pectus petendus ille tibi
 transigendusque est. Deterreri hic sine te potius, quam illic vinci.
 Valeant preces apud te meæ, sicut pro te hodie valuerunt. Liv.

“ fide ;

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“ side ; to which you were admitted by a favour which
 “ only two Campanians share with you ; do you quit
 “ that sacred table only to stain it a moment after with
 “ the blood of your guest ? Ah ! after having obtained
 “ Hannibal’s pardon for my son, were it possible that
 “ I could not obtain my son’s for Hannibal ? But let
 “ us have no regard to any thing, of most sacred
 “ amongst men : let us violate at once faith, religion,
 “ piety : let us be guilty of the blackest action in na-
 “ ture ; if our destruction be not inevitably annexed
 “ to the crime. Do you, single and alone, pre-
 “ tend to attack Hannibal ? But at the same time,
 “ what will become of all those freemen and slaves,
 “ that surround him ? All those eyes, which are in-
 “ cessantly fixed upon him, to watch for his preserva-
 “ tion ; will they be shut on a sudden ? Can you
 “ hope, that so many hands armed for his defence,
 “ will remain benumbed and motionless, the moment
 “ you proceed to that excess of madness ? Can you
 “ sustain the look of Hannibal, that formidable look,
 “ which whole armies cannot sustain, and which makes
 “ the Roman People tremble ? And should all other
 “ aid be wanting, would you have the courage to strike
 “ through me, when I cover him with my body, and
 “ place myself between him and you ? For I assure
 “ you, you must strike through me to reach him. Be
 “ therefore dissuaded this instant, rather than resolve
 “ to perish in so ill-concerted an enterprize : and let
 “ my entreaties prevail with you, after having been
 “ this day so prevalent in your behalf.”

So moving a discourse softened Perolla into tears. His father seeing him moved, embraced him tenderly, and repeated his instances and entreaties, till he had made him promise to quit his dagger, and renounce his design. “ I am reduced then,” said Perolla, “ to
 “ substitute my father to my country, in acquitting
 “ myself to the one of the piety I owe the other. But
 “ I cannot help lamenting you, father, when I con-
 “ sider that you will have the reproach to undergo of
 “ having three times betrayed your country. The
 “ first,

“ first, when you caused the treaty with Hannibal to
 “ be concluded : the second, when you broke the al-
 “ liance with the Romans : and the third, this day,
 “ when you have hindered me from reconciling Ca-
 “ pua with Rome. Dear and unhappy country, re-
 “ ceive this steel, with which I armed myself for thy
 “ defence, since a father wrests it out of my hands.”

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On saying these words he threw the dagger over the garden-wall, and returned into the hall of the feast, to avoid giving suspicion.

We cannot but be struck at first with some admiration for the bold design of Perolla : but if we consider, that war has its laws as well as peace, the design of an assassination will undoubtedly be condemned, which becomes still the more criminal from the circumstances of treachery with which it is attended. If Decius Magius was the author of it, which seems probable enough, he can be considered no longer as innocent, nor believed not to deserve the treatment he is going to suffer.

Accordingly, the next day after Hannibal's entrance, the Senate of Capua being assembled, the Carthaginian General made a very gracious speech to it, full of professions of amity and good-will. He thanked them for having preferred the alliance of the Carthaginians to that of the Romans. And amongst the magnificent promises he made them, he assured them, “ that in a short time Capua should be the Capital of all Italy, and that the Romans themselves, as well as the other States, should come thither to receive the law. That however, there was a man amongst them, that ought not to have any share in the amity of the Carthaginians, nor be included in the treaty lately made with them ; that he even did not deserve the name of Campanian, as he was the only one that opposed the opinion of his country : this was Decius Magius. That he demanded him to be delivered up, and that in his presence the Senate, after having taken cognizance of his crime, should pass sentence in respect to him.” There was not a single Senator that dared reply, though

A. R. 536. though most of them thought, that Magius did not
 Ant. C. deserve so rigorous a treatment, and that Hannibal,
 216. in the very beginning, gave a mortal blow to their liberty.

The principal magistrate immediately quitted the Senate, and having placed himself upon his tribunal, caused Magius to be brought before him, and ordered him to defend himself. The latter, without departing in the least from his haughtiness, refused to answer; alledging that he was dispensed from doing so by the first article of the very treaty made with Hannibal. His reasons could not fail of being rejected. He was put in chains, and dragged away through the streets of the city, in order to be conducted to the camp of the Carthaginians. As long as he had liberty to speak, he continued to address discourse, full of force and boldness, to the multitude that surrounded him. "Behold," said he, "the liberty you imagined to procure for yourselves. In the public Forum, in broad day, before your eyes, a man of the principal rank in your city is laden with chains, and carried to execution. What greater violence could be exercised in Capua, if it had been taken by force of arms? Go meet Hannibal, adorn the city. Make the day of his entrance a day of rejoicing, a festival, to see him triumph over one of your citizens." It was apprehended that these reproaches might make some impression upon the People; so that his head was muffled up in such a manner, that he could not make himself heard. Hannibal was afraid to put him to death in his camp, lest it should excite some tumult in the city. He caused him to be put on board a ship, which was to carry him to Carthage. But a tempest drove him upon the coasts of Cyrene, which was subject to the King of Egypt; who was then Ptolomy Philopater. Magius found an asylum in the states of that prince, and continued there in safety under his protection.

Liv. xxiii. In the mean time Q. Fabius Prætor returned to
 11. Rome from Delphi, where he had been sent Ambassador,

sador, and brought back the answer of the oracle, which ordered the Romans to make certain sacrifices, promised them success for the time to come, and recommended to them to observe great moderation in their prosperity.

S E C T. II.

Mago carries the news of the victory at Cannæ, to Carthage. Himilco of Hannibal's faction, insults Hanno. The latter answers him. The Senate decrees Hannibal aids. The Dictator, after having provided for every thing, sets out from Rome. Hannibal makes vain attempts upon Naples and Nola. Marcellus by his engaging behaviour brings over L. Bantius of Nola. Hannibal is beat by Marcellus before the walls of that city. Citizens of Nola punished for their treason. Hannibal attacks Casilinum. Winter quarters at Capua fatal to Hannibal's army, Casilinum, forced by extremity of famine, surrenders to Hannibal. Fidelity of the Petellini to the Romans. State of affairs in Sicily and Sardinia. Dictator created to appoint new Senators in the room of the dead ones. New Consuls and new Prætors created. L. Posthumius, Consul elect, perishes in Gaul with his whole army. This news occasions a great mourning at Rome. The Senate regulates the distribution of the troops which are to serve this year. Affairs of Spain little favourable for the Carthaginians. Asdrubal receives orders to march to Italy. Himilco arrives in Spain to succeed him. The two Scipios, to prevent Asdrubal's departure, give him battle. His army is defeated.

WHILST what we have just been saying passed at Rome and in Italy, Mago, son of Amilcar Barca, was gone to Carthage to carry the news of the victory of Cannæ. He did not set out immediately after this action. Before he embarked, he stopped during some days in the country of the Bruttii by his brother's order, to receive the cities, that abandoned

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.
Liv. xxiii.
12, 13.

Hod.
Abruzzo.

the

A. R. 536. the party of the Romans, into the alliance of the
 Ant. C. Carthaginians. When he was admitted to audience
 216. in the Senate of Carthage, he gave an account of all his brother had done in Italy. He said, "that Hannibal had fought against seven Generals, of whom five were Consuls, and the two others, one a Dictator, and the other General of the Horse. That in the several battles he had fought with six Consular armies, he had killed above two hundred thousand of the enemy, and had taken more than fifty thousand prisoners. That of five Consuls with whom he had to deal, he had killed two in the field of battle; that a third had been dangerously wounded; and that of the two others who had retired without wounds, the last, after the loss of his whole army, had escaped with difficulty at the head of only fifty men. That the General of the horse had been defeated and put to flight. That the Dictator was considered with admiration, and passed for a singularly great General, only because he continually avoided coming to a battle. That the people of Bruttium and Apulia, with part of the Samnites and Lucanians, were come over to the side of the Carthaginians. That Capua, the capital not only of Campania but all Italy, since the defeat of the Romans at Cannæ, had surrendered of itself to Hannibal. That it was highly proper to return such thanks to the Gods as might bear some proportion to the victories gained over the enemy." Afterwards, to prove by effects the great successes he had related in his discourse, he caused a bushel of gold rings to be emptied in the porch of the Senate, which had been taken off the fingers of those who had fallen in the battle of Cannæ. He added, in order to give a greater idea of the loss which the Romans had sustained in that battle, that none but Knights and persons of distinction had a right to wear them. The result of his harangue was, "That the more hopes they had of speedily terminating the war to their advantage, the greater efforts they ought to make for sending all kinds of supplies to Hannibal. That he was making
 war

war far from Carthage in the midst of an enemy's country; that the consumption of provisions and money rose very high; and that so many battles could not destroy the armies of the enemy, without weakening that of the Victor. That it was therefore necessary to send recruits, provisions, and money to an army, who had rendered the Carthaginian State such great services."

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

As this discourse of Mago's had diffused joy throughout the whole assembly, Himilco, of the Barcinian faction, thought this an happy occasion for insulting Hanno, who was of the opposite faction. "Well, Hanno," said he, "what do you think of all this? Are you still sorry for our having undertaken this war with the Romans? Are you still for having Hannibal delivered up to them? Speak: do you object to our returning thanks to the Gods; as has been proposed? Let us hear a Roman Senator in the midst of the Senate of Carthage."

Hanno, with a grave air and tone, replied to this discourse of Himilco in these terms. "I should have been silent this day, to avoid interrupting a joy to which I see every body abandon themselves, by a discourse, which perhaps will not be to your liking. But, by answering nothing to a Senator, that interrogates me, I should leave room to suspect me either of an ill-judged mistaken pride, or of a servile baseness: which would argue I had forgot, either that I speak to a free man, or that I am so myself. I therefore answer Himilco, that I continue to be satisfied with this war, and that I shall never cease to declare myself against your invincible General; till I see the war terminated by a treaty with sup- portable conditions; and I shall always regret the antient peace, till a new one be made. The advantages which Mago has been displaying, give at this instant great pleasure to Himilco, and the other partisans of Hannibal: they may have the same effect upon me also, and I am very much inclined to rejoice as well as they; because these

" great

A. R. 536. " great successes, if we take the advantage of them,
 Ant. C. " may procure more favourable conditions of peace.
 216. " But if we let so happy an occasion slip, in which
 " we may seem rather to give peace than receive it,
 " I greatly apprehend, that this joy, which now tran-
 " sports you, will soon forsake us, and be reduced
 " to nothing. For after all, what are these so much
 " boasted successes, and what do they determine? I
 " have cut in pieces armies of the enemy; send me
 " troops: what then would you ask, if you had been
 " defeated? I have taken two of the enemy's camps,
 " probably full of spoils and all kinds of provisions;
 " send me provisions and money: what else would
 " you ask, if you had lost your own camp? But that
 " I may not be the only person brought to the bar,
 " (for I think I have as much right to interrogate
 " Himilco, as he me) let him, or Mago, answer me:
 " The defeat at Cannæ has destroyed the power of
 " the Romans, and all Italy has taken arms against
 " them. Tell me then, whether there be one of
 " all the Latine States, that has come over to your
 " side; and whether, of all the citizens, that compose
 " the thirty-five tribes of Rome, there be a single
 " man that has deserted?" Mago having replied,
 that neither the one nor the other had happened:
 " We have then," replied he, " still a great number
 " of enemies upon our hands. Tell us at least, what
 " the disposition is of the enemies that remain, and
 " whether they retain any hope." Mago answering
 that he knew nothing of the matter. " There is no-
 " thing so easy to be known," resumed Hanno.
 " Have you heard that to ask peace has been spoke
 " of in the Roman Senate? Have the Romans sent
 " Embassadors to Hannibal to treat about it?" Mago
 having answered in the negative: " The war there-
 " fore still subsists as entirely as it did the first day,
 " that Hannibal entered Italy," replied the other.
 " There are many amongst us who remember the vi-
 " cissitudes of the first war. Our affairs were never
 " in a better condition either by land or sea, than
 " they

“ they were before the Consulship of C. Lutatius and A. R. 536.
 “ Aulus Postumius. It was in that very Consulship, Ant. C.
 “ that we were defeated at the islands Ægates. If 216.
 “ our fortune should now happen to change (may the
 “ Gods avert the omen) is there any reason to hope,
 “ that we shall have peace, when overcome, whilst
 “ no body offers it at present when we are victorious?
 “ For my part; if the question were, either to give
 “ the Romans peace, or to receive it from them, I
 “ know what I should say. But if you consult me
 “ concerning Mago’s proposals, this is my opinion : ei-
 “ ther Hannibal is victorious, and in that case is in no
 “ need of aid ; or he deceives us with vain hopes,
 “ and then he deserves still less to be regarded.”

Hanno’s discourse did not make much impression upon the Senate. They were too much engrossed by the joy which victory inspires, to hearken to any thing that might change it. Besides which, the perpetual enmity between Hannibal’s house and his, made them suspect him : and they were also convinced, that by exerting themselves a little, they should presently see the war terminate to their advantage. They therefore unanimously resolved, that a reinforcement of four thousand Numidians, forty elephants, and a great sum of money, should be sent to Hannibal. At the same time a general officer was dispatched to raise twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse in Spain, to recruit the army in that province, and that in Italy. But these orders were executed very slowly and with great indolence, as happens often enough in times of prosperity, especially when divisions and jealousies subsist between those that govern. The spirit of faction and party is the ruin of publick affairs. Hanno was a man of counsel and ability, and had very right views : but all his excellent qualities were poisoned by his avowed antipathy for the family and person of Hannibal. To be useful in Councils, and to give weight to one’s opinion in them, it is necessary to be impartial, and to have no view but the good of the publick.

A.R. 536. The Romans, on their side, were very intent upon
 Ant. C. repairing their losses. Besides their natural applica-
 216. tion and vivacity, adversity made them more active
 Liv. xxiii. and vigilant. The Consul neglected nothing that re-
 14. lated to his province. The Dictator, M. Junius
 Pera, after having discharged the duties of religion,
 asked the people, according to custom, permission to
 ride on horseback in commanding the army. He
 immediately made two legions, which the Consuls
 had levied at the beginning of the year, take arms,
 with the eight thousand slaves of whom we have
 spoke above, and the Cohorts, that had been draught-
 ed from the territory of Picenum, and a neighbour-
 ing canton called * Ager Gallicus. As these forces
 did not seem sufficient, he had recourse to a remedy
 never employed but in the most desperate conjunc-
 tures, and when the Decent is obliged to give way to
 the Useful. He published a decree, by which he re-
 leased all that were confined in the prisons either for
 crimes or debts, the number of which amounted to
 six thousand men. As the State was in want of all
 things, it was necessary to give them the arms which
 had been taken from the Gauls, and carried in tri-
 umph by Flaminius. After these dispositions, he
 set out from the city with five and twenty thousand
 men capable of service.

Ibid. As to Hannibal, after having secured Capua, he
 made a second attempt upon the city of Naples, but
 as ineffectually as the first. He afterwards marched
 his troops into the territory of Nola, and confined
 his views to that place. The Senators gave Claudius
 Marcellus advice, who was then at Canusium, of the
 extreme danger in which that city was, because the
 People were inclined to surrender it to Hannibal. He
 marched thither without loss of time. As soon as
 Hannibal was informed, that he approached, he re-

* This was a small country between the Rubicon and the Esis, con-
 quered from the Galli Senones, and distributed amongst the Roman
 citizens in virtue of the law passed by Flaminius when tribune of
 the People.

tired towards the sea on the side of Naples, ardently desiring to make himself master of that city, in order to have a port, where he might securely receive the ships that should come to him from Africa. Not having been capable to alter the fidelity of the inhabitants of that city, he laid siege to Nuceria, and having long kept it blocked up, at length reduced it by famine, leaving the inhabitants at liberty to retire where they thought fit. He promised them great rewards, if they would serve in his troops: but not a single man of them would accept his offers.

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The People of Nola were far from being of the same disposition. There was in that city a young officer called L Bantius. The Romans had not at that time among their allies an horseman more distinguished for his bravery. Hannibal having found him, after the battle of Cannæ, almost without life in the midst of an heap of dead bodies, had caused his wounds to be dressed with abundance of care and goodness, and after he was cured, had sent him home, not only without ransom, but with great presents. In gratitude for so extraordinary a service, Bantius had already spared no pains to put Nola into Hannibal's hands, and Marcellus found him still restless and busy. It was necessary to be rid of him either by execution, or to engage him by favour. Marcellus chose the latter, to which his natural disposition inclined him: for he was humane, affable, insinuating, and of a character highly adapted to engaging affection.

Liv. xxiii.
15.
Plut. in
Marc. 303.

Accordingly one day when Bantius came to make his court to him, Marcellus asked him who he was. It was not because he did not know him long before; but he sought a pretext for entering into the conversation he wanted to have with him. Bantius having told him his name, Marcellus expressed surprize and admiration. "How!" said he; "Are you that Bantius, so much talked of at Rome, as an officer, that fought so bravely at the battle of Cannæ, and was the only one that did not abandon the Consul P. Æmilius, but covered that General with your

A. R. 536. "body against the wounds aimed at him?" Bantius
 Ant. C. having answered that it was himself, and having shewn
 216. him the scars of his wounds, "Ah!" said Marcellus,
 "after having given us such great proofs of your
 "amity, why did not you come to us from the first
 "to receive those honours which you deserve? Do
 "you imagine, that we don't know how to reward
 "the merit of friends, which even the enemy them-
 "selves have in esteem?" To these kind words, at-
 tended with an obliging air of familiarity, he added a
 present that crowned all. Besides a sum of money,
 which he ordered his treasurer to pay him, he gave
 him a fine war-horse: and before his face ordered
 his Lictors to give him admittance, whenever he came
 to see him.

We see here in this instance of Marcellus, how ne-
 cessary the art of disposing the mind, and winning
 the heart, is to those, who are in principal offices,
 and administer governments: that it is not by haugh-
 tiness and insolence, by menaces and chastisements,
 that men are to be governed: but that marks of fa-
 vour and friendship, praises and rewards, dispensed
 properly and with address, are the most certain means
 to bring them into measures, and attach them for
 ever.

By this generous behaviour, Marcellus so effectually
 softened the haughty spirit of the young soldier
 Bantius, that he was all the rest of his life one of the
 bravest and most faithful allies of Rome. No one
 was more attentive, nor more warm, than him to dis-
 cover and declare such of the people of Nola, as
 espoused the party of Hannibal; and they were very
 numerous. Hannibal being returned before Nola,
 they were resolved, as soon as the Romans should
 march out against the enemy, to shut the gates,
 plunder the baggage, and surrender to the Carthagi-
 nians; and they had had several interviews with the
 enemy during the night.

Marcellus was apprized of this conspiracy, and
 took all the necessary measures to prevent its effect.

He

He purposely kept close for some days within the city, not through fear, but to give the enemy a rash confidence. Hannibal, in consequence, approached the place with less order and precaution than usual. Marcellus, who kept his troops drawn up in battle within the walls, made them sally that moment thro' three gates, and fell upon the besiegers with so much force and impetuosity, that they could not sustain the charge. After having defended themselves for some time with sufficient vigour and courage, they were at length broke, and obliged to retire into their camp. Hannibal lost two thousand three hundred men in this action, and on the side of Marcellus only five hundred were killed.

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Ant. C.
216.
Plut. in
Marc. 303.

This was the first advantage gained by the Romans over Hannibal since the battle of Cannæ, and it was of extreme consequence to them. For, in the condition the affairs of the Commonwealth then were, it was more difficult to stop the course of Hannibal's victories, than it was afterwards to conquer him. This advantage revived the courage of the Romans, and inspired them with a confidence in themselves, by shewing them, that they fought with an enemy who was not invincible, but might be checked and beaten.

Marcellus having then caused the gates of the city to be shut, and posted guards to prevent any body from going out, made an exact enquiry concerning such as had held secret correspondence during the night with the enemy. Seventy of the most criminal having been convicted of treason, the Prætor condemned them to lose their heads, confiscated their estates for the benefit of the Roman people, and restored all the authority to the Senate of Nola, of which the cabal had deprived it.

Hannibal having failed at Nola, besieged Casilinum. But, though the place was small, and the gar- Liv. xxiii.
18,
rison only a thousand men, the Carthaginians were frequently repulsed with loss: so that Hannibal, ashamed to continue long before an inconsiderable

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216.

place without doing any thing, chose to fortify his camp, and to leave some troops there, in order not to abandon the enterprize entirely, and retired to Capua.

It was * here that this army, which had so long withstood the greatest hardships, and which the most dreadful dangers had never been able to discourage, was entirely conquered by plenty and pleasures, into which it plunged the more greedily, as it had not been accustomed to them. Rest, wine, and good cheer, debauch with women, and idleness, which became every day more grateful to them, as they familiarized themselves with it, all combined to enervate their bodies and courage to such a degree, that if they sustained their ground for some time, it was rather in effect of the lustre of their former victories, than by their present force. Those who were judges of the art of war, considered the fault committed by Hannibal in putting his troops into winter-quarters at Capua, as much greater than that of not having marched to Rome immediately after the battle of Cannæ. For that delay and neglect, says Livy, might seem only to have deferred his victory; whereas his stay at Capua deprived him of the forces necessary to conquer. When Hannibal drew out his troops from that city, one might have said that they were quite different men from what they had been before. Accustomed to lodge in commodious houses, to live in abundance and idleness, they could no longer endure hunger, thirst, long marches, and the other fatigues of war. Most of them carried away debauched wives with them. During the whole summer great numbers deserted, who had no other asylum but Capua against the wise severity of their Generals.

I have only copied Livy in what I have just said of Capua : but I do not know whether all he says of the

* Quos nulla mali vicerat vis, perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates immodicæ : & eo impensius, quo avidius ex insolentia in eas se merferant. Liv.

fatal consequences of the winter-quarters in that voluptuous city, is entirely just and well-founded. When we consider attentively all the circumstances of this part of history, we can scarce be convinced, that the little progress made afterwards by Hannibal's arms, is to be ascribed to his stay at Capua. That is indeed one cause, but the least considerable; and the bravery, with which the Carthaginians after that time beat Consuls and Prætors, took cities in the sight of the Romans, maintained their conquests, and continued fourteen years in Italy, without its being in the power of the enemy to drive them out: all this suffices to give us room to believe, that Livy exaggerates the pernicious effects of the voluptuousness of Capua.

The true cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs, was the want of supplies and recruits from his country. After Mago's representation, the Senate of Carthage had judged it necessary, in order to push on the conquest of Italy, to send thither from Africa a considerable reinforcement of Numidian cavalry, forty elephants, and a thousand talents, (about an hundred and fifty thousand pounds) and to take twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse into pay in Spain, to reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy. However, Mago could obtain only twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse; and even when he was ready to set out for Italy with these troops so short in number of those he had been promised, he was countermanded and sent to Spain. Hannibal then, after such great promises, received neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money; and had absolutely exhausted his personal resources. His troops were reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse. How was it possible, with an army so weakened, to occupy in a foreign country all the necessary posts, hold his new allies in dependance, maintain his conquests, make new ones, and keep the field against two armies of Romans renewed every year? And this was the true cause of the de-

A. R. 536. cline of Hannibal's affairs. If we had the passage, in
 Ant. C. which Polybius treated upon this subject, we should
 216. undoubtedly see, that he had insisted more upon this
 cause, than upon the voluptuousness of Capua.

Liv. xxiii. As soon as the rigour of the cold weather began to
 19. abate, Hannibal drew his troops out of their winter-
 quarters, and returned to Casilinum, the inhabitants
 of which, as well as the soldiers of the garrison, were
 reduced to extreme famine. For though the attacks
 had ceased during the winter, as the city had been
 continually blocked up, it had not been possible to
 introduce provisions into it. Tib. Sempronius com-
 manded the Romans in the absence of the Dictator,
 whom the affairs of religion had recalled to Rome.
 Marcellus was very desirous of marching to the aid
 of the besieged: but he was kept back, on the one
 side by the waters of the Volturnus, which had rose
 extremely, and on the other by the people of Nola,
 who were afraid of being attacked by the Campanians,
 as soon as the Romans should be removed. Sempro-
 nius was at hand to act; but as the Dictator had for-
 bade him to undertake any thing till his return, he was
 afraid to make any motion in favour of Casilinum,
 though he was informed that it suffered extremities
 capable of subduing the most heroick fortitude. All
 that he could do was to fill a great number of barrels
 with corn brought in from the neighbouring country,
 and to put them in the Volturnus, the current of which
 carried them into the city, taking care to give the
 magistrate notice to take them out as they arrived.
 This was done for three nights successively, and gave
 the besieged a little time to breathe. But the Car-
 thaginians having at length discovered it, that resource
 was entirely cut off. Nothing passed afterwards, but
 what was stopped on the way, except nuts which the
 Romans threw in, and when at Casilinum, were taken
 out with hurdles. But what was so poor a supply in
 so great a famine? Reduced to the last extremity, they
 were obliged to eat the leather of their shields, after
 having boiled it to make it soft; to add to such
 wretched

wretched nourishments, rats and other the most unclean animals; and to dig up the herbage and roots that grew at the bottom of the walls. Hannibal perceiving that they were sowing radishes: "How!" cried he quite astonished, "do the besieged imagine that I shall stay before this place till those plants are ripe?" This sight determined him to suffer them to treat with him concerning the ransom of the free persons, which he had always refused before. They agreed to pay about twenty pounds for each. When the money was paid, Hannibal suffered them to retire to Cumæ, as he had engaged, and put a garri-^{Septunces auri.}son of six hundred soldiers into the place.

The inhabitants of Petelia, a city of the Bruttii, shewed no less fidelity. The Senate having answered with grief to their deputies, that the Roman people were not in a condition to send aid to so remote a place, they persevered in their attachment to the Romans, till necessity at length reduced them to surrender.^{Liv. xxiii. 20.}

Almost at the same time, letters were received at Rome from Sicily and Sardinia, which were read in the Senate. The Pro-prætor, T. Otacilius, wrote from those provinces, that the Prætor Furius was arrived from Africa at Lilybæum with his fleet, dangerously ill of the wounds he had received, and at the point of death. That they had neither money nor corn to pay and subsist the soldiers and mariners, and did not know how to act. He strongly pressed the Senate to send both as soon as possible, and, if they thought it proper, to make one of the new Prætors set out immediately to succeed him. Aulus Cornelius Mamula, Pro-prætor of Sardinia, also demanded provisions and money, of which he was in want. The Senate answered both, that they were not in a condition to supply them with any thing: and that they must provide, as well as they could, for the occasions of their fleets and armies. T. Otacilius sent Ambassadors to King Hiero, the sole resource of the Roman people, and received from him as much money as he had^{Ibid. 21.}

A. R. 536. had occasion for, with provisions for six months. The
 Ant. C. cities of Sardinia supplied Cornelius in like manner,
 216. and with abundance of zeal and affection.

Liv. xxiii. As money was also wanting at Rome, the People
 22, 23. nominated three of the principal citizens to receive
 the sums, which private persons were willing to lend
 the Commonwealth. After having chosen three Pon-
 tiffs in the room of those who were dead, it was thought
 proper to fill up the vacant places of the Senators,
 which were very numerous; the loss of so many
 battles having made a great gap in the Senate. The
 affair was brought on by the Prætor Pomponius. Sp.
 Carvilius, who spoke first, was of opinion, that in or-
 der to supply the places of those who were wanting,
 and at the same time to unite more firmly with them,
 the freedom of Rome should be given to two Sena-
 tors of each of the Latine States, and that they should
 be substituted to those of Rome, who were dead. This
 proposal occasioned a general murmur and indigna-
 tion. Q. Fabius Maximus said, that nothing had
 ever been advanced at a more improper time, than a
 proposal capable of exciting new commotions amongst
 the allies, whose fidelity was but too much shaken
 already. And that if the deliberations of the Senate
 had ever required inviolable secrecy, this discourse,
 which had escaped the rashness of a single man, ought
 to be forgot, suppressed, and buried in eternal silence,
 as something that had never happened. Accordingly
 it was never mentioned afterwards.

The Senate thought it proper to create a Dictator,
 in order to make the choice in question. This nomi-
 nation was usually made by the Censors: but there
 were none then in the Commonwealth, and the pre-
 sent situation of affairs required a shorter method. The
 Consul Varro, who had been expressly sent for from
 Apulia, nominated M. Fabius Buteo Dictator, with-
 out a General of the horse, with power to exercise that
 office during six months. He was the oldest person
 that had been Censor. As soon as he ascended the
 tribunal for harangues, attended by his Lictors, he
 himself

himself observed upon all the irregularities that had passed in his creation. He declared, " that he did not approve either that there should be two Dictators at the same time in the Commonwealth, which had never happened before ; or, that they should raise him to that dignity without a General of the horse ; that the same person should have the authority of a Censor for the second time ; or lastly, that a Dictator should be permitted to continue six months in office, unless it were for making war. He added, that if necessity obliged him to set himself above the laws, it was incumbent upon him to act as near to them as it should be possible. That he should strike out the name of no Senator actually upon the list, that it might not be said, that a single person had been supreme arbiter in respect to the honour and dignity of a Senator. And as to the vacant places, in filling them up, he should regulate his conduct according to distinctions generally known and independant of his choice, and not according to his own opinion of personal merit, of which it did not become him to make himself the sole judge."

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He kept his word, and after having caused the list of the old Senators, with which he did not meddle, to be called over ; to supply the places of the dead, he nominated first those, who had exercised some curule magistracy, according to the order of time in which each had held it. He afterwards nominated those who had been Plebeian Ædiles, Tribunes of the People, Prætors or Quæstors : and lastly, those who had taken spoils from the enemy, or obtained the civic crown.

After having created in this manner an hundred and seventy-seven Senators with the general approbation of all the citizens, he abdicated the Dictatorship, and descended from the tribunal as a private person. And having ordered his Lictors to withdraw, he mingled with the crowd, and purposely remained there a considerable time, to avoid being reconducted home in pomp by the People. But his modesty did not cool the

the

A. R. 536. the ardour of the citizens. When he withdrew, they
 Ant. C. formed a very numerous train for him, and attended
 216, him quite home with the utmost zeal and respect. There is a moderation and wisdom in the discourse and conduct of Buteo, that cannot be too much esteemed and admired. It was a small number of such Senators as him, who always determined the opinions of the whole body in important affairs, and were in a manner the soul of the public deliberations, and of the government. Happy the Legislatures, in which there are such men, and which know how to set the right value upon their merit!

Liv. xxiii. The Consul set out the next night to rejoin his army,
 24, without apprizing the Senate, and for fear they should keep him in the city, to preside at the election of the Consuls for the following year. The next day the Senate was of opinion, that the Dictator should be wrote to, and desired, in case the affairs of the Commonwealth would admit, to come to Rome for the election of Consuls, and to bring with him the General of the horse, and the Prætor, M. Marcellus, in order that they might consult them in person upon the present state of the Commonwealth, and in concert with them, take such measures as should be judged the most prudent and salutary. All who had been sent for came to Rome, having left their Lieutenants to command the legions. The Dictator, after having spoke of himself in few words, and with great modesty, and with the highest praises of the wise conduct of Ti. Sempronius, his General of the horse, summoned an assembly, in which L. Postumius was created Consul for the third time, with Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. The first was absent, and commanded in Gaul: the second was at Rome, and then General of the horse, and Curule Ædile. M. Valerius Flaccus and Q. Mucius Scævola were afterwards created Prætors. The Dictator, after having caused these magistrates to be nominated, returned to rejoin his army at Theanum, leaving the General of the horse at Rome, who was to enter upon the Consulship some days

days after, and to whom, for that reason, it was necessary to consult the Senators concerning the troops that were to be raised, and employed the year following for the service of the Commonwealth.

At the time, whilst they were most occupied by these cares, news came that L. Postumius, Consul elect, had perished in Cisalpine Gaul with all the troops under his command. He was to march his army through a vast forest, which the Gauls called * Litana. On the right and left of the way he was to take, those people had sawed the trees almost through at bottom, in such a manner that they continued upright, but so, that the least force sufficed for throwing them down. (This fact seems scarce probable, and still less what follows.) Postumius had two Roman legions with him, which with the allies that had joined him along the *Mare Superum* or Adriatic sea, formed a body of fifteen thousand men, at the head of which he had entered the enemy's country. The Gauls, who were posted at the extremities of the forest, no sooner saw the Romans in the midst of it, than they pushed down the sawed trees, that were most distant from the way. These falling upon those next them, which did the same on others that the least blow sufficed to throw down, crushed the Romans, arms, men and horses, in so dreadful a manner, that scarce ten of them escaped. For most of them being either killed or stifled by the trunks and branches of the trees under which they lay; those who by accident escaped so dreadful a disaster, were immediately destroyed by the enemy, who had dispersed themselves compleatly armed in the adjacent places, and in the middle of the forest. A very small number, who were in hopes of escaping by a bridge over a river, were taken by the Gauls, who had seized it some time before. It was here Postumius fell, after having used his utmost efforts not to be taken prisoner. The Boii cut off his head, and carried it in triumph with his arms, and the rest of his spoils, into the prin-

A. R. 536
Ant. C.
216.

Liv. xxiii.
24.

* The exact situation of this forest is not known.

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216.

cipal temple of their nation. They afterwards extracted the brains and lined the scull with gold; and, according to their custom, the priests and ministers of their Gods used it as a cup for the libations which they made in their sacrifices, and to drink out of it at their meals. The spoils they took were proportioned to their victory. For except the animals, which had been crushed to death by the fall of the trees, no part of the spoils was lost: all was found upon the spot where the army had perished, nothing having been carried off in flight.

When the news of so great a misfortune was brought to Rome, the citizens were seized with such sorrow, that the shops were immediately shut, and the whole city for some days seemed a solitude; every body continuing at home as at midnight. To remove this image of universal affliction and mourning, the Senate ordered the Ædiles to go through the streets, and cause the shops to be opened. T. Sempronius then having assembled the Senate, consoled them, “and having bade them call to mind the courage and constancy, with which they had sustained the defeat at Cannæ, he exhorted them to arm themselves with courage, and not to suffer themselves to be overwhelmed by less calamities. He gave them to understand, that, provided affairs should succeed against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, as there was room to hope, the war with the Gauls might, without hazard, be deferred till another time. That with the assistance of the Gods, the Roman People should find a proper occasion to avenge themselves for the fraud and artifice of those barbarians. But that the object which ought to employ their attention at present, was the war with the Carthaginians, and the forces which they should be in a condition to bring into the field against them.”

Liv. xxiii.
25.

He began himself to give an account of the number of the horse and foot, as well citizens as allies, that actually served in the Dictator's army. Marcellus then gave the detail of his. Those who knew what troops the Consul Varro had with him in Apulia, were asked

asked concerning them. And the result of this kind of review was, that they should find it very difficult to form Consular armies, capable of supporting so important a war. For this reason, whatever cause there was to be irritated against the Gauls, it was resolved to abandon that enterprize for the present. The Dictator's army was given to the Consul. The soldiers of Marcellus's army, who had fled at Cannæ, were ordered to go to Sicily, and to serve there as long as the war should continue in Italy. It was also judged proper to transport thither such of the troops of the Dictator's legions, upon whose valour they could least rely, without fixing them any time, but that assigned by the laws for the number of campaigns every citizen was obliged to serve. The two legions that had remained this year in the city to guard it, were decreed to the Consul that should be elected to succeed L. Postumius. And orders were given for two legions to return immediately from Sicily, out of which the Consul, to whom those of the city should fall, should take what number of soldiers he should have occasion for. The Consul Varro was continued in command for one year, without lessening the number of the troops he had under him in Apulia, for the defence of that country.

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Ant. C.
216.

Whilst these things passed in Italy, the war was carried on in Spain with no less vigour. The Romans had always had the advantage hitherto in that province. The two Scipios had divided their forces, so that Cneus commanded the land-army, whilst Publius kept the sea with his fleet. Asdrubal, who commanded the Carthaginians, not being in a condition to resist the Romans upon either element, placed his whole security in the distance he set between him and the enemy. It was not till after he had used abundance of entreaties, and made many instances, that four thousand foot and five hundred horse were sent him to recruit his army. With this aid, he marched and incamped near the Romans, believing himself in a condition to make head against them by land : and at the same time he ordered

Liv. xxiii.
26, 27.

A. R. 536. ordered his fleet, after having supplied it with all that
 Ant C. it wanted, to defend the islands and sea-coasts in the
 216. dependance of the Carthaginians.

At the same time that he used his utmost endeavours to reinstate the affairs of the Carthaginians in Spain, he had the mortification to receive advice, that the Captains who commanded his ships, had deserted. After the great reproaches he had made them for having abandoned the fleet near the Iberus in a cowardly manner, they had adhered but faintly to Asdrubal, and the interests of the Carthaginians. They first declared for the Romans, and then brought over several cities in the country of the * Tartessii, and even took one by force. This revolt obliged Asdrubal to remove from the Romans, in order to carry the war that way. The rebels had at first considerable advantages over the Carthaginians, so that Asdrubal was afraid to keep the field: but those successes became fatal to them. Observing no longer either order or discipline, they dispersed on all sides without any precaution. Asdrubal well knew how to take his advantage of their negligence. He fell upon them when they least expected him, put them to the rout, and entirely defeated them. This victory obliged the whole nation to submit to him the next day.

Liv. xxiii. Things were in this state, when Asdrubal received
 27. orders to march immediately into Italy. The report of this spreading in Spain, entirely changed the face of affairs. Asdrubal perceived it well. He wrote to the Senate of Carthage, to inform them of the bad effect, which the report of his departure had already produced throughout the whole country. He told them, " that if he quitted the province, he should no sooner have passed the Iberus, than it would declare entirely for the Romans. That besides his not having either General or troops to leave in his place, those who commanded the Roman armies, were Captains of such abilities in war, that it would be highly

* These people were borderers upon the Iberus near Arragon.

difficult to make head against them even with equal forces. That therefore, if they were desirous to preserve Spain, they should send him a successor at the head of a considerable army: that however successful such new General might be, it could not be without difficulty, and that he would find employment enough in his command."

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Ant. C.
216.

These letters at first made some impression upon the Senators of Carthage: but as they were, preferably to all things, bent upon supporting themselves in Italy, they did not change their resolution in respect to Asdrubal and his troops. They made Himilco set out with a good army and a strong fleet, to preserve and defend Spain both by sea and land. As soon as that General arrived, having provided for the safety of his troops and fleet, he marched to join Asdrubal with a body of cavalry with all possible expedition. When he had informed him of the decrees of the Senate, and had been told in his turn in what manner the war was to be made in Spain, he returned to his camp, placing his whole safety in expedition, and continually quitting the places through which he passed, before the inhabitants could take any measures for stopping him. As to Asdrubal, before he quitted the province, he raised money from all the States, that continued in subjection to the Carthaginians, foreseeing, that he should have great occasion for it in the march he was going to undertake; after which he moved towards the banks of the Iberus.

Liv. xxiii.
28.

The two Roman Generals were no sooner apprized of the orders Asdrubal had received, than they renounced all other designs, and joined their forces to oppose his departure. They rightly perceived, that if that General, with the army he had in Spain, should actually enter Italy, where it was already highly difficult to resist Hannibal alone, the joining of the two brothers would infallibly be followed by the ruin of Rome. They therefore united their forces upon the banks of the Iberus, and having passed that river, they marched against Asdrubal. For some days the two

Ibid. 28,
29.

A.R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

armies continued incamped at five miles from each other, contenting themselves with skirmishing, whilst neither seemed to think of a general action. At length on the same day, and almost at the same moment, the Generals on both sides, as if by concert, gave the signal of battle, and came down into the plain with all their forces. The Romans were drawn up in three lines as usual, which were the Hastati, the Principes, and the Triarii. The cavalry formed the two wings. Part of the light-armed soldiers were placed amongst those in the front rank, the rest were in the rear of the army. Asdrubal posted the Spaniards in the main body, with the Carthaginians on their right, and the Africans with the auxiliary troops on their left. As to the cavalry, he placed that of the Numidians on the right wing in a line with the Carthaginian infantry, and the rest in a line with the Africans. He did not place all the Numidians on the right, but only those, who led two horses at once, and were accustomed, in the heat of the action, to leap completely armed from that which was tired and harrassed upon the other that was fresh: so great were both the agility of the riders, and the docility of the horses in adapting themselves to all their motions.

The Generals on both sides having drawn up their armies in the order I have just said, had different motives for hoping, that were almost equally founded. Their troops were equal enough as to their number: but on the side of the soldiers, the sentiments and courage were highly different. For, though the Romans were making war far from their own country, their Generals had not omitted to persuade them, that they fought for Italy, and the city of Rome itself, in preventing the two brothers and their armies from joining. For which reason, conceiving, that their return to their wives and children depended upon the success of this battle, they were determined to conquer, or to die. The other army was composed of people, who had neither the same ardour, nor the same resolution, because they had not the same interests.

terests. Most of the soldiers were Spaniards, that chose rather to be defeated in Spain, than to conquer there, in order to be dragged into Italy. Accordingly, those who were in the main body gave way on the first charge, and almost before one dart had been thrown at them: and afterwards seeing the Romans come on with abundance of vigour, they openly took to flight. The two other bodies of infantry did not fight with the less courage on this account. The Carthaginians on one side, and the Africans on the other, charged the enemy with great ardour, whom they kept in a manner inclosed. But as soon as the infantry of the Romans was entirely advanced into the middle in pursuing the main body that fled, it was in a condition to open its way through the two bodies of the enemy's foot that attacked it in flank on the right and left. Though it had two attacks to sustain at once, it was victorious in both. For after having defeated and put to flight the centre, it was superior both in valour and number to those that remained. There was abundance of blood shed in this latter part of the battle; and if the Spaniards had not fled in the beginning of the action, very few of so great an army had escaped. The cavalry did not charge at all. For, as soon as the Moors and Numidians saw victory declare for the enemy by the defeat of the main-body, they fled, and driving the elephants before them, left the two bodies of the infantry uncovered. Asdrubal, on his side, having sustained the battle to the last, escaped from the midst of the slaughter with a small number of soldiers. The Romans seized and plundered his camp.

The success of this battle confirmed such of the Spaniards in the party of the Romans, as wavered before between them and the Carthaginians: instead of which Asdrubal had lost all hopes, not only of going with his army to Italy, but even of continuing in Spain with any safety. This good success, which the letters of the Scipios made known at Rome, occasioned great joy, not only because Asdrubal had been defeat-

A. R. 536. ed in Spain, but because he had been prevented from
 Ant. C. coming to Italy.
 216.

In the events I have been relating, we see how careful Providence is to temper and ballance good and bad successes, in order to keep mankind in a wise * mean, equally distant from two extremes, by inspiring them with sentiments either of fear in the most smiling prosperity, or of hope in the greatest adversity.

S E C T. III.

Double tax laid on the people at Rome. Distribution of the armies. Marcellus is elected Consul. Defect in his election. Q. Fabius Maximus substituted to him. New disposition of the armies. The Carthaginians send troops into Sardinia. The Consuls and other Generals repair to their respective provinces. Philip sends Ambassadors to Hannibal. Stratagem of Xenophanes, Chief of the embassy. Alliance made between Philip and Hannibal. Xenophanes, with the rest of the Ambassadors, is taken by the Romans, and sent to Rome. State of Sardinia. Enterprize of the Campanians against Cumæ frustrated by Sempronius. He also defends Cumæ against Hannibal. Vigilance and prudence of that Consul. The Ambassadors of Philip and Hannibal brought to Rome. Measures taken by the Romans against Philip. That Prince sends new Ambassadors to Hannibal. Discord at Nola between the Senate and People. Sardinia revolts. It is entirely subjected by Manlius after a great victory. Marcellus ravages the lands of Hannibal's allies, who implore his aid. The army of Hannibal is beaten before Nola by Marcellus. Single combat between Jubellius and Claudius. State of affairs in Spain. Private persons supply the Commonwealth with money. The Carthaginians beaten twice together in Spain by the Scipios.

* Sperat infestis, metuit secundis
 Alteram fortem bene præparatum Pectus. HORAT.

WHILST the affairs of Spain went very ill on the side of the Carthaginians, Hannibal laboured with indefatigable application to sustain and advance those of Italy. Petellia was taken by the Carthaginians: Croto and Locris by the Bruttii. Rhegium was the only city of that canton, that continued faithful to the Romans. Sicily also, at the instigation of Gelo, Hiero's eldest son, inclined to the Carthaginians. Gelo's death deferred the effect of this disposition for some time, as we shall shew in the sequel.

A. R. 536.
Ant. C.
216.

The three sons of M. Æmilius Lepidus celebrate funeral-games in honour of their father, and give combats of gladiators: I have spoke of these combats in a former part of this volume. The great Roman games were also celebrated.

The fourth year of the war with Hannibal, the Consul T. Sempronius Gracchus entered upon office on the Ides of March (the fifteenth) as well as the Prætors. The People were desirous that M. Marcellus should continue to command in quality of Pro-consul, because since the battle of Cannæ, he was the only General, that had fought Hannibal in Italy with advantage.

TI SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.

A. R. 537.
Ant. C.
215.

The first day the Senate assembled in the Capitol to deliberate upon the affairs of the Commonwealth, they decreed, that this year the citizens should pay double the usual tax, and that out of half the total amount, which should be levied immediately, the soldiers should be paid the arrears actually due to them for their service. Those who were at the battle of Cannæ, were excluded from this payment.

Liv. xxiii.
31.

As to the armies, the Consul Ti. Sempronius, in consequence of what had been regulated in the same assembly, ordered the two legions of the city to rendezvous at Cales, from whence they were to march to the camp of Claudius Marcellus beyond Sueffula.

A.R. 537. The Prætor, Appius Claudius Pulcher, had orders to
 Ant. C. take the troops of that district, which were principally
 215. the remains of the army of Cannæ, in order to transport them to Sicily, and send back those to Rome that were in that province. M. Claudius Marcellus went to take the two legions of the city at Cales, whither they had been commanded to repair, in order to march them into the camp, called the Claudian camp, from his name. Appius Claudius ordered T. Metilius Croto, his Lieutenant, to put himself at the head of the old troops, and to carry them to Sicily.

Liv. xxiii. At first every body expected with impatience, that
 31. the Consul would appoint an assembly for the nomination of his colleague. But many having observed, that Marcellus had been removed as if with design, for whom that dignity was intended preferably to all others, as a reward of the glorious actions, which he had done during his Prætorship, a great murmur arose in the Senate. There was reason to suspect, that there was artifice in the conduct that had been observed in respect to Marcellus. He was a Plebeian; as the Consul was also. It is probable enough, that the Patricians were for preventing both Consulships from being filled by Plebeians; which had hitherto been without example. However this conjecture were, which the sequel will appear to verify, the Consul, whose being a Plebeian himself, must exempt him from all suspicion of having entered into this combination, and who had it in his power to frustrate it, replied to those who complained: "Nothing has been done, Fathers, but for the good of the Commonwealth. It was proper, that Marcellus should go to Campania to change the armies there, and that the assembly should not be appointed till after he had executed his commission, and was returned to Rome; in order that you may have such a Consul, as the present conjunctures require, and you yourselves approve." Accordingly, nothing more was said of assemblies till the return of Marcellus. As soon as that happened, one was held, and he was elected

elected Consul unanimously, and immediately entered upon office. But as a clap of thunder was heard that moment, and his election was declared defective by the Augurs, he abdicated, and Q. Fabius Maximus was substituted in his place, who was then Consul for the third time.

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Ant. C.
215.

This declaration of the Augurs upon the pretended defect in the election of a second Plebeian Consul, may with reason be suspected. A great many years will pass before this first example of two Plebeian Consuls will be followed by a second.

TI. SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS.

Q. FABIVS MAXIMUS, III.

The Consuls made a new distribution of the troops different from the former plan. Fabius had for him the army, which M. Junius had commanded during his Dictatorship : and his colleague Sempronius twenty-five thousand allies, to which were added the slaves, who had voluntarily engaged to carry arms to the number of eight thousand. The Prætor Valerius had the legions, which were returned from Sicily. Marcellus, as Pro-consul, was left at the head of those, who were to cover Nola beyond Sueffula. The Prætors, to whose lot Sicily and Sardinia had fallen, set out for their provinces.

Whilst this passed, when Mago, Hannibal's brother, was upon the point of setting out for Carthage, in order to carry to Italy twelve thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, twenty elephants, and a thousand talents of silver, (an hundred and fifty thousand pounds) with a convoy of sixty galleys, news came that the Carthaginians had been defeated in Spain, and that all the states of that province were gone over to the Romans. This news made Carthage change the design of sending Mago to Italy ; because supplies seemed more necessary in Spain. At the same time also another event happened, which made them still more unmindful of Hannibal : this was an occasion that of-

A. R. 537. fered of recovering Sardinia. They were informed,
 Ant. C. " that the Romans had but few troops in that island ;
 215.
 Liv. xxiii. that they had sent a new Prætor, of no experience, in
 32. the room of Aulus Cornelius, who had long governed the province, and who knew it perfectly well. That besides, the Sardinians were weary of the Roman government, which the year before had treated them with exceeding rigour, in obliging them to furnish money and corn beyond their power. That they wanted only a leader to revolt." These complaints were carried to Carthage by deputies, who secretly sent thither the principal persons of the nation, and especially Hampsicoras, the most considerable of them all by his credit and riches. The news from Spain and Sardinia, which came at the same time, having excited both hope and fear, they sent Mago to Spain with his ships and troops, and chose Asdrubal, surnamed the Bald, for the expedition of Sardinia, with forces very near equal to those commanded by Mago. Hannibal in the mean time, who on his side had the most pressing occasion for aid, and who saw his forces decrease every day, must have been in great uneasiness and perplexity.

The Roman Consuls, on their side, had no sooner finished the affairs which kept them in the city, than they prepared to set out for the army. Sempronius ordered the troops he was to command to repair to Sinuessæ by a day assigned them. Q. Fabius also set out, in order to put himself at the head of his army, after having commanded the inhabitants of the country, according to the permission he had obtained for that purpose from the Senate, to carry all their grain into the fortified cities before the first of June ; declaring, that as to those, who should not have obeyed, he would ravage their lands, sell their slaves by auction, and burn their houses. The very Prætors who had been created for the administration of justice, were not exempted from the functions of war. Valerius was sent into Apulia, to receive the army from Varro, and to make it go to Sicily under the command of
 some

some Lieutenant-general; whilst he put himself at the head of the legions that returned from Sicily, and employed them for the defence of the sea-coasts between Brundisium and Tarentum, with the assistance of a fleet of twenty-five ships, of which the command was also given him. Q. Fulvius, Prætor of the city, with a like number of ships, was appointed to guard the coasts adjacent to Rome. Varro, who was continued in command, but only in employments of little importance, and remote from the enemy, had orders to levy troops in the territory of Picenum, and to act for the safety of that country. T. Otacilius Crassus had no sooner consecrated the temple of Prudence, than he was sent into Sicily to command the fleet in the ports or upon the coasts of that island.

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Ant. C.
215.

All the Kings and nations had their eyes upon the famous quarrel, that had armed the two most powerful people of the earth. Philip, King of Macedonia, interested himself particularly, being a nearer neighbour than any of the rest to Italy, from which he was separated only by the * Ionian sea. As soon as he was informed, that Hannibal had passed the Alps, he was rejoiced to see two such powerful Republicks at blows with each other: and as long as their strength seemed equal, he did not know for which of the two to wish that victory might declare. But, when he was informed, that Hannibal had defeated the Romans in three battles, which he had fought with them almost upon the neck of each other, he was no longer in suspense about determining for the side of the victor. Advices that he received soon after, confirmed him in that resolution. Whilst he was present at the celebration of the Nemæan games at Argos, a courier arrived from Macedonia, with the news, that the Romans had lost a great battle. This was evidently that of Cannæ. He imparted this only to Demetrius of Pharos, who, as we have said, had taken refuge with that Prince, after the Romans had reduced him to quit Illyricum.

Liv. xxiii.
33.

Polyb. v.
439.

* Part of the Mediterranean between Greece and Sicily.

A. R. 537. Demetrius took the advantage of this occafion to ani-
 Ant. C. mate him for a war with the Romans, to which, faid
 215. he, the Gods themfelves feemed to invite him, fo fa-
 vourable was the prefent conjuncture. He reprefented
 to him, that in the prefent condition of Rome, which
 had neither aid nor hope, he might, by joining his
 numerous forces with thofe of Hannibal, affure him-
 felf of the conquest of Italy; after which it would
 be eafy for him to make himfelf monarch of the uni-
 verfe; a noble ambition, that became no one better
 than himfelf.

A young King, fuccefsful till then in his under-
 takings, bold, enterprizing, and befides of a family
 that had always flattered themfelves with one day at-
 taining univerfal empire, could not but be enchanted
 with fuch difcourfe. He therefore from thenceforth
 meditated nothing but giving peace to Greece, where
 he was actually at war with the Ætolians, in order
 that he might turn his whole thoughts, and all his
 Anc. Hift. forces, on the fide of Italy. We have given the de-
 tail of this negociation elfewhere, and have repeated,
 after Polybius, the wife reflections of a deputy from
 Naupactus, who reprefented both to Philip and the
 Greeks, of what importance it was to unite, if they de-
 fired not to be crufted, either by the Romans or Car-
 thaginians, that is, by that of the two people, which
 fhould be victorious in the war they were then making
 upon each other. But we muft not omit obferving
 here, that from that moment all Greece (and foon af-
 ter Asia) had their eyes fixed folely upon the Weft, at
 firft either upon Rome or Carthage, and afterwards
 upon Rome only, as if the States and Kings of the
 Eaft and South had from that time forefeen, that it
 was from the Weft they were to receive mafters.

Philip, after having made peace, returned into Ma-
 cedonia, where Demetrius continued his warm folli-
 citations, fpeaking of nothing but the grand project,
 with which he had fo fuccefsfully began to infpire him.
 And the Prince's thoughts turned upon nothing elfe
 night and day, fo that his converfation, and even
 dreams,

dreams, were solely engrossed by the war with the Romans. Polybius observes, that it was not out of friendship for the King, that Demetrius was so warm and tenacious in giving him this advice, but out of hatred for the Roman Commonwealth, and because there was no other means for him to re-instate himself in the island of Pharos. It is usual for flatterers to cover their self-interested views under the mask of warm and passionate zeal; as it is for Princes to abandon themselves blindly to counsels, that flatter and gratify their passions.

Philip, after the battle of Cannæ, put what he had resolved the year before in execution, and sent Ambassadors to Hannibal, to congratulate him upon his victories, and to make an alliance with him. Those Ambassadors took great care to shun the ports of Brundisium and Tarentum, knowing they were guarded by the ships and troops of the Romans. They therefore landed near the temple of Juno at the * promontory, which gave the name of Lacinian to that Goddess. From thence, crossing Apulia in their way to Capua, they fell directly into the middle of the Roman troops, that guarded the country, and were carried before the Prætor Valerius, who was then encamped at Luceria. Xenophanes, chief of the embassy, was not at all confounded. He told Valerius boldly, that he came from King Philip to demand the amity and alliance of the Romans. That he was charged with orders from his master for the Consuls, Senate, and People of Rome, and that he desired to be conducted to them. Valerius, charmed with the advantageous offers of so powerful a King, at a time when the Commonwealth was abandoned by its antient allies, received these Ambassadors from an enemy as friends and guests. He gave them guides, whom he commanded to carry them the safest way, and very carefully to inform them which posts were occupied by the Romans, and which by the Carthaginians.

* Lacinian promontory near Croto in Calabria.

A. R. 537.
Ant. C.
215.

Xenophanes passed through the midst of the Roman troops into Campania; and from thence with the first opportunity of escaping, repaired to Hannibal's camp, and made an alliance with him in the name of Philip, of which the conditions were: "That the King of Macedonia should come to Italy with as strong a fleet as he could fit out: (this was supposed to be about two hundred ships) that he should ravage the coasts of Italy, and on his side should make war with all his forces, both by sea and land. That when they should be reduced into subjection, Italy, with the city of Rome, and the whole spoils, should remain to Hannibal and the Carthaginians. That they should afterwards go in conjunction into Greece, and make war upon such nations as Philip should direct; and that all the countries, as well on the continent, as the islands that border upon Macedonia, should be annexed to the dominions of that Prince."

Livy repeats only the little I have cited of this treaty. Polybius has preserved the whole, of which I think it incumbent on me not to deprive the reader. These fragments, which shew antient customs, especially in a point of such importance as that of treaties, must seem valuable, and excite our curiosity.

Polyb. vii.

502—505.

"Treaty of alliance, made by oath between Hannibal the General, Mago, Myrcal, Barmocar, and all the Senators of Carthage, then with him (Hannibal) and all the Carthaginians, that serve under him on the one side; and on the other between Xenophanes the Athenian, the son of Cleomachus, sent to us as Ambassador for King Philip, the son of Demetrius, as well in his name as in the name of the Macedonians, and of the allies of his crown.

"In the presence of Jupiter, and Juno, and Apollo; in the presence of the tutelar divinity of the Carthaginians, and of Hercules, and of Iolaus; in the presence of Mars, of Triton, and Neptune; in the presence of the Gods, that accompany our expedition, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of
" the

“ the earth ; in the presence of the rivers, of the
 “ fields, and of the waters ; in the presence of all the
 “ Gods, that Carthage acknowledges for its masters ;
 “ in the presence of all the Gods, that are the masters
 “ of Macedonia, and of all the rest of Greece ; in the
 “ presence of all the Gods, that preside at this Treaty :
 “ Hannibal the General, and all the Senators of Car-
 “ thage that are with him, and all the soldiers of his
 “ army, have said :

“ With your good pleasure and ours, there shall
 “ be a treaty of amity and alliance between you and
 “ us as friends, allies, and brothers, on condition,
 “ that King Philip and the Macedonians, and all
 “ the allies they have amongst the other Greeks, shall
 “ preserve and defend the Carthaginian Lords, and
 “ Hannibal their General, and the soldiers under his
 “ command, and the governors of the provinces de-
 “ pendent upon Carthage, and the inhabitants of
 “ Utica, and all the cities and nations in subjection
 “ to the Carthaginians, and all the soldiers and allies,
 “ and both the cities and nations, which have joined
 “ us in Italy, Gaul, Liguria, and whosoever, in that
 “ region, shall enter into amity and alliance with us.
 “ In like manner the Carthaginian armies, and the
 “ inhabitants of Utica, and all the cities and nations
 “ in subjection to Carthage, and the soldiers and al-
 “ lies, and all the cities and nations, with which we
 “ have amity and alliance in Italy, in Gaul, in Li-
 “ guria, and with which we may contract amity and
 “ alliance in this region, shall preserve and defend
 “ King Philip, and the Macedonians, and all their
 “ allies amongst the other Greeks. We do not seek
 “ to surprize each other, we lay no snares for each
 “ other. We, the Macedonians, declare ourselves
 “ from our hearts with affection, without fraud, with-
 “ out design of deceiving, enemies to all those who
 “ shall be such to the Carthaginians, except the ci-
 “ ties, ports, and Kings, with whom we are engaged
 “ by treaties of peace and alliance. And we, the
 “ Carthaginians, also declare ourselves enemies to all
 “ those

A. R. 537. " those, who shall be such to King Philip, except
 Ant. C. " the Kings, cities, and nations, with whom we are
 215. " engaged by treaties of peace and alliance. You,
 " the Macedonians, shall enter into the war which we
 " have with the Romans, till it shall please the Gods
 " to give good success to our arms and yours. You
 " shall assist us with all that shall be necessary, accord-
 " ing as shall be agreed in that respect. If the Gods
 " do not give us the victory in the war against the Ro-
 " mans and their allies, and we should treat of peace
 " with them, we shall treat of it in such a manner,
 " that you may be included in the treaty, and on
 " conditions that they shall not be allowed to declare
 " war against you; that they shall not be masters of
 " the Corcyreans, nor of the Apollionates, nor of
 " the Epidamniums, nor of Pharos, nor of Dimallum,
 " nor of the Parthini, nor of Atintania; and that
 " they shall restore to Demetrius of Pharos his rela-
 " tions whom they detain in their dominions. If the
 " Romans declare war against you, or against us, we
 " then will assist each other according to the necessity
 " of the occasion. We will act in the same manner,
 " in case any other shall make war against us, except
 " in respect to the Kings, cities, and nations, to
 " whom we shall be friends and allies. If we shall
 " judge it proper to add any thing to, or retrench
 " any thing from, this treaty, we will not do it without
 " the consent of both parties."

This treaty is an authentick proof of the common opinion that prevailed amongst all nations, that the good and bad successes of war, and in general all the events of life, depend absolutely upon the Divinity, and that there is a Providence, that regulates and disposes all things.

The words *in the presence*, repeated so often in so few lines, shews how much the Pagans themselves were convinced that God is actually present in the ceremony of making treaties, that he hears all the articles of them, and that he reserves to himself the punishment of those who dare to violate any of them,
 and

and insult his sacred name, that has been invoked to them.

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In what astonishment should we be, if our Ambassadors should think fit to use in treaties the invocation of saints as often as the Pagans did that of their Gods, of whatever rank they were, for they had different kinds of them.

Such were very near the conditions of the treaty made between Hannibal and the Ambassadors of Philip. Hannibal sent Gisgo, Bostar, and Mago, with them to confirm the alliance with the King in person. They all repaired together to the same temple of Juno Lacinia, where the ship of the Macedonians was concealed in the road. They embarked there : and were out at sea, when they were perceived by the Roman ships that guarded the coasts of Calabria. P. Valerius detached some light vessels, with orders to pursue the ship, that had been seen, and to bring it in. The Ambassadors at first did their utmost to escape. But seeing that their pursuers were upon the point of coming up with them, they surrendered themselves of their own accord to the Romans. When they were brought to Valerius, he asked them who they were, from whence they came, and whither they were going. Xenophanes, whose first lie had succeeded so well, replied at first, “ that King Philip had sent him as Ambassador to the Romans : but that it had been impossible for him to cross Campania, which he had found full of the enemy’s troops.” The Carthaginian habits having made the Roman General suspect Hannibal’s Ambassadors, he interrogated them, and their answer fully discovered them. Having intimidated them by the terror of punishment, he obliged them to deliver the letters to him which Hannibal had wrote to Philip, and the treaty which had been concluded between that Prince and the Carthaginians. When Valerius was informed of all that he desired to know, he judged, that the best he could do was, as soon as possible, to send the prisoners he had taken, and all the persons in their train, to the Senate at Rome, or
to

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to the Consuls wheresoever they should be. For this purpose he chose five of the lightest galleys, which he made set out under the command of L. Valerius Antias, to whom he gave orders to separate the deputies, by putting them in different ships, so that they might have no communication with any body, nor even with one another.

When we unite all the misfortunes, that happened to the Romans in the course of one and the same year, in one point of view: fifty thousand men killed at Cannæ with the flower of their Generals and Senators; soon after another army entirely destroyed with the Consul in Gaul; the almost general defection of the allies; the orders sent to Asdrubal to march with his whole army to Italy, and to Mago, another of Hannibal's brothers, to carry thither twelve thousand foot, fifteen hundred horse, and twenty elephants: add to this the new treaty of Philip upon the point of sending a fleet of two hundred sail against them, and to attack them with all his forces by sea and land: I repeat it, when we unite all these circumstances, which might, and even, morally speaking, must have concurred together, so wisely were the measures concerted, does not the ruin of Rome seem absolutely inevitable, and can we believe but that her end is just at hand? But, if this be so, what becomes of the clear and evident prediction of her future greatness laid down in the Scriptures? Is it difficult for the Almighty to dispel all these dangers, and to make them entirely vanish? And this is what happens. The moment Asdrubal is upon the point of setting out, a battle judiciously fought and gained by the Scipios, stops him short. The news of this blow carried to Carthage, prevents Mago's voyage. The taking of Philip's Ambassadors disconcerts all the designs of that new enemy. We shall see, that Rome, in the midst of all these storms, retains a tranquillity and constancy, that have something prodigious in them. But let us go on with the history.

On the report made by Mammula, that was re-^{A. R. 537.}
turned from his government of Sardinia, of the state ^{Ant. C.}
of that province, of the sickness of Q. Mucius his ^{215.}
successor, of the disposition of the inhabitants to a ^{Liv. xxiii.}
general revolt, and of the rumour of an approaching ^{34.}
irruption of the Carthaginians, the Senators ordered
Q. Fulvius Flaccus to levy five thousand foot, and
four hundred horse, and to make that legion set out
immediately for Sardinia, under such a General as he
should think fit to chuse, to command it and the
other troops already in the province, till Q. Mucius's
health should be re-established. This commission was
given to T. Manlius Torquatus, who had been twice
Consul and Censor, and had subjected the Sardinians
in his first Consulship. Almost at the same time, the
fleet which the Carthaginians sent under the command
of Asdrubal the Bald, having met with a dreadful
storm, was driven on shore at the islands Baleares. All
the crews had suffered exceedingly, and the bodies of
the ships had been so violently shattered, that they
were obliged to draw them on shore, and to employ
a very considerable length of time in refitting them.

To return to Italy, as the battle of Cannæ had ^{Liv. xxiii.}
much reduced the strength of the Romans, and the ^{35—37.}
voluptuousness of Capua had softened the courage of
the Carthaginians, the war was carried on no longer
with the same vigour. The Campanians undertook
to subject the people of Cumæ to their yoke. They
at first employed solicitations, to induce them to
quit the party of the Romans. But not being able
to succeed by that method, they had recourse to stra-
tagem, in order to surprize them. They invited the
Senate of Cumæ to a sacrifice, which was to be made
in the little city of Hama, where the Senate was to
be present. The people of Cumæ suspected some
treachery; however, they did not fail to accept the of-
fer, with the view of making the Campanians fall
into their own snare. They immediately gave advice
of what passed to Sempronius, who at that time in-
camped near I. iterum, and caused him to be told,

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that not only the Senate, but the people and army of Capua, would be at the sacrifice. The Consul ordered them to remove all their effects out of the country into the city, and to keep themselves shut up within the walls. As to him, the evening before the sacrifice, he began his march to approach Cumæ, which was but three miles from Hama. The Campanians were already assembled there in great numbers. The ceremony was to last three days. It began in the evening, and ended before midnight. Sempronius believed this the time for attacking the Campanians. Accordingly he set out about two hours before the setting of the sun, and arriving at Hama, in great silence about midnight, he entered at once through all the gates of the camp of the Campanians, which he found much neglected, as happens with people, who, after having eat and drank plentifully, are very sleepy. Most of them were killed, some in their beds, where they were in a manner buried in sleep; and the rest as they returned unarmed from the sacrifice. The Campanians lost above two thousand men in this nocturnal slaughter, with their chief Marius Alfius. Thirty-four colours were taken. Sempronius did not lose an hundred soldiers, and remained master of the camp.

After having plundered it, he retired hastily to Cumæ, apprehending that Hannibal, who was incamped upon the mountain Tifata above Capua, might come to attack him. Accordingly, on the first rumour of this surprize, he set out, and marched with abundance of expedition towards Hama, persuading himself, that he should find the Romans still there, and that an army composed chiefly of raw soldiers, and even slaves, blinded by their success, would amuse themselves with taking the spoils of the enemy, and with gathering the plunder. But, whatever diligence he had used, he found no enemies at Hama, where he saw only the traces of the defeat of his allies, and the earth strewed with their dead bodies.

The next day he besieged Sempronius in Cumæ; nor did this enterprize succeed better. The besieged defended themselves with intrepid valour. Seeing one of Hannibal's towers placed against the walls, they set it on fire, by means of abundance of torches, which they threw into it all at once. This fire put the enemy into confusion. The Romans immediately sallied through two of the gates of the city at once, and repulsed the Carthaginians as far as their camp with such vigour, that Hannibal, and not the Consul, seemed that day to be besieged. About thirteen hundred Carthaginians were killed in this action; and fifty-nine were taken alive. Sempronius did not stay till the enemy had recovered themselves from their consternation, to sound the retreat, and draw off his troops into the city. The next day, Hannibal flattering himself, that the Consul, flushed with the advantage he had gained, would offer him battle in form, drew up his army between the camp and the city. But when he saw, that the enemy contented themselves with defending their walls as usual, without hazarding any thing rashly, he returned into his camp of Tifata with the mortification and confusion of having missed his aim.

The Consul Sempronius was a General of experience, vigilant, and attentive to every thing, and shewed no less prudence than activity and valour. When the deputies of Cumæ applied to him, they found him, as I have said, at Liternum. As he had no enemy actually upon his hands, he there made his troops frequently perform exercises, in order that the new soldiers, most of whom were slaves, that had lifted voluntarily, were taught to follow their colours, and know their ranks in battle. His principal care was to keep up a good understanding amongst them. For this reason, to prevent quarrels, he ordered his Lieutenant and the Tribunes expressly to forbid the soldiers to reproach any one with his former condition; and that all of them, old soldiers and new, freemen and slaves, should consent to be treated in

A. R. 537. the same manner. He represented to them, that they
 Ant. C. ought to think * all those, to whom the Common-
 215. wealth had confided her arms and ensigns, were suffi-
 ciently honourable. That the same reason, which
 had obliged them to act in this manner, required,
 that they should support what they had done." The
 soldiers were no less careful to conform to these wise
 admonitions, than the officers to give them; and so
 great a concord was soon seen to take place in this
 army, that the condition from which each was taken
 to be made a soldier, was in a manner entirely forgot.

At the same time, that Sempronius Gracchus made
 Hannibal raise the siege of Cumæ, another Sempro-
 nius, surnamed Longus, gained a battle in Lucania
 against Hanno, in which he killed him two thousand
 men, with the loss of only three hundred, and took
 one and forty ensigns. M. Valerius the Prætor re-
 took three cities of the Hirpini, that had revolted
 from the Romans.

Liv. xxiii.
 38.

Whilst these things passed, the five galleys, that
 carried to Rome the Ambassadors of Philip, and
 those of Hannibal, that had been taken prisoners, af-
 ter having coasted almost all Italy from the Adriatic
 gulf to the Tuscan sea, passed almost opposite to Cu-
 mæ. Sempronius, who did not know whether those
 ships belonged to the Commonwealth or to the enemy,
 detached some of his fleet after them, to know who
 they were. From the questions and answers, that
 passed on both sides, Valerius, who commanded the
 five galleys, learnt that one of the Consuls was at Cu-
 mæ. He immediately entered the port of that city,
 and delivered the prisoners in his custody to Sempro-
 nius, with Hannibal's letters to Philip. When the
 Consul had read them, he sealed them up again care-
 fully, and sent them by land to the Senate, ordering
 Valerius to continue his voyage by sea with his pri-
 soners. The letters and prisoners arrived at Rome

* Omnes satis honestos generosque ducerent, quibus arma sua sig-
 naque Populus Romanus commississet. Liv.

almost at the same time. When the affair had been enquired into, and the Ambassadors, that were prisoners, interrogated, their answers agreeing with what was contained in the letters, the Senators were in extreme anxiety to find, that at a time when they were scarce able to make head against Hannibal, they were upon the point of having so formidable an enemy as Philip upon their hands. But, far from suffering themselves to be discouraged by fear, they immediately deliberated upon the means for carrying the war first into Macedonia, in order to prevent that Prince from attacking them in Italy. Where do we find the like resolution and greatness of soul?

After having imprisoned the Ambassadors, and sold those of their train by auction, they decreed, that five and twenty new gallies should be fitted out, to join the twenty-five commanded by P. Valerius Flaccus. When they were in a condition to put to sea, they took with them the five that had brought the prisoners, and all together, to the number of thirty, set sail from Ostia for Tarentum. P. Valerius had orders to embark the troops, which had formerly served under Varro, and which were then under the command of the Lieutenant General Apustius in Tarentum; and with this fleet, composed of fifty ships, not only to defend the coasts of Italy, but also to enquire into the motions, that might be made on the side of Macedonia. He had orders also, in case Philip should seem to act in conformity to what the treaty and letters, found upon his Ambassadors, declared, and to the answers they had given, to give advice of it to M. Valerius, in order that the latter, leaving the command of his army to L. Apustius, might take the fleet at Tarentum to carry it immediately to Macedonia, and keep Philip in his own dominions. The money which had been sent to Appius Claudius in Sicily to pay what had been borrowed of King Hiero, was appropriated to the subsistence of the fleet, and of the troops employed in the war of Macedonia. L. Apustius caused it to be carried to Tarentum. Hiero also fur-

A. R. 537. nished two hundred thousand bushels of wheat, and an
 Ant. C. 215. hundred thousand of barley.

Whilst the Romans were employed in these preparations, the Macedonian ships, which had been taken and sent to Rome with the five of the Romans, found means to escape, and returned into Macedonia. Philip was thereby informed, that the Ambassadors had been seized with the letters they were to bring to him. But not having any knowledge of the treaty, which his Ambassadors had made with Hannibal, nor of the answer those of Hannibal were to deliver him, he dispatched a second Embassy with the same orders and the same powers. These second Ambassadors were more fortunate than the first. But the campaign ended before the King of Macedonia could undertake any thing; so important for Rome was the taking of one ship, and the Ambassadors it carried, in deferring a war for an whole year, that might, in the present conjuncture, have become fatal to her.

Fabius, after having expiated the prodigies, that disturbed the public tranquillity, passed the Vultur-nus, and having joined his Collegue, they acted in concert in the neighbourhood of Capua. Fabius retook some cities by force which had declared for Hannibal.

As to Nola, things there were in the same situation as the year before. The Senate adhered firmly to the Romans, and the People were for Hannibal. The latter carried on the plot for delivering up the city, after having massacred the principal citizens. But, to prevent the success of it, Fabius marched and occupied the post of Marcellus beyond Sueffula between Capua and Hannibal's army, which was near Tifata: and he sent Marcellus to Nola with the troops he commanded, for the preservation of that city.

Liv. xxiii.
 40, 41.

In Sardinia, T. Manlius revived the vigor of the Roman arms, which had drooped exceedingly since the illness of Q. Mucius. Manlius placed his fleet in safety in the port of Carales (now Cagliari;) and having made the Crews take arms, he joined these with

with the troops he had received from the Prætor; and formed of the whole an army of twenty thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse. He was very successful against the natives of the country, which would have terminated the war of Sardinia, if Asdrubal the Bald, with the Carthaginian Fleet, which the storm had driven upon the islands Baleares, had not arrived very opportunely to encourage the People, who were upon the point of submitting again to the Romans. Manlius had no sooner received advice of the arrival of the Carthaginian fleet, than he returned to Carales: which made it easy for Hampsicoras the General of the Sardinians to join Asdrubal. The latter, having landed his troops, and sent back his ships to Carthage, set out with Hampsicoras, who knew the country, to plunder the lands of the Roman allies. He would have advanced to Carales, if Manlius had not marched to meet him with his army, and had not put a stop to the ravages which he was making in the country. The two armies incamped at no great distance from each other: which at first occasioned frequent skirmishes, wherein both sides had the advantage alternately. They at length came to a general battle, which continued four hours. The Sardinians fought with little vigour, as usual; and the Carthaginians kept the victory in suspense during that time. They at last gave way, when they saw the army of the Sardinians routed, and the earth covered with the bodies of the slain. Manlius, having made the wing that had defeated the Sardinians, advance, surrounded them at the time they turned their backs. It was then a slaughter, rather than a battle. Twelve thousand remained upon the field, as well Carthaginians as Sardinians. About three thousand six hundred were taken, with twenty ensigns.

What made this battle the more glorious and memorable was, that Asdrubal himself, who commanded the enemy, was taken prisoner with Mago and Hanno, two persons of the first quality of Carthage. Mago was of the Barcinian family, and a near relation of

A.R. 537. Hannibal. Hanno was the author of the revolt of the
 Ant. C. Sardinians, and consequently of the war which had
 215. ensued. The Sardinian Generals also made this victory of the Romans the more glorious by their disgrace. For Hioftus, the son of Hampficoras, was killed in the battle; and Hampficoras, who had escaped by flight with a small number of horse, had no sooner heard of his son's death, which compleated his misfortunes, than he killed himself.

Cornus, the capital city of the district where the battle was fought, served for a retreat to the rest. But Manlius having invested it with his victorious army, made himself master of it in some days. By the example of Cornus, the other cities, which had joined Hampficoras, and the Carthaginians, sent him hostages, and surrendered to him. After having exacted money and provisions from each of them, according to their power, he retired to Carales with his army. He there made his soldiers embark on board the ships, which he had left in the port, and returned to Rome. Having informed the Senate of the reduction of Sardinia, he delivered the money he had brought away to the Questors or Treasurers, the provisions that remained to the Ædiles, and the prisoners to the Prætor Fulvius.

At the same time T. Otacilius, having sailed from Lilybæum into Africa with his fleet, ravaged the country of the Carthaginians, and from thence, steering his course towards Sardinia, whither it was said Asdrubal was lately gone from the islands Baleares; he met his fleet returning to Africa; and after a slight battle, took seven ships, with the soldiers and mariners on board. Fear dispersed the rest, like a storm.

Bomilcar was more successful. He landed at Locris with a recruit of four thousand soldiers, and forty elephants, and with all sorts of provisions, which he brought from Carthage for the army of Hannibal.

Marcellus, who had been sent to Nola by the Consul Fabius, did not remain idle there. He made incursions into the countries of the Hirpini and Samnites of Caudium; and put all to fire and sword in such a manner, that he made those people call to mind the ravages they had suffered in their wars with the Romans. In this extremity they sent deputies to Hannibal to implore his aid.

The chief of the Embassy, "after having mentioned the wars, which they had in former times sustained during almost an hundred years with the Romans, and boasted the ardor and fidelity of their attachment to Hannibal, added," "We believed that we had nothing to fear from the anger of the Romans, as long as we should have so powerful and successful a General as you for our protector and friend. And notwithstanding, whilst you are not only victorious and triumphant, but being present in person, can hear the cries and groans of our wives and children, and see the fires that consume our houses, we have undergone all this summer, and still actually suffer such dreadful ravages, that it seems to be Marcellus, and not Hannibal, that gained the battle of Cannæ. We in former times withstood Consuls and Dictators with numerous armies: but now we are the prey of an handful of soldiers, scarce sufficient to defend the city of Nola, where they are in garrison. If our youth, that now serve in your army were in their country, they could defend it well against these robbers, that ran to and fro in small bodies with as much negligence and security, as if they were walking in the fields about Rome. Send a small number of Numidians against them, which will suffice to over-power them. You undoubtedly will not refuse your protection and support to those, whom you have not thought unworthy of your amity and alliance." Hannibal replied obligingly, "That he would soon put it out of the power of the Romans to hurt them. Then reminding them in emphatical terms of his past exploits, he assured them, that

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42, 43.

A. R. 537. that as the battle of Thrasymenus had been more glorious than that of Trebia, and the victory of Cannæ had afterwards eclipsed that of Thrasymenus; so, ere long, he would make that of Cannæ be forgot by one still more bloody and more famous." After having spoke in this manner to them, he dismissed them with great presents. Accordingly, having left a small number of soldiers to guard the camp at Tifata, he marched with the rest of his army towards Nola, assuring himself of an easy victory, from what his allies had told him, concerning the weakness and negligence of Marcellus.

Liv. xxiii. Hanno at the same time quitted the country of the
43—46. Brutii, and repaired towards Nola with the soldiers and elephants, which Bomilcar had brought Hannibal, who was incamped not far from that city, having examined every thing with abundance of care, perceived that his allies had only made false reports, and told him things quite otherwise than they really were. For Marcellus acted with great prudence, not coming out to plunder the country without a strong body of troops, and till he had sent scouts to view the neighbouring places, and provided for a retreat in case of being attacked: and lastly, with the same precautions, as if he had been to engage with Hannibal himself. And on the present occasion, he kept his soldiers close within the city.

Hannibal having attempted in vain to corrupt the fidelity of the Senators of Nola, drew up his troops round the place, with design to attack it on all sides at once. Marcellus seeing him near the walls, made a vigorous salley. The Carthaginians were at first put into disorder, and some of them were killed. But they rallied, and the forces being become equal on both sides, they began to fight with great ardor and animosity. The action had been one of the most memorable, if a violent storm, that came on suddenly attended with heavy rains, had not obliged the combatants to separate. About thirty Carthaginians were killed in this attack: Marcellus did not lose one
man.

man. The rain continued all night, and great part of the next morning.

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The third day Hannibal sent out part of his troops to forage. Marcellus immediately marched out with his army in order of battle, and Hannibal did not decline fighting. It was about a thousand paces between his camp and the city. In this space, which was part of a great plain, that surrounded the city on all sides, they fought. Both armies raised great cries at first, which made those of the Carthaginian foragers that were not far off, rejoin their army soon after the battle began. The inhabitants of Nola offered also to join the Romans: but Marcellus, having praised their zeal, ordered them to form a body of reserve, to assist him in case of need, and in the mean time to content themselves, with carrying off the wounded from the press, without fighting, unless he gave them the signal.

It was doubtful for which side victory would declare. Both sides, animated by the speeches and example of their Generals, fought with the utmost ardor. Marcellus represented to his troops, " That if they acted with any vigor, they would soon defeat troops they had already overcome three days before; that had very lately been driven from before Cumæ (by the Consul Sempronius) and that himself, though with other soldiers, had beaten and put to flight the preceding year before Nola. That all the forces of the Carthaginians were not together, a great part of them being dispersed about the country to plunder. That those who fought were soldiers of no force and vigour, enervated by the pleasures of Capua, where they had passed the whole winter in all kinds of excess and debauch. That they had utterly lost that courage and force, with which they had overcome all the difficulties of passing the Alps and Pyrenees. That they were only the remains of those first Carthaginians: that they had scarce retained sufficient vigor to sustain the weight of their bodies and arms. That

Capua

A. R. 537. * Capua had been to the Carthaginians what Cannæ
 Ant. C. was to the Romans. That it was there, that Hanni-
 215. bal had lost the valour of his soldiers, the vigour of
 military discipline, the glory he had acquired by his
 past actions, and all the hopes he had conceived for
 the time to come."

Whilst Marcellus, to raise the courage of his people, depreciated the Carthaginians, Hannibal himself reproached them in a much rougher manner. "I see
 " here," said he, " the same colours, and the same
 " arms, as at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannæ:
 " but I do not see the same soldiers. How! can you
 " scarce sustain the charge of a single legion, and a
 " small body of Latines, commanded by a Roman
 " Lieutenant, you, whom two Consuls, and two con-
 " sular armies, could not withstand? This is the se-
 " cond time that Marcellus, with new raised men
 " and the burghers of Nola, has come to attack us
 " with impunity. What is become of that Cartha-
 " ginian, who cut off the Consul Flaminius's head,
 " after having unhorsed him? What is become of
 " him, that killed L. Paulus after the battle of Can-
 " næ? Are your swords blunted, are your arms be-
 " numbed? What! you used without difficulty to
 " conquer armies much more numerous than your
 " own; now, when you have the advantage of num-
 " ber, are you not able to withstand an handful of
 " soldiers? Brave only with your tongues, you brag
 " that you would take Rome, if you were only led to
 " its walls. The enterprize in question is much less
 " difficult. The proof to which I this day put your
 " courage and force, is to take Nola. This city is
 " situated in the midst of a plain, and has neither
 " river, nor sea, to defend it. Carry it by storm;
 " and when you are enriched with the plunder of so
 " opulent a place, I'll lead you, or I'll follow you,
 " wheresoever you please."

* Capuam Annibali Cannas fuisse. Ibi virtutem bellicam, ibi mili-
 tarem disciplinam, ibi præteriti temporis famam, ibi spem futuram
 extinctam. Liv.

Neither

Neither reproaches, nor praises, could inspire them with courage. They gave way on all sides, and as the natural bravery of the Romans increased every moment, as well from the exhortations and praises of their General, as the applauses given them by the people of Nola from the walls, the Carthaginians openly fled, and retired full of terror into their camp. The victorious Romans immediately prepared to attack them in it. But Marcellus made them draw off into the city, where they were received with exceeding joy and great acclamations, even by the People, who till then had inclined to the side of the Carthaginians.

A. R. 537
Ant. C.
215.

The Romans killed this day more than five thousand of the enemy, took six hundred prisoners, nineteen colours, and two elephants, of which four were killed in the field of battle. Marcellus did not lose a thousand men. The next day there was a tacit truce, during which they buried their dead. Marcellus burnt the spoils of the enemy in honour of Vulcan, to whom he had promised to sacrifice them.

The third day after the battle, twelve hundred and seventy-two of the Spanish and Numidian horse, either through discontent for some bad treatment they had received, or in hopes of serving more to their advantage under the Romans, went over from Hannibal's camp to Marcellus. Nothing of this kind had yet happened to Hannibal. For though his army was composed of many barbarous nations, and all as different in their manners as languages, he had however kept up a good understanding and strict union between them. These horse served the Romans afterwards with abundance of zeal and fidelity. When the war was over, each of them had settlements and lands given them in their own countries, as a reward for their services. Hannibal, having sent back Hanno into the country of the Bruttii with the troops he brought from thence, went to winter in Apulia, and incamped in the neighbourhood of Arpi.

A. R. 537.
Ant. C.
215.

Q. Fabius was no sooner informed, that Hannibal was set out for Apulia, than he caused corn to be brought from Nola and Naples into his camp at Sueffula; and having fortified it, he left a sufficient number of troops in it to guard it during the winter. As to himself, he went towards Capua, and put the whole country to fire and sword. The inhabitants, who did not much rely upon their forces, quitted their walls however, but did not remove far from them, and posted themselves near the city in a well fortified camp. They had a body of six thousand bad infantry. Their cavalry was better, for which reason they made use of it to harass the enemy.

Liv. xxiii.
46, 47.

Jubellius Taurea held the first rank amongst the most distinguished by their birth and bravery in the Capuan Cavalry; so that, when he served in the Roman armies, only the Roman, Claudius Asellus, was capable of being compared with him. He spurred his horse towards the Roman squadrons; and having long fought Asellus with his eyes, as he saw they were disposed to hear him, he asked aloud where Claudius Asellus was? why after so many disputes in words about their bravery, did he not come in arms to decide the quarrel? "Why does not he shew himself," said the proud Campanian, "either to give me the glory of overcoming him, or to acquire a glorious victory himself?" Claudius having been informed of this defiance, delayed answering, only till he had got the General's permission to accept it. He then armed immediately, and advancing out of the gates of the camp, called Taurea by his name, and told him he was ready to fight him where he pleased.

The Romans had already quitted their camp in a throng to see this combat; and on the side of the Campanians, not only their intrenchments, but the walls of the city were covered with spectators: the two champions then, after having exchanged some words of defiance, fell upon each other lance in hand. But, as they were in the plain, and could manage their horses as they would, they avoided each other's strokes,

strokes, and the combat continued a great while without any wounds on either side. The Campanian then said, "This will be a combat of horses, and not of men, unless we go down into this hollow narrow way; there, as we shall not have room to separate, we may come to close fight." He had scarce said this but Claudius spurred his horse into that way. But Jubellius, braver in words than actions, * "See, (said he) the As in the ditch," a proverb then used; and immediately retired and disappeared. Claudius returned into the plain, and after having rode round several turns without finding his enemy, he reproached Jubellius with cowardice as victor, and went back into the camp in the midst of the applauses of the whole Roman army.

A. R. 537.
Ant. C.
215.

Both sides remained quiet; and the Consul even removed his camp farther off, in order to give the Campanians time to sow, and committed no waste upon their lands, till the corn was sufficiently grown for forage. He then caused it to be cut, and carried into his camp at Sueffula, which he put into a condition to serve the troops for winter-quarters.

He ordered the Pre-consul Marcellus to keep only as many soldiers at Nola, as were necessary to guard the place, and to send the rest to Rome, in order that they might not be a burthen either to the allies or the Commonwealth.

Sempronius, having led his legions from Cumæ to Luceria in Apulia, sent the Prætor M. Valerius from thence with the army he had at Luceria, and gave him orders to defend the coast of Sallentum, to provide all things, and to take all the measures necessary for being well upon his guard against Philip King of Macedonia.

Towards the end of the campaign, letters arrived from the two Scipios, in which they gave an account

Liv. xxiii.

48.

* This is not entirely the sense of the Latin. The usual sense of this proverb is not easy to be applied here. Taurea, by the word Cantherium, which comes from *κάνθηρος*, as, alludes to the Roman's fir-name, Asellus.

A. R. 537.
Ant. C.
215.

of the good success of their arms in Spain ; but they added, that the armies, both by sea and land, were in want of money, cloaths, and provisions. That if there was no money in the public treasury, they would find some means to raise it among the Spaniards : but that it was absolutely necessary to send them the rest from Rome, without which they must not rely, that it was possible to preserve either the army, or the province. After these letters had been read, every body agreed both in respect to the reality of the wants, and the necessity of providing for them : but at the same time they reflected on the number of troops both by sea and land they were to keep up, and the new fleet it would soon be necessary to fit out, if they were obliged to make war with Philip. “ That Sicily and Sardinia, which paid tribute before the war, scarce supplied enough to support the armies that defended them. That indeed the taxes laid on the Roman citizens and the allies of Italy, had hitherto supplied extraordinary expences : but that the number of those upon whom this money was raised, was exceedingly diminished by the loss of the great armies, that had been defeated at Thrasymenus and Cannæ ; and that if the small number, that had survived those defeats, should be overburthened, it would be entirely crushing and destroying them in a different manner. That therefore, unless the Commonwealth could find resources in the generosity of those who should voluntarily lend it, it was not in a condition to subsist by the sums actually in its coffers. That the Prætor Fulvius should assemble the People, * make known to them the wants of the State, and exhort such of them as had acquired riches in the enterprizes they had shared in, to assist the Commonwealth with what they had gained, not by sacrificing to it what they should so advance, but by giving it time to repay the sums, and to take upon them to supply the army in Spain with

* Indicandas populo publicas necessitates, cohortandosque, qui redempturis auxissent patrimonia, ut reipublicæ, ex qua crevissent, tempus commodarent. Liv.

the things it had occasion for, upon condition of being reimbursed first of all, as soon as money should come into the public treasury." A. R. 537.
Ant. C.
215.

The Prætor made these remonstrances in the full assembly, and set the day, when he would make the agreement with such as would undertake to supply the armies and fleet in Spain with cloaths, provisions, and the other things they wanted. When the day arrived, nineteen citizens came in three companies, who, in order to their undertaking this, demanded two conditions: the first was, to be exempt from serving in the troops as long as this contract should subsist; the second, that the Commonwealth should charge itself with all the losses which their ships should sustain either from storms or the enemy. Both being granted, they accepted the conditions. Thus the money of private persons supplied all the occasions of the publick. Such were the manners of these happy times. * The same spirit of generosity and love for their country, equally animated all orders of the State, and inspired the whole people with a lively and ardent zeal for the safety and glory of the Commonwealth. Liv. xxiii.
49.

The contractors, at least in the beginning, shewed no less exactness and fidelity in supplying all that was necessary, than they had courage and confidence in taking it upon them; and the troops were clothed and subsisted, as well as they could have been in times when the coffers of the Commonwealth were full. When these convoys arrived, Asdrubal, Mago, and Amilcar the son of Bomilcar, were besieging the city Illiturgis, which had declared for the Romans. The Scipios passed through the midst of these three camps with great efforts, and a great slaughter of those who endeavoured to oppose them: and after having thrown into the city of their allies such provisions as they wanted, and exhorted them to defend their walls with the same courage they had seen the Romans fight for their Ibid.

* Hi mores, eaque caritas patriæ per omnes ordines velut tenore uno pertinebat. Liv.

A. R. 537. service, they marched to force Asdrubal's camp, which
 Ant. C. 215. was the most considerable of the three. The two other
 Carthaginian Generals, seeing all at stake here, march-
 ed immediately to his aid with their two armies. Ac-
 cordingly all having quitted their camps, there were
 sixty thousand combatants against the Romans, who
 were only sixteen thousand men. However, the vic-
 tory was so little doubtful, that the Romans killed
 more of the enemy, than they had soldiers in their
 army, took three thousand prisoners, with fifty-nine
 ensigns. Besides this, five elephants were killed, and
 the conquerors made themselves masters of the three
 camps.

The Carthaginians being obliged to abandon Illitur-
 gis, went to reduce Intibili, after having recruited
 their armies with the subjects of the province, who
 were always ready to list, provided there was any
 thing to be got in war; besides which the country at
 that time abounded with young men. On this occa-
 sion there was another battle with the same success as
 the former. The Carthaginians lost thirteen thousand
 men in the action; and above two thousand were
 taken, with forty-two ensigns, and nine elephants.
 At this time almost all the States of Spain went over
 to the Romans; and this year much greater actions
 passed in that province, than in Italy.

liv. xxiv. As soon as Hanno returned from Campania into the
 country of the Bruttii, with the advice and assistance
 of the natives, he endeavoured to bring over the
 Grecian cities that continued to adhere to the Romans.
 The Bruttii, who had flattered themselves with the
 hopes of plundering Locri and Rhegium, not satisfied
 with being disappointed, went with their own forces to
 besiege Croton, intending to carry that city, and to
 make themselves masters of it in their own name.
 Croton had formerly been a powerful city: but since
 the wars of Pyrrhus, it was much fallen from its an-
 tient opulence. Six miles from the place was the
 celebrated temple of Juno Lacinia, more famous than
 the city itself, and for which all the people had an
 extreme

extreme veneration. Amongst abundance of other riches, there was in it a pillar of massy gold. These riches, as well as those of the city, were a great allure-ment to the Bruttii; and the discord between the inhabitants gave them hopes that their enterprize would be successful. At Croton, as in almost all the other cities of Italy, the Senate continued faithful to the Romans, and the multitude was inclined to make an alliance with the Carthaginians. The People having delivered up the town to the Bruttii, the principal persons of Croton retired into the citadel, which was very strong. The Bruttii, concluding that they could not take it by force, had recourse to Hanno, who prevailed upon the besieged to consent to be transported to Locri.

The Romans and Carthaginians, who were then in Apulia, did not continue quiet, even during the winter. The Consul Sempronius was incamped at Luceria, and Hannibal not far from Arpi. According as either side found occasion, skirmishes passed frequently enough, in effect of which the Romans became more warlike every day, and at the same time more prudent, in avoiding all ambuscades that might be laid for them.

END of the THIRD VOLUME.

Cleaned & Oiled

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